by N S Nash
The passage downriver was difficult and just above Azizieh, Comet and Shaitan had run aground. Grounding was part and parcel of navigation on this river and usually it was possible to back off a sand bank. In this case Comet did just that, but Shaitan was stuck fast and under speculative sniper fire from Arabs on the banks. Comet, Firefly and Shushan all put lines aboard Shaitan. However, she would not budge and eventually sprang a leak. The hull had been subjected to strains for which the ship was not built and a seam had opened. Shaitan sank in shallow water. She was unloaded, her guns and ammunition being a priority in the limited time available. Comet, Shushan and Firefly engaged the Arabs to cover this operation but the imminent arrival of the Turkish advance guard caused Nunn to abandon the ship.
46. HMS Firefly. (W. Nunn)
It was not possible to ‘live off the land’ as armies had done countless times in the past because in Mesopotamia there was nothing, but nothing, to live off. Nunn’s ships did not just carry ammunition and food; they also transported fodder for horses and mules, firewood and a host of other prosaic items, all of which took up valuable cargo space, but without which life was bordering impossible.
The marching troops were often out of touch with the ships and it was only when their shorter route touched the apex of one of the innumerable bends that contact was re-established. The map on page 108 illustrates that point. The course of the river gave the Arabs ample opportunity to snipe the flotilla, and Nunn asked for cavalry support. The recently arrived 14th Hussars did what they did best and swept along the riverbank ‘accounting for about 150’155 of their adversaries.
Nixon wired to say that Townshend’s plans to stand at Azizieh were approved and said comfortingly that about a third of the new reinforcement division would arrive there by 15 December. This was yet another hollow promise of ‘jam tomorrow’, and it did not impress Townshend. He now, belatedly, appreciated that the 6th Division was hopelessly outnumbered and that survival was his new aim.
A safe haven was needed, but where? Kut was 90 miles south, but Amara would be preferred. The latter was 130 miles away, as a mosquito flies, but 250 miles by way of the dawdling Tigris. The option to march in a straight line to Amara was impractical as the Tigris was the Division’s lifeline – tenuous as it was. It was Hobson’s choice, but the General resolved to press on and consolidate at Kut.
Previously, Azizieh (22 miles from Ctesiphon) had been strongly fortified but all the weapon pits had been filled in, the wire cut and dispersed, and the redoubts destroyed. The discarded heavy baggage of 6th Division was stacked ready for collection by a victorious army. When Azizieh was reached, on 27 November, the Division rested and hunted through the mountains of kitbags for prized possessions in a haphazard and ill-disciplined manner. The soldiers could only take what they could carry and all manner of treasures were left to the Arabs, who had been in constant attendance as they trailed the rearguard. There was going to be no use for ceremonial uniforms or mess silver from here on, and so these were regretfully abandoned.
Nunn asked Townshend if he could send on ahead, to Kut, any craft that could be spared. It was agreed that the naval 4.7-inch guns and the army 5-inch guns in barges, together with Massoudieh and Shushan, should leave for Kut in the south at once.
It had been a modest bonus when half a battalion of the Royal West Kents arrived with the 14th Hussars. These new members of the 6th Division were more than somewhat discommoded to be greeted with derision and then to discover that, having reached Azizieh, they would now have to retrace their steps. Mr Sherlock told Braddon that, when asked who they were, one of the newly joined soldiers replied, ‘Half of the West Kents.’ This drew the response, ‘That’s no bloody good; we need half the British Army.’
Other reinforcements were making their way north; among them were the Anglo Indian gunners from Amara. Their journey had halted at Kut because of the unavailability of river craft, most of which were making their slow, putrid passage south.
