Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [15] Dio. Therefore you will be all the more surprised to learn that this handsome youth belongs to no one.

  Int. What do you mean by his belonging to no one?

  Dio. Just what you meant by asking to whom he belongs. For I suppose you were asking whose son he is.

  Int. Well, is he one of the Sown Men?

  Dio. That would be in keeping with his stature and manliness, if they had been gentle and kindly in disposition, just as this youth is, and not altogether rough and wild, real children of the earth; for as to his physique, you are not far wrong in likening him to a Boeotian rather than to a Spartan or an Athenian. For that he is utterly Greek, I presume is quite patent.

  [16] τι γὰρ; εἴη τις ἂν τοῦ γένους διαφορὰ πρός γε τὸ κάλλος; ἢ οὐδένα οἴει γίγνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις καλόν; — Δ. Ἀλλ̓ οὐκ οἴει τὸ μέν τι βαρβαρικὸν εἶναι ὥσπερ εἶδος καὶ κάλλος, τὸ δὲ Ἑλληνικόν, ὥσπερ καὶ φωνὴν καὶ ἐσθῆτα, ἢ ὁμοίως σοι δοκεῖ γενέσθαι καλὸς Ἀχιλλεύς τε καὶ Ἕκτωρ; — Οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὡς περὶ ἀνδρείου τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὁ ποιητὴς διέξεισιν; — Δ. Ὅπου γε τὰς ναῦς ἐμπίμπρησιν: οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι περὶ κάλλους ἔπρεπεν αὐτοῦ τι μεμνῆσθαι. τελευτήσαντος δὲ καὶ γυμνωθέντος ἐκπλαγῆναί φησιν αὐτοῦ τὸ κάλλος τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἰδόντας, οὕτω πως λέγων: οἳ καὶ θηήσαντο φυὴν καὶ εἶδος ἀγητὸν Ἕκτορος.

  [16] Int. Why, I should like to know? Can there be any racial distinction as regards beauty? Or do you think that no handsome man is to be found among foreigners?

  Dio. Well, do you not think that there is a foreign type of beauty, as there is of general appearance, and an Hellenic type, just as their language and dress differ, or do you think that Achilles and Hector were handsome in just the same way?

  Int. Why, does not the poet discourse about Hector as a brave man only?

  Dio. Yes, where he is setting fire to the ships. For it would not, I think, have been fitting to mention beauty at that point. But after he had been slain and stripped, the Achaeans were simply amazed on beholding his beauty, so the poet says in about the following words:

  “Then gazed they upon the wonderful form and beauty of Hector.”

  [17] οὐ γὰρ ἦν αὐτοῖς πρότερον οἶμαι σχολὴ θηήσασθαι αὐτὸν ἀκριβῶς: [p. 271] καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σχεδὸν σαφέστερον ἐπέξεισιν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν καλλίστων. τήν τε γὰρ κεφαλὴν χαρίεσσαν αὐτοῦ φησιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν κόμην πάνυ μέλαιναν καὶ τὸ σῶμα οὐ σκληρόν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως εἴδους οὐδὲν λέγει καθ̓ ἕκαστον ἀλλ̓ ἢ τῆς κόμης, ὅτι ξανθὸς ἦν, καὶ περὶ τῆς Εὐφόρβου κόμης καὶ Πατρόκλου ὡς μάλιστα ἐν ἀκμῇ τελευτησάντων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων σμικρόν τι περὶ ἑκάστου καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν τῶν καλλίστων. πλὴν ὅτι γε οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι τούσδε ὁμοίως ἂν εἶναι καλούς, οὐδὲ Ἀλέξανδρον ἢ Εὔφορβον ἢ Τρωίλον: ἐοικέναι τι Μενελάῳ καὶ Πατρόκλῳ καὶ Νιρεῖ, οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις Σέσωστριν τὸν Αἰγύπτιον ἢ Μέμνονα τὸν Αἰθίοπα ἢ Νινύαν ἢ Εὐρύπυλον ἢ Πέλοπα.

