by N S Nash
Duff, faced with that uncompromising and bleak report, then complained bitterly about the very enquiry he had instigated. Much later, when giving evidence himself to the MC, he claimed weakly and unconvincingly that Vincent-Bingley had exceed its brief and delved into matters not of its concern. It was too late for Duff; he had shot himself in the foot – well, both feet, actually.
A flavour of Vincent-Bingley is this extract from its Report:
The absence of any river steamers equipped for the transport of sick and wounded, and of any separate medical establishment for such vessels … has had more prejudicial results than almost any other defects in the organisation. It has constantly delayed evacuation, dislocated medical arrangements and caused great suffering and injury. So long as operations were confined to the immediate vicinity of Basra there was no need for any such transport but directly columns advanced up the Tigris, Euphrates and Karun the necessity of some means of speedy evacuating the sick and wounded by water became apparent.231
That report and all its repercussions lay in the future. Meanwhile, deep in the desert, Aylmer was convinced that the key to success was for Townshend to attack the Turks from the rear, and he lived in hope that at some stage this concept would find support.
On the face of it, Townshend’s message on 23 January to Aylmer and Lake was supportive. Townshend suggested that there were three possible courses open to him in the event that Aylmer could not reach him. These courses were: first, to attempt to break out of Kut by crossing the Tigris to the right bank and then to make straight for Sheikh Saad, being met halfway if possible by a column sent by Aylmer; second, to hold Kut to the last; and finally, for him to open negotiations with the enemy seeking terms for surrender.
Townshend had no intention of breaking out, but he raised the matter confident that it would be rejected. Holding Kut ‘to the last’ had the required and expected heroic ring but raised the spectre of defeat. Townshend had a pipe dream that von der Goltz and Khalil, filled with admiration for his brilliant advance to Ctesiphon, his masterly withdrawal to Kut and his tenacious defence of that town, would allow the garrison to march out to freedom bearing its weapons.
It was never going to happen, but Charlie had plans for his own salvation and an element of that was his intention of establishing a relationship with his adversaries. Braddon argued that the anger Townshend displayed when the artillery fired on Goltz was indicative of his undeclared aim. Later events added credence to this theory.
Nixon had vetoed a break-out and now, just as Charlie expected, Lake did the same. The only other highly unattractive option was a further frontal assault by Aylmer. The stumbling block was the well-defended – and formidable – Dujaila Redoubt.
Chapter notes
200 Mousley, E.O., Secrets of a Kuttite, p.50. There are no recorded instances of anyone being tried, found guilty and executed for this offence.
201 MC Report, p.31.
202 Townshend, C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, pp.235–6.
203 Moberly, F.J., The Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.281.
204 MC Report, p.56.
205 Ibid, p.31.
206 Major General Sir George Younghusband KCMG KCIE CB (1858–1944).
207 Barker, A.J., The Neglected War, p.153.
208 Ibid, p.156.
209 Ibid, p.157.
210 Nunn, W., Tigris Gunboats, p.203.
211 Ibid, p.204.
212 MC Report, p.31.
213 LG Supplement, 21 June 1916.
214 Mr J. Boggis in an interview with Braddon, The Siege, p.161.
215 Moberly, F.J., The Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.261.
216 Ibid, p.261.
217 Duff to Hardinge, 6 January 1916, and reply, 7 January. Hardinge papers, 103/No. 2075 & 1528.
218 Moberly, F.J., The Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.264.
219 Ibid, p.351.
220 Eato, H., interviewed by Braddon, R., quoted in The Siege, p.188.
221 Page-Roberts, F.W., quoted by Braddon, The Siege, p.170.
222 MC Report, p.32.
223 Barker, A.J., The Forgotten War, p.176.
224 Atta is the hard wheat flour commonly used in South-East Asia to make a dense bread. Atta is not only the flour but also the name of the bread it produces.
225 Wilcox, R., Battles on the Tigris, p.105.
226 Mousley, E.O., The Secrets of a Kuttite, p.82.
227 Gould, D., ‘Lord Harding and the Mesopotamia Expedition and Inquiry’, The Historical Journal, December 1976.
228 Hardinge to Chamberlain, 10 March 1916, Chamberlain papers, 62/2. Chamberlain note of 17 July, Crewe papers, M/15(2).
