by N S Nash
Lord Hardinge, however, was judged to be generally responsible as he was the head of the IG and had been entrusted with the management of the expedition, medical provision included. He may have shown the ‘utmost goodwill’, but given the magnitude of his authority he was ‘not sufficiently strenuous and peremptory’. However, Duff earned ‘a more sever censure … for not only did he, as Commander-in Chief of the Army in India, fail closely to superintend the adequacy of medical provision but he declined, for a considerable time, to give credence to rumours which proved to be true and he failed to take measures, which a subsequent experience shows would have saved the wounded from avoidable suffering.’
There were more general criticisms made of the IG, but on perusal those criticisms are aimed at the only two people with the executive power to effect change and to improve the ‘cumbrous and inept military system of administration’. That is to say, Hardinge and Duff.
Generals Townshend, Aylmer, Younghusband, Gorringe and Lake did not feature in the Report in any negative sense, but Hathaway, Hardinge, Duff and Nixon attracted frequent criticism.
The tenor of life in the theatre was addressed by the Report and it commented upon the attempts made by Colonel Hehir to assist and advise Surgeon General Hathaway (on the instructions of General Babtie), which fell on stony ground and were clearly resented. The Report noted with disfavour the treatment meted out to Major Carter, the first to bring to the notice of the authorities the medical difficulties, and whom Generals Cowper and Hathaway then threatened with professional sanctions for his trouble. The Report also noted the later threats made to Cowper by Duff, via Lake, when Cowper, in turn, presumed to comment negatively on the provision of river transport. The Report concluded that, ‘Such incidents as these indicate the atmosphere of repression of complaints which permeated Indian officialdom, and do much to explain the unfortunate suppressions of truth.’293
The Report drew attention to the absurd dual chain of command that was in place in 1914, the various authorities that had to be consulted and who had a voice in the direction of affairs. It said:
We will enumerate the various authorities; first the General Officer Commanding on the spot in Mesopotamia, then the Commander-in-Chief in India, then the Viceroy, followed by the Secretary of State for India with his Military Secretary, then the War Council with the Imperial Staff and finally the Cabinet. It was under this dual system that the administrative failures took place during 1915 and early in 1916 and it was not until London took over the sole charge that there was any marked improvement in the management of the campaign.294
The members of the MC were not as one in the production of its Report, and Commander Josiah Wedgwood took a different view to his colleagues. He had served during the war and insisted on producing a minority report. He took a very robust line with the two most senior people who were considered to have a case to answer. He said, writing of the attitude of the IG towards the expedition to Mesopotamia and to the war as a whole:
It is precisely Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff who I cannot merely charge with human error. They, and they alone … formed and were the Indian Administration during that part of the war under consideration. Throughout their conduct of the war they seem to have shown little desire to help and some desire to actually obstruct the energetic prosecution of the war. [Author’s emphasis] As a reason for this obstruction they gave – the situation in India; and I for one feel no sense of obligation to them for placing ‘risks’ in India above the dire necessities of the British Empire, and the welfare of their own troops in Mesopotamia.295
69. Commander Josiah Wedgwood MP – the author of the Minority Report and outspoken critic of Hardinge and Duff. (Internet source)
In June 1917, the MC published its findings and, initially, these were only circulated in government circles – causing consternation, as very senior government servants, both military and civilian, were named in the most uncompromising terms. For example, Wedgwood had, in effect, accused Hardinge and Duff with conduct tantamount to treason. The body of the MC was less aggressive when it said:
To Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, as Viceroy, belongs the general responsibility attaching to his position as the head of the Indian Government, to which had been entrusted the management of the expedition, including the provision of medical services. In regard to the actual medical administration he appears to us to have shown throughout the utmost good will, but considering the paramount authority of his office, his action was not sufficiently strenuous and peremptory.
