by N S Nash
Sir John Chilcot’s public inquiry into the causes of Britain’s war in Iraq inspires little confidence. The inquiry itself was born of Gordon Brown’s political calculation, a transparent ploy to distance himself from his predecessor Tony Blair. … Whenever that the inquiry reports, it seems unlikely to change many minds: Britain’s opinions of that bloody and costly war are too deeply entrenched for any analysis, no matter how authoritative, to change them.
The extraordinary duration of the inquiry is a further cause for despair. Sir John’s decision to allow those criticised in his report to respond to that criticism may have had honourable motivations, but its practical effect has been disastrous: six years on there is still no date for publication. As the process drags on, lawyers on generous fees are the only beneficiaries.302
It may well be that the Chilcot Inquiry, or one of its historian members, recognised the criticism of the MC in its dealings with witnesses and has accordingly made every effort to avoid that pitfall of a hundred years before.
Although acknowledging the traditional ‘right of centre’ position of the newspaper, nevertheless its comment is germane. The public perception, in early 2016, is that the report of the Chilcot Inquiry will be less than satisfactory, although the members are unlikely to be accused of ‘criminality’, as their predecessors were. Nevertheless, the possibility of a transparent report that might lead any individual to face legal action is remote in the extreme and the nine caveats that limit the information to be published and available to the public will be a factor.
The high probability is that, just as in 1917, the findings of the Chilcot Inquiry will lead nowhere, but at great expense.
In mid-July 1917, the debate was over; in the desert wastes of Mesopotamia the mercury hovered between 110°F and 120°F, and so there was nothing new there. What was new was that the only sound was that of the wind as it found its way through the thorn bush.
The guns were silent; Baghdad had fallen to the thrusting Lieutenant General Maude and his vast army on 11 March. The war had moved much further on, and the trials and tribulations of an earlier generation of soldiers who had failed to reach Baghdad had faded slightly in memory.
The cemeteries were being reorganised and where possible some of the bodies of men who had drowned, died of exposure, shock or bullet wounds were being identified and given a burial appropriate to their faith. Basra now looked like the base of a large army; from utter chaos had come order, and September 1914 seemed like a hundred years ago.
There was general public anticipation that there would be retribution for the failures in Mesopotamia, but in reality, only two individuals suffered the least inconvenience.
The publication of the MC Report in June 1917 had hit the Army Council like a bombshell. It was expecting there to be criticism, but not of this gravity. On 6 July, and notwithstanding the performance of Hardinge in the House of Lords only a few days before, it directed that charges should be framed and court martial proceedings started against Duff, Nixon, MacNeese, Babtie and Hathaway.303 Barrow was ignored. The following day, after some further thought, it was decided to allow the ‘accused’ the opportunity to defend themselves at a public inquiry.
A minor glitch to be overcome was that, if a court martial was to be the tool for retribution, then Section 161 of the Army Act 1916, which applied specifically to courts of inquiry, would have to be waived. This section, inconveniently, debarred the trial of any soldier after three years from the commission of the offence.
The military arrangements hit another, and more serious, stumbling block on 11 July, when the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained by the MC became evident. By 19 July, any thoughts of conducting trial by court martial had been abandoned, but despite this, the ‘accused’ (not yet formally charged with any offence) were ordered to provide written explanations for their conduct and legal advice was made available to them. General Sir Edwin Barrow was excluded from the process and was cleared, tacitly, of any malfeasance.
Paul Davis304 had researched the matter in considerable detail but was unable to find these explanations on file; however, he did find that, ‘On 5 September Sir William Babtie’s statement was accepted as satisfactory.’305 Surgeon General Hathaway’s was not considered until 20 March 1918, and at that meeting the council decided that he should be called upon to retire. Hathaway was well towards the end of his service and his anticipated retirement age anyway. He left with his pension intact and, hurt pride apart, was unscathed. MacNeese was exonerated that same day.306
Nixon’s explanation was reviewed on 4 September 1918, seventeen months on – the Army Council then ‘excused him’.307 Duff did not respond to the order for an explanation. He was not pursued, the matter was dropped and so he too was, in effect, exonerated by default.
