by Tony Insall
A letter to SIS from Anthony Nutting in Northern Department in December 1942 provides a rare contemporary insight into the difficulties which the Foreign Office faced, and the range of its interests. Though long, it is worth quoting in some detail:
Herewith my questionnaire (14 questions) plus an explanatory footnote in brackets. I fear it is long, but it would be most useful if you could let us have as much information as possible on these lines since we are at present almost entirely dependent for information on the Norwegian ‘E’ Office†† and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with whom we maintain close collaboration and have no other source with which to check up. We of course realise the difficulties under which your people work with regard to Norway, but as we are constantly burdened with requests for intelligence on this country, it is of vital importance that we should have some other source of information apart from our Norwegian contacts … We attach considerable importance to information about the state of morale and about political feeling amongst the population and local authorities in all parts of Norway, especially in the north, west and south west.
General state of morale … with particular reference to pro-British, pro-German, pro-Russian, pro-Haakon or pro-Nygaardsvold government; (there is little evidence of pro-German feeling, except in the area between Hedmark and the Trøndelag depression);
Opinion towards invasion, commando raids, air raids on towns, ports shipping and active or passive sabotage;
Any evidence of criticism of allied war strategy and impatience or disappointment at the long delayed opening of a second front in the west;
Any signs of an increase or decrease in underground activity, including communist and illegal press activities; (communist activity has been quieter of late. The illegal press suffers much from the difficulties of communications, which restrictions on travel have increased.)
Prevalence of radio sets and the effect of BBC and freedom broadcasts (very little is known about this, and we believe that radio sets are few and far between, but BBC news does seem to seep through especially in populated districts);
Feelings towards NS, the army of occupation (including Austrian troops), the German civil administration and the Gestapo; (we believe … Austrians to be generally regarded as less evil than Germans.)
Feelings towards the labour front (especially trade unions), the intellectuals (i.e. church, teachers etc.) and communists;
Attitude of labour, the communists and the intellectuals;
Feelings about and any facts obtainable concerning the food situation and the question of relief (this is the most knotty problem of all, since every report differs slightly from the other. On the whole, it is fairly definite that the situation is bad but not critical: the population would naturally welcome relief but are probably prepared to face another winter of privation without it, if it will hasten the end of the war);
Feeling and percentage of NS amongst the central and local authorities (including Government departments, police and town and county councils); (our information is that on the whole 60–70 per cent of local authorities are either quislings or pro-German. Proportions vary considerably, but in the last year quislings have succeeded in establishing themselves in control in nearly every part of the country.)
Any evidence of dissension in NS; (we have little definite information on this.)
Relations between the Quisling government and local authorities on the one hand and the German military and civil administration on the other; (bad and not improved by divergence between Gestapo and quislings.)
Attitude of German military and civil administration towards Quisling and the NS and any evidence of the former intending to secure Quisling’s removal; (we have no concrete information.)
Evidence of Germans tightening the screw on the opposition. (it is clear that the Germans have given up their former policy of trying to win over Norwegians by subtle blandishments … and are resorting to force.)‡‡
There is no evidence to show that this list of requirements was copied to SOE, who were still providing quite regular reporting of their own, and who were by now beginning to be in regular contact with Northern Department. Their contacts were more extensive than those of SIS, which were generally limited to those connected with coast-watching stations. Shortly afterwards, when commenting on the extent to which the Norwegian population still favoured passive resistance – an attitude which was beginning to attract powerful criticism – Nutting observed that he was hoping to obtain further information from SIS on this subject in answer to the questionnaire which he had just sent them.57
Notes
1 TNA, 10 September 1941, PREM 3/328/11B.
2 Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (London: Cassell, 1950), p. 551.
3 Henry Denham, Inside the Nazi Ring: A Naval Attaché in Sweden, 1940–1945 (London: John Murray, 1984), pp. 84–86. See also ADM 233/489, NID history of Scandinavia, which was written by Denham.
4 Rørholt, Usynlige soldater, p. 62.
5 Ottosen, Theta, Theta, photograph of document opposite p. 125.
6 TNA. The main papers describing this are on PREM 3/328/11B. There are also details on ADM 223/464 and ADM 223/489, where Denham states that he had encouraged the First Lord of the Admiralty to intervene with Churchill. See also FO 371/29433, where some additional documents have recently been released, showing that Northern Department were for some time unaware of the involvement of Eden and Churchill.
