The Targeter

by Nada Bakos

  In 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had been busy finishing a doctoral degree in Quranic studies at Saddam University, in Baghdad. A year later, Baghdadi was being held by US forces at Camp Bucca, the main American-run prison camp in Iraq at the time. It appears he had been arrested in Fallujah while visiting a friend whose name showed up on a coalition “Wanted” list. Over the coming years, many more such incidental arrests would fill US detention centers.

  The reason for holding Baghdadi for ten months has never fully been ascertained. He may have held fanatical ideologies, or he may have been one of the 90 percent of inmates who, according to Red Cross reporting, were arrested “by mistake.” Whatever Baghdadi’s mind-set going into that prison was, there’s no doubt about his state of mind when he emerged. The same is true of any number of the inmates at US-run Iraqi prisons I visited. “Many of us at Camp Bucca were concerned that instead of just holding detainees, we had created a pressure cooker for extremism,” said former air force security officer James Skylar Gerrond, who was Bucca’s compound commander from 2006 to 2007. “When some of Baghdadi’s personal history started to come out,” Gerrond told Mother Jones, “I started to reflect on my deployment and what the conditions were at the facility during that time.”

  Quietly, inmates began referring to Camp Bucca as “the Academy.” One of Baghdadi’s fellow detainees told Al-Monitor, “New recruits were prepared so that when they were freed they were ticking time bombs.” Longtime prisoners would take a new arrival under their wings to “teach him, indoctrinate him, and give him direction so he leaves a burning flame.” That approach lingered at Bucca long after Baghdadi was released, in December of 2004—just after al Qaida had made Zarqawi’s Iraq offshoot an official franchise.

  Following his time in detention, Baghdadi reportedly connected with a relative who had joined al Qaida and was put in contact with a representative of Zarqawi’s group in Iraq. AQI sent him to Syria, and from Damascus Baghdadi helped oversee the network’s online propaganda mill. He continued on in a similar role once Zarqawi was killed and, like AQI’s founder, soon climbed the ranks of the newly named Islamic State of Iraq under Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi through sheer force of will and demonstrated brutality. In the spring of 2010, he was selected by the group’s senior consultative council to take over after Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi were killed. That succession—another step in the thought experiment I occasionally ponder—may have been enabled by al-Iraqi’s capture in 2006 and exacerbated by the surge. And if so, it set the stage for everything Baghdadi has since unleashed.

  As Baghdadi began putting his imprint on the organization throughout 2010, he filled its upper ranks with fellow radicalized inmates who’d been detained at Camp Bucca—many of whom were captured during the surge. The following year, Baghdadi capitalized on regional instability by expanding his group’s influence and capturing territory in neighboring Syria; by 2013, Baghdadi had enough of a foothold there to rename his network the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS (sometimes known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL). ISIS established a de facto capital for their caliphate in Raqqa, Syria; then Baghdadi set his sights on expanding across western Iraq.

  Baghdadi systemically dismantled border security between the two countries, creating a pipeline through which radical foreign fighters were once again funneled into northern Iraq. ISIS recruits in Iraq and Syria have unleashed waves of barbaric violence, beheading policemen, chopping the hands off of thieves, selling women and children into sex slavery, and mass-executing Iraqi soldiers who opposed them. Much of it has been filmed and posted online and disseminated widely through social media channels that didn’t exist in the days when I hunted Zarqawi. Yet as his organization rose in global recognition, what has been most startling to me are the haunting echoes of the past.

  There were reportedly more than 275 suicide bombings in Iraq in 2013, nearly all of which US officials attributed to Baghdadi’s network. I didn’t have to read past the headlines to know that the group’s main targets were mosques, playgrounds, and markets within Iraq’s Shia community. I recognized all that from Zarqawi’s old playbook: “If we succeed in dragging [Shias] into the arena of sectarian war,” Zarqawi wrote to the al Qaida leadership nearly a decade earlier, “it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger.” Baghdadi advanced that message further than even Zarqawi did, so much so that in the summer of 2014, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani—Iraq’s highest-ranking Shia cleric, who traditionally shunned any sort of political vocation—summoned civilian Shias to take up arms in defense of their homeland. In a scene reminiscent of early 2006, Sistani’s call was promptly answered by “thousands of gun-toting men, who emerged in Baghdad, Basra and other Iraqi cities to declare their readiness to join a holy war,” said the Wall Street Journal. What was old was new again.

