[22] But the man who extols the coward as a hero makes the most justifiable use of the folly of him who is flattered; since, if the craven believes him and attempts to perform heroic deeds, he will come to grief all the more speedily. —
[23] καθόλου δὲ φωραθεὶς μὲν ὁ κόλαξ οὐ καταγιγνώσκεται μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μισεῖται: δοκεῖ γὰρ καταγελῶν λέγειν: πείσας δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς λέγει οὐ μεγάλης τινὸς τυγχάνει χάριτος. τί γὰρ καὶ δοκεῖ χαρίζεσθαι τἀληθῆ λέγων;
[23] Yet, generally speaking, when the flatterer is found out, he is not only condemned, but hated as well, since his words are thought to be mockery; while, if he convinces one of the truth of his words, he gets no very great thanks. For what great favour is he thought to confer by simply telling the truth?
[24] πολύ γε μὴν πονηρότερός ἐστι τῶν ψευδομένων μαρτύρων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρουσι τὸν δικαστήν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐξαπατῶσιν: ὁ δὲ κολακεύων ἅμα δεκάζει τῷ ἐπαίνῳ.
[24] Besides, he is a much greater rascal than a lying witness: for the latter does not corrupt the judge, he merely deceives him; but the flatterer corrupts at the same time that he praises.
[25] ἵνα δὲ μήτε ἐγὼ κολακείας αἰτίαν ἔχω τοῖς θέλουσι διαβάλλειν μήτε σὺ τοῦ κατ᾽ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐθέλειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι, ποιήσομαι τοὺς λόγους ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρηστοῦ βασιλέως, ὁποῖον εἶναι δεῖ [p. 38]
[25] Accordingly, that I may not be open to the charge of flattery by my would-be detractors, and that you on your part may not be accused of a wanting to be praised to your very face, I shall speak of the ideal king, of what sort he should be, and how he differs from the man who pretends to be a ruler but is in reality far from true dominion and kingship.
[26] καὶ τίς ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ προσποιουμένου μὲν ἄρχοντος εἶναι, πλεῖστον δὲ ἀπέχοντος ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας. εἰ δέ τις φήσει με τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι λόγους, τοῦτο ἂν εἴη κοινὸν ἐμοὶ τὸ ἔγκλημα καὶ Σωκράτει. φασὶ γάρ ποτε Ἱππίαν τὸν Ἠλεῖον, διὰ χρόνου πλείονος ἀκούοντα τοῦ Σωκράτους περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀρετῆς λέγοντος,
[26] And if anyone shall say that I always say the same things, this will be the same charge that was laid against Socrates. For the story runs that once Hippias of Elis, who had been listening for some time to the words of Socrates about justice and virtue and to his wonted comparisons with pilots, physicians, cobblers and potters, finally made the exclamation natural to a sophist,
[27] καὶ παραβάλλοντος, ὥσπερ εἰώθει, τοὺς κυβερνήτας καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ κεραμέας, εἰπεῖν, ἅτε σοφιστήν, Πάλιν σὺ ταὐτά, Σώκρατες; καὶ ὅς γελάσας ἔφη, Καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. σὺ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑπὸ σοφίας οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγεις, ἡμῖν δὲ ἓν τοῦτο δοκεῖ τῶν καλλίστων εἶναι. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ
[27] “The same things once more, Socrates!” to which the other replied with a laugh, “Yes, and on the same subjects. Now you by reason of your wisdom probably never say the same about the same things, but to me this appears a thing most excellent. We know that liars say many things and all different, while those who stick to the truth cannot find anything else to say than just the truth.”
[28] ψευδομένους οἴδαμεν πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόμοια λέγοντας: τοῖς δὲ ἀληθεύουσιν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἕτερα εἰπεῖν τῶν ἀληθῶν. ἐγὼ δὲ εἰ μὲν ἑώρων ἄλλην ὑπόθεσιν σπουδαιοτέραν ἢ σοὶ μᾶλλον προσήκουσαν, ἐκείνην ἂν ἐπεχείρουν ποιήσασθαι. νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἰατρὸν ἄλλους τινὰς ἀκούειν ἢ λέγειν λόγους φαίην ἂν ὀρθῶς ἢ τοὺς περὶ ὑγιείασσώματος καὶ νόσου: οὗτοι γὰρ ὑγιεινοὶ καλοῦνται ἰατροῖς: οὔτε κυβερνήτην ἢ τοὺς περὶ ὡρῶν καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ ἄστρων: οὗτοι γὰρ κυβερνητικοὶ δικαίως λέγονται:
[28] So too with me: if I knew of any subject more serious or more suited to you, that is the subject that I should attempt to handle. But as it is, just as I should say that the proper subject for the physician to listen to or discuss is physical health and disease (indeed, the terms applied to physicians, hygieinoi and iatrikoi, mean “men who are concerned with health and with healing”), and for the navigator, seasons and winds and stars (for navigators are rightly termed kybernetikoi, “men concerned with the steering of ships”), so I maintain that the proper subject for the ruler and king is the government and control of men.
