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Since the results of sound reconnaissance depend on atmospheric conditions, Germans always try to use these to their advantage. For example, when sound carries well, (at night, in fog, on calm days) Germans try to use their artillery as little as possible. On the other hand, when sound conditions favor the Germans (wind in the direction of their positions, vertical midday currents, sharp drops in temperature etc.) the activity of their artillery increases. In selecting their firing positions Germans take into consideration the effect of the surrounding terrain on sound. Firing positions on the reverse slopes of the hills, in groves, near lakes, and marshes are more desirable in this respect than those on tops of hills.
In order to deceive our sound reconnaissance and to draw our fire on empty positions Germans use "swinging" or "duty" batteries (American roving guns). These batteries swinging from one position to another, fire a few rounds from each position, mixing it occasionally with systematic fire. These positions are selected away from other batteries and other troop positions. Germans are very careful not to disclose their fire system. Many batteries do not fire for a long time as their mission is to ambush either our troops or our batteries. Almost never does a gun fire individually as it is then easily located by sound reconnaissance; instead, as a rule, several batteries fire together at an even tempo so that individual shots are drowned in the general noise.
To camouflage fire activity of especially important positions special devices are used that imitate sounds of gunfire. These devices are placed from 200 to 300 meters on the flanks of the camouflaged battery, or to the rear with respect to the direction of actual firing. Sometimes, for more complete imitation of a battery, these devices are supplemented by others which produce a flash simultaneously with the real volley.
Along the same principle a single piece located also 200 to 300 meters from the others is used for ranging fire. This piece if moved farther away, would interfere with correct ranging for the rest of the battery and would also enable us to discover the trick. These seperate pieces also have the secondary mission of nuisance fire. If several batteries are to take part in a barrage, these ranging pieces are used during the first stages. As soon as the Germans think that our sound reconnaissance has located these pieces, the rest of the guns open up. The ranging pieces continue their fire until the end of the barrage.
In order to hide their guns from our flash locators, very often rockets are sent up, haystacks and other material burned, so that the gun flashes are nearly invisible against the burning background. Smokeless powder and flash hiders are also used. Large-scale engineering works are made in order to hide the batteries from ground and air observation. Each battery has two camouflage experts who supervise this work.
Of course, all these measures are not taken by every German battery all the time, but it is well to know about all these tricks. Such knowledge enables us to evaluate properly the findings of our flash and sound locators, and when everything else fails we check our evaluation with PW interrogation.
Notes on German Artillery Forward Observers
Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 28, July 1, 1943.
In the observation of fire, the greatest reliance by the Germans is placed on forward observers. Often the battery commander himself goes ahead in this role. The part that the observer plays in German field operations is brought out in the following translation from a recent issue of Artilleristische Rundschau.
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The artillery forward observer (Vorgeschobene Beobachter) plays a decisive part in the success of infantry. In the attack he goes along with the infantry, accompanied by a radio operator. If the attack is stopped, this observer calls for fire on enemy points of resistance and carries the infantry on to the next assault. In static warfare, the observer orders destructive fire against the enemy and covering fire to aid his own troops. He also directs destructive fire against enemy infantry who are about to attack or actually attacking. The results of this are shown not only in the effective cooperation between the two arms, but in the existence of a spirit of brotherhood in combat--the artillery forward observer becomes the best friend of the infantry.
A few examples from the Eastern Front will illustrate the role of the forward observer.
In one instance, a German battalion was attacking a Russian objective at a place where there was a churchyard in close proximity to the Russian rear; the attack was gaining ground very slowly, impeded by stubborn defense and by poor observation for the German artillery. Finally, a forward observer succeeded in the face of Russian fire in reaching an observation position located at the flank, whence he could observe the churchyard. The signal troops, working fast, established communication in a very short time with the battery, which was then able to deliver well-placed fire. The opponent was so pinned down that the attack regained its impetus. In a short time the village and churchyard were captured.
In August 1941, a German division had been defending for some time a stream south of C--. A battalion received the mission to make a limited-objective attack in order to secure prisoners; the attack was to be made with a reinforced company, supported by heavy infantry weapons and artillery. After assembly in combat outposts, the company began the attack in several groups. The forward observer of a light battery and heavy battery went forward with the company, while at the same time another forward observer was stationed in the advance combat positions of the sector to the right of the attack in order to watch for any threat to the flank. Given excellent support by the artillery, and working skillfully through the terrain, the assault troops succeeded in penetrating deeply into the Soviet positions, without loss, and in capturing prisoners and weapons. At the same time, on his own initiative, the company commander in the sector to the right sent a weaker assault group to capture a Russian scout squad. The forward artillery observer in this sector supported the effort so well that nearly all the personnel of the scout unit were disabled or captured. The result of these two operations was a total of 42 prisoners and 12 captured machine guns and mortars, while on the German side the only casualty was one soldier slightly wounded. The skillful and rapid fire-support given by the artillery as a result of the work of the forward observer played a major role in this success.