47. The stern-wheeler HMS Shushan, photographed in the earlier Nasiriya operations and during which Nunn flew his pennant. (Nunn)
It was on 30 November that Azizieh was abandoned by 6th Division. Burdened with all that it could carry, its men had packed into their equipment food, souvenirs, personal possessions and also those of men long since dead. As the column struck out into the featureless desert, it left behind rising black smoke that besmirched a faultless blue sky. Everything flammable that could not be carried had been put to the torch. The smoke sent a clear message to Nureddin, about 6 miles behind, that the British were not preparing to give battle and the initiative was his to exploit.
It was winter in Mesopotamia, but as the sun climbed in the sky so the soldiers started to wilt and progressively they jettisoned their booty so rapaciously gathered only the day before. Four miles into their long day, Townshend called a halt to allow stragglers to catch up. To fall out and be left behind was to suffer a merciless and excruciating death at Arab hands. Some did not catch up, gave up the struggle and became forever ‘missing’.
Every soldier is dependent upon his comrades and Arthur Kingsmill wrote of one incident:
He was lying on the ground, and when I told him to get up he said he was finished. I took his rifle, grabbed him by the collar, pulled him to his feet and kicked him. ‘Now come on,’ I said. He hung on to me and, as luck would have it, we caught up. ‘Any more tricks and you get your throat cut,’ I said, giving him half a biscuit and a piece of bully.
That unnamed soldier’s life was saved by Kingsmill’s unsympathetic treatment and he lived to fight another day. This was not an isolated incident and the bleak terrain, heat and thirst took their toll of men who had given their all at Ctesiphon and who had little left in reserve.
At about noon, the column, having advanced only about 8 miles, reached Umm-al-Tubal and was now much closer to the river, where the shadowing ships could be seen gliding slowly through the muddy water and providing, albeit briefly, an element of big gun protection. It was at this point that Nunn and Townshend had a misunderstanding that could have been very serious.
Townshend apparently thought that 10 ‘desert’ miles as the insect flies was the limit of the ships’ daily progress as they ploughed their way down the sinuous Tigris. Nunn, on the other hand, thought that he should halt because the troops were exhausted. Both men would have pressed on, but they did not discuss the matter and each deferred to what he thought to be the other’s wishes. An unnecessary halt was called.
It was at this point that a message from Nixon arrived, telling that Butterfly was under a determined attack near Sheikh Saad. Although there was no mention of the ship being surrendered to Arabs, is this evidence in support of Albert Maynard’s story? (See page 104.) However, after this incident Nixon demonstrated interesting and uncharacteristic concern about the security of his sole line of communication. This was concern that had come a little late in the piece as it had been needed some months earlier. Nixon asked the GOC 6th Division to help secure the river, and in turn Townshend detailed Mellis (30th Brigade) to move ahead of the column and eradicate any threat. It was agreed to lengthen the next day’s march as Nunn wanted to make best use of daylight and his flotilla had a much longer journey than his khaki-clad comrades.
At Umm-al-Tubal, the British camp was roughly square, with the Tigris forming the southern boundary. Nunn positioned Firefly at the south-west corner. Comet was moored in the centre of that same boundary. It was a long night; the Turks fired star shells but made no assaults on the British line. Later analysis of events showed that the Turks had decided that the precipitate exit of 30th Brigade, to aid Nixon, with accompanying clouds of dust, was the 6th Division decamping. Drawing this fallacious conclusion, Nureddin halted for the night and gave orders to his 44th Regiment to occupy the abandoned British camp.
The 44th Regiment got lost in the dark and did not stumble over the encamped 6th Division.
The events that followed were extraordinary. Townshend decided th
at he needed Mellis to return and called for volunteers to ride to find 30th Brigade with the message. Captain C. Trench and Lieutenant W.J. Coventry volunteered, and they were to be accompanied by six cavalrymen. They knew that the desert was alive with hostile Arabs but were prepared to take their chances. Typically, Charlie gave an assurance that he would recommend them both for the VC;156 he made no such offer to the six soldiers.
Nunn was told to send a similar message downriver in one of the launches. Lieutenant Wood RNR stepped forward and set off, but inevitably, his vessel was attacked and two of his crew were wounded. Wood extricated his launch from the engagement and returned to Umm-al-Tubal, his message undelivered. Nevertheless, he was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) for his trouble.