[29] οὔτε ἄρχοντα καὶ βασιλέα ἢ τοὺς περὶ ἀρχῆς τε καὶ διοικήσεως ἀνθρώπων. ὡς δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐνόμιζε Σωκράτης πειράσομαι εἰπεῖν. μετὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν
[29] So in discussing this subject I shall endeavour to set forth the views of Socrates. After the answer about happiness Socrates’ interrogator put the following question to him:
[30] τὴν περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπύθετο τοῦ Σωκράτους ὁ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐρώτημα ἐρωτήσας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, τοῦτο μὲν ἐπίστασαι παντὸς μᾶλλον, ὅτι τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον ἀνθρώπων ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ἰσχυρότατος καὶ μηδὲ τῶν θεῶν αὐτῶν ἥττονα ἔχων δύναμιν, ᾧ γε ἔνεστι καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα δοκοῦντα ποιῆσαι δυνατά, εἰ βούλοιτο πεζεύεσθαι
[30] “Socrates,” said he, “you know perfectly well that of all men under the sun that man is most powerful and in might no whit inferior to the gods themselves who is able to accomplish the seemingly impossible — if it should be his will, to have men walk dryshod over the sea, to sail over the mountains, to drain rivers dry by drinking —
[31] μὲν τὴν θάλατταν, πλεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὄρη, τοὺς δὲ ποταμοὺς ἐκλείπειν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων πινομένους. ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι Ξέρξης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεὺς τὴν μὲν γῆν ἐποίησε θάλατταν, διελὼν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ὀρῶν καὶ διαστήσας ἀπὸ τῆς ἠπείρου τὸν Ἄθω, διὰ δὲ τῆς [p. 39] θαλάττης τὸν πεζὸν στρατὸν ἄγων ἤλαυνεν ἐφ᾽ ἅρματος; ὥσπερ οἶμαι τὸν Ποσειδῶνά φησιν Ὅμηρος: καὶ τυχὸν ὁμοίως οἵ τε δελφῖνες καὶ τὰ κήτη κάτωθεν ὑπέπλει τὴν σχεδίαν, ὁπότε ἐκεῖνος ἤλαυνεν.
[31] or have you not heard that Xerxes, the king of the Persians, made of the dry land a sea by cutting through the loftiest of the mountains and separating Athos from the mainland, and that he led his infantry through the sea, riding upon a chariot just like Poseidon in Homer’s description? And perhaps in the same way the dolphins and the monsters of the deep swam under his raft as the king drove along.”
[32] καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Οὐδὲ τοῦτό σοι ἔχω εἰπεῖν, εἴτε μέγιστον ὁ ταῦτα ποιῶν δύναται, καθάπε
ρ σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε ἐλάχιστον ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέν. αὐτίκα εἰ μὲν ἦν σώφρων καὶ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ δίκαιος καὶ μετὰ γνώμης ἔπραττεν ὅσα ἔπραττεν, ἰσχυρὸν αὐτὸν ἡγοῦμαι καὶ μεγίστην ἔχειν τῷ ὄντι δύναμιν:
[32] “I cannot tell you that either,” replied Socrates; “I mean whether the man who does such things has the greatest power, as you affirm, or the least power, or none at all. If, for example, he was temperate, brave, and just, if all his acts were marked by judgment, I think he was a powerful man and really had the greatest might.
[33] εἴ δὲ αὖ δειλὸς καὶ ἀνόητος καὶ ἀσελγὴς καὶ παράνομος καὶ δι᾽ ὕβριν ταῦτα ἐπιχειρῶν, τοὐναντίον ἔμοιγε ἀσθενέστερος εἶναι δοκεῖ τῶν σφόδρα πενήτων καὶ μηδὲ ἕνα γῆς κεκτημένων βῶλον, ὥστε διαθρύψαι μακέλλῃ τροφῆς ἕνεκεν, οὐχ ὅπως τὰ μέγιστα διθρύπτειν ὄρη, καθάπερ σὺ φῄς.