A forward observer showed up well in another local assault by a neighboring regiment. The night before the operation, he went into no-mans-land with a scout squad. Three kilometers in front of the German lines he found a hide-out, and for 9 hours observed the Russian position from so short a distance that no detail could be missed. He could look into each pit dug for protection against tanks and could almost count the number of occupants in each. The next morning the assault group attacked at the appointed time. The radio of the forward observer had scarcely given the first order of command when the answers roared from 3 batteries. The Russian position was thoroughly raked. After a momentary pause, a powerful concentration of fire was placed on the left-hand sector of the enemy positions, only to move in another instant 100 yards to the right on a zigzag trench net. On the left, where the dust clouds from the bursts were slowly settling, the hand grenades of the assault troops were already exploding. With incredible speed, the trenches were mopped up, and always, throughout the action, the concentrated fire of 12 guns moved just before the assault group from right to left. About 500 meters of the Russian position was overrun in this way. With the mission accomplished, the assault group withdrew from the Russian positions, while the forward artillery observer placed his fire to cover the withdrawal. Numerous prisoners and weapons were brought in, without any losses suffered by the Germans. In this case too, the service of the forward artillery observer was no minor factor.
Every member of the First Battalion still remembers the day at O-- in September 1941. This position was taken by storm without any difficulty. However, before the battalion had organized itself for defense, the Russians made a counter-attack in heavy force, supported by 18 tanks and designed to recover the locality. Fortunately, the second batt
ery which had been attached to the battalion had moved its position and was ready for action, having established communications with the forward observer. Gun after gun fired its destructive barrage into the massed ranks of the Russian infantry following the tanks. Even the tanks hesitated, and then gave up the attack. The Russian attack was repeated several times in very strong force, and every time was stopped by the barrage ordered and directed by the forward observer. Bodies of Russians and ruined tanks covered the field at evening, and the battalion officers thanked the battery commander, assuring him that the village would have fallen had it not been for the artillery support and the courageous conduct of the forward observer, who had fallen in the combat.
German Antiaircraft Artillery
Military Intelligence Service, Special Series 10, Feb. 1943
SECTION I. ORGANIZATION
1. General
The German approach to the subject of military organization is one of extreme flexibility. The underlying thought is that in view of the rapid progress of science as applied to war, organizational practice must remain flexible if it is to take advantage promptly of new scientific development, to exploit various kinds of situations, and to cope with all types of enemies. Efficient combat effectiveness of an organization is always considered a primary requisite. It should therefore be remembered that although the organization of German antiaircraft units is founded on certain basic principles, experimentation with new tactical doctrines, economy of military manpower and equipment, or the considered needs of a task force situation may cause the organization of certain AA units to vary from normal.
2. Basic Principles of Organization
All German military organization is based on certain fundamental principles which are primarily designed to permit tactical and administrative flexibility.
One of these fundamentals is the Einheit (unit) principle, which provides that any given arm or service will develop a number of standard unit groups, each with standard organization, leadership, training, and equipment. The unit group is an organic entity, capable of operating independently and self-sufficient both for tactical and administrative purposes. Within a given branch or service, each basic type of unit group will represent a different combination of the various components (or weapons) of that branch or service. In AA organization the unit groups are ordinarily battalions, and the types (heavy, mixed, light, etc.) differ in organic composition with respect to their respective weapons (light and/or heavy guns, searchlights, etc.).
The Einheit principle of organization has several advantages. Obviously the supply and replacement of equipment can be more readily geared to a few standard types of units. The training and tactical employment of a given type of unit can be standardized, and directed with uniformity. Above all, the existence of these basic type-units, each so composed as to serve a different function, permits easy organization of any desired type of larger unit. In the AA branch, for example, regiments are formed by combining any desired number of the different basic units. And the Einheit system is excellently designed to facilitate the construction of task forces, made up of different amounts of necessary arms and services, in terms of the basic units of each arm or service required for a given mission.
3. Antiaircraft as a Component of the Air Force
a. General
With some few exceptions, German antiaircraft units are an organic part of the German Air Force (Luftwaffe). German antiaircraft artillery is called Flakartillerie, and is more commonly referred to as "Flak." This term is an abbreviation of "Flieger- or Flugabwehrkanone," which means "cannon for defense against aviation."
Flak troops wear the uniform of the Luftwaffe, which is easily distinguished from that of the Army and Navy by the gray-blue color of the material, the lounge cut of the open collar blouse, and the plain trousers. To distinguish the AA artillery from other branches of the Air Force, red piping is worn on the cap, and the blouses of both officers and enlisted men have this distinguishing red color on the shoulder strap as lining and edging, and on the collar patches.