  In another unsettling parallel to Zarqawi’s reign of terror, Baghdadi’s indiscriminate thirst for blood has made al Qaida central squeamish. Videos of ISIS militants drowning and immolating prisoners, including journalists and aid workers, have led the most notorious of all terror groups to once again dissociate itself from ISIS and from what was happening on the ground in Iraq. Baghdadi’s network “is not a branch of the al Qaida group,” al Qaida’s general command said in a 2014 statement. “[Al Qaida] does not have an organizational relationship with [ISIS] and [al Qaida] is not the group responsible for their actions.”

  Regardless of its decrease in territory and evolving media strategy, ISIS remains the most prominent extremist network in the world. Many of Baghdadi’s followers are young enough to have only faint memories of the September 11, 2001, attacks that thrust al Qaida into international infamy; others had not yet been born at the time. In fact, one of ISIS’s most shocking tactics has been to have school-age children gun down its prisoners.

  Regardless, some of today’s mujahideen see al Qaida as out of touch. Bolstered by a surprisingly savvy public relations wing—which even publishes annual reports for its financial backers, accounting for the numbers of assassinations, car bombings, and cities occupied that year—ISIS appeals to the social-networking generation of extremists. Al Qaida continues on as a covert terrorist organization, thrives through affiliates, and inspires radicalization of individuals.

  I had been hoping the next president of the United States would engage in a political collaboration with the entire region and put pressure on the governments that are part of the proxy war inside Syria. A zero-sum solution would fail—and has failed—miserably. During any major humanitarian crisis, focusing on a perfect political solution instantaneously is unrealistic: stemming the violence should first and foremost be the priority, leaving open the option to rebuild a better, and possibly different, version of Syria. Let’s use some of the tools that Richard Holbrooke used with the Dayton Accords—let go of the idealism and create the conditions required to force a solution.

  The question of how to dismantle these networks for the long term is not and cannot be answered solely by a military response—regardless of which military is responding. Terrorism is not an existential threat to the United States and requires a multilayer approach that is not linear and should encompass locally derived goals. The US government should envision kinetic operations as only one part of a broader strategy to stabilize a country in conflict, or we will continue to find ourselves in a perpetual war.

  The entities responsible for carrying out counterterrorism work in the United States carry out divergent actions with no coherent purpose. This lack of coherent purpose makes it easy to fall into the trap of misreading activities, such as strikes or raids, as ends in and of themselves. They are divorced from a strategy or series of policies that might have a more cumulative impact on terrorist actors or communities, providing them with operating space. From Southeast Asia to the Middle East and North Africa, the US government often has turned to kinetic operations, a tactical function, as a substitute for a
strategy. As hinted at earlier, these operations offer a veneer of “doing something” when there is a sense of urgency in the face of a perceived or real risk, even if the efficacy of using kinetic operations is questionable. They can be useful in the short term to prevent or limit control of territory, or if a terrorist organization has settled into a power vacuum, kinetic ops can buy time for stabilization efforts to take root. But if they are not incorporated into a broader strategy, kinetic operations cannot be successful in combating terrorist threats—particularly because kinetic operations are a tactical and episodic response to a strategic and enduring challenge.

  One thing we know well about groups formed by the anvil of Zarqawi’s vision is that they have a habit of wearing out their welcome. Offer a viable opportunity for everyday people to have a real life, and they will respond to it. The United States has tried and failed to respond to such an opportunity by spreading our version of democracy in the Middle East. In contrast to a replica of what we have, an open society that the Middle East would find sustainable has to be designed by those who believe in the solution.