229 Stamfordham to Chamberlain, 28 February 1916 and E.W. Wallington to Chamberlain, 29 February, Chamberlain papers, 46/2/65,67.
230 Curzon to Chamberlain, 17 March 1916, Chamberlain papers, 23/1/2.
231 Vincent–Bingley Report, absorbed into the MC Report at p.64.
Chapter 13
February–March 1916 The Battle of the Dujaila Redoubt
‘Judgement and not headlong courage, is the true arbiter of war.’
(Count Belisarius, c. AD 505–506)
In Kut, March 1916 got off to a grim start. All twenty-one of the Turkish guns were employed in a major ‘stonk’. Three German aeroplanes dropped a total of fifty bombs. They hit not only the hospital but also Arab housing and the mosque. Nine soldiers were killed and twenty-eight wounded.232
Townshend ordered the issue of respirators as, from some unidentified source, it was rumoured that the Turks were going to use gas. The respirators were widely seen as an ‘enbuggerance’ by the soldiers of Mr G. Roff. He said that his men’s response was, ‘Fancy this place having respirators. Fancy respirators being a bit of flannel you pissed on and then wrapped around your mouth and nostrils. No food: but respirators you pissed on. Typical army.’233
The sappers laboured to construct the elements of a flying bridge and three recalcitrant Arabs observed them closely. On the night of 4 March, the three men swam the river and reported to the Turks what was taking place in Kut.234 Immediately, the Turkish piquets were strengthened and the possibility of a surprise river crossing, never a high probability, now became a total non-starter.
The following day, the sappers constructed a mine and it was their intention to launch it into the river where it would float downstream and blow up one of Khalil’s bridges. The launch point was to be the Woolpress Village. The mine was sent on its way and was last seen dancing away on its mission of destruction. Shortly afterwards, it exploded and deposited a layer of mud all over the adjacent geography. E.W.C. Sandes235 was more specific and commented that it created a crater in the bank of the Shatt-al-Hai.236
On 5 March, Townshend sent, by wireless, his despatches from Ctesiphon. As is the norm, he named individuals who had distinguished themselves and recommended some for decorations. Then, in a typically gauche manner, he added that his division had:
suffered professionally in comparison with our comrades in the European theatres of war who, in many instances, are being promoted over our heads simply because the despatches of their operations were promptly published and promptly rewarded. I know in my own case that several major generals junior to me in the Army have been promoted to lieutenant general over my head although these officers had not had an independent command nor such responsibilities as I had.237
This ingenuous final paragraph encapsulates the ambition and feeling of self-worth that were the dominant characteristics of Charles Townshend.
In Basra, Lake had gripped the parlous administrative situation that he obtained in the port, but the problems were so deep-rooted and fundamental in nature that he was starting from scratch. Progress was being made but it was slow, and the turn-round time for ships was still measured in weeks and not days. Inevitably, the resupply of the divisions at the front remained inadequate.
The 13th Division was on its way to reinforce Aylmer, but the continuing sense of urgency had not abated despite the ex
traordinary message from Townshend that he had found ‘great supplies of barley’. He also averred that by killing and eating all his 3,000 animals he could resist for a further eighty-four days. Townshend and the truth were not always bedfellows, and this sudden windfall and the new estimate of survivability placed further strain on his credibility in Basra, Simla and London.