[33] But if, on the other hand, he was cowardly, foolish, licentious, and lawless, and understood what he did in wanton insolence, then, on the contrary, I think he was a weaker man than the veriest beggar who has not even a clod of earth to break up with the pick to gain his livelihood — to say nothing of breaking through the highest mountains, the feat of which you speak.
[34] ὁ γὰρ ἀδύνατος μὲν ὀργὴν ἐπικατασχεῖν πολλάκις ὑπὲρ μικρῶν γιγνομένην, ἀδύνατος δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν παῦσαι τῶν αἰσχίστων, ἀδύνατος δὲ ἀπώσασθαι λύπην, ἐνίοτε μηδενὸς λυπηροῦ παρόντος, οὐ δυνάμενος δὲ ὑπομεῖναι πόνους, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν γιγνομένους, ἀδύνατος δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπελάσαι φόβον, οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦντα ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα βλάπτοντα,
[34] For he who cannot check a fit of anger, which is often caused by mere trifles; who cannot conquer a lust for the basest things; who cannot thrust pain aside, imaginary as it often is; who cannot endure toil, even to gain pleasure; who cannot drive fear from his soul, though it avails naught in the midst of alarms but works the greatest mischief — must not such a man be greatly lacking in strength, be weaker than a woman, weaker than a eunuch?
[35] πῶς οὐκ ἄνανδρος σφόδρα, ἡττώμενος μὲν γυναικῶν, ἡττώμενος δὲ εὐνούχων; ἢ σὺ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι λέγεις τὸν καὶ τοῦ μαλακωτάτου πάντων ἀσθενέστερον, ὕπνου; ὑφ᾽ οὗ ξυμποδισθεὶς πολλάκις ἄνευ δεσμῶν οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλοις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἑαυτῷ δύναται βοηθεῖν οὐδὲ ἐπίκουρον οὐδένα καλέσαι τῶν βουλομένων ἀμύνειν;
[35] Or do you call that man strong who is weaker than the softest of things? — I mean sleep, enchained by which, often without fetters, he cannot help himself, let alone others, nor call to his aid anyone willing to fight in his defence.”
[36] ταῦτα δὲ ἀκούσας εἶπεν, Ἐκεῖνο μέντοι οἶσθα δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι τῆς ἁπάσης οἰκουμένης τοῦ πλείστου καὶ ἀρίστου βασιλεύει μέρους. ἔξω γὰρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας καί τινων ὀλίγων ἐθνῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην ξύμπαντα τἄλλα ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ πεποίηται,
[36] On hearing this, the other exclaimed: “However, I presume you know, Socrates, that of the entire inhabited world the Persian king rules over the largest and best part; for, excluding Greece, Italy, and a few other peoples scattered throughout Europe, he has made all the rest subject to him;
[37] καὶ τῆς μὲν [p. 40] καλουμένης Ἀσίας ὅλης ἄρχει μέχρις Ἰνδῶν: πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν φασιν ὑπακούειν: τῆς δὲ Λιβύης τοῦ πλείονος μέρους: ἐν δὲ τῇ Εὐρώπῃ Θρᾴκης καὶ Μακεδονίας: ἁπάντων τούτων κρατεῖ: ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μέγας βασιλεὺς κέκληται μόνος ἐκεῖνος.
[37] and of what we call Asia he governs everything as far as the Indies, many of whose people are said to own his sway too, as well as the greater part of Africa; while in Europe he governs Thrace and Macedonia. All these he holds in subjection, and this is the reason that he alone has received the title of ‘The Great King.’”