Wedgwood did not end with that first blast, and a little later in his report he added, ‘To charge two high officials with “little desire to help and some desire to actually obstruct the energetic prosecution of the war” is a serious accusation and one difficult to accept.’ He went on to say that he had accumulated a body of evidence from cables, letters and extracts from the protests made by such as Lord Kitchener and Lord Crewe. He then made it clear that Hardinge and Duff had served the Empire best by leaving their posts. He observed:
I have felt it advisable to back up the extracted evidence with a list of measures for helping the Empire that India has adopted since the departure of Lord Hardinge and General Duff, many of them having been previously waved aside as impracticable by these same officials in written evidence before the Commission. Such a list will confirm my findings.
Wedgwood’s ‘evidence’ fills many pages of the MC Report, and if nothing else it certainly highlights the unfortunate attitude of ‘India first at all costs’, an attitude that was emphatically confirmed when Lord Crewe, General Sir Edmund Barrow and Major General Maurice (Director of Military Operations) gave their evidence.
There is no profit in pursuing the campaign of Josiah Wedgwood, but suffice it to say he was clearly angered by what he had heard and was anxious that retribution should fall on those guilty of culpable incompetence. He was not alone. The publication of the MC Report, and Wedgwood’s addendum in particular, was inflammatory; the Government looked to limit the damage and the first step was to debate the issue in the House of Commons.
The MC Report had identified and censured in approximately descending order of culpability the following: Lord Hardinge, General Sir Beauchamp Duff, Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon, Major General H.G. Hathaway, Lieutenant General Sir William Babtie, Mr Austen Chamberlain, General Sir Edmund Barrow and the War Committee of the Cabinet.
The extraordinary, convoluted and grossly inefficient administrative system that managed the Indian Army was fully exposed and dissected by the Commission. The decision-making process, compounded by geographic constraints and inadequate funding, combined to inhibit the effectiveness of the Army. The Commission’s very strong recommendation for immediate reform and reorganisation was a positive outcome of its labours.
The MC, its work done, stood down and left it to HMG to decide how to play a very volatile document that simply could not be ignored.
Hardinge’s reaction at the time was predictable. The document was, in his view, ‘unfair and narrow minded, leaving the impression that Mesopotamia was India’s sole effort, criticising everybody and giving credit to nobody in the process’.296
The Cabinet’s concern, however, was how it was to deal with the Report. Pigeonholing it was not realistic and would certainly anger the House; the suggestion that there be courts martial for the civilians mentioned, like courts martial for officers, would, as a priority, require the drafting of specific charges. Neither would it be easy; as in Hardinge’s case, although the Commission had been censorious, it had nevertheless not specified any crime.
Lloyd George was in a quandary and recognised that the MC Report was a volatile document likely to blow up in his government’s face. There was a need to be decisive. The Prime Minister ducked the issue and took refuge in the safe haven of politicians – he appointed a committee to advise him.
But first there was to be a debate in the House of Commons.
Chapter notes
278 Hardinge
to Chamberlain telegram No. M39 0554, 18 July 1916.
279 Davis, P.K., Ends and Means, p.177.
280 Little, J.G.H., H. Asquith and Britain’s Manpower problems, 1914–1915.
281 Hansard, 14 August 1916.
282 MC Report, p.3.
283 On 21/22 October 1904 the Russian Baltic Fleet mistook forty-eight British fishing trawlers as torpedo boats of the Imperial Japanese Navy and opened fire. Fortunately, the Russian gunnery was appalling and only one trawler was sunk, with the loss of two men. The incident almost led to war with Russia.
284 Barker, A.J., The Neglected War, p.375.
285 Memorandum on India’s contribution to the War in Men, Material and Money: August 1914 to November 1918, India Office Library, L/MIL/17/5/2381.
286 Curzon, memo of 4 June 1917, Cab 1/24/5, Chamberlain to Curzon, 5 June, Chamberlain papers, E/6/3.
287 MC Report, p.111.
288 Ibid, p.112.
289 It also features in the Crewe papers at M/15(2) and also in Tragedy of Mesopotamia by George Buchanan at p.69 in his book, which was written in 1938.
