[17] οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τόδε νομίζουσιν, οὐκ εἶναι ἐν τῇ Ὁμήρου φύσει τὸ ψεῦδος οὐδὲ ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον: πλεῖστα γοῦν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πεποίηκε ψευδόμενον, ὃν μάλιστα ἐπῄνει, τὸν δὲ Αὐτόλυκον καὶ ἐπιορκεῖν φησι, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ δεδόσθαι. περὶ δὲ θεῶν πάντες, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὁμολογοῦσι μηθὲν ἀληθὲς λέγειν Ὅμηρον καὶ οἱ πάνυ ἐπαινοῦντες αὐτόν, καὶ τοιαύτας ἀπολογίας πειρῶνται πορίζειν, ὅτι οὐ
[17] And, further, they do not think that falsehood was foreign to the character of Homer or that he made no use of it. Odysseus, at any rate, whom he praised most highly, he has represented as telling numerous falsehoods. He says, too, that Autolycus actually perjured himself and that he learned this from Hermes. And as regards the gods, practically every man, including his warmest admirers, admits that Homer does not speak a word of truth, and they seek to offer such excuses as this, that at such times he is not speaking his real mind but is using riddles and figures of speech.
[18] φρονῶν ταῦτ᾽ ἔλεγεν, ἀλλ᾽ αἰνιττόμενος καὶ μεταφέρων. τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων αὐτὸν οὕτως εἰρηκέναι; ὅστις γὰρ περὶ θεᾶν οὐ φανερῶς τἀληθῆ φησιν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον οὕτως ὥστε τὰ ψευδῆ μᾶλλον ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, καὶ ταῦτα μηδὲν ὠφελούμενος, πῶς ἂν περί γε ἀνθρώπων ὀκνήσειεν ὁτιοῦν ψεῦδος εἰπεῖν; καὶ ὅτι μὲν πεποίηκεν ἀλγοῦντας τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ στένοντας καὶ τιτρωσκομένους καὶ ἀποθνῄσκοντας σχεδόν, ἔτι δὲ μοιχείας καὶ δεσμὰ καὶ διεγγυήσεις θεῶν, οὐ λέγω, πρότερον εἰρημένα πολλοῖς. οὐδὲ γὰρ βούλομαι κατηγορεῖν Ὁμήρου, μόνον δὲ ἐπιδεῖξαι τἀληθὲς ὡς γέγονεν: ἐπεί τοι καὶ ἀπολογήσομαι περὶ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα.
[18] Then what is to prevent him having spoken in the same way of men also? For when a man does not frankly tell the truth about the gods, but, on the contrary, puts the matter in such a way that his readers get the wrong idea of them and without any advantage to himself either, why would he hesitate to utter any falsehood whatsoever regarding men? That he has represented the gods as suffering pain, groaning, being wounded, and almost dying; that he tells of their amours withal, of their durance vile, of their giving bonds — on these matters I do not dwell; many others have already done that. For I have no desire to impeach Homer, but only to show how the truth stands. For indeed I shall even tell in his defence what I think to be the facts.
[19] ὅτι δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος οὐκ ὤκνει πάντων μάλιστα οὐδὲ αἰσχρὸν ἐνόμιζε, τοῦτο λέγω: πότερον δὲ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ παρίημι νῦν σκοπεῖν. ἀφεὶς οὖν ὅσα δοκεῖ δεινὰ πεποιηκέναι περὶ θεῶν καὶ οὐ πρέποντα ἐκείνοις, τοσοῦτό φημι μόνον, ὅτι λόγους οὐκ ὤκνει τῶν θεῶν ἀπαγγέλλειν, οὕς φησιν αὐτοὺς διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς αὑτούς, καὶ οὐ μόνον γε τοὺς ἐν κοινῷ γενομένους καὶ παρατυγχανόντων ἁπάντων τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὓς ἰδίᾳ τινὲς διαλέγονται ἀλλήλοις,
[19] But this I do assert, that he made the freest possible use of falsehood and considered it no shame. Whether he was right in this or not, I forbear to consider now.
Omitting, then, what he has pictured concerning the gods in his poems that is shocking and unbecoming to them, I say merely this, that he did not hesitate to repeat conversations of the gods, which he says they held with one another, not only those held in open court when all the other deities were present, but also those which some had privately with one,
[20] οἷον ὁ Ζεὺς τεθυμωμένος τῇ Ἥρᾳ διὰ τὴν ἀπάτην καὶ τὴν ἧτταν τῶν Τρώων, καὶ πρότερον Ἥρα πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην, παρακαλοῦσα φαρμάξαι τὸν πατέρα καὶ δοῦναι τὸ φίλτρον αἰτῇ, τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα, ὡς εἰκός, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τοῦτο [p. 120] ἀξιοῦσα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰκὸς ἄλλον τινὰ εἰδέναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς διαφερομένων καὶ λοιδορούντων ἐνίοτε ἀλλήλους. καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πεποίηκεν ἐπανορθούμενον τὸ τοιοῦτο, μὴ δόξῃ ἀλαζὼν διηγούμενος τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς γενομένους ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ λόγους. ἔφη γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι τῆς Καλυψοῦς, ἐκείνην δὲπαρά του πυθέσθαι: περὶ αὑτοῦ δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον εἴρηκεν ὅτι πύθοιτο παρὰ θεοῦ τινος.
[20] as, for instance, when Zeus was angered at Hera for deceiving him and bringing on the defeat of the Trojans, or that previous conversation which she had with Aphrodite, in which she urged her to drug her father and lend her the love charm, to wit, the embroidered girdle — a request which she presumably made in secret. For it is unlikely even in human affairs that any outsider knows of those occasional scenes where husbands and wives fall out and abuse one another. Yet Homer has a passage in which Odysseus puts this matter properly so as not to seem a mere impostor, namely, where he tells of the debates which the gods held concerning him. For he says that he heard these debates from Calypso and that she had learned of them from someone else; but about himself Homer has made no such claim of having received his information from some god.
[21] οὕτω πάνυ κατεφρόνει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐθὲν αὐτῷ ἔμελεν, εἰ δόξει μηθὲν λέγειν ἀληθές. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πείσειν γε ἐνόμιζέ τινα ὡς ἐπίσταιτο τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς γενομένους ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ λόγους. ἔφη γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι ἅπαντα καὶτοὺς πολλοὺς ἔπεισε. διηγεῖται δὲ καὶ τὴν συνουσίαν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς πρὸς τὴν Ἥραν ἐν τῇ Ἴδῃ γενομένην καὶ τοὺς λόγους οὓς εἶπε πρὸ τῆς συνουσίας, ὡς αὐτὸς ἑωρακώς τε καὶ ἀκηκοώς, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτὸν ἐκώλυσεν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ νέφος, ὅ περιεκάλυψεν ὁ Ζεὺς τοῦ μὴ φανερὸς γενέσθαι.
[21] Such utter contempt did Homer show for men, and not a whit did he care if all his statements were regarded as false. For of course he did not imagine that he would convince anyone that he knew [of his own knowledge about] the debates among the gods. He tells also of the dalliance of Zeus and Hera that occurred on Mount Idea, and what words Zeus spoke before the meeting, as though he had personally seen and heard, and apparently no obstacle was presented by the cloud in which Zeus had wrapped himself to escape being seen.
[22] τούτοις δὲ ἐπέθηκε τὸν κολοφῶνα σχεδόν: ἵνα γὰρ μὴ ἀπορῶμεν ὅπως ξυνίει τῶν θεῶν, οὕτως διαλέγεται ἡμῖν σχεδὸν ὡς ἔμπειρος τῆς τῶν θεῶν γλώττης, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ οὐδὲ τὰ αὐτὰ ὀνόματα ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ λέγουσιν ἅπερ καὶ ἡμ
εῖς. ἐνδείκνυται δὲ ταῦτα ἐπὶ ὀρνέου τινός, ὅ φησι τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς χαλκίδα καλεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους κύμινδιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τόπου τινὸς πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃν τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους Βατίειαν ὀνο- [p. 121] μάζειν, τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς Σῆμα 1 Μυρίνης.
[22] And to all this Homer has just added the finishing touch. For, not to keep us in doubt as to how he came to understand the gods, he talks to us almost as though he were acquainted with their language, tells us that it was not the same as ours, and that they do not apply the same names to the various things as we do. He draws attention to this in the case of a bird, which he says the gods call chalkis and men kymindis, and in the case of a place before Troy which men call Batieia, but the gods call the Sema Myrines.