7 TNA, correspondence between Eden and Churchill, 22–23 September 1941, PREM 3/328/11A.
8 TNA, FO 371/32837.
9 TNA, HS 2/231.
10 TNA, ADM 223/851.
11 TNA, FO 371/36875.
12 David Garnett, The Official History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive 1939–1945 (London: St Ermin’s, 2002), p. 168
13 TNA, FO 371/29431.
14 TNA, FO 898/241.
15 TNA, FO 371/29435.
16 TNA, FO 371/29431.
17 Ibid.
18 Garnett, The Official History of PWE, p. 204.
19 TNA, HS 2/126.
20 Garnett, p. 204.
21 Thomas Barman, Diplomatic Correspondent (London: Hamilton, 1968), p. 104.
22 TNA, HS 2/236.
23 TNA, report by Manus and Gram on impressions of the Home Front, 26 May 1943, HS 2/191.
24 TNA, HS 7/174.
25 TNA, SOE reports for the Prime Minister, July to September 1943, HS 8/250.
26 TNA, Leaflets for Norway. FO 898/447.
27 TNA, FO 898/63.
28 TNA, HS 2/178.
29 TNA, PREM 3/409/7.
30 TNA, HS 2/225.
31 TNA, FO 371/29422.
32 TNA, FO 371/32829.
33 TNA, HS 2/127.
34 TNA, HS 2/138.
35 This was set out in some detail by Wilson in a long-term policy paper of 21 September 1942. TNA, HS 2/128.
36 TNA, PREM 3/409/7.
37 TNA, PREM 3/409/3.
38 Ian Herrington, The Special Operations Executive in Norway 1940–1945: Policy and Operations in the Strategic and Military Context (Unpublished PhD thesis, 2004), pp. 93–94. There is a slightly different explanation of how Milorg’s letter reached Britain in Sverre Kjeldstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, Hovedtrekk av den militære motstanden under okkupasjonen (Oslo: Bokstav og Bilde, 2011), p. 84.
39 TNA, HS 2/231.
40 Ibid.
41 TNA, FO 371/29446.
42 TNA, FO 371/29417.
43 TNA, FO 371/32823.
44 TNA, HS 2/161.
45 TNA, Menzies to Loxley, 24 September 1942, FO 371/32825.
46 TNA, HS 2/129.
47 TNA, FO 371/29421.
48 Ibid.
49 TNA, FO 371/32823.
50 TNA, HS 2/196.
51 TNA, FO 371/32827.
52 TNA, HS 2/129.
53 TNA, HS 8/937.
54 NHM, FO.IV box 55.
55 TNA, FO 371/26596. A few months later Ruge was moved from Königstein to a camp in Toruń, in Poland.
56 TNA, FO 371/29416.
57 TNA, FO 371/36876.
* The Swedes covered other significant areas too. For example, they tapped some of the lines between the German High Command in Berlin and their headquarters in Norway, which passed through Swedish waters (TNA, ADM 223/489.)
† Nygaardsvold brought this up because earlier representations from Colban to Collier in December had not been effective. It transpired that the changes had been made to accommodate more suitable timing for the Hungarians.
‡ Churchill was displeased by the speed of the withdrawal, and commented to the Chiefs of Staff that ‘ANKLET must be judged a marked failure, as it was abandoned hastily and without any facts being apparent which were not foreseen at the time of its inception and preparation’. When he learned that the First Sea Lord Dudley Pound sent a message supporting the decision to withdraw, he informed him: ‘I do not remember that you made any such formal communication to me, and I was not aware that you intended to send such a telegram as this – which taken in conjunction with my telegram … appears to indicate a relationship between us which I am sure does not exist’. Pound apologised. (TNA, PREM 3/47.)
§ In September 1943, Wilson was promoted to be head of the whole Scandinavian section.