The Division posted sentries and the great majority climbed gratefully under their blankets. Townshend did too, but could not sleep and, when he was awake, so was everyone else.
He called out: ‘Boggis.’
‘Sir.’
‘Can you hear wheels?’
‘No, Sir.’
‘Well, I can. Go and get Colonel Evans and we’ll see if he can hear anything.’
Boggis crawled from beneath his blanket and set off to find the irascible, profane Colonel U.W. Evans, the formidable General Staff Officer Grade 1 (GSO1). Evans was the senior of Townshend’s staff. He was a red-faced man with a bristling moustache and he did not suffer fools in any circumstances. He was not best pleased to be woken. Nevertheless, he hastened to his general’s side.
‘Evans,’ enquired the GOC, ‘can you hear wheels?’
‘No, Sir.’
‘I can. There are Turks on the move. Why have the sentries not reported it? See to it.’
Evans returned to his own tent, and an officer called E.J. Mant, one of those who shared the tent, recalled being woken by an irritable Evans who ordered Mant to ‘listen and tell me what you hear’. By now any number of sleepers had woken and all were turned to listening. There were sounds, certainly the wind in the guy ropes, and the musical jingle of harnesses in the horse lines.
One officer ventured bravely, ‘I think it’s only the mules, Sir.’
‘I know that’s only the mules you pissbegotten bugger; but what else can you hear?’
‘Nothing, Sir.’
‘Well the General can!’157
The entire division ‘stood to’, donned its equipment and manned the shallow trenches that had been dug the previous afternoon. Tired men peered into the stygian darkness of the desert night. Just before dawn, the Division started to make preparation to move further in its odyssey to Kut. The move from Umm-at-Tabul started at 0800 hrs and thirty minutes later, the column was underway. It was a foggy morning and visibility was very restricted.
Lieutenant Edward Mousley, a gunner officer, remembered that at about 0900 hrs the fog cleared and ‘before us some 1,800 to 2,000 yards off on the higher ground we saw a host of tents.’158 There were lights among the tents and the immediate opinion was that it was the following Arabs. As the light strengthened, it became clear that it was not Arabs in those distant tents.
It was the Turkish Army.
Mousley observed that, ‘The guns of the [10th] Field Brigade were limbering up ready to move but within two minutes they were down again, in action, and the first shell sang out the delight of the gunner at the prospect of so gorgeous a target.’159
The British, although surprised, were the first to react and within minutes the gunners were bringing down effective fire on the large number of advancing Turks and their encampment to their rear. The effect on the Turks was cataclysmic and very heavy casualties were sustained under the first few salvos fired by the artillery. Townshend commented later that, ‘I have never seen artillery shoot with the precision with which 10th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery opened a rapid fire. This was most deadly. One saw Turkish lines of men dissolve in a regular cloud of our shells. What a splendid gun is our 18-pounder field gun.’160 It was estimated, by Townshend, that the Turks were 12,000 strong, but by what means he made this estimate is unclear. Nevertheless, it was evident that there were hundreds of Turkish soldiers milling about among the multiple tents pitched on the crest of the distant dunes.
The Turkish response was brave but ill-judged. Thousands advanced across the flat desert into the fire of very professional gunnery and carnage was the only possible result. Gun teams limbered up and moved forward to shorten the range and give line of sight to fresh targets.
