The motorized aircraft-warning companies supplement and increase the density of the fixed aircraft-warning net, as well as being put around a temporarily vulnerable area. Although ordinarily used well forward, they may be employed on open flanks and in rear areas.
The reports of the territorial aircraft-warning service are made by telephone and wire, whereas the reports of the motorized aircraft-warning companies are made by radio.
c. Flak Intelligence Service
The aircraft-warning service is supplemented by the troop-warning service of the German AA artillery, which is similar to the U.S. Antiaircraft Artillery Information Service (AAAIS). Every active German AA unit observes the air in the area under its jurisdiction with specially trained personnel. In addition, all troop units use their own air guards to avoid surprise. The guard gives warning by means of calls, horns, sirens, or blinker lamps.
d. Use of Radio-Detection Devices
It is known that both long- and short-range radio-location instruments are now being used for warning purposes. The long-range instruments are located at intervals along the Western European coast for early warning purposes, and undoubtedly other sets of both long and short range are scattered in a net throughout rear areas to supplement visual observation.
24. Passive Means
In the defense of rear areas, the Germans lay much stress on the use of passive means. These involve every feasible type of deception, including the extensive use of camouflage. No effort has been spared to change the appearance of important potential air objectives as completely as possible. In 3 years of war, the system has been developed to a very high degree of efficiency. AA artillery units cooperate in the system of passive defense by the use of movable defense forces, and through carefully considered gun and searchlight positions. The civil population is well disciplined, and blackout regulations are stringently enforced.
Obviously, it is impossible to conceal the general location of a large military objective such as an industrial city. The Germans recognize this fact, and their attempts to deceive their enemy accordingly include removal of the center of gravity of the defense of the area from the center of the objective area itself. At night this is accomplished largely through the use of searchlights. A hostile flyer will usually fly toward the center of the ring of illumination, since he will assume that the center of the objective should be in that area. Under the German system, the center of the ring of searchlights is accordingly placed to one side of the center of the defended area. Furthermore, the center of the searchlight defense may be moved from time to time, thus precluding any definite "fix" of the center of the searchlight defense with respect to the true objective. For daytime deception, camouflage will be used to a very large extent, no effort being spared to bring about the maximum results.
In line with the German belief that if a considerable portion of the enemy attack can be diverted to dummy objectives, the defense may be considered to have been quite successful, the Germans use complete systems of dummy objectives around their important military establishments. Some of these dummy objectives have been so successful that they have been bombed by hostile aviation many times over. Active means are used to assist the effectiveness of the faked objectives. For example, at night when hostile aircraft bomb the dummy objectives, personnel housed in nearby bomb-proof shelters will start large fires to cause further bombing attempts at the objectives, and to confuse the fliers as to the outcome of their mission. To increase the effect of reality, in many cases the dummy objectives may be protected by AA artillery. Captured materiel is often used for this purpose. Dummy objectives are also placed near the center of the searchlight perimeter. The use of dummy gun positions has already been mentioned. When these positions exist, the mobile section of the active AA artillery defense may move in and out of them. The use of dummy flashes may intermingle with the firing of real AA guns, as a result of which the hostile flier secures a very incorrect picture of the true situation on the ground.
Some examples of the extent of the use of camouflage by the Germans will not be amiss. It is well known that Berlin has been extensively camouflaged, not only the city itself but also the outskirts. One example is that of the most important distinguishing landmark in Berlin, namely, the wide avenue running east and west through the city and called the "Axis." The pavement of this avenue has been sprayed with a dark green paint to blend with the trees in the Tiergarten (a large park), along the avenue and throughout the western section of the city. The Victory Monument (Siegesäule), in the center of a circle on the Axis, has been painted with a dull color so as not to reflect light. An overhead cover of wire matting, interwoven with green materials to resemble vegetation, covers the avenue for a considerable distance. The wire netting is about 18 feet high and is interspersed with artificial shrubs and trees. About every 30 yards, the coloring and texture of the greenery has been changed. To eliminate shadows, netting has also been hung from the sides at an angle of about 20 degrees.
To create an opposite effect—that is, to simulate a street where in fact there is none—wire netting has also been used. These dummy streets are frequently connected with the real ones, which then disappear into artificial woods. In one instance it is reported that a "woods" was created by fastening artificial sprigs about 1 foot high and about 1 to 2 inches apart to a wire net. Through these "woods" a system of "roads" was painted in brown on the mesh of the net.
Many important buildings in Berlin have been camouflaged by covering them with nets, and by placing artificial barns, farm buildings, and trees on the roofs. Small lakes have been covered by reed-like mats.
The extent of these camouflage efforts is a good indication of the lengths to which the Germans will go in carrying out large-scale efforts at deception. It may well be expected that no means will be spared to hide the real disposition of gun positions and vital areas.