290 MC Report, p.71.
291 Ibid, p.74.
292 Ibid, p.114.
293 Ibid, p.88.
294 Ibid, p.117.
295 MC, Wedgwood, p.121.
296 Busch, B.C., Hardinge of Penshurst, p.268.
Chapter 17
The Debate
‘It was Hardinge who had failed, not merely as a viceroy but as a man, half a whine and half an attempt to shift the blame and had just been made a Knight of the Garter in spite of the gathering protest about his competence.’
(The Morning Post, 13 July 1917)
The debate in the House of Commons, held over 12/13 July 1917 and faithfully recorded in Hansard, amounts to about 80,000 words. To put that into perspective, this book is about 100,000 words. The extracts from Hansard can do no more than give a flavour of the debate, in which there were few references to the officers and men who were so shamefully treated in Mesopotamia. In contrast, warm tributes were paid, during the debate, to the public service given to all of those who were censured in the Mesopotamia Commission Report. The only exception to the eulogising was Surgeon General Hathaway; he was the most junior of those named and attracted unanimous scorn.
On 12 July, Mr S. MacNeill addressed the House and challenged the status of Lord Hardinge. He quoted the cases of Lord Tenterden and the Earl of Iddesleigh who, on succeeding to peerages, did not apply for writs of succession to the House of Lords, on the grounds that a seat in that assembly would disqualify Lord Tenterden for the position of Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Earl of Iddesleigh for the position of Chairman of the Board of the Inland Revenue, of which they were respectively holders. He went on to ask, in one very long sentence:
What is the reason in Lord Hardinge’s case for the rupture of a hitherto unbroken constitutional usage, that a Member of either House of Parliament should not be a member of the permanent Civil Service; and whether, having regard to the fact that the Report of the Mesopotamia Commission is likely to shake public confidence in Lord Hardinge’s administrative ingenuity and the withholding of information from the public of foreign affairs, and the lack of effective control by Parliament of foreign policy, he will consider the desirability of removing Lord Hardinge from the Foreign Office in the public interest?
Mr Bonar Law297 the Leader of the House of Commons, replied on behalf of the Government, saying that, in his opinion, it was clearly open to the Government to allow a civil servant who is a peer to make a statement in the House of Lords on a particular occasion, provided that this course does not conflict with the duties of the office, which he holds for the time being. However, very significantly, he said he would not even consider the desirability of removing Lord Hardinge from his post.
That afternoon, Sir Fredrick Smith, the Attorney General (more popularly known as F.E. Smith), formally opened the debate and dealt at very great length with the authority, standing and legal issues arising from the MC and its Report. As a lawyer, he spoke in legalese and in the process dotted endless i’s as well as crossing a multitude of t’s. In part, he reiterated what Bonar Law had said the previous day.
70. Sir Frederick Smith MP, the Attorney General, 1917, later, 1st Earl of Birkenhead. (Internet source)
He was representing a government that had instituted the MC and had determined its composition. A deficiency of the Commission to have emerged was that it did not number a lawyer among its members and, accordingly, the taking of evidence, while satisfactory for an inquiry, was not sufficiently well founded to be used in a court of law. It follows that the nub of Smith’s early remarks was to advise that no evidence given to the MC could be used in the later prosecution of that witness. Smith then commented, perhaps ‘speculated’ is more accurate, upon the wishes of Parliament in establishing the MC by saying:
It said to them [the witnesses] in effect: ‘Throw yourselves practically and amply upon this Commission, and upon the protection given by this Act of Parliament, and we, on our part, give our assurance to you in return that nothing which you say at this Commission shall be used against you subsequently until it is supported and proved.’
