by Livia Kohn
“the mind of humanity” from the Shangshu (Book of History): In the midst of phenomena, there is still nonbeing; there is nothing called nonbeing outside of phenomena. The wonder of nonbeing is active throughout phenomena; there is no way one can dispense with nonbeing and be able to function among phenomena. The unity of nonbeing and phenomena is very wondrous—big, it is heaven and earth; minute, it is every individual being; condensed, it is part of every human mind—it pervades them all. ( Laozi yi 11)
This, in turn, lays the foundation for Wang’s basic understanding of existence. He states:
The Dao cannot but bring forth the One, the One cannot but bring forth the Two, and similarly the Two bringing forth the Three, the Three bringing forth the myriad beings—all these circumstances exist on their own without any input. Similarly heaven and earth cannot but be regular—how much more should this apply to human beings? Thus uncarved material cannot but be broken up and made into vessels, just as the sages cannot just keep the Dao to themselves and never apply it.
And as they apply it, they use nonbeing to control phenomena; holding on to the old, they manage the present. ( Laozi yi 28)
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As Wang, therefore, thinks about going beyond ordinary, concrete phenomena to reach the Dao at the depth of the mind, he yet finds that he cannot entirely let go of concrete objects. To find a bridge between the two, he again turns to the Laozi.7
The Aims of the Laozi yi and Wang’s Overall Thinking Throughout his Laozi yi, as well as in certain other works and essays, Wang Dao tries to capture both the moment of transcendence when one leaps from concrete phenomena to the Dao within the mind, and the moment of attachment when one is involved with concrete phenomena. His main foci are the pursuit of transcending the mind’s individual and concrete morality and the search for the underlying, unchanging mental substance at its base. He grapples with this issue by reflecting on and criticizing theories of mind that had gone before him.
For example, about Mencius’s thesis that human nature is good, he says: Mencius says that human nature is good, and places it on a higher level than do Xunzi and Yang Xiong. But Mencius never approaches an explanation of why human nature is good, and when he says that it is, he merely points to inherent human feelings. Now, human nature may be basically good and without evil, yet one’s inherent feelings are a combination of both good and evil. Here, then, is the reason why the two masters [Xunzi and Yang Zhu] dared to voice a contrary position and disagree with Mencius. . . . ( Wenlu 4, “Zisi”)
Mencius’s error is in generalizing about nature when he is really talking about feelings. Along the same lines, he also criticizes the concept of the “pure knowledge of the good” ( liangzhi ) of Wang Yangming. He states:
Using the idea of “pure knowledge of the good” and applying it to Confucius would be as erroneous as looking at the sun when it is partly obstructed by clouds. [For Wang Yangming,] “Pure knowledge of the good” is no more than the activation of one’s personal feelings, but its existence at the moment before that activation remains doubtful.
For Mencius, the “pure knowledge of the good” was his concept of the Four Sprouts [of virtue], which he located in the place where the feelings were first activated. . . . [Wang] Yangming similarly suggests this is the basic substance of the sage, entirely missing the point. ( Wenlu 6,
“Yangming”)
Here, the feelings that arise from Mencius’s “Four Sprouts” and the power of moral judgment deriving from Wang Yangming’s concept of
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the pure knowledge of the good are both criticized for operating at the level of a mind already developed. The level of nature’s response to external objects is not that of the deepest substance of the mind.
The most fundamental basis of human nature, on the other hand, is the pre-active, quiescent, soundless, and formless substance, which Wang sees as the quality of “utmost good” ( zhishan) on which all humans must depend.
Attaining this quality is a matter of practice, and accordingly, Wang Dao’s cultivation begins with immersion in the depth of a tranquil and restful mind. This approach stands in stark opposition to the standard Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi with its emphasis on the “investigation of things” ( gewu), a more outside focused inquiry that involved an active mind. Yet Wang Dao’s cultivation is also different from the notion of the utter mental immersion associated with Wang Yangming (see Wenlu 6, “Response to Zhu”). He finds both outside inquiry and sole reliance on the inner mind insufficient.8 Instead, practitioners of self-cultivation should give up their grasp on principle as it resides in concrete, individual things and affairs and instead depend on their quality of utmost good as the basic substance of the mind. At the same time, without separating from concrete affairs, they should accord with the Dao in the mind and find principle there. They should not “from their minds proceed to affairs, from principle proceed to the mind.” Rather, they should “use the basic substance of the mind to echo outside things, and use affairs to penetrate principle” ( Wenlu 7, “Preface presented to Zhou Daotong”).
Just as principle follows the “pathways of vital energy” ( qi), and as the Dao is linked to the “never ending movement of vital energy,” so too human nature is explained through the concept of vital energy.
In this way, Wang Dao’s thought is intimately linked with the tradition of “vital energy centered thinking.” This also explains his strong focus, again and again, on outside things and affairs. However, the same pattern as it applies to principle, Dao, and human nature is not related with complete consistency to his overall cosmology, which proposes the unity of humanity’s basic substance with that of the universe and demands that people transcend external things to attain this basic substance.
Wang Dao himself was conscious of this inconsistency and tried to resolve it by resorting to two notions: the oneness of Dao and vital energy as found in the commentaries to the Yijing (Book of Changes), and the transcendence through the Dao as proposed in the Laozi. He tries to clarify his position in this way:
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The theories of the sages and worthies are not identical; they may be direct or remote, shallow or profound. “One yin, one yang—that is the Dao” is a way [for the Yijing] to speak about the flow of the Dao. Laozi, on the other hand, says: “The Dao brought forth the One, the One brought forth the Two.” Master Zhou [Dunyi] states: “There was the Non-Ultimate, and then there was the Great Ultimate. The Great Ultimate moved and created yang.” . . . Yet all these different formulations point to the moment of origin of the Dao. . . .
Laozi says one thing, and Master Zhou says another. When the “Great Commentary” [to the Yijing] says how the Dao relates to yin and yang this is the same as [when Laozi speaks of] the two coming from the One.
When the [ Yijing says] that “goodness comes from these,” this is the same as [when Laozi speaks of] the two bringing forth the three. When the [ Yijing says] that “nature comes from their completion,” this is the same as [when Laozi speaks of] the three bringing forth the myriad beings. Putting them all together like this, their various levels of direct and remote, shallow and profound can be clarified in one system.
( Wenlu 4, “Xun Qing”)
This means that Wang Dao took the notion of the Dao as presented in the Yijing and linked it with the idea of virtue in the Laozi to explain the structure of things on the lower level of ordinary affairs, but maintains that this Dao is on a lower level than the deep and remote Dao in the Laozi. The problem of the inconsistency in his thought is resolved by his proposal of two different levels and understandings of the Dao. Presenting the term in these two ways, he tries to preserve the unity and integrity of his philosophical system, but is not ultimately successful. In the end, to resolve the tension between the two tendencies of either transcending through the Dao or working with outside things and affairs, he does not give up on either, but rather
emphasizes one or the other in different parts of his writings.
Wang Dao’s Thought Relative to Confucianism and Daoism
In what category, then, should Wang Dao be placed? As with Xue Hui, Wang Dao’s social position was such that he passed the civil service examination, and while serving as a high offical he advocated the harmony of the three teachings. Should he be called a Confucian, a Daoist, or a Buddhist? Or, alternatively, simply an advocate of the integration of the three teachings?
There are several classical perspectives from which one may approach questions of categorization or identification of thought or re-
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ligion. First, we may categorize people according to the terms they themselves use to describe their thought or religion. Another perspective relies on the standard way in which those around them, in their society or country, categorize or identify their thought. A third perspective is that of outside observers, who may establish standard categories based on the content of their thought. These three perspectives are sometimes used in tandem but, ideally, should be kept separate.
Wang Dao was not exclusively dedicated to any one of the three teachings, so it is not possible to categorize his thought on such grounds. On the other hand, we do have the evaluations of his contemporaries and heirs. For example, Lin Wenjun said that he was “one who talked about the Sage’s [i.e., Confucius’s] learning” ( Fangzhai cungao 3, “Preface presented to Mr. Wang”); Yan Song said he “deeply immersed himself in the Study of Principle”; and You Qi called him “the Confucian founder of the generation.” To be sure, these are evaluations of people whose basic research was into Confucian thought.
At the same time, the epilogue to the Ronghui sanjiao (Merging the Three Teachings) describes Wang Dao as a theorist who tried to unify the three teachings. From the perspective of content, it is indeed possible to see his establishment of Buddhism and Daoism at a level as high as Confucianism as an effort to integrate the three teachings.
However, standard Neo-Confucian concepts such as principle, vital energy, mind, and nature framed his thought. Thus it seems most appropriate to approach Wang Dao’s ideas as if they were a development and transformation of Confucian thought.
Pursuing the question in this manner, it is not easy to reconcile the various perspectives on Wang Dao into one coherent identification, mainly because the labels of the contemporaneous schools are problematic in themselves. Conventional wisdom has it that the standard Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi, the Wang Yangming school, and the School of Evidentiary Scholarship ( kaozheng xue) are all part of Confucianism, and they certainly all identify themselves as such. When thinkers like Wang Dao enter the picture, however, the lines blur, and demarcation becomes complicated. Therefore, if the question of what is Confucianism—or, for that matter, Daoism—is to be answered historically, then self-identifications, identifications made by those surrounding them, and identifications made according to their essential doctrinal elements all need to be taken into account. It will then be possible to carry out new investigations, with new perspectives and criteria, into the question of categories.