¶ There were also some significant changes in the hierarchy of SOE at around this time. Dalton was moved and promoted to be President of the Board of Trade. He was succeeded by Lord Selborne. Jebb returned to the Foreign Office. He was replaced by Sporborg, though in a new position approximating to Principal Private Secretary. Sir Frank Nelson retired in May 1942. His position was taken by Hambro, until he was succeeded by Colin Gubbins in September 1943. The most important change on the Norwegian side was the replacement in December 1942 of John Rognes by Bjarne Øen as the head of FO.IV, a post which he held until the end of the war.
|| Sometimes SOE agents were suspected of being collaborators. For example J. Gunleiksrud, the Anvil organiser, was nearly killed by Milorg who, when reassured about him, wanted to keep him under their control. Sometimes too, operations undisclosed to Milorg had adverse consequences and led to German reprisals and executions, such as those which followed KNOTGRASS/UNICORN, a combined operation mounted with NORIC assistance against Glomfjord power station in September 1942.
** For more detail on this operation see Chapter 7.
†† Etterretning, or intelligence office.
‡‡ Letter of 14 December 1942 from Nutting to G. Pinney, Passport Control Department, i.e. SIS. (TNA, FO 371/32826.) Pinney had been appointed an honorary attaché in Norway in 1930, but his position was terminated in 1931 and he did not thereafter appear in the Diplomatic List. There is, not surprisingly, no record of any reply to this letter.
CHAPTER 7
SOE’S SUCCESSES AND SETBACKS
OPERATIONS AND PROBLEMS 1941–1943
Press here quote official statement from Oslo that two German Secret Service police were shot on an island off Norwegian coast by certain Norwegians who had illegally visited England where they were equipped with explosives arms and sabotage equipment. As a reprisal 18 Norwegians captured some weeks ago when attempting to flee to England from Ålesund were executed. Strongly recommend immediate counter reprisal. Suggest form it might take is to select home town or village of German troops stationed in Norway, identity of certain divisions being known to us, and bomb it heavily irrespective of whether it can be classified as military objective. Fact that such bombing is intended as counter reprisal should be given widest publicity through BBC.
PERSONAL AND VERY RESTRICTED CIRCULATION TELEGRAM FROM SOE IN STOCKHOLM RECOMMENDING RETALIATION AFTER THE INCIDENT AT TELAVÅG, 1 MAY 1943.1
Communications links
While radio provided a vital channel for the passing of intelligence reports and instructions, the main methods of communication between Britain and Norway were by sea and air across the North Sea. The land route into Sweden was also used for agents, refugees and documentary intelligence, but it was slower because air transport facilities between Sweden and Britain were very limited. This was a source of frustration to both sides, particularly the Norwegians, who tried to get the frequency of flights increased but with limited success.* Sea and air transport was generally restricted to the winter months, because the short summer nights increased the dangers of German interception. The extent to which this disrupted resistance work in Norway is illustrated by a minute from Wilson to the head of SOE’s naval directorate, Rear-Admiral A. H. Taylor, in January 1943.2 Wilson wrote that during the previous three years it had been impossible to infiltrate any personnel into Norway by sea between mid-April and mid-September. And, by 1942, the Air Ministry had ruled out flying between mid-May and mid-August. In practice, apart from a couple of Catalina flying boat trips which were arranged unofficially, the non-flying period extended from the end of April to the last week in September.