Flak serving in the field is fully motorized, and units intended to operate with the spearhead of the attack are equipped for cross-country operation.
Luftwaffe AA organizations and units operating with the Army are subordinated operationally and for command purposes to the Army unit concerned, and administratively (for replacements, etc.) to a parent Air Force ground unit.
b. Higher Units
(1) General.—In general, Flak units consist of corps, divisions, regiments, battalions, and batteries. From a practical point of view the AA corps, divisional, and regimental organizations are primarily composed of a commander, staff, and organizational troops who coordinate and assist in the disposition and activities of the basic units, the battalions (Abteilungen).
(2) Corps.—The Flakkorps is the highest AA unit. It may be found in rear areas or with field forces, depending on the considered need for a command of this size. There is no fixed allotment of units to this highest formation; it has been noted that the corps may contain from two to four AA divisions. In general, when serving with the field forces, an AA corps would normally control the area of an army group (group of armies). It may also be found with air fleets and on some occasions with Panzer armies.
(3) Division.—The Flakdivision is frequently found in German armies. Its composition is not fixed, varying from two to five regiments. In general, when with field forces, the AA division usually operates in the area of an army.
(4) Regiment.—(a) Pre-war establishment.—At the outbreak of World War II, Flak regiments were organized on a standard basis of three battalions per regiment. The first two battalions were alike, each consisting of three batteries of heavy AA guns and two batteries of light AA guns with organic 60-cm (light) searchlights. The third battalion consisted of three batteries, each with nine 150-cm (heavy) searchlights.
(b) Present organization.—At the present time the composition of the regiment is flexible; it may contain from three to five battalions of any type.
c. The Battalion
(1) General.—The basic tactical AA unit is the battalion (Abteilung), which also has administrative functions. There are several known types of gun battalions, but in general these types will fall into one of three general categories consisting of heavy, mixed, and light battalions. In this connection, it should be noted that in action the gun battalion commander is essentially a tactical commander, the battery being the fire-control unit. Allotment of AA units to Army field forces varies according to the estimated needs, but all army corps commonly has one or more separate gun battalions permanently attached to it during all operations, and at least one mixed battalion will usually be found attached to a Panzer division.
(2) Heavy battalion.—This battalion is equipped with either 88-mm or 105-mm antiaircraft guns, or with both, and usually consists of a headquarters with three batteries (Batterien) each of four, or possibly six, guns. This type of organization is rare; the unit is usually found only in static positions in Germany.
(3) Mixed battalion.—This is the more common type of standard battalion organization incorporating heavy AA guns. There are two separate establishments for these mixed battalions, one with four 88-mm guns per battery, the other with six. The most recent indications suggest that preference is being shown for the six-gun unit as equipment becomes available. In some cases, primarily in rear areas, 105-mm AA guns may be substituted for the 88-mm guns.
The organization of this mixed battalion is as follows:
Headquarters;
3 heavy batteries, each consisting of four (possibly six) 88-mm guns, and two 20-mm guns for close protection;
2 light batteries, each consisting of twelve 20-mm guns and four 60-cm (23.58-inch) searchlights. (A medium battery of nine 37-mm guns and four 60-cm searchlights is sometimes substituted for one of the light batteries.)
(4) Light battalion.—Two types of light gun battalions exist:
(a) Headquarters;
3 lig
ht batteries, each of twelve 20-mm guns;
1 searchlight battery of sixteen 60-cm searchlights.
(b) Headquarters;
2 light batteries, each of twelve 20-mm guns;
1 medium battery of nine 37-mm guns;
1 searchlight battery of sixteen 60-cm searchlights.
(5) Reserve battalion.—In addition to the battalions mentioned above, there are heavy, mixed, and light reserve battalions. These have only a small amount of organic motor transport and are used in a static role in Germany and rear areas. Otherwise the reserve organization corresponds to that of standard mobile battalions. The transportation of these battalions, when necessary, is carried out by a separate transport unit.
(6) Searchlight battalion.—Most searchlight battalions are composed of a headquarters and three batteries, each battery containing nine 150-cm (60-inch) searchlights. Sound locators are used with these searchlights, and although their present number per battery varies with the employment of the searchlights in rear areas, at the beginning of the war they were allotted on the basis of one per searchlight. Although mobile, most of the heavy searchlight battalions are used only within rear and static defense areas. The smaller, 60-cm (23.58-inch) lights are used with 20-mm and 37-mm AA guns, and accordingly are an organic part of both the light and mixed battalion, as mentioned above. Heavy searchlight battalions are very often grouped to form searchlight regiments, which operate as such only in rear areas.
d. The Battery
(1) General.—The battery (Batterie) is the normal fire unit of AA artillery. Several types of batteries exist:
(2) Heavy battery.—A heavy battery in the mixed battalion is normally organized as follows:
German Artillery in Combat Page 3