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Similarly, one can find suggestions here regarding the difficulties inherent in deciding what it is that we call Daoism. In short, deciding what is and is not Daoism necessitates straightening out the complexities and contradictions inherent in the various perspectives from which identification is approached. The term “Daoism,” once such an approach is used, turns out to capture a number of vaguely formed entities. This holds especially true in the case of the two categories of daojia and daojiao. Regarding the perspectives of self-identification and identification by state and society, there was no way to identify what was and was not called Daoism in the Song and later periods because no sect or school became the exclusive basis for a definition. Daoists were additionally subject to the pressure of Confucian officials, and it was the latter who generally wielded the power to recognize divisions of thinking. So even for the Daoists’ own statements with regard to the question of what is Daoism, the gaze of the high officials and the state was decisively influential. That was the case for the majority of people who identified themselves as Daoists in traditional Chinese society. Thus, based on the contradictions inherent in such a self-identification, especially in terms of how the high officials and state defined “Daoism,” pursuing this issue in order to decide on the reality of the “Daoism” that existed in Chinese society at the time may be said to be important work. However, it seems that few people have concentrated on the importance of the perspectives of the “non-Daoists”
in questions of Daoist identity. Therefore, I think the issue of what daojia and daojiao are, once three-dimensional work on it begins to progress further, is a question that should be answered inductively.
Wang Dao’s Thought among His Contemporaries
The dual nature of Wang Dao’s thought is a characteristic that sets him apart from his Ming-dynasty contemporaries. Unlike him, early Ming thinkers and scholar-officials were entirely focused on the study of principle in the wake of Zhu Xi, following him in different formulations yet without any real modification in ideas. Among mid-Ming philosophers there were more thinkers opposed to Zhu Xi, and in the early sixteenth century the study of the mind of Wang Yangming began.
Wang Dao has points in common with both these currents. To begin, he does not follow Zhu Xi’s emphasis on reverence and pursuit of principle but criticizes his methods as a fossilization of personal activity and sees in them an invitation to the development of counterfeit goodness. In contrast, he proposes a focus on the mind within and a search
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for the true nature that links human beings with the single vital energy, the basic substance of the cosmos.9 His main method here is transcendence through the Dao, by which one’s unwavering concrete nature can be found. From this position, then, people are able to suitably go along with all manner of circumstances and outer affairs. In the latter perspective, Wang Dao shares a perspective begun by Chen Xianzhang and Wang Yangming,10 maintaining a strong focus on outside things while at the same time emphasizing their ultimate oneness with the underlying Dao. The latter’s concept of the unity of knowledge and action, Zhan Ruoshui’s categorization of the investigation of things as a form of action, and the various proposals of the study of vital energy as represented by Wang Tingxiang and Luo Qinshun all exerted a certain influence on Wang Dao’s thought.
Rather than listing all the different perspectives of Ming thinkers reflected by Wang, I would like to focus on the specific notions that he has in common with the philosophy of Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui, his two main teachers. We begin with the points shared by all three. Starting with Wang Yangming’s doctrines of pure knowledge of the good, I find that his ideas are clearly present in the two tendencies of Wang Dao’s thought discussed above. In Mingru xue’an 42, Huang Zongxi has shown how Wang Dao’s concept of transcendence through the Dao is linked directly with that of Wang Yangming. While little is known of the intellectual influences on Wang Dao prior to his studies with Wang Yangming, it is clear that the latter was the major influence on the former in the early part of the development of his ideas.
Another major influence on Wang Dao was his later teacher Zhan Ruoshui, a thinker with significantly different ideas from those of Wang Yangming (see Qiao 1993). A student of Chen Xianzhang, Zhan was critical of his teacher’s practice of quiet-sitting and of the notion that one could find the basic substance of the mind in it, but was also strongly influenced by him. Part of that influence was a strong rejection of Zhu Xi’s idea of the universality of principle to be discovered in all things, as well as the understanding that upright principle manifested itself in the mind when it corresponded with affairs. Zhan Ruoshui developed a theory of self-cultivation he described as “pursuing suitable embodiment to recognize heaven’s principle” (see Mingru xue’an 37). Zhan he
re finds a solution to the basic questions concerning self-cultivation by referring to the experience of the basic substance of the mind within oneself, but he also links this introspective approach with Zhu Xi’s investigation of things, stating that “investigation means
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attainment” and that it “points to reaching creation, . . . proceeding together in study and reflection.” Thus knowing and acting (in Zhan’s thought, inseparable yet distinct) are being cultivated together as two sides of the same Dao, and it is by being “in good accordance with the times and the circumstances” that one attains heaven’s principle. In other words, when affairs and beings are dealt with at their proper time, then heavenly principle is attained in the mind, and one is able to follow the right path. This is how, through the investigation of things, one can attain heaven’s principle.
This reading follows Zhu Xi and also encompasses the idea of the unity of knowledge and action; it includes the intellectual penetration of principle as proposed in Zhu Xi’s investigation of things, and at the same time includes a guide to active practice as proposed in Wang Yangming. Goodness here is reached by constantly maintaining close contact with outside things yet never getting too involved in or attached to them. Zhan also states that “the ancients did not set up a contrast between human nature and principle or energy”—which is correct because “the nature of Heaven and Earth is never outside of vital energy or matter” ( Mingru xue’an 37). Here he makes clear that principle and inner nature are seen through the concept of vital energy, which makes Zhan Ruoshui a follower of the school of the study of vital energy within the Neo-Confucian tradition. Like Wang Dao and Wang Yangming, he finds the thought of Zhu Xi insufficient and wishes to add to it a sense of transcendence through the Dao, a way for the mind to grasp the basic substance of everything, and the intuitive practice that will lead there.