"If things only go well," the expression on the lieutenant's face seemed to say.
And things did go well. We saw the third burst against the background of the evening sky. We fired shells equipped with percussion fuzes by ear (it had grown quite dark in the meantime) and brought the fire back to the target. The infantry was happy. It repulsed two attacks by the enemy.
We had not hit anything--the shots had gone over--and as the lines were only 30 yards in front of us, we couldn't bring the fire any closer. The infantry, however, swore by their artillery battalion, and the moral value of the fire, completely offset its lack of material effect.
b. Example 2
We, that is, our division and my light horse-drawn field howitzer battalion, relieved an armored division that had pressed forward to the western border of a strongly defended city but could get no farther because of deep minefields, tank traps, and the river. The period of position warfare lasted a month. We were at first provided with poor maps, but finally obtained captured maps on a scale of 1:50,000. The observation posts and command post were necessarily located at the edge of the wood 300 yards behind the front line. Only from the observation posts was it possible to get a fairly good view of the city and of the slowly rising open hinterland behind it. These posts were fitted up at night and carefully camouflaged. As we learned later from the enemy's position, these posts could not be seen. The flying bullets of the enemy infantry, however, constantly whined among the trees and made our stay there very unpleasant. The enemy artillery likewise beat the edge of the wood with a brisk fire. The fire-control wires were destroyed many times every day. Even the radio often failed us, largely because of the difficulty of supplying the anode batteries. The observation posts were connected with one another as well as with the battalion command post, and the battery positions were also connected with one another. Subdivisions of the battalion were interconnected; thus, for example, on a day when the enemy attacked and all the wires were destroyed by artillery fire, the fire of the entire battalion was controlled by the one remaining radio circuit of the battery within calling distance of the observation post.
c. Example 3
The enemy had pushed forward a salient in wooded and swampy terrain. The division, to which my mountain artillery battalion belonged at this time, was driven from the railway during the combat.
The infantry of both sides lay in the dense wood with lines not more than 50 yards apart. There were no elevated observation posts, consequently, our OPs were located in the front line. The longest view - 80 yards - was in a sparsely wooded area. In view of the dispersion, the center of impact of the barrage fire was 300 yards in front of the main line of resistance and consequently failed to accomplish its purpose. The fire was adjusted only by ear. It was necessary to adjust separately the fire of each of the guns laying the barrage and to check their adjustment separately twice a day. When our battery positions were surveyed in, we used map data to fire upon enemy positions, supply lines, and concentrations, deep within his combat zone (map on a scale of 1:50,000 and 1:25,000) and the fire was checked from time to time by aviators.
If the enemy was finally annihilated solely by artillery fire, this was due exclusively to the continuous bursts and harassing fire of the entire regiment. The expenditure of ammunition was heavy. My battalion (2 batteries) fired 17,500 shells during the 28 days. This method is really not "elegant", but it is impossible to do otherwise when fighting in wooded country.
d. Examples Compared
In example No. 1 there was no data relating to the position. The observation posts did not have a good view. Rough aiming in azimuth by ear, laying on any point, range estimated. In example No. 2 the positions were surveyed, the batteries interconnected, but only a small sector of terrain two miles deep could be seen from the observation posts. The laying was in the grid direction, ranges were obtained from the map. The regular firing method was used; smoke shells fired on a terrain, parts of which were not clearly visible. In example No. 3 the positions were surveyed but the observation posts did not have a good view. Laying was in grid direction, ranges obtained from map, fire brought back to the target by ear.
e. The Work in the Observation Post
In cases 1 and 3, the observation posts were located far forward. The lack of vision and the fact that the posts were located in the front line permitted the performance of only the most essential tasks. It was obviously impossible to employ the observation posts on a large scale. Radio, communication, supplemented by wire, and binoculars were the means used by the battery commander's representative. Corrections in azimuth and range, given in meters with respect to the line of sighting, were supplied to the battery. In case 3, the battery commander's representative was expressly forbidden to give ranges over the telephone or radio, as the interception service of the enemy was working well and could easily draw correct conclusions concerning the location of the battery positions from the ranges given.
In case 2, the fire was also affected by the "front-line influences", although an ordinary observation-post service could be maintained. Command posts A and B (instrument section) and the observation post, situated within call of its battery, were actually in communication because within calling distance. Moreover, it was possible to reach the other observation posts through the infantry command post; the battery positions could also be reached by means both of an infantry wire and that of an artillery group. The supplementary radio connections also permitted communication, but were less used, as the enemy located them by means of a radio direction-finder. The great importance of having as many lateral radio and telephone lines as possible was plainly indicated. The control of fire by the battalion was always assured. The observation posts in trees were occupied only in the most urgent cases. The observers, who wore safety belts, occupied positions in the forks of branches rather high up in the trees. One observation post could use the battery commander's telescope, but the others were restricted to binoculars.
