by Tony Insall
§§ Allowing for inflation, the equivalent of about £200 at 2019 prices.
¶¶ The Todt organisation was a large German civil and military engineering group, responsible during the war for projects in occupied Europe, which relied quite heavily on forced labour.
|||| Allowing for inflation, £12,000 at 2019 prices.
*** Allowing for inflation, approximately £26,000 at 2019 prices.
††† The nature of this organisation is not further described, but was most likely SIS.
‡‡‡ Allowing for inflation, worth about £5,160 at 2019 prices.
§§§ A rather less credible case involved Marina Lee, who was Russian by birth, but Norwegian by marriage. According to a statement by Van Wijk, a Dutch agent detained in Camp 020, who obtained the details from von Finckenstein, she was a highly valued and experienced German agent who had worked for the Germans for some five years. The file shows that she apparently somehow managed to gain access to Auchinleck’s HQ in Tromsø and by that stage Auchinleck was doing so well that General Dietl was thinking of retreating into Sweden. However, Lee obtained details of his plans, which enabled Dietl to rearrange his defence and to defeat Auchinleck. Lee appears to have spent some of the rest of the war in Spain, and never came into Allied hands. The Security Service merely noted these details and made no attempt to evaluate the credibility of the statement, which seems implausible. They kept records of her in case she was subsequently used by the Russian Intelligence Service: she was put on the ports watch list after the war. (TNA, KV 2/2381.)
¶¶¶ Allowing for inflation, equivalent to £75 a head at 2019 prices.
|||||| George Furre was shot in error by a German sentry later in the war.
**** (Letter from Liversidge to Nagell, 27 June 1942, Riksarkiv, hereafter RA, Nagell box 15.) The file register for KV 2/829 in TNA shows that the first paper on the file, dated 29 June 1942, was a cross-reference to Gulbrandsen, which was dated 29 June 1942, but the document itself has not been released. This may have been the letter from Liversidge. An extract from the second document, a report on German intelligence activities in Norway dated 1 July 1942, states that ‘Tor Gulbrandsen, arrested by the Germans has given (probably under coercion) information about an Allied intelligence operation operating in the Kvikne district.’ Harmer referred to this latter information, which he described as ‘coming from an unimpeachable source’, in his report on the first interrogations of Gulbrandsen in later November, but does not refer to the Bergen information. It therefore looks as though by then he had been able to work out that it was a coincidence that another person of the same name had come to adverse attention at almost the same time. It is not clear whether this information came from an Abwehr source which SIS was running in Norway (which will be further described in Chapter 8) or from ISOS.
†††† The other case was a clumsy attempt to use Harald Konrad Aaberg, who was involved in the Workers Sporting Association in Trondheim. Although Aaberg was not involved, the association had a good courier service to Sweden, and the Lark organisation had tried unsuccessfully to use it. In August 1942 Aaberg was arrested by the Germans, for no obvious reason. After six days’ interrogation with beatings, when he admitted his interest in money, he was released on condition he would work for them. He invented a story of a contact in Sweden, and was driven to within a mile of the border and released. On crossing, he gave himself up. The Security Service were not satisfied with his story, but he was eventually released and sent to STS 24, where he did poorly on an SOE training course, and in view of this and the lingering Security Service doubts about him, was released to serve in the Norwegian Army. (TNA, HS 9/1/1.)
‡‡‡‡ In September 1945, Morgenbladet incorrectly reported that Jeff had been sentenced to four months’ imprisonment. What is more, the article also revealed that both Jeff and an unnamed Norwegian friend had been released after their initial arrest and given the task of sending to the Germans some false messages which were composed by the British counter-espionage authorities. This was more than twenty-five years before Masterman first wrote publicly about the Double-Cross system!
CHAPTER 6
SECRET ALLIANCES TAKE EFFECT
1941–1942: CREATING A PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP
I shall be much obliged if your Excellency and M. Lie will help me in a matter to which I have been giving my personal attention. I am told that it is the intention of the Norwegian Government to withdraw from Stockholm their Military Attaché Captain Roscher Lund. This officer has been of great service to the British intelligence organisation in Sweden, and his presence there is of special value to Her Majesty’s Government and to the Allied cause as a whole. I realise that the case presents difficulties. Nevertheless, since this is a question which affects not only the Norwegian Government but the general war effort, I sincerely hope Your Excellency and your colleagues may feel able to reverse the decision which has been taken. It is a matter to which I attach great importance.