This was a serious hindrance to SOE. They sought to increase their use of submarines and in December 1941 asked for Admiralty assistance. Unfortunately, an imaginative attempt by Ian Fleming (then working for the Director of Naval Intelligence) to obtain the loan of the French submarine Surcouf came to nothing.3 SOE had to rely instead on occasional use of the Norwegian submarine Uredd. In February 1943 she hit a mine while taking the six members of the Seagull party to northern Norway, and was lost with all on board.4 Uredd was also carrying Paul Nygaard, an SIS agent who was going to reinforce Upsilon in Tromsø, and also to check the identity of four submariners, two of them French, who had been marooned during an attempt by a French submarine to resupply Upsilon the previous November. This had been abandoned because of a security scare. It had been intended that Uredd would recover them.5 SOE’s attempts to procure other air transport fared little better. For example, they had unsuccessfully requested a Sunderland flying boat to take the Seagull party to northern Norway, and were obliged to rely on Uredd instead. SIS were more successful in obtaining alternative transport. They were quite frequently able to call on naval vessels and aircraft. Thus Ole Snefjellå was brought back by the submarine Sea Nymph from the SIS station Crux in Mo i Rana in January 1944. SIS also made greater use of Catalinas both for despatching agents to Norway and recovering them, and for rescuing them in emergencies. Ole Snefjellå was brought out with four others from station Pi near Stavenes in May 1942 in a rescue in dangerous circumstances.6 And John Kristoffersen, a stalwart of Pisces and later Erna, both productive stations, managed in May 1944 to escape from the island of Onøya when surrounded by a force of over 200 Germans. He sought assistance from Crux and was flown out with some of them early in June.7
A Catalina off the coast of Finnmark during the winter of 1944. They were frequently used to deliver and collect SIS agents. © NHM
The volume of traffic gradually increased, especially from 1944 onwards, with the provision of better boats and greater availability of aircraft. Despite seasonal disruptions, the statistics tell a remarkable story of the effectiveness of these supply lines for SOE. There were over 150 successful trips by sea, landing about 220 agents and collecting 70, while also picking up 360 refugees. The boats also delivered over 320 tons of stores. The RAF, and latterly the USAAF (United States Army Air Force) too, flew more than 700 missions dropping over 200 agents. We do not have the figures for SIS, but these SOE statistics do include a number of SIS agents, showing that they landed nearly 40 in Norway, mainly in 1944–1945.
By sea: Shetland bases
The first base chosen by commandant Leslie Mitchell at Catfirth, described in Chapter 2, did not prove entirely suitable. In the summer of 1941 it was moved to Lunna, about twenty-five miles from Lerwick. A flotilla of half a dozen Norwegian fishing boats was built up, with most of the original crews replaced by fishermen from the west coast of Norway who had been selected and trained for their tasks. Operational demands placed on the base continued to increase, and Lunna proved to be an inadequately small anchorage for the larger number of boats which were required, and also too remote
from Lerwick for effective supply and communications. Consequently, in the summer of the following year the base moved again, this time to Scalloway, where it remained for the duration of the war. There were periods when both SIS and SOE set up independent and subordinate bases – SIS in Peterhead from July 1941 until November 1943, and SOE in Burghead from November 1942 to April 1943.† This separation created problems – and suspicions – between the two agencies. While SOE was willing to disclose to SIS the destination of operational trips which it was planning, SIS did not readily reciprocate. This occasionally led to boats landing agents from both services in or near the same place at about the same time. This was an unnecessary security risk, and contributed, for example, to the disaster at Telavåg.
For more than half the war, until they were replaced by larger and much more powerful American submarine chasers, the only means of transport across the North Sea was small Norwegian fishing boats. While they were sturdy and robust, they were not always able to resist the extremities of the winter weather. Between October and March, it was generally expected that the wind in the area between Shetland and Norway would reach gale force about 50 per cent of the time. Each winter, there were generally also a couple of storms which reached hurricane force.
Despite the experience and skill of their skippers, boats were regularly lost without trace. Refugees making their own way to Britain also risked their lives. Oluf Reed Olsen, who worked for SIS, described how he and two comrades escaped from Norway in September 1940 on an eighteen-foot fishing smack. When they had almost reached Scotland, a gale lasting eight days nearly sank the smack and blew them back to the Danish coast. Their journey lasted fourteen and a half days, a remarkable feat of endurance not least because they had lost most of their supplies in the storm.8 During a hurricane in November 1941 which blew for six days, the Blia was sunk with forty-two people on board, and many boats which were laid up in Shetland ports were damaged or destroyed. Apart from the weather, North Sea crossings also became more hazardous as the Germans learned the extent of Shetlands traffic and increased their patrols accordingly. Furthermore, the shortage of fuel and restrictions on coastal fishing off Norway limited the presence of other boats in the area, so Shetlands boats became more visible. The winter of 1942–1943 ended with half the flotilla and nearly half of the crews lost on operations (compared with only three boats lost in 1941–1942).‡ This led Wilson to visit Shetland, where he concluded that such a rate of attrition could not continue – and, crucially, to start the process leading to the acquisition of the American submarine chasers which arrived in October.