  Most important, we have spent too many lives and too much time, money, and energy focused on creating a military solution to a nonmilitary problem. It’s time we focus on nonkinetic options such as diplomacy. Diplomacy can help ensure that kinetic measures are bolstered by removal of the power vacuum terrorist organizations rely upon, ensuring that others can’t step in behind them.

  Threat perception and the way in which governments measure and assess risk play a pivotal role in counterterrorism operations. For instance, a study of terrorism threat perceptions after 9/11 in the United States and Europe revealed substantial differences in public opinion among countries that had little or no experience in terrorism compared with countries that had experienced one or more acts of terrorism. Countries like the United States with little experience in terrorism typically had a high perception of the threat compared with countries that had experienced more acts of terrorism and which therefore had a lower threat perception prior to September 11, 2001. As a result, threat perceptions in the United States have tended to be too high. Government policies should be based on risk assessments, not on threat perceptions, and policy makers should acknowledge publicly the vulnerabilities that free societies face and the reality that not all risk can be mitigated.

  The big challenge for the US government going forward will be to act less like a hegemon imposing solutions and picking winners, and instead to think of ourselves as part of a complex network that can ultimately provide for better futures than the alternatives. If Iraq showed us anything, it was that a severe lack of capability in this regard could not be overcome simply by imposing our military’s might. Considering our routine failures in public policy here at home, in an environment that is familiar, I find the likelihood of the United States demonstrating any sort of consistent skill in influencing conditions abroad very low at this point.

  I have no doubt there are analysts and targeters at Langley right now focused on defining threats against the United States. They’re surely losing sleep and dreading the late-night calls just as much as I did. I know all too well the toll a multinational, cross-continental hunt like theirs can take upon everyone involved. As removed as some of those individuals might seem from everyday life in America, they are just people, like me, dedicated to their job and focused on protecting our country.

  To all the women and men who are currently working in the national security sector and to those who aspire to, I am cheering you on every day. There is still a lot of work to be done, and our national security apparatus needs women now more than ever.

  Acknowledgments

  To my coauthor, Davin Coburn, without whom this book wouldn’t exist. To my agent, Cait Hoyt at CAA, thank you for your support, dedication, and patience. To the editors and staff at Little, Brown, thank you so, so, so much for your patience and sticking with me, especially Judith Clain and Vanessa Mobley, Sareena Kamath, Betsy Uhrig, Elizabeth Garriga.

  Thank you to Mark Zaid and Bradley Moss for helping me dislodge the book out of the government review. Special thanks to Dennis Gleeson, Bill Harlow, John Nixon, Yashar Ali, Joby Warrick, Rodney Faraon, David Priess, and Jeffrey Smith and Charles Blanchard at Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer for their advice and encouragement. Thank you to Morgan Fairchild, Brett McGurk, Clarissa Ward, Martha Raddatz, John McLaughlin, Clint Watts, Ali Soufan, and Doug Ollivant, for your pre-read and feedback.

  To the Warkids for keeping me sane; you are all amazing. I would also like to thank my colleagues at Foreign Policy Research Institute: Ronald Granieri, Barak Mendelsohn, and Michael Noonan; and Elmira Bayrasli at Foreign Policy Interrupted.

  Without these people in media that gave me a platform, I wouldn’t have been able to get my story out: Greg Barker, John Battsek, Claudia Rizzi, Jake Swantko, Diane Becker, Razan Ghalayini, Gayle Lemmon-Tzemach, Lauren Wolfe, Barbara Gaines, David Letterman, Rachel Burstein, Don Lemon, Janelle Griffin, Maria Spinella, Joy Reid, Rukmini Callimachi, Mike Madden, Adam Serwer, Kriszta Satori, Michael Rauch, Michael Weiss, Lee Farren, PBS Frontline, and HBO Docs. CAA staff who have given me opportunities and support: Tiffany Ward, Michelle Weiner, Hannah Epstein, Amie Yavor, Andy Roth, Christina Cohan, Erik Telford. Also thanks to Karga 7, Claire Kosloff, Julia LoVetere, and Daniela Lockwood.