Completely unacceptable losses had been incurred at Sheikh Saad, the Wadi and the Hanna Defile and, despite a trickle of reinforcements coming upriver, the Tigris Corps was not fully up to strength, although the arrival of the 13th Division would alter the balance – if it arrived in time. In the meantime, Aylmer kept the Hanna Defile under fire and held Turkish troops in place. The only practical effect of that was that the Turks were encouraged to dig their fortifications deeper. On 13 February, General Townshend, expressing anxiety on account of the reports of the imminent arrival of two fresh Turkish divisions, urged that General Aylmer should advance as soon as possible.238
Townshend’s urging, not for the first, second or third time, was a goad that Aylmer did not need. The annual and entirely predictable spring floods were on time. The Tigris continued to rise throughout February, as did the water in trenches and previously dry watercourses across Mesopotamia. The Shatt-al-Hai was now navigable and General Lake recognised that that could provide the Turks with a route to Nasariyeh and from thence to Basra. It was sufficient reason for him to insist that Townshend continue to hold Kut and command the confluence of the Hai and the Tigris. By now it appeared that unless Kut was relieved by around 15 March, the probability was that the water table would accomplish what the Turks had so far failed to do.
Aylmer was under great pressure and decided to launch his attack on 6 March; however, the ground over which his soldiers had to advance was, as ever, a complete swamp. In the forlorn hope that conditions would improve, he delayed until 8 March. This was the same day that the first two battalions of the 13th Division arrived in Sheikh Saad. The remainder were strung out all the way back to Basra. Clearly, the Division was neither organised nor deployable, and certainly not battle ready.
Aylmer, having been worsted at Hanna, looked for another solution. He decided to switch his force to the right bank and by so doing bypass the Hanna position on the left bank. He would keep the Turks in position on the left bank and not allow them to decamp to the right bank.
It was not ideal and the terrain was much to the advantage of the defenders, but there was a possibility of outflanking the Es Sinn ridge. Although this was little more than a substantial bank within sight of Kut, it was elevated above the flat desert and provided line of sight and, in consequence, line of fire. Aylmer’s objective was the Dujaila Depression and its associated redoubt. The depression was not a large feature, being only about 150 yards wide, but, more usefully, some 6 feet deep. It afforded cover from sight and cover from direct fire. To its front it was flat terrain with a thin cover of thorny scrub and the two defendable Nasifiya and Maqasis canals. To the right of the depression and on the extreme right of the Turkish position was the Dujaila Redoubt, and this defence work was key to the battle that was to follow.
The master plan was to seize the redoubt and spin around it, mopping up the Turks from their now unprotected flank. Defeating the Turks on the right bank would destabilise their position on the left bank and open the door to Kut.
It gives the reader a sense of the scale of this operation if the composition of the British force is identified. The order of battle is below:
Column ‘A’ (Brigadier General G. Christian)
36th Brigade
37th Brigade
9th Brigade (from D’Urban Keary’s 3rd Division)
22,000 men, six guns
Column ‘B’ (Major General Kemball with Column ‘A’ under command)
28th Brigade and logistic support
8,000 men, twenty-four guns
Column ‘C’ (Major General D’Urban Keary)
7th Brigade
8th Brigade
6,500 men, thirty-two guns.
The Dujaila Redoubt was some 5 miles distant from the river and had no water supply. It was lightly held and the bulk of its nominated defenders bivouacked on the riverbank. A night march with superior numbers could be moved across the Turkish front so as to arrive at daybreak and mount an assault before the redoubt could be fully manned.
The key elements in this plan were the accurate timing of the approach march and the maintenance of surprise. The Mesopotamia Commission observed:
A night march is far from being an easy operation at any time. The difficulties vary with the nature of the ground, the distance to be traversed and the number of troops engaged. It requires good march discipline and first-rate staff work especially when, as in this case, an attack is to follow immediately. To Major General Kemball was entrusted the task of turning the flank to be attacked in cooperation with a column on his right.239
A realistic speed of march was estimated to be 1 mile per hour and the model for such an operation was that at Tel-el-Kebir in 1882, when Lord Wolseley marched 13,000 men 3½ miles over easy going. His troops arrived in the right place at the right time and his attack was a crashing success.
This case was different in both scale and scope. To outflank the Es Sinn bank, about 20,000 men would have to move between 12 and 16 miles, together with wheeled vehicles, field ambulances and pack animals. Concentrating this force before the start was, in itself, a test of coordination and required skilled staff work. Some of the units had to march several miles to the concentration area to rendezvous by 2030 hrs.