The senior officers responsible, in one form or another, for the debacle in the desert had walked free. Curzon had alleged in a memo to the Cabinet on 17 June 1917 that:
the publication of the Report would – in such a case as that of the ex-Viceroy – in itself be a punishment to those whose conduct had been thus exposed and that it would be very damaging to their reputations and future careers.308
To a point he was right; they did indeed, albeit briefly, carry the taint of censure, but there was no discernible impact on future careers. The public memory is short; the war would soon be won and then the campaign in the Middle East would slip into its correct perspective as just a ‘side show’ to the main event.
72. Commonwealth War Grave Commission Cemetery in Basra, now Iraq.
In 1917, the Government progressively exculpated those responsible for the disastrous events in the desert. For the men of the Tigris Corps, and the 6th Division in particular, this was the final and most insulting betrayal.
Initially, their elected political masters and their military leaders had betrayed them. Now, the House of Commons, at whose behest they had gone to war and which had the capacity to provide redress, had betrayed them. Frederick Smith, Arthur Balfour and David Lloyd George figured high on the list of these, the most recent betrayers.
The sequence of events outlined here begs the question, was justice served?
Emphatically, it was not!
Was it a public disgrace?
Of course it was, and a hundred years later, the events that gave rise to the Mesopotamia Commission remain an immovable, dark blot on Britain’s military history. The hope is that the men who died will not be forgotten and the men who indirectly caused their deaths will not be forgiven.
Chapter notes
298 George Nicoll Barnes CH PC (1859–1940), Labour politician.
299 Edward George Villiers Stanley, 17th Earl of Derby KG, GCB, GCVO, TD, PC, KGStJ, JP (1865–1948). From July 1916 Under-Secretary of State for War, later, Secretary of State. Ambassador to France 1918–20.
300 Busch, B.C., Hardinge of Penshurst, p.218.
301 Manchester Guardian, 13 July 1917, p.4.
302 The Daily Telegraph, 14 August 2015.
303 Army Council meeting, 216, 6 July 1917, WO/163/22.
304 Davis, P.K., Ends and Means, p.221.
305 Army Council meeting, 230, 5 September 1917, WO/163/22.
306 Army Council informal meeting, 20 March 1918, WO/163/23.
307 Army Council informal meeting, 4 September 1918, WO/163/23.
308 Busch, B.C., Hardinge of Penshurst, p.218.
Appendix A
What Happened to Old …?
‘How softly but how swiftly they have sidled back to power by the favour and contrivance of their kind.’
(Rudyard Kipling, Mesopotamia, 11 July 1917)
Tens of thousands of people played a part in the desert campaign between September 1914 and April 1916. The overwhelming majority did as they were bidden, and many paid with their lives. Apart from Charles Townshend, none of those who ordered affairs in Mesopotamia were ever at any physical risk.
It would be appropriate to tie up some loose ends and determine just what effect,
if any, the MC Report had on some of the main players.
* * *
Austen Chamberlain KG
Secretary of State for India, 25 May 1915–17 July 1917
His resignation raised his profile, attracted many plaudits for his high principles and did him no harm at all. He was quickly back at the centre of public life. Chamberlain, possibly the least culpable of those censured, was guilty of being misled. His resignation brought a wave of support and his principled action added to his reputation. The India Office was no great loss and, although out of high office, he was quickly reemployed. He became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1919, a post he held until 1921, by which time he was the leader of the Conservative Party and Lord Privy Seal.
His career flourished and in 1924 he became Foreign Secretary. In this post he excelled, and his skilled negotiations in 1925 established the ‘Locarno Pact’. In an effort to maintain the post-war status quo in the West, Chamberlain was prepared to assist the German Foreign Minister in seeking a British guarantee of Germany’s western borders.
Chamberlain actively supported the cause of Franco-German reconciliation and his aim was to create a situation where Germany could pursue its territorial revisionism in Eastern Europe ‘peacefully’. Chamberlain believed that if Franco–German relations improved, France would abandon its cordon sanitaire, and as soon as France had traded off its relations with eastern allies, closer relations with Germany would be the beneficial result, although Poland and Czechoslovakia would be obliged to adjust to German demands.
With hindsight it is glaringly obvious that this was an incredibly dangerous policy, depending as it did on German goodwill in which, we now know, that nation was manifestly hugely deficient. Chamberlain, by his actions, was a contributory factor to the outbreak of the Second World War.
His success in driving through this flawed plan resulted in his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In addition, he was created a Knight of the Order of the Garter.
Chamberlain died on 17 March 1937, aged seventy-three, just as the German war machine was limbering up. Less than three months later, his half-brother Neville became Prime Minister and fell victim to that war machine, in part, created by Austen.
* * *
General Sir Beauchamp Duff GCB GCSI KCVO CIE KStJ
Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, 8 March 1914, replaced in June 1917
Duff may have ignored the Army Council, but the censure of the MC and the accusation that he (and Hardinge) ‘showed little desire to help and some desire actually to obstruct the energetic prosecution of the war’ caused him distress. He was, for practical purposes, removed from his post as soon as he returned to the UK to give evidence to the MC. He was, of course, at the time the incumbent Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army and a person of considerable substance. The indignity added to his pain and apparently he was the one individual to be filled with remorse. He was found dead in his bed on 20 January 1920. Allegedly, he had committed suicide by taking an overdose. He was sixty-two.
* * *
Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon GCMG KCB
Commander, Indian Expeditionary Force ‘F’, 1 April 1915–19 January 1916
Although Nixon was censured by the MC and later exonerated by the Army Council, he was nevertheless removed from the active list of the Army and retired in late 1918. In 1975, Nixon attracted the attention of Norman Dixon, who coupled Nixon’s name with others when he wrote of a group:
whose besetting sin was overweening ambition coupled with terrifying insensitivity to the suffering of others. These men like Haig, Townshend, Walpole, Nixon and Joffre seemed dedicated to one goal – selfadvancement. Vain, devious, scheming and dishonest, they were certainly not inactive in the courses they pursued, nor, of course, were they without military talents.309
Be that as it may, the following year Nixon was decorated as Knight Grand Cross of the order of St Michael and St George (GCMG). This is a very high honour and its award to Nixon was a powerful indication of his absolution by His Majesty’s Government.
In 1921, Nixon and his wife went to the Côte d’Azur to spend the winter. On 15 December, Nixon died at St Raphael, aged sixty-four. His career had been exemplary until those fateful few months (April 1915–January 1916) in which he commanded in Mesopotamia.
* * *
Lieutenant Sir Edmund Barrow GCB KCMG
Military Secretary to the India Office, 1914–1917
He was sixty-two when he took up the job of Military Secretary to the India Office. After his censure by the MC in 1917, he moved smoothly on and was appointed to be a member of the autocratic Council of India. He retired in 1919 and died in 1934.
* * *
Lieutenant General Sir William Babtie VC KCB KCMG
Director, Medical Services India, 22 March 1914–5 June 1915 Principal Director, Army Medical Services, Mediterranean, 15 June 1915–10 March 1916
He was an officer whose personal qualities were never in doubt, but the MC questioned his competence. In September 1917, he provided the written explanation demanded of him. Then he too moved smoothly onward. On 1 March 1918, he was promoted to lieutenant general and appointed Inspector of Medical Services. The following year he was decorated as Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath (KCB) but he did not have long to enjoy his enhanced status because he died on 11 September 1920, aged sixty.
* * *
Major General Harold G. Hathaway CB
Principal Medical Officer Mesopotamia, April 1915 to about 6 July 1916
Hathaway was obviously over-promoted and out of his depth, but it took time for his inadequacy to be noted. He was ‘mentioned in despatches’ for his services up to September 1915 and the taking of Kut. This was not gazetted until 4 April 1916, by which time the dire medical situation in Mesopotamia was well reported. On 6 July 1916, after a month’s sick leave, he was posted ‘home’, and that implies back to the UK.
On 24 February 1917, his name was ‘brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for War for valuable services rendered in connection with the war’. The Army Council gave thought to his ‘explanation’ on 20 March 1918, and barely two weeks later, on 7 April, his retirement was recorded. Hathaway, who had been born on 30 June 1860, enjoyed a lengthy retirement until his death on 3 September 1942, aged eighty-two.310 No photograph of Hathaway could be found.
* * *
Major General Sir Charles Townshend KCB DSO
GOC 6th (Poona) Division, Indian Army, 23rd April 1915–29 April 1916
After the surrender of Kut, it was thought that, had Townshend insisted that he and his officers would stay with their men, some of the horrors of the ensuing death march would have been avoided. However, marching 1,000 miles with his men was not on Charlie’s agenda and, from April 1916, Charles Townshend went into very comfortable captivity.
He was the recipient of guards of honour and a pleasing degree of Turkish adulation. Enver Pasha, the Turkish War Minister, who knew full well the conditions his people were inflicting on their prisoners, condoned it. He was an unmitigated swine, and Townshend had the opportunity to influence him when he visited, but failed to do so.
Charles Townshend lived in considerable style in a handsome house on the island of Halki. He was comfortable in captivity and was able to swim and walk about the island at will. Once settled, Townshend started to lobby the British Government to allow his wife to join him in ‘captivity’. The Turks had no objection but H.H. Asquith wrote to Mrs Townshend on 1 August 1916311 refusing permission.
Charlie’s next ploy was to ask the Turks to give him parole so that he could go and live quietly in Spain. This approach came to nothing but it had afforded Charlie the chance to partake of generous lunches during the negotiations.
As winter approached, Townshend and his entourage were moved to Prinkipo, a larger island with a more sheltered aspect. The new prison was the former home of the British Consul; ‘It looked like a country vicarage with a charming garden,’ reported Errol Sherson, his cousin
and the first of his biographers.
The bad news was that, back in England, the Marchioness of Townshend, despite eleven years of childless marriage to the 6th Marquess, had given birth to a son. This small boy would be the 7th Marquess and Charles Townshend would now never be Lord Townshend – he was not going to be a lieutenant general soon either.
In October 1916, his disappointment was slightly ameliorated when he was notified that he had been promoted to Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath (KCB). With marked lack of grace, he grunted at Boggis that it was ‘not before time’, adding, ‘I don’t suppose anyone will begrudge me my KCB after thirty-five years’ service in nine campaigns and nine mentions in despatches. It has not been awarded too soon.’312
It has to be said that, based on his record of success, he could reasonably have expected to be decorated back in September 1915, after he took Kut. Townshend’s regular contact with senior Turks and the manner in which they entertained him started to affect the setting of his moral compass, and increasingly he identified with the Turkish cause. An amateur psychologist might wonder if he was an early example of the ‘Stockholm syndrome’.313
As the war ran to its end, Townshend sought to play a part in the peace negotiations. He was rejected by HMG. Similarly, on his return to the UK, via Paris, where he spent time with his wife, he was invited coldly to explain, ‘in writing’, why he had given an unauthorised press conference to The Times.
73. The Prime Minister’s reply to Mrs Townshend. (A.J. Barker)
74. Townshend in captivity with his personal staff. From the left. LCpl J. Boggis, Tewfic Bey (Turkish ADC) General Townshend, Captain Morland ADC. (Braddon)
Townshend lobbied for further employment but had by now attracted the disfavour of Field Marshals Haig and Robertson. To be held in low esteem by one field marshal would be career limiting, but the disfavour of two is terminal. To cap that degree of disfavour, the icing on the career cake was when King George V expressed the view that Charles Townshend should have stayed with his men.