LETTER FROM CHURCHILL TO NYGAARDSVOLD, REQUESTING HIM TO OVERTURN HIS DECISION TO WITHDRAW ROSCHER LUND, WHO HAD PROVIDED THE FIRST INTELLIGENCE ABOUT THE ATTEMPTED BREAK-OUT OF BISMARCK INTO THE NORTH SEA IN MAY 1941.1
In the course of 1941, over 4,000 Norwegians arrived in Britain. Many of them had successfully completed the often dangerous journey across the North Sea. Others had travelled much further via the Middle East or even the Far East and America in order to take part in the war. These numbers strained the refugee reception facilities at the Royal Victoria Patriotic School, which, in some instances, led to errors being made, as in the case of Ingvald Johansen. In general, though, the arrivals were a welcome addition to the pool of willing volunteers for the Norwegian armed forces from which SIS and SOE were able to recruit. In early 1941, SOE were attempting to recruit between twenty and twenty-five Norwegians a month for their work. Martin Linge approached General Fleischer for permission to form an independent company, whose recruits would all be members of the army and subject to its rules and regulations but not under its command. This was granted and the Norwegian Independent Company No. 1 (NORIC) was formed. After the death of Linge in the Måløy raid in December 1941, it came to be known as the Linge Company. The organisation built up by SOE operated independently – both of Milorg in Norway and also of the Norwegian government in London. Its longer-term objective was to arrange a general uprising in Norway, which did not coincide with the aim of Milorg to slowly build up a secret army which would prepare for the day of liberation. As a result, throughout 1941 and for much of 1942, relations between SOE, the Directorate of Combined Operations, and both the Norwegian government and Milorg were not straightforward. And neither were Norwegian relations always straightforward with the rest of the British government, for example over propaganda – as will be considered in due course.
Naval intelligence requirements for the Admiralty – the value of Roscher Lund
The tide of war was also not going in favour of Britain and her Allies during this period. The Germans were consolidating their control over the extensive areas of Europe which they had occupied, in addition to launching an initially successful attack on Russia in June 1941. In the Far East, the Japanese were also making gains, sinking Prince of Wales and Repulse in December 1941, to the consternation of Churchill. After the war, he wrote ‘in all the war I never received a more direct shock. As I turned over and twisted in bed the full horror sank in upon me.’2 Two months later, the Japanese also captured Singapore. The sinking of Bismarck in May 1941 had been a rare piece of good news.
Rear-Admiral Godfrey, the DNI, had been critical of SIS achievements up to the end of 1940, observing that there had been an almost complete lack of useful intelligence. He did, however, acknowledge that it took time to establish the kind of coverage which was required. Communications difficulties as well as a shortage of suitably qualified and trained personnel did not help, which meant that for nearly four months between May and August 1941, Skylark B in Trondheim was the only active SIS station
in Norway. The naval attaché in Stockholm, Henry Denham, was often producing more valuable reporting than SIS did at this stage. He had an extremely effective relationship with the Norwegian military attaché. Ragnvald Roscher Lund was able to exploit a range of close contacts with members of the Swedish General Staff, who had developed detailed coverage of German naval activities.* He regularly passed their information to Denham. It was Roscher Lund who, on 20 May 1941, provided Denham with intelligence obtained from the Swedes: reporting that two large German warships (which proved to be Bismarck and Prinz Eugen) had been sighted sailing northwards through the Kattegat, towards the North Sea. Denham’s report to the Admiralty started the search which led to the sinking of Bismarck on 27 May.3
Nonetheless, SIS intelligence subsequently also made an important contribution. Skylark B reported that on 22 May three German destroyers had sailed into Trondheim. The Admiralty was able to work out that these three destroyers had been escorting Bismarck. The fact that they were now detached was a clear indication that Bismarck was intending to break out into the Atlantic. Shortly afterwards Skylark B received a message from SIS headquarters which read, ‘Congratulations on the quick transmission of the report on the three destroyers. Keep it up.’ It was only some forty years later that one of the members of Skylark B discovered why their report had been so important, when he read a book written by one of the German officers who survived Bismarck’s sinking, which described the ending of the destroyers’ escort duty. Security concerns had prevented Skylark B being told at the time.4 Such considerations meant that it was rare for an SIS station to be informed about the value of any really significant intelligence which it had provided. An exception occurred when Theta, in Bergen, reported on 23 January 1942 that Tirpitz and six destroyers had been observed in a fjord close to Trondheim on 20 January. It was photographed there by RAF reconnaissance a week later. Theta received an enthusiastic response from Eric Welsh in London: ‘Our heartiest congratulations. We are proud of you. You have shortened the war.’5 While Welsh was premature in predicting the consequences, the message marked the beginning of SIS coverage of Tirpitz in Norway, which continued regularly until the warship was finally sunk in November 1944.