SECTION V. CONCLUSIONS
25. Conclusions
From an analysis of the contents of this study, certain general conclusions concerning German AA artillery and its employment may be drawn. The most important of these conclusions follow:
1. The organization of German AA artillery units is extremely flexible. The exact composition and size of any AA unit may vary with the specific mission to be performed.
2. Although German AA artillery as an arm is an organic part of the German Air Force, there are some AA units which are organic to higher Army units and are considered as Army troops. These furnish AA protection to the Army units of which they are a part.
3. AA units assigned to an Army field force are subordinated operationally and for command purposes to the Army ground unit with which they are operating.
4. The principal German AA weapons are dual purpose AA and AT weapons which can be and are used in other roles as well.
5. In the approach to battle, and until air superiority has been obtained, German AA weapons which are actually assigned to an AA role remain in that role, except for purposes of self-defense against ground targets or where sudden opportunities for surprise fire against ground targets outweigh the necessity for AA protection. As air superiority is obtained, however, AA weapons are released for AT missions as well as for other roles against ground targets.
6. At the outset of an operation, depending on the considered need for such use, a certain number of AA guns may be assigned to AT or other artillery roles.
7. The Chief of the German Air Force is responsible for the air defense of Germany and the important areas of occupied countries. This responsibility is carried out through subordinate air territorial districts and special defense commands, all of which contain sufficient fighter aviation, AA artillery with searchlights and barrage balloons, and necessary aircraft-warning-service units to effect a carefully coordinated AA defense.
8. The outstanding feature of the German air defense is the coordination effected by unity of command. All of the means in any single air defense, including fighter aviation, AA artillery, warning services, and
civil defense organizations are under one commander, who is alone responsible for the accomplishment of the mission.
Artillery with a German Tank Division
Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 8, Sept. 24, 1942.
The following is a digest of an article written in the Red Star (Moscow) on the use of artillery in a German tank division during attack. It is interesting in that it describes the composition of march columns and attack formations, in addition to discussing tactical employment.
The organic artillery with a German tank division, as used against the Russians on the Eastern Front, normally consists of two 105-mm battalions and one 150-mm howitzer battalion, and is usually reinforced by one or two battalions of light artillery.
On the march, the commanding officers of the artillery regiments, battalions, and batteries, plus a minimum of their respective staffs and control units, march at the head of the column. The artillery reconnaissance party marches with the tank reconnaissance unit. Battery reconnaissance parties consist of two armored cars and two motorcycles. In case one of the cars is destroyed the other can carry on the vital reconnaissance work.
Artillery observers ride in armored cars which are armed with machine guns. In each car there is an observer, the observer's assistant, a radio operator, and a driver. There are two such observation vehicles per battery. The battery commander rides in one and another officer in the other. The battalion has three such observers' cars.
Planes are assigned to work with the artillery of the division and are subject to call by the commanding officer of the artillery who assigns through battalion one plane or more per battery, depending upon the amount of planes available. In the attack, one light artillery battalion normally supports one tank regiment in direct support and the medium battalion is in general support. But in the majority of cases experienced, the artillery of the tank divisions has been reinforced so that two light battalions can be assigned to a regiment in the first echelon, which allows one light battalion per tank battalion. One battery of each battalion supports the right element of a tank battalion, another the left element, while the third is echeloned to the rear and is charged with security of the flanks and rear.
Observation posts, command posts, and battery positions are all moved as far forward as possible. Batteries fire from concealed positions, as a rule.
Preceding an attack, preparation fire is conducted from 15 minutes to 1 hour on enemy artillery and tank assembly areas, and observation points are smoked. Enemy front-line infantry is generally disregarded during the preparation, as their neutralization is left to the tanks. Direct-support battalions do not always participate in the preparation fire, but are put in march order with full supplies of ammunition, ready to jump off with the tanks.
The battalion commanders and battery commanders of direct-support units remain at their observation posts in an attack until the head tank passes their line, at which time they take up their positions in the attack echelons. The German general-support artillery does not change its position in an attack which is designed to go no further than the enemy artillery positions. However, in an attack which is intended to penetrate beyond enemy artillery positions, they do move forward when practicable. If the German infantry lags and is finally held up, but the tanks break through and continue forward, the general-support artillery does not move forward.
During the German break-through at the end of October 1941, from the city of Orel in the direction of Mtsensk, German tank units succeeded in breaking through the Soviet infantry lines, but the German infantry supporting the tanks was cut off and forced to dig in. The support artillery could not move forward and, as a result, the tanks, having no support from their artillery, were compelled, after suffering heavy losses, to return to their original positions.
Comment
The above discussion confirms well-known German tactics. It is important, regardless of the success of the enemy tanks in a break-through, to stop the infantry moving up in support of the tanks because the artillery is therefore prevented from advancing and the tanks are deprived of their direct support. The tanks can then be much more easily dealt with.
German Visual Signal System for Artillery Fire Control
Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 23, April 22, 1943.