With respect to camouflage, it should be mentioned that it is more important to have a good background, that is, trees with thick foliage, than to use camouflage on the side toward the enemy. The branches must be changed frequently and must be cut from trees of the same species.
f. Possibilities of Barrage Defense Against Enemy Attack
The event which causes the artilleryman the most pain is when a shell falls short and drops in his own lines. Artillery fire in forest combat reaches a decisive stage at just this point.
The barrage fire, whose center of impact was between 200 and 300 yards in front of our own front line, was adjusted by ear! No rule gives any information as to how the distance of detonations is to be estimated in a wood, without interrupting fire if possible, as in case 3. Nor can one decrease the range until the shells begin to fall in our own lines, when one learns that it would have been better to keep it at a distance. Moreover, sound is deceptive. Many bursts that sound far, away actually occur in the nearby underbrush, while many that sound near at hand result from detonation on distant trees. Here the difficulties begin.
Can we call fire directed behind the enemy's front line a barrage fire? In case 3, the enemy had always prepared for an attack in his front line, because he was safest from artillery fire there (according to the statements of prisoners). At most, the barrage blocks the second or third wave of attack and the supply lines. Our own infantry must always be apprised of this fact, for they must lay the barrage themselves.
Harassing fire and concentrations of fire on rear areas proved very effective, especially in case 3. This, in my opinion, is absolutely the only way in which artillery support can be useful in an engagement in the woods. If one has enough ammunition, the enemy can be driven out of the woods. There is little prospect, however, that artillery can be successful in supporting troops attacking in a forest. Enemy positions, supporting points, and bunkers can, at most, be recognized at a distance of 100 yards, a range at which the artillery can no longer fire upon them. Antitank guns, and particu
larly assault guns, on the contrary, have proven their usefulness. The forward artillery observer can at best only direct a scattering fire toward the rear. Attempts to measure the positions of tracer ammunition fired by forward observers have been useful in locating the position of the forward observer and the course of the front line. However, I would hardly recommend that fire be based on these measurements when all the tracer ammunition is not plainly recognized.
g. Conclusions
The lessons taught concerning artillery in a combat in the forest may therefore be summarized as follows:
(1) It is usually possible to fire only by ear in dense wood;
(2) The barrage as such is ineffective and constitutes a fire barrier only in front of the rear areas;
(3) The artillery cannot support attacking troops, for it can fire only from clearings in the forest and areas containing scattered trees;
(4) The main value of artillery in a forest combat is in firing upon routes over which the enemy approaches and areas in which he assembles;
(5) It is suicide to observe from trees in a dense forest, owing to the proximity of the enemy's front line;
(6) As far as possible, only forward observers should be employed in a combat in the woods; to establish a larger "command mechanism" in the front line will cost many casualties;
(7) The nearer the front line and the denser the forest, the more facilities for communication should be established. It is sometimes impossible to find wires that have been cut by artillery fire in a dense wood;
(8) Interconnection is of value only when the observation posts have more or less view or no firing maps are available. It seems useless in a dense wood unless air observation is available for adjusting the fire. No liaison plane is needed when the target is shown on the map;
(9) Under certain circumstances, however, artillery should fire during an engagement in a forest even when its "material" ineffectiveness is obvious, for its "moral" effect is always obtained;
(10) The artilleryman must never forget to explain in detail to the infantry the artillery's role in a combat in the woods, so that the former will have no expectations that the latter cannot fulfill.
Six-Barrel Rocket Weapon (The Nebelwerfer 41)
Intelligence Bulletin, November 1943
I. INTRODUCTION
Whenever the fortunes of the German Army take a new turn for the worse, Nazi propagandists attempt to encourage the people of the Reich—and influence public opinion in neutral countries—by spreading rumors of new and formidable developments in German ordnance. Recently the Nazis have been releasing propaganda declaring that spectacular results are being achieved with the German six-barrel rocket projector known as the Nebelwerfer (smoke mortar) 41. Actually, this is not a particularly new weapon. Its name, moreover, is extremely misleading. In the first place, the Nebelwerfer 41 is not a mortar at all, and, in the second place, it can accommodate both gas-charged and high-explosive projectiles, as well as smoke projectiles.
It would be just as foolish to discount the German claims 100 percent as it would be to accept them unreservedly. Although fire from the Nebelwerfer 41 is relatively inaccurate, one of the weapon's chief assets appears to be the concussion effect of its high-explosive projectiles, which is considerable when the weapon's six barrels are fired successively, 1 second apart. The high-explosive round contains 5 pounds of explosive; this is comparable—in weight, at least—to the high-explosive round used in the U. S. 105-mm howitzer.
In view of the mass of misleading information which has been circulated regarding the Nebelwerfer 41—or, as the Germans sometimes call it, the Do-Gerät25 —it is hoped that junior officers and enlisted men will find the following discussion both timely and profitable.
2. DESCRIPTION
The Nebelwerfer 41 (see figs. 1 and 2) is a six-barreled (nonrotating) tubular projector, with barrels 3 to 3 1/2 feet long and 160 mm in diameter. The projector is mounted on a rubber-tired artillery chassis with a split trail.
Figure 1.—German Six-barrel Rocket Projector (side view).
There is no rifling; the projectiles are guided by three rails, each about 1/3-inch high, which run down the inside of the barrels. This reduces the caliber to approximately 150 mm.
The barrels are open-breeched, and the propellant is slow-burning black powder (14 pounds set behind the nose cap). This propellant generates gas through 26 jets set at an angle. As a result, the projectiles rotate and travel at an ever-increasing speed, starting with the rocket blast. The burster, which is in the rear two-sevenths of the projectile, has its own time fuze. The range is said to be about 7,760 yards.
The barrels are fired electrically, from a distance. They are never fired simultaneously, since the blast from six rockets at once undoubtedly would capsize the weapon. The order of fire is fixed at 1–4–6–2–3–5.
The sighting and elevating mechanisms are located on the left-hand side of the barrels, immediately over the wheel, and are protected by a light-metal hinged box cover, which is raised when the weapon is to be used.
Each barrel has a metal hook at the breech to hold the projectile in place, and a sparking device to ignite the rocket charge. This sparker can be turned to one side to permit loading and then turned back so that the "spark jump" is directed to an electrical igniter placed in one of 24 rocket blast openings located on the projectile, about one-third of the way up from the base. About one-third of the length of the projectile extends below the breech of the weapon.
Figure 2.—German Six-barrel Rocket Projector (front view).
The projectile itself resembles a small torpedo—without propeller or tail fins. The base is flat, with slightly rounded edges. The rocket jets are located about one-third of the way up the projectile from the base, and encircle the casing. The jets are at an angle with the axis of the projectile so as to impart rotation in flight, in "turbine" fashion.
The propelling cl1arge is housed in the forward part of the rocket. A detonating fuze is located in the base of the projectile to detonate the high-explosive or smoke charge. In this way, on impact, the smoke or high explosive is set off above ground when the nose of the projectile penetrates the soil.
3. NOTE ON OPERATION
The following note on the operation of the Nebelwerfer 41 is reproduced from the German Army periodical Die Wehrmacht. It is believed to be substantially correct.
The Nebelwerfer 41, or Do-Gerät, is unlimbered and placed in position by its crew of four men. As soon as the protective coverings have been removed, the projector is ready to be aimed and loaded. The ammunition is attached to the right and to the left of the projector, within easy reach, and the shells are introduced two at a time, beginning with the lower barrels and continuing upward. Meanwhile, foxholes deep enough to conceal a man in standing position have been dug about 10 to 15 yards to the side and rear of the projector. The gunners remain in these foxholes while the weapon is being fired by electrical ignition. Within 10 seconds a battery can fire 36 projectiles. These make a droning pipe-organ sound as they leave the barrels, and, while in flight, leave a trail of smoke (see cover illustration). After a salvo has been fired, the crew quickly returns to its projectors and reloads them.
4. HOW THE GERMAN ARMY USES IT
The following statements have been made by a high-ranking German Army officer, and may be accepted as an authoritative expression of German ideas concerning the employment of this weapon.
Units of Nebeltruppen (smoke-laying troops) are organized as rocket-projector regiments (Werferregimenter), which are fully motorized and therefore extremely mobile. A rocket-projector regiment is divided into battalions and batteries, like those of the artillery. Since rocket-projector regiments are capable of playing a decisive part in battle, they may be concentrated at strategically important points along a front. ... The organization of a rocket-projector regiment is much like that of a motorized artillery regiment; organizationally, the motor vehicles and signal equipment of both are also much the same. Since the proje
ctor units usually are kept close behind the forward infantry line, their batteries may also be equipped with antitank guns. Because of the light construction of the projectors, a 3-ton prime mover is sufficient for traction purposes, and can also carry the gun crew and some of the ammunition. ...
The Nebelwerfer 41 can fire three different types of projectiles: high-explosive shells, incendiary projectiles, and smoke projectiles.
The high-explosive shells include those with supersensitive fuzes and those with delayed-action fuzes. The latter can penetrate reinforced cover. Because of their fragmentation and concussion effect, high-explosive shells are used primarily against personnel. It has been found that the concussion has not only been great enough to kill personnel, but occasionally has caused field fortifications and bunkers to collapse.
The incendiary projectiles are psychologically effective, and under favorable conditions can start field and forest fires.
The smoke projectiles are used to form smoke screens or smoke zones.
Rocket-projector troops are employed as battalion and regimental units, in keeping with their task of destroying hostile forces by concentrated fire. One of the advantages of the Nebelwerfer 41 is that it can mass its projectiles on a very small target area. By means of a shrewd disposition of the batteries, a carefully planned communication system, and a large number of observation posts with advanced observers, the infantry can assure for itself maneuverability and a concentration of its fire power upon the most important points. Projectors are placed well toward the front—almost without exception, at points forward of the artillery—so that they will be able to eliminate hostile command posts, destroy hostile positions, and even repulse sudden attacks effectively. The firing positions of the projectors are always carefully built up so that the weapons can give strong support to the infantry.
German Artillery in Combat Page 17