As I have said in the House of Commons, there was not … one single voice raised against it, and if there had been a single voice raised against it, the answer would have been immediate. Such were the circumstances under which these officers appeared before the Mesopotamia Commission. I say frankly that I think the Act contemplated that the Commission would take evidence judicially; that is to say … take evidence according to legal rules. I remember making the observation at the time the Commission was appointed that there was not a single lawyer upon it.
Smith went on to say that the rules of evidence had not suddenly evolved as the result of some caprice. Rather were they the product of long deliberations and the experience of wise men. Their chief preoccupation was to see that an innocent man should not be found guilty. None could argue with that. Smith added that although the MC had not laid formal charges at anyone’s door, nevertheless the Press had insisted that Parliament and the Government should act as though charges had been laid and, what is more, had been proved. He then quoted from evidence taken by the MC and was immediately challenged by Sir Henry Dalziel, not on the evidence but his access to it.
This disagreement occupied valuable time and Mr James Hogge added his weight to the protest. The Speaker ruled that the Attorney General could not quote directly from the evidence but could summarise it. After this small spat, the debate moved on. Sir Frederick spoke of the procedure for the taking of evidence and said that as an officer gave his evidence any members of the Commission could ask him questions in the form of a cross-examination. He alleged that the witness was then dismissed and in many cases was never recalled. In the meantime, any number of other witnesses were called and may well have laid blame on the earlier witness and his conduct in the matter in question. The original witness was ‘never given the slightest opportunity of making any reply to the allegations.’ Smith claimed, incorrectly as it happens, that this happened frequently and then posed the question:
Can anyone suggest that you can properly punish on the strength of evidence taken in this way? Is there anyone in the House who will go so far as to say that you can inflict a most grave punishment upon a man when the evidence has been taken in this manner?
The Attorney General reminded the House of how serious some of these ‘charges’ were. Against Sir Beauchamp Duff it was of suppressing the truth, failure to communicate to Sir John Nixon information received as to the possible concentration of 60,000 Turks at Baghdad, and censuring General Cowper in respect of his demand for river transport. The principal charge made against Sir John Nixon was of suppressing the truth of the medical breakdown at Ctesiphon. The charge against General Hathaway was of not exhibiting due care and diligence in estimating and considering the medical provision that was necessary.
He pointed out that every one of these charges was against a general officer and, if asked to advise the military authorities as to whether a case could be brought against these officers at a court martial, he would undoubtedly reply in the affirmative. Smith then speculated that the unsought and unconfirmed opinion of the Judge Advocate General established the fundamental distinction between the case made against the officers and the case made against the civilians.
The Attorney General opined that no one would wish, in any way, to attenuate the gravity of some of the conclusions of the Commission, so far as civilians go. However, if a just and fair balance of the situation was to be maintained, it was essential to remember that the charges made against the officers were charges that in a court martial could be made the subject of proceedings, whereas the charges against civilians were of an entirely different character.
Smith underscored Bonar Law’s suggestion of the previous day that a tribunal be formed, partly composed of generals and partly of judges, with those involved represented by counsel, and those who presented the facts also with counsel. He considered that this tribunal would fit the bill.
Sir John Jardine, the MP for Roxburghshire, asked:
Will the Right Honourable Gentleman explain what are to be the powers of this Court? Does he mean that it shall deal with matters of errors of judgment, which are not criminal offences or misdemeanors? May it deal with cases of deficiency of intellect, for instance?
Smith explained the manner in which the proposed inquiry might conduct its business, at which Commander Wedgwood asked, ‘Would the Report come within the purview of the court of inquiry?’ To which Smith replied, ‘the Minority Report will be handed over with the rest of the Report.’ Wedgwood persevered, saying, ‘Will Lord Hardinge come before the inquiry?’ Crushingly, Smith answered, ‘I think that is obvious.’ Undeterred, Commander Wedgwood raised a key issue when he commented, ‘I made a charge against Lord Hardinge and will that come before the tribunal?’ Smith responded by saying: