Sonny (Ad Dionem Chrysostomum Analecta, f.) expresses the view that this Discourse and the pseudo-Platonic Sisyphus, which apparently was written about 350 B.C., were drawn from a common source, while Dümmler (Academica, ) would go further and name Antisthenes’ paradox ὅ τι οὐκ ἔστι ζητεῖν (seeking that which is not) as this common source. On the other hand, Hirzel (Der Dialog II, ), von Arnim, as one may infer from his note on §§ 4-5, and Wegehaupt (De Dione Chrysostomo Xenophontis Sectatore, ff.) maintain that Dio used the Sisyphus directly. Wegehaupt points to so many parallels between this Discourse and the Sisyphus as to make his theory appear very reasonable. If this theory is not correct, then Dio and the author of the Sisyphus followed their common source very closely.
The Twenty-sixth Discourse: On Deliberation
Dio. For a long time, as I sat and listened to you men when you spent many hours at the home of one of our public men in deliberating about certain affairs of state, I have been considering by myself and examining the meaning of that which you call deliberation, or what deliberation in the abstract is. Does a person really deliberate about a matter which he knows and understands?
Interlocutor. I do not think that when a person knows certain things, he deliberates about them, but that he already knows them.
Dio. Well then, when there are things he does not know or understand, is it about these that he deliberates, casting about as it were like a diviner, and thus seeking to find out what he does not know?
Int. It does not seem to me that this man, either, can deliberate about things when he has no knowledge about them.
[2] Dio. Then can deliberation be something like this — that when men know some things but do not know other things, this is the subject about which they deliberate? And in order that we may follow the argument better, we shall make it clear by an illustration. For instance, we assume that we know Charicles and Charixenus, but do not know where they live, and so are making conjectures about their place of residence; [3] is not this deliberation — the drawing of inferences from what we do know about that which we do not yet know? Or, just as people playing at odd and even know that the challengers have something in their hands but now how much; yet sometimes they do hit upon the right answer and in that way come off victorious. May we conclude, then, that deliberation too is like this — that though there is something we do know, yet concerning all the other things which we do not know, we make a guess and sometimes accidentally hit it although without any knowledge?
[4] Now come, let us see what the nature of the thing is: Things which are in being both are, and have come to be, and exist, while things that are not in being neither are, nor have come into be, nor do they exist. Now we do not need deliberation for things which are already in being; for there is no profit in deliberating about things which have come into being and exist. In fact, what imaginable reason will we have for deliberating about them? In order that things that have come into being may not come into being? It is impossible for them not to have come into being. Well, is it in order that things which are in being may not be? Absurd! Can we prevent their being just as they have come to be? Well, is it in order that they may not exist? Everything which is in being has existence. But about things that are in being why should a person deliberate anyway? [5] About what things, then, do we deliberate? About the future, as the argument suggests. But the future neither is, nor has been, nor exists. Hence, about things that are not and do not exist, who is able to deliberate? For the thing not in being is nothing, and about that which is not no one can deliberate. Hence no one can deliberate about things which are yet to be; for deliberation deals with a thing that is, and that which is yet to be does not exist. Therefore deliberation cannot possibly be about the future either.
[6] Take another case: Would the unmusical person and the one who has no knowledge of harmony, melody, rhythm, and their arrangement and movement be able to deliberate successfully about music and the operations involved in music?
Int. Certainly not.
Dio. Another point: Would the man who has no knowledge of geometry, in deliberating about a solid body, its length, width, and height, deliberate successfully?
Int. No, he also would not.
Dio. Then further: Would the man who does not know how to command a ship, in deliberating about the command of a ship and the duties of the captain, deliberate competently?
Int. No, he would not, either.
[7] Dio. Then a person who has had no competent education and no knowledge whatever about a thing is not competent to deliberate about it, either. Therefore it is necessary to give the greatest attention to prudence and education, in order that it may be easy for us to deliberate about all things whatsoever and to know what is going to suit each deliberation and not to make serious mistakes; but just as musicians, geometricians, and ship-captains consider with professional skill their own particular work, and as all persons who possess skill in any matter are also competent to understand their work, in like manner let us also be competent to deliberate and speak about our own business. [8] For it is absurd that while those playing at odd and even show intelligence, and that too when they are guessing and do not see the thing about which they make a guess, yet those who are deliberating about public matters should display neither intelligence, nor knowledge, nor experience, although these matters are sometimes of the greatest importance, such as concord and friendship of families and states, peace and war, colonization and the organization of colonies, the treatment of children and of wives.
THE TWENTY-SEVENTH DISCOURSE: A SHORT TALK ON WHAT TAKES PLACE AT A SYMPOSIUM
Dio begins by saying that it is at symposia and at the great national festivals that the characters of men are shown most clearly. Then, after speaking of the varied effects of wine on men according to their characters, he passes on to a description of the different types of men seen at one of the national festivals such as the Isthmian games. The last type mentioned is the philosopher, who finds it just as difficult to get the attention of men as the physician does. The elaboration of this thought, and the comments on the foolishness of men in giving no heed to either their bodies or their souls, take up the second half of the Discourse.
From this brief outline it will be seen that the title is not very suitable. What Bio says about symposia and national festivals is merely to gain attention for his real theme, which is the folly of men in taking no thought of either body or soul until trouble is actually upon them. It is very natural for Bio here, as in other parts of his writings, to refer to bodily infirmities, because he suffered from ill health himself as a result of the hardships incurred in exile.
The simplicity of the ideas expressed and their similarity to those found in the eighth and ninth Discourses, which belong to the period of Dio’s exile, make it seem probable that this Discourse also was written in that period.
THE TWENTY-SEVENTH DISCOURSE: A SHORT TALK ON WHAT TAKES PLACE AT A SYMPOSIUM
The qualities of mind and character of individual men stand revealed at our national festivals no less than at symposia, except that at festivals the revelation is more varied and extends over a longer period of time.
As of the symposia, we may assume that some persons attend for the sake of drinking and devote themselves to that, just as thirsty wayfarers when they come to a spring stoop down and drink. Yet travellers, when they have drunk their fill and quenched their thirst, quietly go their way without having done or said anything indecorous, but the others, on the contrary, both say and do many disagreeable things at times. [2] For Dionysus does not welcome his votaries who need him with the same sort of welcome as the Nymphs do theirs; but since he is of a frenzied nature and the child of lightning and thunder, as the poets say, he literally fills with fire those who use him in too ignorant a way, and actually makes the majority of them thunderstruck or stupefied. Nay rather, his votaries, being practically crazed, do many evil things, just as Homer says of the Centaur that in a fit of drunkenness he wrought evil in the h
ome of Peirithoüs. [3] And others, too, who are naturally loquacious, feeling that they have got their table-companions for an audience, recite stupid and tedious speeches; while still others sing in tune and out of tune, although they have no gift whatever for music; and one might almost say that they give more annoyance than those who quarrel and use abusive language. But there is another class of men who claim to be abstemious and temperate, that bore people to death by their disagreeable manner, since they will not condescend either to drink moderately or to take part in the general conversation. [4] But the man that is gentle and has a properly ordered character, easily endures the rudeness of the others, and acts like a gentleman himself, trying to the best of his ability to bring the ignorant chorus into a proper demeanour by means of fitting rhythm and melody. And he introduces appropriate topics of conversation and by his tact and persuasiveness attempts to get those present to be more harmonious and friendly in their intercourse with one another.
[5] So much for symposia. But people also attend the national festivals, some just to see the sights and the athletic contests in particular; and all those who take a very great interest in these continue doing nothing else from early dawn. Many too bring in merchandise of all sorts, the tradespeople, that is; and some display their own arts and crafts; [6] while others show off their accomplishments, many of them declaiming poems, both tragedies and epics, and many others prose works, so that they annoy the man who has come for a rest and wishes to have a holiday. And these people seem very much like those who hum tunes and sing songs at the symposia, whom you cannot help hearing even if you do not wish it.
But the man who in the midst of these folk has the ability to speak words edifying and profitable and thus make the whole gathering more decorous and better, because of the general disturbance and the great throng of those of the other sort keeps quiet and withdraws into himself.
[7] For really most men feel towards the words of philosophy exactly as they do, I believe, toward the drugs which physicians administer; that is, no one resorts to them at first, nor buys them until he contracts some unmistakable illness and has pain in some part of his body. And in the same way people are, as a general rule, not willing to listen to the words of the philosopher until some affliction visits them, something which men consider grievous. [8] To give an illustration: the prosperous man — I use the term in the sense in which the majority use it — for instance, a man who derives a large income from his loans, or has a good deal of land, and not only enjoys good health, but has children and a wife living, or a man who has some position of authority and a high office without war, or rebellion, or any open dangers — such a person you would not easily find approaching these philosophers, or caring to listen to the teachings of philosophy. [9] But if some disaster should overtake any one touching his livelihood, and he should become either poor after having been wealthy, or weak and powerless after having been influential, or should meet with some other misfortune, then he becomes much more friendly disposed toward that craft, somehow manages to endure the words of the philosophers, and practically admits that he needs comfort. And if it is his misfortune to lose any of his relatives, either his wife, or child, or a brother, he asks the philosopher to come and speak words of comfort, as if he thought it were only then necessary to consider how one may endure with resignation what happens and be able to face the future; before that he does not. [10] It is much the same as the feeling of ignorant persons in regard to their bodies: ordinarily they have no concern whatever about their health, but enjoy foods, wine, and women, and all their other regimen as intemperately and unconcernedly as possible; but if any weariness or fever does unexpectedly seize them owing to the changes in the weather, then they indeed demand to be treated, since their health is greatly disordered and they are suffering from severe illnesses, such as you expect would attack people of this sort. But how to avoid having any need of a physician is a problem which they do not consider at all.
THE TWENTY-EIGHTH DISCOURSE: MELANCOMAS II
Dio, accompanied by at least one friend, comes up from the harbour — of Naples presumably — to witness the athletic contests then being held, and has his attention drawn especially to a tall handsome boxer who is training, surrounded by a great crowd of admirers. On asking one of the bystanders who the man is, he learns that it is the boxer Iatrocles, so often the antagonist of Melancomas, who has recently died. This bystander speaks in the highest terms of Melancomas both as a boxer and as a man, and is evidently greatly distressed by his death. Thereupon Dio offers various reflections to comfort him.
vonº Arnim, chiefly from a study of this Discourse and the following one, which is the funeral oration for Melancomas, comes to the conclusion that the occasion of it was the Games in honour of Augustus (Ludi Augustales) as held at Naples in the year A.D. 74, when Titus, soon to be emperor and now thirty-three years old — Dio himself would be of about the same age — was either Director of Games (γυμνασίαρχος) there or Exhibitor of Games (ἀγωνοθέτης).
On the other hand, Lemarchand (Dion de Pruse, Les Oeuvres d’avant l’Exil,º ff.) gives various reasons for thinking that Melancomas is a purely imaginary character. He considers it rather remarkable that, apart from one passage in Themistius (i.e. Oration 10, ), who got his information from Dio (see Scharold, Dio Chrysostomus und Themistius, Burghausen 1912), there is no other reference in ancient literature to this incomparable athlete and boxer, no inscription that has come to light commemorating any victory of his. He also shows in detail that this Melancomas is the embodiment of all the youthful qualities and virtues for which Dio shows admiration in other Discourses, and that Dio at times, as in the Euboean Discourse, describes what is ideal rather than actual. And in Dio’s time, he adds, the Romans began to take an interest in athletics, so that outstanding athletes came from Greece and Asia Minor to give exhibitions — note that Melancomas’ father is represented as coming from Caria in Asia Minor. Their contests served to recall the glorious past of Greece. Therefore, may not Dio, who was an ardent Hellenist and who looked with disapproval on the cruel gladiatorial exhibitions (see Discourse .), have wished to increase the interest in athletics by creating and describing this ideal athlete, this gentle boxer, who would not think of injuring his opponent by striking him with his fist armed with the terrible caestus? But this gentleness would make little appeal to most men of Dio’s time.
As a literary effort the twenty-eighth Discourse is superior to the twenty-ninth, and toward the end the hortatory and preaching element, which is regarded as typical of what Dio wrote during his exile, is somewhat in evidence. It is possible, then, that this Discourse was written considerably later than the following one.
THE TWENTY-EIGHTH DISCOURSE: MELANCOMAS II
After coming up from the harbour, we strolled over at once to have a look at the athletes, just as if the sole purpose of our trip had been to view the contests. When we got near the gymnasium we saw a number running on the track outside of it, and there was a roar as the crowd cheered them on; and we also saw the athletes who were exercising in other ways. To those, however, we thought it hardly worth while to pay attention; but wherever we saw the biggest crowd, there we would stroll. [2] So we noticed a great number of people standing near the Arcade of Heracles and a stream of others coming up, and some also going away because they could not see. At first we tried to see by looking over other people’s shoulders, and with difficulty managed to catch a glimpse of the head of a man who was exercising with his hands up. Then we gradually got in closer. He was a very tall and beautiful young man; and besides, the exercises he was taking made his body seem, quite naturally, still taller and more beautiful. He was giving a most brilliant performance, and in so spirited a way that he seemed more like a man in an actual contest. [3] Then, when he stopped exercising and the crowd began to draw away, we studied him more closely. He was just like one of the most carefully wrought statues, and also he had a colour like well blended bronze.
[4] After he
had gone, we asked one of the bystanders, an old man, who he was; and the man said with a frown:
“Why that is Iatrocles, the opponent of Melancomas, the only man who would not give in to him, at least, that is, if he could help it. Still he could not get the better of him, for he was always defeated, sometimes after competing for a whole day. However, Iatrocles had already given up trying, so that in the last contest here in Naples, Melancomas defeated no opponent more quickly than he did Iatrocles. But you see how confident he is now, and how large a crowd he has about him as he takes his exercise. For my part, I really believe that he feels a malicious joy at the other man’s misfortune; and naturally enough, for he knows that not only the next crown but all others are now his own.”
[5] “What!” I exclaimed, “Is Melancomas dead?” — for even we knew his name at least, although we had never seen the man himself.
“Yes,” he replied, “he died not long ago. I believe this is the second day since he was buried.”
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 35