[38] καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης εἶπεν, Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῦτο οἶδα ὅλως γε, εἰ βασιλεύς ἐστι τὴν ἀρχὴνοὐδεμιᾶς πόλεως ἢ κώμης. σὺ ἄρα, εἶπε, μόνος ἀνήκοος εἶ τούτων ἃ πάντες ἴσασιν; ἀκούω, ἔφη, πολλῶν λεγόντων ἃ σὺ λέγεις καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων: ὃ δὲ οὐκ ἐᾷ με γιγνώσκειν ὃ λέγω τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν:
[38] “But I am not absolutely sure even on this point,” replied Socrates, “whether he is king of any city or hamlet at all.” “Have you alone,” interjected the other, “never heard what all the world knows?” “Yes,” he replied, “I do hear many people say just what you are saying — many, both Greeks and barbarians; but what keeps me from forming a definite opinion on the point I raise is this:
[39] οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰ νομίμως καὶ δικαίως τούτων ἁπάντων προέστηκεν καὶ τοιοῦτος ὢν ὁποῖον εἴρηκα πολλάκις:εἰ μὲν γὰρ εὐγνώμων καὶ φιλάνθρωπος καὶ νόμιμος ὢν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι τῶν ἀρχομένων ἐπιμελεῖται, αὐτὸς πρῶτος εὐδαίμων καὶ φρόνιμος ὤν, καθάπερ εἶπον, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μεταδιδοὺς καὶ τῆς αὑτοῦ εὐδαιμονίας, οὐ δίχα θεὶς τό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ τότε χαίρων μάλιστα καὶ τότε νομίζωνἄριστα πράττειν, ὅταν ὁρᾷ καλῶς πράττοντας τοὺς ἀρχομένους,
[39] I do not know, my good sir, whether he is placed in right and lawful authority over all these people and is a man of the stamp I have mentioned time and again. If he is a man of good mind and heart, respects the law, cares for his subjects with an eye to their safety and welfare, and is, to begin with, happy and wise himself, as I have described him, and shares this happiness of his with others, not divorcing his own interest from that of his subjects, but rejoicing most and regarding himself as most prosperous when he sees his subjects prosperous too — then he is most powerful and a king in very truth.
[40] δυνάμει τε μέγιστός ἐστιν καὶ βασιλεὺς ἀληθῶς: εἰ δὲ φιλήδονος καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ ὑβριστὴς καὶ παράνομος, αὑτὸν οἰόμενος αὔξειν μόνον, ὡς ἂν πλεῖστα μὲν χρήματα κεκτημένος, μεγίστας δὲ καὶ πλείστας καρπούμενος ἡδονάς, ῥᾳθύμως δὲ διάγων καὶἀπόνως:
[40] If, on the other hand, he loves pleasure and wealth, is overbearing and lawless, and is minded to exalt himself alone to the end that he may get the most wealth and enjoy the most and greatest pleasures, leading an idle and effortless life and looking upon his subjects one and all as but slaves and ministers to his own luxury;
[41] τοὺς δὲ ὑπηκόους ἅπαντας ἡγούμενος δούλους �
�αὶ ὑπηρέτας τῆς αὑτοῦ τρυφῆς, οὐδὲ ποιμένος ἐπιεικοῦς ἔχων ἦθος, σκέπης καὶ νομῆς προνοούμενος τοῖς αὑτοῦ κτήνεσιν, ἔτι δὲ θῆρας ἀπαμύνων καὶ φῶρας προφυλάττων, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς πρῶτος διαρπάζων τε καὶ φθείρων καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέπων, καθάπερ, οἶμαι, πολεμίωνλείαν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴποιμι τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄρχοντα ἢ αὐτοκράτορα ἢ βασιλέα, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τύραννον καὶ λευστῆρα, ὥς [p. 41] ποτε προσεῖπεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων τὸν Σικυώνιον τύραννον, εἰ καὶ πολλὰς μὲν ἔχοι τιάρας, πολλὰ δὲ σκῆπτρα ὑπακούοιεν αὐτῷ.
[41] if he lacks even the quality of a good shepherd, who takes thought for the shelter and pasturing of his own flock, and, besides, keeps off wild beasts and guards it against thieves; nay, if he is the very first to plunder and destroy them and to grant the same privilege to others as though they were veritable spoil of the enemy — never should I style such a ruler either emperor or king. Much rather should I call him a tyrant and oppressor, as Apollo once called the tyrant of Sicyon — yea, even though he had many tiaras, many sceptres, and many obeyed his behests.”
Such was the sage’s habitual message while he constantly incited to virtue and tried to make both rulers and subjects better.
[42] τοιαῦτα μὲν ἐκεῖνος εἰώθει λέγειν, προτρέπων ἀεὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ βελτίους ποιῶν καὶ ἄρχοντας καὶ ἰδιώτας. ὅμοια δὲ εἰρήκασι περὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτόν, ὡς οἷόν τε ἑπόμενοι τῇ σοφωτάτῃ γνώμῃ. αὐτὰ δὲ πρῶτα δηλοῖ τὰ ὀνόματα τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν πραγμάτων.
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 180