  To my colleagues at the CIA, thank you for continuing to serve your country.

  To my AOPi’s, thank you for the support for the past thirty years!

  My Twitter community and friends: Morgan Fairchild, William Gibson, General Michael Hayden, Sarah Carlson, Cindy Otis, Bob Baer, Lisa Kaplan, Chris Diehl, Dave Gutelius, Cindy Storer, Susan Hasler, Barbara Sude.

  Thank you to the staff at the publication review board for your hard work.

  To my family and friends, thanks for listening to my frustration while the book was in review for three years. This book is also dedicated to my grandmother and my mom, miss you and wish you were here.

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  About the Author

  Nada Bakos is a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst and targeting officer. She was a key member of the team charged with analyzing the relationship between Iraq, al Qaida, and the 9/11 attacks. During the war in Iraq, Bakos served as the chief targeting officer tracking one of the world’s most wanted terrorists, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In 2006, Zarqawi was killed in a targeted strike conducted by US military forces. She is a senior fellow in the Program on National Security at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and was featured in the Emmy Award–winning HBO documentary Manhunt. She has appeared as a guest commentator on PBS’s Frontline, CNN, ABC, MSNBC, Fox, NBC, and as a guest on Late Night with David Letterman. She is also a contributor for publications including the New York Times, The Atlantic, and the Washington Post. After leaving the CIA, Bakos worked in a key role with Starbucks Corporation Public Affairs and now works as a consultant for a variety of social media and technology organizations.

  Notes

  Introduction

  1. May of 2011: Peter Baker, Helene Cooper, and Mark Mazzetti, “Bin Laden Is Dead, Obama Says,” New York Times, May 1, 2011.

  2. Navy SEALs: Ibid.

  3. Abbottabad, Pakistan: Ibid.

  4. shot Usama bin Ladin multiple times in his head and chest: Matthew Cole and Anna R. Schecter, “Who Shot Bin Laden? A Tale of Two Navy Special Operators,” NBC News, November 6, 2014.

  5. Agency personnel tracked bin Ladin’s trusted courier: Marc Ambinder, “How the CIA Really Caught Bin Laden’s Trail,” The Week, April 29, 2013.

  6. the godfather of terrorism in Iraq: John F. Burns, “U.S. Strike Hits Insurgent at Safehouse,” New York Times, June 8, 2006.

  7. no insurgent group caused more bloodshed: Henry Schuster, “The World’s Most Dangerous Terrorist,” CNN, January 21, 2005.

  8. li
terally thousands of deaths: Burns, “U.S. Strike Hits Insurgent.”

  9. in the actions of the Islamic State: Joby Warrick, “ISIS, with Gains in Iraq, Closes in on Founder Zarqawi’s Violent Vision,” Washington Post, June 14, 2014.

  10. network known as Al Qaida in Iraq: Burns, “U.S. Strike Hits Insurgent.”

  11. main character from Zero Dark Thirty: Nada Bakos, “How True Is Zero Dark Thirty? A Former Operative Weighs In,” Pacific Standard, January 16, 2013.

  12. women initially made up the majority of the CIA targeters: Robert Windrem, “Hunting Osama bin Laden Was Women’s Work,” NBC News, November 14, 2013.

  13. I can now speak more freely: John Hollister Hedley, “Secrets, Free Speech, and Fig Leaves, Reviewing the Work of CIA Authors,” Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1998): 75–83.

  14. ISIS… has risen from the ashes of Zarqawi’s organization: Warrick, “ISIS, with Gains in Iraq.”

  15. ISIS’s brutal approach: Ibid.

  Chapter 1

  1. New Headquarters Building, in Langley, Virginia: CIA History Staff, “50 Years in Langley: Recollections of the Construction of CIA’s Original Headquarters Building, 1961–2011” (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2012), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/50-years-in-langley-recollections-of-cias-ohb/OHB%2050th%20Anniversary.pdf.