Recently information has come in from German sources of what seems to be a simple visual signal system for artillery fire control in the event of failure of other means of communication. Apparently, it is employed between OP and gun position. Also, it may possibly be used between a forward observer and his communications detachment, when, for one reason or another, it is necessary for the latter to remain at a distance from the observer.
No knowledge of any general signal code is required, and the apparatus can be nailed together and painted in half an hour.
Two disks or panels (see sketches) are required, attached to short rods or handles--such as a barrelhead nailed to a broomstick. The disk is possibly painted half red, half white or whatever other colors that may be more suitable to the background. These disks are used as shown in the accompanying sketches. At night, lights are used.
GERMAN VISUAL SIGNAL SYSTEM
75-mm Assault Artillery
Intelligence Bulletin, July 1943.
The German 75-mm assault gun is a weapon comparable to the U. S. 75-mm and 105-mm self-propelled guns. The gun and mount weigh about 20 tons. The maximum speed across country is about 7 miles per hour; on roads, about 22 miles per hour. It can average about 15 miles per hour. On normal roads its radius of action is about 100 miles; across country, about 50 miles. To move an assault-gun battery 100 kilometers (about 65 miles) requires 4,000 liters (about 1,050 gallons) of gasoline. The range of the 75-mm short-barreled tank gun, with which this weapon was originally equipped, is about 6,000 yards.
Apparently there are now three types of German assault guns in service: the short-barreled 75-mm tank gun, with a bore 23.5 calibers in length; the long-barreled 75-mm tank gun, with a bore 43 calibers in length; and an intermediate gun which seems to be a 75-mm gun with a bore 30 calibers in length. It seems probable that the long-barreled 75, which is the principal armament of the new Pz. Kw. 4 tank, may be primarily an antitank weapon, while the intermediate gun will take the place of the old short-barreled 75 as a close-support weapon.
A 1940 German document states that the assault gun "is not to be used for antitank purposes, and will only engage enemy tanks in self-defense or where the anti-tank guns cannot deal with them." However, a 1942 German document states that "the assault gun may be used successfully against armored vehicles and light and medium tanks." This apparent contradiction can perhaps be explained by the fact that prior to the invasion of Russia in 1941, this weapon had been used in limited numbers. Experience in Russia may have shown that it could be used successfully against tanks, although Russian sources refer to it as an infantry support weapon, essentially. Perhaps a more logical explanation lies in two German technical developments since 1940, namely: hollow-charge ammunition, which is designed to achieve good armor-piercing performance at relatively low muzzle velocities, and the reported replacement of the short-barreled, low-velocity 75-mm with the long-barreled, high-velocity 75-mm gun on some of the newer models.
The following information about German assault artillery is a condensation of a recent article in "Red Star," the official Soviet Army publication, and deals with only one of the three types—the short-barreled 75-mm.
The Germans make extensive use of self-propelled guns as assault artillery. Their most important mission is to destroy the opposition's antitank and heavy infantry weapons. The German self-propelled mount under discussion is a Pz. Kw. 3 chassis armed with a short-barreled 75-mm gun, which has a semiautomatic breech block. The gun's traverse is limited. The armor on the front and sides of the vehicle has thicknesses of 50 mm and 30 mm, respectively. The top and rear of the gun carriage is open. The speed of the self-propelled gun is about 31 miles per hour, and its range is about 84 miles. The g
un's initial muzzle velocity is about 1,389 feet per second. The gun carries 56 rounds. The ammunition is fixed and consists of the following types: high-explosive, armor-piercing, and smoke.
The gun crew consists of a gun commander, a gunner, a loader, and a driver. Two self-propelled guns make up a platoon. The platoon commander's vehicle is equipped with signal flags, rocket pistols, a two-way radio, and a speaking tube for communication between the commander and his gunner and driver. The radius of the radio is about 2 1/2 miles when the vehicle is at the halt, and from 1 1/4 to a little less than 2 miles when it is moving. The second vehicle in the platoon has only a receiving set and signal flags.
There are three platoons in a battery, as well as a separate gun for the battery commander, three armored vehicles with supplies, and an ordinary supply truck. In a battalion (the largest unit) there is a headquarters, a headquarters battery, and three firing batteries. The battalion commander has a gun under his own personal command. According to the German table of organization, the battalion of assault guns is an independent unit and is part of the GHQ artillery pool. The assault artillery battalion can be placed under the command of an infantry commander or tank unit commander, but not under an officer of lower rank than regimental commander. It is important to note that if an assault-gun battery has the necessary supplies to permit it to take care of itself, it may assume an independent role, apart from that of the battalion.
Assault batteries, which are assigned a limited number of targets, have the mission of supporting the attacks of the infantry, and of destroying the opposition's heavy infantry weapons and strong points disclosed during the course of the attack. In supporting tank attacks, the self-propelled artillery assumes some of the normal tasks of the heavier tanks, including the destruction of antitank guns.
German Artillery in Combat Page 10