Comet and Firefly brought their guns to bear and added to the weight of shell falling on the Turkish XIIIth Corps. However, both ships were targets of Turkish artillery and Firefly was crippled when a shell hit her boiler. Firefly was towed away with great difficulty by Comet, a ship singularly ill-equipped for the purpose. Comet soon ran aground as her burden made her unwieldy, and she could not be freed. Nunn signalled to the little armed tug Sumana to drop the two barges she was towing and move upstream to assist with the recovery of Comet. Firefly meanwhile was drifting downstream ‘not under command’. Sumana got a line onto Comet but could not free her. Turkish artillery was now operating at quite short range and becoming more and more effective. Comet was hit and set on fire. Captain Nunn decided that both Comet and Firefly should be abandoned. He ordered Sumana alongside and Comet’s crew threw overboard the breechblocks of the guns and disabled the engines. Two men, Lieutenant Harden161 and Seaman Ernest Gray RNR, pulled over to Firefly in a small boat and brought her officers and men to safety.162
On the river, the Turks had won the battle.
Two ships and several barges had been lost, together with invaluable stores. More worryingly, one of the barges dropped by Sumana was carrying wounded and those men had to be left to their fate. The only hope was that the Turks got to them before the Arabs.
The Turkish 44th Regiment that had been ‘lost’ now reappeared and joined the fight. Townshend ordered Delamain (16th Brigade) and Hamilton (18th Brigade), without formal orders, to attack, head on. The cavalry, with ‘S’ Battery in support, took up a position on the enemy flank and the Turks were receiving fire from two directions. This was an ‘encounter’ battle and quite unlike the more deliberate, formalised contests of the previous twelve months. There was no time to plan ‘turning manoeuvres’ and no room for subterfuge. This was a conflict that was ‘played off the cuff’.
In the spontaneity stakes, the British were winning. Excellent gunnery and disciplined musketry did the trick. A little later in the morning, General Mellis’s brigade, which had been sent for during the night, arrived on the scene of action, appearing from the south-eastern quarter. The Brigade’s arrival was critical and effectively threw back the Turkish attack.
There had been countless acts of bravery and, as one example, Lieutenant Colonel J. McConville reported, ‘a Norfolk with both legs broken, ignored his injuries. Spreading his ammunition carefully around him, he continued his deliberate fire, round after round.’163
Kipling might have had a battle like this in mind when he penned those famous words:164
If your officer’s dead and the sergeants look white
Remember it’s ruin to run from a fight
So take open order, lie down and sit tight
An’ wait for supports like a soldier
Edward Mousley was able to observe Chitrál Charlie during this engagement and his view runs counter to those culled by Braddon and which appeared earlier. Mousley wrote:
One could not but feel the keenest admiration for General Townshend, so steady, collected and determined in action, so kind, quick and confident. There, totally indifferent to the shellfire, he stood watching the issue receiving reports from various orderly officers and giving every attention to the progress of the transport. Some shells pitched just over us, one not 15 yards away, killing a horse and wounding some drivers. More than once I caught a humorous smile on the General’s face as some shell missed us. … It was a most wonderful engagement and an exclamation of delight broke from him as he d
irected our attention to a charge of the 14th Hussars. Over the brown of the desert a mass of glittering and swiftly moving steel bore down upon the line of Turks, which broke and bolted.165
Townshend had the option of pursuing a broken but still numerous enemy. However, to his credit, and like the good soldier he was, he stuck to his declared aim, and that was ‘to withdraw to Kut’. Accordingly, he issued orders to Delamain and Hamilton to ‘retire in alternate echelons of brigades’ – an order more likely to have been understood by the recipients than this author and perhaps his reader!
It had been a short, brisk battle, now out of living memory and forgotten. After the war, the Turks said that the British gunnery had paralysed them; they admitted to 2,000 casualties.166 6th Division had thirty-seven killed, 281 wounded and there were 218 missing. All the 1,500 Turkish prisoners were secure.
The engagement was broken off and 6th Division turned its face southward again. It faced a march of 36 miles. The naval component being now much reduced, the carriage of a fresh batch of wounded slowed progress. The ‘road’ alongside the river was regularly broken by old canals and irrigation ditches. Each of these had to be bridged for the wheeled vehicles and after the last wheels had passed, the bridging material, such as it was, had to be recovered and delivered to the head of the column for reuse.
The retreat was by no means the ‘walk in the park’ of legend. Mousley recorded: