by Shuja Nawaz
The national system of decision making has been whimsical and prompted more by personal gain than public good. It shuns institutions in favour of individual actions. Kitchen cabinets have undermined the process of elections and systems of government. The persistence of antique bureaucratic systems adds to the ballast holding back change. Pakistani leaders need to understand that good government is the best antidote to the creeping menace of religious extremism, signs of which have begun appearing in all South Asian countries.
Security remains a looming concern. But the current sequencing of security and then economic development needs to be reversed. Expanding economic opportunities can help trigger and sustain changes in social systems. If these developments are accompanied by better governance and the devolution of fiscal authority to local levels, security would become the business of the populace and not just the state alone. The command economy approach has not worked well in South Asia. Its leaders need to trust the inherent capacity of their people to work hard and to innovate, as they do when they resettle in the developed world. If this happens, South Asia could create the world’s largest contiguous market and a source of jobs not just for itself but also for the developed world with which the region now has burgeoning economic, trade and investment ties.
Internal security will continue to be a drag on political and economic decision making, despite heavy military presence and operations. The contagion of jihadi ideology, assisted by speedy web-based transmission mechanisms, will add an extra layer of uncertainty. Protected economies operating at sub-optimal levels may lead South Asia and particularly Pakistan to miss the opportunity to make the region the fulcrum of the global economy by 2035.
Pakistan has the ability to stay ahead of the curve and help transform itself as well as the region around it. If it makes the right choices, and receives the right kind of advice and assistance from its friends.
Improving the US–Pakistan Relationship
Among those friends, the US is the oldest major power to have had a relationship with Pakistan. But, the US has failed to develop a steady relationship with Pakistan despite its potential leverage of direct economic and military assistance, including a large quantum of training for the best and brightest military officers from Pakistan, and assistance from US-dominated international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank. Pakistan continues to view its regional interests and strategies at a tangent from the views of the US and its Coalition partners, while ostensibly working with the Coalition Forces in return for Coalition Support Funding (or any successor arrangement).
This will be a major challenge for the Imran Khan government, as it balances sovereignty against the need to have relationships with the West and China. Pakistan needs to free itself of economic dependence on US aid by undertaking reforms internally and reducing tensions with India and Afghanistan. It can do this. Rather, it must do this.
There are a number of critical factors that will affect Pakistan’s view of India and the US in the next few years:
The below par state of the economy in Pakistan is a serious cause for concern. Increased pressures from the return of migrant workers from the Middle East, and demographic pressures internally, leading to a sharp increase in the Youth Bulge and a rapid urbanization, will add to Pakistan’s difficulties at achieving stability at home. Compounding these will be a lack of institution-building, and weak decision-making systems in managing the economy. For example, the PML-N government was unprepared for the roughly $7.4 billion ‘budgetary savings’ windfall per annum that resulted from the drop in the price of imported energy in 2015 and beyond and frittered it away on inconsequential projects and pork barrel politics. A senior minister, who was a member of the prime minister’s inner circle, told me the ‘savings’ from the energy import bill had ‘gone down the hole’. The reality is that both Pakistan and the US will have to do more with less in the next decade or so.
A persistent dynastic and corrupt political system under which the major Old Guard political parties are led by autocrats or run as family businesses is increasingly coming under fire from Pakistani society. The 2018 elections reflected this changing trend. Opposing them, increasingly through extra-legal and subterranean operations, are a growing number of extremist militant groups that use Islam as a rallying cry against the state and neighbours, including India and Afghanistan.
At the same time, a powerful military establishment continues to foster a ‘culture of entitlement’ for its senior ranks. (This is mimicked by civilian entities.) It actively protects its turf even against the constitutionally superior civilian government. Yet, despite being the best organized group in Pakistan today, the Pakistan military remains organizationally stuck with administrative systems that rely on outmoded budgetary and management systems. There is very little active or open oversight and accountability of military finances and management systems by the civilian rulers of Pakistan. The military can and should achieve much-needed economies and efficiencies in its operations autonomously as well as with greater oversight and inquiry from the peoples’ elected representatives in parliament. A leaner, more mobile and more effective military may offer a more powerful defence of the country against internal and external threats.
On the positive side, the Pakistani military, particularly the army and air force, have been transformed in recent years into a force that is focused on fighting internal militancy and insurgency. Younger officers are routinely sent from the PMA to the border region. They are all battle-inoculated and tend to view unfavourably the corruption of their civilian masters as well as the visible wealth acquired by senior military officers through the acquisition of real estate via the proliferation of the defence housing schemes that provide windfall profits with relatively small investments. Continued urban recruitment will strengthen such views among the younger recruits.
The multiple ethnic and sectarian wars within Pakistan will persist for some time to come and drain the ability of the state and the military to de-weaponize and de-radicalize Pakistani society. Some political parties are seen as beholden to jihadi groups with whom they have electoral alliances. Others use militant wings of their parties to amass wealth through kidnappings, extortion and coercion. But the state and the military should not strengthen the hands of militant sectarian groups by so-called ‘mainstreaming’ initiatives. As in the past, the fostering of such groups may boomerang on the patrons over time.
What Can the US Do?
There are persistent Pakistani suspicions, particularly in the senior leadership of the army, that the US aims to defang Pakistan’s nuclear capacity and will countenance or even support Indian moves against Pakistan as a regional surrogate for the US in that regard. Lack of a centre of gravity in decision making inside Pakistan, with the civil and the military often at loggerheads, and the heavy reliance by the US on its mil-to-mil contacts to affect decisions inside Pakistan, has exacerbated the problems of communication and cooperation between these so-called allies.
The US can work on multiple fronts to build Pakistani confidence in this relationship, while shifting the onus on to the Pakistanis to craft mechanisms for implementing, benchmarking and reviewing projects and cooperative operations in both the civil and military sectors. Creating Pakistani ownership of these operations is critical to instilling confidence and fostering trust. This approach also makes it easier for the US to turn off the aid spigot if Pakistan fails to meet its own self-imposed targets without the US being seen as arbitrary or antagonistic.
Some in the early Trump administration’s military leadership often cited Thucydides’ dictum of ‘Fear, Respect and Honour’ as guiding principles in approaching relationships with other countries or institutions. 10 This needs to be applied to relations with Pakistan, putting the US decision makers in Pakistani shoes and seeing how Pakistanis measure US actions in light of Pakistani fears, their need for respect, and an honourable method of interaction. Both sides would do well to dust off and re
view the Kayani 3.0 and Kayani 4.0 documents so they can mutually agree on updating and revalidating the issues Gen. Kayani outlined in those seminal documents in 2010 and 2011. Prime Minister Khan also echoed these sentiments when he said that his maiden visit to Washington DC in July 2019 was not to ask for anything other than ‘understanding’.
Pakistan also needs to understand and verify that the US does not wish to take away its nuclear capabilities but wishes to help safeguard its sovereignty and assets. Moreover, the US must work to help Pakistan understand that it will not assist any foreign attempt to undermine Pakistan’s integrity and independence. Finally, the US must make it clear that it can bolster Pakistan’s defence but will not support offensive capabilities. Candour and honesty from the Pakistani side would help demolish some of the fears of the American counterparts.
A number of approaches could be explored by the US:
Employ the US influence directly and through international financial institutions to transform Pakistan’s management of the economy, especially its longer-term strategies to deal with growing demographic pressures and changing economic situations in the Middle East. A more efficient system of employing economic aid, monitoring and reviewing its use at the provincial level and setting of attainable targets by the Pakistanis themselves would engender great confidence among donors and potential donors. This will require transforming the Economic Affairs Division into a more professional and active body inside the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan tends to over-promise and under-deliver on economic aid. It needs to become more realistic in its planning, and the US could help it draft achievable plans and projects. The US could follow the Chinese model of insisting on a strong US presence at the federal and provincial level to help monitor progress of implementation. But this needs to be done in a quieter and low-key manner so the US is not seen as hegemonic.
Help Pakistan achieve a bigger bang for its military dollars. This could be done by providing Pakistan advice and assistance in adopting a practicable taxonomy for defence planning and management, revamping the budget system so it is driven by results rather than wishlists of the military. Helping Pakistan understand the need for longer-term defence planning and budgeting along the lines of the quadrennial review in the US may be a start. The US could provide expertise in the theoretical construct of such reviews and budgetary mechanisms without requiring Pakistan to share sensitive details of its plans and expenditures with the US. Use of NATO partners, especially the British, in this process would make it less US-dominated and more palatable to the Pakistani military. If the US can help the Pakistan military remove the fat inside its own system, it might help it understand that US intentions are not mala fide and they can do much more with what they have rather than constantly demanding more resources from their own government and the US.
The US could help improve Pakistan’s defences while exercising greater influence over its offensive capabilities in the neighbourhood. Pakistan has a relatively immobile land army that forces it to rely on tactical nuclear weapons for defence. Provision of three helicopter fleets (fifty helicopters each) with troop-lifting capacity for the long eastern border and another fleet of fifty helicopters for use in monitoring the western border and attacking insurgents in the difficult terrain of the western marcher regions would enhance Pakistan’s defences. Prohibitions on the movement of the western fleet to the eastern border could be imposed if the supply of helicopters were under a lease agreement rather than outright purchase.
Reducing Pakistan’s paranoia of India’s growing military might is a more difficult task. If India could be persuaded to shift one or more of its three strike corps facing Pakistan to the Chinese border or deeper into the heartland, the signalling effect on Pakistan would be enormous. So long as a third of the Indian military budget continues to be spent on troops arrayed against Pakistan, it is hard to convince the Pakistanis that India does not wish to coerce Pakistan into submission. 11 The US could quietly help India make this strategic shift to reduce regional tensions.