[23] περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποταμοῦ φράσας ἡμῖν ὅτι οὐ Σκάμανδρος ἀλλὰ Ξάνθος λέγοιτο παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτὸς οὕτως ἤδη ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν ὀνομάζει, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἐξὸν αὐτῷ τὰς ἄλλας γλώττας μιγνύειν τὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν αἰολίζειν, ποτὲ δὲ δωρίζειν, ποτὲ δὲ ἰάζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαστὶ διαλέγεσθαι. ταῦτα δέ μοι εἴρηται, ὥσπερ δὴ ἔφην, οὐ κατηγορίας ἕνεκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἀνδρειότατος ἀνθρώπων ἦν πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος Ὅμηρος καὶ οὐθὲν ἧττον ἐθάρρει καὶ ἐσεμνύνετο ἐπὶ τῷ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ 2 τῷ τἀληθῆ λέγειν. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ σκοποῦσι πάνυ σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια φαίνεται, ἃ ἐγώ φημι αὐτὸν ἐψεῦσθαι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἀνθρώπινα ψεύσματα καὶ λίαν πιθανὰ πρὸς θείαν καὶ ἀμήχανον φύσιν. 3 πέρας δὴ ἐπιτέθεικεν: ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς βαρβάροις διαλέγονται οἱ δίγλωττοι καλούμενοι καὶ ἑρμηνεύοντες αὐτοῖς τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν, οὕτως Ὅμηρος ἡμῖν διαλέγεται, τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἑρμηνεύων, ὥσπερ ἐπιστάμενος τὴν θείαν διάλεκτον: πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐχ ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ οὐδὲ τὰ αὐτὰ παρά τε ἡμῖν καὶ παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις ὀνόματα, ἔπειτα ἐξηγούμενος περί τινων, ὅπως οἱ θεοὶ νομίζουσιν, οἷον ὅτι τὴν χαλκίδα κύμινδιν οἱ θεοὶ καλοῦσι: τόπον δέ τινα πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, Βατίειαν ὀνομαζόμενον σῆμα Μυρίνης.
[23] And after telling us that the river is called not Scamander but Xanthus by the gods, Homer himself proceeds to call it by this latter name in his verses, as though it were his privilege not only to mix the various dialectalº forms of the Greeks freely, using now the Aeolic, now a Dorian, and now an Ionic form, but to employ even the Zeus dialect in the bargain. I have spoken in this way just as I have said, not by way of criticism, but because Homer was the boldest liar in existence and showed no less assurance and pride in his lying than in telling the truth.
[24] τὸ δὲ μῶλυ εἰπὼν ὅπως οἱ θεοὶ λέγουσιν, οὐκέτι προστίθησι τὸ παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὄνομα: καὶ τὸν ποταμὸν εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐ Σκάμανδρος ἀλλὰ Ξάνθος ὀνομάζοιτο παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς, οὕτως ἤδη ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι χρῆται, ὡς ἐξὸν αὐτῷ, μὴ μόνον τὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων φωνὰς μιγνύειν, μηδὲ τοῖς σφόδρα ἀρχαίοις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς δαιμονίοις χρῆσθαι ὀνόμασι, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν αἰολίζοντα ποτὲ δὲ δωρίζοντα, πάλιν δὲ ἰάζοντα διαλέγεσθαι, καθάπερ οἶμαι θετταλίζοντα ἢ κρητίζοντα, οἱονεὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐκάλει λιμένα, Θετταλῶν ἀκούσας. 5 ταῦτα δέ μοι εἴρηται, ὥσπερ ἤδη ἔφην, οὐ κατηγορίας ἕνεκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἀνδρειότατος ἦν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τό ψεῦδος Ὅμηρος καὶ οὐχ ἧττον ἐθάρρει καὶ ἐσεμνύνετο ἐπὶ τῷ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ τῷ τἀληθῆ λέγειν. οὕτω γὰρ σκοποῦσιν οὐδὲν ἔτι φαίνεται παράδοξον οὐδὲ ἄπιστον τῶν ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ δεικνυμένων, ἀλλὰ σμικρὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπεια ψεύσματα πρὸς θεῖα καὶ μεγάλα. [p. 122] 6 ἐπιχειρήσας γὰρ τὸν πόλεμον εἰπεῖν τὸν γενόμενον τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Τρῶας, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἤρξατο ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅθεν ἔτυχεν: ὃ ποιοῦσι πάντες οἱ ψευδόμενοι σχεδόν, ἐμπλέκοντες καὶ περιπλέκοντες καὶ οὐθὲν βουλόμενοι λέγειν ἐφεξῆς: ἧττον γὰρ κατάδηλοί εἰσιν: εἰ δὲ μή, ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἐξελέγχονται.