60. The Battle of the Dujaila Redoubt. (Ordnance Survey, 1924)
2100 hrs was the time of departure and only one hour had been built into the programme to cater for contingencies. The MC commented shrewdly that:
Lord Wolseley had had a marked advantage. His small army was entirely composed of well-trained British troops with a most efficient staff. General W. Aylmer’s force was heterogeneous, British and Indian troops being mixed up together and he and other generals make many complaints about the ‘scrappy’ character of their staffs. This army was expected to march about 14 miles [or more] in rather less than nine hours.
Aylmer had drawn up his plan for the advance and assault only after discussion with his formation commanders and a weighing of all the factors. The Corps Commander intended to exert complete control over the operation and accordingly his plan was very detailed. Much more significantly, he left little to the initiative of subordinate commanders. This determination to retain iron control was probably a by-product of his defeats at Sheikh Saad, the Wadi and the Hanna Defile. In those actions he had delegated the initiative and his subordinates had not served him well.
At 1400 hrs on 7 March, General Aylmer held a coordinating conference. General Gorringe was in attendance and the latter, in addressing the principal commanders, emphasised the fact that it was hoped to surprise the enemy. He concluded that, ‘As delay or hesitation in the attack would give the Turks time to push in their reserve and reinforcements, it was essential that the capture of the Dujaila Redoubt should be pushed through with the greatest vigour.’240
Aylmer predictably endorsed what Gorringe had said and underscored the vital necessity for dash in the impending operations. General Kemball received permission to eliminate his logistic tail from his assault force in order for them to march in the rear.
In the event, Kemball’s orders were issued too late and when he arrived at the rendezvous the whole of the transport and field ambulances were formed up as ordered originally. It was far too late to reorganise the order of march, so Kemball had to bite on this organisational bullet.
The night of 7 March was dry and proved to be fine, clear and starlit, with a fairly warm temperature. When Columns ‘A’ and ‘B’ under Kemball stepped off, he was at the head of a body that stretched for 2 miles over the desert. The force was led and guided by Captain K. Mason RE, assisted by a small staff that checked the dead reckoning with a bic
ycle wheel, three pedometers and an improvised pace-stick.241/242
Things had started to go wrong from the start. A number of units had been late in arriving at the concentration area and Kemball’s departure was delayed until 2222 hrs. The single hour allowed for contingencies was already used up. In the dark, units were mixed and valuable time was lost restoring order.
The march was marked by the need for brief halts in the first half hour; at midnight, after ninety minutes en route, only about 3 miles had been covered. As units paused on the march, men lay down and fell asleep – some were left behind. At midnight, Kemball ordered a ten-minute halt. Up the line came a message not to continue as Column ‘C’ had lost contact. This was because transport ahead of it had slowed and halted – another invaluable hour was lost before Kemball got the nod to move on. At 0230 hrs, the head of the column reached the predesignated ‘point of divergence’, and it was from here that the columns diverted, each to their own objectives.
A problem that had not been anticipated was the degree not only to which soldiers would fall asleep, but also the difficulty of waking them. The prime offenders were the drivers of mule and camel-drawn transport.
Kemball, whose 28th Brigade had the furthest to go, had had an unsuccessful campaign so far and was hoping for better days ahead. He advanced a further 2 miles, at which point he encountered an enemy entrenchment that, happily, was unoccupied. The Official History said that nevertheless the position was a significant obstacle because it was:
5 feet deep and too great an obstacle for the column to cross. The scouts of the 26th Punjabis moved south for about 150 yards and got round it, but a gap in the trench line some 30 yards wide was found for the column to pass through. This, however, necessitated reducing the front of the column and further delay occurred before all had negotiated it. In consequence, it was not until 0510 hrs that the head of the column struck the Dujaila Depression just beyond the entrenchment, at a distance of about 1½ miles from the point of divergence. Here a short halt was necessary to make certain that it was the depression (which was very shallow here), to allow the troops in the rear to close up and to change the direction of the advance to a bearing of 238°. There still remained a distance of about 3 miles to be traversed to General Kemball’s position of deployment, so it was clear that he could not reach it by the appointed time.