The White House and Department of State also need to work in tandem with the Pakistani government and the US Congress with the Pakistani parliament to help make government more open, inclusive, and pluralistic in running the country. In other words, make Pakistan truly the federation that its constitution has defined. A greater review and public scrutiny by parliament of economic and military matters would assist the growing media inside Pakistan to play a more useful role in informing the public about key issues and answers. Engaging with and educating civil society and media in this direction would act as a multiplier for the US efforts to assist Pakistan. Much has already been done by the US to build these relationships with Pakistani civil society. But it could be better branded and publicized and owned by Pakistani counterparts.
The US needs to craft a clearer and longer-term Pakistan strategy and not see it as a spin-off or subset of its Afghanistan or India strategies. Once Pakistanis understand this to be the case, they will feel more respected and comfortable in taking the US at its word. While it may be tempting to follow a ‘feel good’ policy of isolating or containing Pakistan, those approaches confuse America’s friends within the country and weaken their position while achieving little by way of influence in what still remains a critically important country in a tough neighbourhood.
History has taught us that crises will continue to erupt in the Arc of Instability that extends from Turkey to Indonesia. Who knows when the US may need to have Pakistan on its side again? Therefore, it should eschew the short-term fix and over-reliance on the military channel to solve problems as they arise.
The Americans should ask the Pakistanis to help identify ways its allies can work with them to improve nuclear safety and the prevention of leakage of nuclear materials and weapons into the hands of unsavoury groups, and work with them to further strengthen safeguards. This approach is better than offering unsolicited public advice. The US has provided more aid without strings and more grant aid to Pakistan than China, yet the Chinese are perceived by the Pakistan government and the public as a better friend of Pakistan than the US. One reason is that they lower the boom quietly and privately, while the different branches of the US government and political system resort to public criticism that provokes perverse behaviour from counterparts inside Pakistan. Here the constraints of the US system with its different centres of power in Washington DC come into play. But the Executive Branch needs to take the lead as a champion of a new policy.
The US need not always be the lead Western agency for change in Pakistan. Use of key NATO allies, especially the British, the Germans and the Turks, could help it achieve its goals. This bank-shot approach might sometimes be preferred, since on some issues Pakistanis listen more to the British and the Germans and Turks. The NATO office in Islamabad, populated by the Turks, has been one of the best-kept secrets in Pakistan! A growing number of senior military officers in today’s Pakistan Army have been trained in Germany and Britain. The Australians also could help Pakistan think through the institutional changes needed to assess the structure to support the work of the newly minted National Security Committee. Their own experience in reshaping their security structure would help. 12
In the end, Pakistan itself is key to its change and development. It has the people, the ideas, the strategic location and untapped resources to make it a peaceful hub for economic activity in South and Central Asia. If it chooses that objective, the US, China and others could help it reach its goals. But it needs to define its goals and stick to them. It should avoid the popular American Sage Yogi Berra’s advice: ‘When you get to the fork in the road, take it!’
1 Constitution of Pakistan, Article 6, high treason: 1. Any person who abrogates or subverts or suspends or holds in abeyance, or attempts or conspires to abrogate or subvert or suspend or hold in abeyance, the Constitution by use of force or show of force or by any other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason; www.infopakistan.pk/constitution-of-pakistan/article/6-Hi
gh-treason
1 If memory serves me well, I first came to know this play and Arms and the Man by Shaw as a young man and occasional member of the Rawalpindi Amateur Theatrical Society (RATS), which was formed by members of the diplomatic corps and locals in Rawalpindi and Islamabad in the late 1960s.
2 Interview with Peter Lavoy, February 2017, Washington DC.
3 ‘Mobile Phone Users in Pakistan 150 Million in May 2011’, Telecoalert, 27 June 2018, https://www.telecoalert.com/mobile-phone-users-in-pakistan-150-million-in-may-2018/
4 Umair Javed, ‘Pakistan’s Middle Class’, Dawn, 20 November 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1371675
5 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Penguin Random House, 2019.
6 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Press, 2004.
1 Charles Dickens described it thus in his nineteenth-century book American Notes (Penguin Classics, reprint 2001), though he referred more to the architectural plans of Pierre L’Enfant than the machinations of American politicians in Washington DC.
2 Dawn, ‘Text of the Charter of Democracy’, 16 May 2006, http://www.dawn.com/news/192460
3 Agence France-Presse report posted by AAJ TV: AAJ News Archive, ‘Benazir to Put Up Amin against Musharraf ’, 26 September 2007, http://aaj.tv/2007/09/benazir-to-put-up-amin-against-musharraf/
4 Hamid Javed was a classmate of mine in the lower school at St. Mary’s Cambridge School on Murree Road, Rawalpindi, and we reconnected briefly when he was named Defence Attaché at the Pakistan embassy in Washington in the early 1990s.