[24] Thus regarded, none of my statements seems strange and incredible any longer; nay, they appear as but insignificant human falsehoods in comparison with great superhuman ones.
For when Homer undertook to describe the war between the Achaeans and the Trojans, he did not start at the very beginning, but at haphazard; and this is the regular way with practically all who distort the truth; they entangle the story and make it involved and refuse to tell anything in sequence, thus escaping detection more readily. Otherwise they are convicted by the very subject-matter.
[25] τοῦτο δὲ ἰδεῖν ἔστι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ παρ᾽ ἄλλοις γιγνόμενον, οἳ μετὰ τέχνης ψεύδονται. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τὰ γενόμενα ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὡς ξυνέβη ἕκαστον, οὕτως ἀπαγγέλλουσι, τὸ πρῶτον πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον δεύτερον καὶ τἄλλα ἐφεξῆς ὁμοίως. ἓν μὲν τοῦτο αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἄρξασθαι τῆς ποιήσεως:ἕτερον δέ, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ τέλος μάλιστα ἐπεβούλευσεν
[25] This is just what may be seen happening in courts of justice and in the case of others who lie skilfully; whereas those who wish to present each fact as it really occurred do so by reporting the first thing first, the second next, and so on in like order. This is one reason why Homer did not begin his poem in the natural way. Another is that he planned especially to do away with its beginning and its end as far as possible and to create the very opposite impression concerning them.
[26] ἀφανίσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι τὴν ἐναντίαν δόξαν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. ὅθεν οὔτε τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τὸ τέλος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ ὑπέσχετο ὑπὲρ τούτων οὐδὲν ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴ που καὶ μέμνηται, παρέργως καὶ βραχέως, καὶ δῆλός ἐστιν ἐπιταράττων: οὐ γὰρἐθάρρει πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδὲ ἐδύνατο εἰπεῖν ἑτοίμως. συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ψευδομένοις ὡς τὸ πολύ γε, ἄλλα μέν τινα λέγειν τοῦ πράγματος καὶ διατρίβειν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς, ὃ δ᾽ ἂν μάλιστα κρύψαι θέλωσιν, οὐ προτιθέμενοι λέγουσιν οὐδὲ προσέχοντι τῷ ἀκροατῇ, οὐδ᾽ ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ χώρᾳ τιθέντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν λ
άθοι μάλιστα,καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὅτι αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ ἀποκνεῖν προσιέναι πρὸς αὑτό, ἄλλως τε ὅταν ᾖ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων.
[26] That is why he did not dare to tell either the beginning or the end in a straightforward way and did not bind himself to say anything about them, but if he does make mention of them anywhere, it is incidental and brief, and he is evidently trying to confuse. For he was ill at ease with respect to these parts and unable to speak freely. The following device, too, is usually employed by those who wish to deceive: They mention some parts of the story and dwell upon them, but what they are particularly anxious to conceal they do not bring out clearly or when their auditor is paying attention, nor do they put it in its proper place, but where it may best escape notice. They do this, not only for the reason just mentioned, but also because lying makes them ashamed and reluctant to go on with it, especially when it is about the most important matters.
[27] ὅθεν οὐδὲ τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγουσιν οἱ ψευδόμενοι, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἔλθωσιν: οἱ δέ τινες αὐτῶν βατταρίζουσι καὶ ἀσαφῶς λέγουσιν: οἱ δὲ οὐχ ὡς αὐτοί τι εἰδότες, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἑτέρων ἀκούσαντες. ὃς δ᾽ ἂνἀληθὲς λέγῃ τι, θαρρῶν καὶ οὐδὲν ὑποστελλόμενος λέγει. οὔτε οὖν τὰ περὶ τὴν ἁρπαγὴν τῆς Ἑλένης Ὅμηρος εἴρηκεν ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέος οὐδὲ παρρησίαν ἄγων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς οὔτε τὰ περὶ τῆς ἁλώσεως τῆς πόλεως. καίτοι γάρ, ὡς ἔφην, ἀνδρειότατος ὢν ὑποκατεκλίνετο καὶ ἡττᾶτο, ὅτι ᾔδει τἀναντία λέγων τοῖς οὖσι καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 213