Unfortunately the productive relationship between Denham and Roscher Lund did not last much longer. In early June 1941, Denham learned that Roscher Lund was being recalled to London. This created a wider problem for the Norwegians. Sweden had decided that legations of foreign countries occupied by the Germans were not to be increased in size, and that new arrivals or replacements would not be recognised. The fact that Roscher Lund’s successor Ingvald Smith-Kielland was an old friend of Foreign Minister Christian Günther made no difference. Denham told Mallet that he regarded Roscher Lund’s continued presence in Stockholm to be vital to him. The British tried hard to persuade the Norwegians to reverse their decision and to find ways of leaving him in place. Mallet made representations to Günther, and Eden instructed Cadogan (the Permanent Under-Secretary) to approach Lie – but all without effect. Eventually, in early September Eden wrote to Churchill and asked him to meet Lie himself. Churchill went one better and wrote to Nygaardsvold, explaining (more frankly than Eden had advised him to, because the Norwegians in London were not thought to be aware of the extent of Roscher Lund’s activities) precisely how Roscher Lund had been of value to British intelligence. He took the unprecedented step of asking that the decision to withdraw him should be reversed. Nygaardsvold replied that although Roscher Lund was urgently needed in London, the Norwegians would be willing to allow him to remain as assistant to Smith-Kielland if the British could ensure that Smith-Kielland was recognised by the Swedish government. Further British attempts to achieve this were unsuccessful, and Roscher Lund left to assume overall responsibility for Norwegian intelligence in Britain. He was replaced instead by Major Ørnulf Dahl, who was already serving in Stockholm.6 The difficulty in resolving this, and the time it took, caused Churchill to decline a suggestion by Eden, made at the instigation of Lie, that he should meet Nygaardsvold for a general discussion of the progress of the war.7 They eventually lunched together in February 1942, when Churchill optimistically assured Nygaardsvold that Norway would be the first occupied country to be liberated.8 The departure of Roscher Lund had an immediate impact in more areas than just the passing of intelligence. For example, Stockholm complained to SOE that land communications with Norway had been disrupted after Roscher Lund had left: the clandestine post boxes which had been established on the Swedish border were no longer working properly.9
Chapter 8 examines how the intelligence gap caused by Roscher Lund’s departure was filled by the development of reporting from SIS coast-watching stations. For now, it will suffice to say that Godfrey judged that the quality of SIS work gradually improved during the latter part of 1941. In January 1942, he wrote to the Chief of the Naval Staff that ‘in the past two years great progress has been made, and a new organisation is flourishing in Norway, Belgium and Holland and France. NID is well served at key points on the Norwegian coast.’ SIS work was further improved by the appointment in January 1942 of a senior Marine officer, John Cordeaux, who had been running NID3 covering the Mediterranean. Godfrey hoped he would improve reporting there, but he was given responsibility for Scandinavia instead.10
Propaganda problems
It makes sense here on the grounds of coherence to consider problems with wartime propaganda in one section. Commenting to the Foreign Office in August 1943 about a difficult meeting with Lie when he and deputy head of SOE Harry Sporborg had discussed propaganda proposals which proved unwelcome to the Norwegians, Wilson wrote from SOE that ‘it is a curious fact, but true, that it has proved more difficult to secure cooperation for the distribution of Allied propaganda than it has been to secure cooperation for various enterprises which are liable to endanger the safety and lives of local people in Norway’. He referred for example to Operation CARHAMPTON, when in January and February 1943, an SOE force of forty men was looked after near Flekkefjord by local Norwegians, who provided them with accommodation, transport and medical attention.11
The paradox highlighted by Wilson’s comment neatly encapsulated the difficulty which faced the two governments. The question of who should exercise control over the dissemination of propaganda in Norway was for both sides one of the most consistently complex, difficult and divisive which they had to confront. Although a modus vivendi was eventually achieved, it was one which achieved more for Norwegian interests than for British objectives. For the Norwegian government in exile, especially Prime Minister Nygaardsvold, the question of control over propaganda was essentially a matter of sovereignty. After the disastrous defeat following the German invasion in 1940, the government was predictably concerned about its standing back at home. It wanted to be able to regulate the message which was presented to Norwegians, so as to help to strengthen its position there. It also needed to manage satisfactorily its relationship with Milorg – and, for its part, Milorg wanted to be responsible for the conduct of the propaganda campaign in Norway.
The main propaganda objective of the British government was to ensure coordination of the message which was to be transmitted to enemy countries and countries under German occupation, as well as Allies, to ensure that it was consistent and to prevent the Germans exploiting any discrepancies. A number of factors combined to make this difficult to achieve as far as Norway was concerned. For one thing, there were too many different organisations involved, which did not necessarily all have quite the same aims and which did not always work well with each other – in particular the Ministry of Information, the BBC, the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), SOE and the Foreign Office. There were also some quite sharp clashes of personality. Furthermore, there was an undue emphasis on security which meant that the Norwegian government was not informed about certain propaganda operations affecting their country. This led to significant Norwegian ministerial displeasure when the facts were eventually uncovered. A few select examples will
illustrate the difficulties which all these factors caused.
Control over broadcasting
In August 1940, the BBC, Ministry of Information and Norwegian government agreed the arrangements which would govern broadcasts to Norway. PWE did not come into existence until September 1941, and was therefore bound by the terms of a deal which allowed both for Norwegian announcers to be seconded to the BBC without coming under its administrative control, and also for Toralv Øksnevad, the Norwegian government’s chief announcer, to advise on all talks in Norwegian. The PWE official historian wrote that:
Political Warfare [i.e. propaganda] to occupied countries proved … both far easier and more effective than to Germany, since the majority in every occupied country hated the Germans and respected us for continuing the fight. Nevertheless, there were certain handicaps from which propaganda to the enemy was free. Hasty agreements had been made with the refugee governments as a result of which they were entitled to carry out their own propaganda to their own peoples. The Norwegian government had exclusive rights, though all governments had ‘free time’.12
Øksnevad was not an easy colleague, for he was seen by both BBC colleagues and PWE officials as being autocratic and high-handed.13 Similarly, the Norwegians found Thomas Barman, the PWE official responsible for Scandinavia, equally difficult to deal with. In October 1941 Charles Hambro reported to the director-general of PWE, Robert Bruce Lockhart, that Lie considered that although Barman’s parents were Norwegian, the fact that he was born abroad meant that he was neither Norwegian nor British, and was therefore prone to make mistakes in judgement. Lie had suggested to him that Barman no longer be responsible for Norway. At the same time, after Barman had proposed the formation of a committee chaired by Nygaardsvold to discuss propaganda policy, Lie told Laurence Collier that he thought this would give Barman too much importance, and he would rather deal with someone else. Collier advised Lie not to press for Barman’s removal unless he had definite proof that it was impossible to work with him.14 The extent to which differences between Lie and Barman created a problem is illustrated by the fact that the main PWE file for Norway, FO 898/241, contains a folder of papers marked ‘Barman–Lie controversy’. Nonetheless, Barman remained at his post until January 1943 – and even then his successor Brinley Thomas proved little more successful in developing an effective working relationship with Lie and his colleagues.