  [17] For I imagine that before this they had been too busily occupied to gaze upon him critically. And the poet goes on to describe him more vividly, one may almost say, and in great detail than he describes any other of the most handsome men. For he says that his head was graceful, his hair quite black, and his body not hard. But about Achilles’ appearance he gives no detail except to say that his hair was auburn; and he mentions the hair of Euphorbus and of Patroclus as of men who had died in the very prime of life; and about each of the other men and most beautiful women he has very little to say; however, nobody would assert that these men could have been handsome in the same way, or that Alexander, or Euphorbus, or Troïlus bore any resemblance to Menelaus and Patroclus and Nireus, any more than among the barbarians Sesostris the Egyptian did or Memnon the Ethiopian, or Ninyas, Eurypylus, or Pelops.

  THE TWENTY-SECOND DISCOURSE: CONCERNING PEACE AND WAR

  ΠΕΡΙ ΕΙΡΗΝΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ.

  THE TWENTY-SECOND DISCOURSE: CONCERNING PEACE AND WAR

  We have here just a fragment of this Discourse. In § 3 Dio does mention his subject, but all that precedes and follows is of an introductory nature. He says that there are many questions which are the common concern of both philosophers and orators. One class of these common questions comprises those which have to do with the state (πολιτικὰ ζητήματα); and some of these, such as that about peace and war, have to do with what is advisable. Then in questions of advisability the philosophers and orators make a division, the philosophers dealing with those of a general nature and the orators with particular cases.

  This was the division made by Posidonius, the distinguished Stoic philosopher, born in 135 B.C. at Apamea, a city not far from Dio’s native Prusa. That the followers of Plato and Aristotle made the same division appears from Cicero, De Oratore . and . In this matter, then, Dio is clearly siding with the philosophers against the rhetoricians or teachers of oratory such as Hermagoras, who claimed all political questions for oratory and rhetoric. It is possible that what Dio says here is based upon Posidonius, as von Arnim thinks, and at any rate we may conclude that Dio composed this Discourse after his conversion to philosophy.

  [1] Πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα εὕροι τις ἂν καὶ ξύμπαντα ἀτεχνῶς τὰ ἔργου τινὸς ἐχόμενα καὶ πράξεως κοινὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ τοῖς ῥήτορσιν, ὅσοι μὴ ἀγοραῖοι μηδὲ μίσθαρνοι, πρὸς χρήματα ὁρῶντες μόνον καὶ τὰς ἰδιωτικὰς ἀμφιλογίας περὶ συμβολαίων ἤ τινων ἀλλὰ δημοσίᾳ συμβουλεύειν καὶ νομοθετεῖν ἀξιούμενοι — καθάπερ οἶμαι Περικλῆς καὶ Θουκυδίδης Ἀθήνησι καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἔτι πρότερον καὶ Κλεισθένης καὶ Πεισίστρατος, ἕως ἔτι ῥήτωρ καὶ

  The Twenty-second Discourse: Concerning Peace and War

  Many things in general and absolutely everything involving any work or activity will be found common to philosophers and orators — all those orators, that is, who do not carry on their business in the market-place and work for hire with their eyes fixed on matters of money only and on private disputes regarding contracts or loans out at interest, but aspire to advise and legislate for the state. That is, I think, what Pericles and Thucydides must have done at Athens, and Themistocles still earlier, and Cleisthenes, and Peisistratus, so long as he still let himself be called ‘orator’ and ‘popular leader’ —

  [2] δημαγωγὸς ἠνείχετο καλούμενος: Ἀριστείδην μὲν γὰρ καὶ Λυκοῦργον καὶ Σόλωνα καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδαν, καὶ εἴ τις ἕτερος τοιοῦτος, φιλοσόφους ἐν πολιτείᾳ θετέον ἢ ῥήτορας κατὰ τὴν γενναίαν τε καὶ [p. 272] ἀληθῆ ῥητορικήν — λέγω δὲ οἷον περί τε ἀγωγῆς τῶν νέων συμβουλεύοντες καὶ νομοθετοῦντες, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι Λυκοῦργος, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς ὁμιλίας �
�αὶ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσεως, ὅσην τε καὶ ὅπως δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ περὶ γάμου καὶ περὶ κοινωνίας καὶ περὶ νομίσματος καὶ περὶ τιμῆς καὶ ἀτιμίας καὶ περὶ οἴκων κατασκευῆς, καὶ πότερα χρὴ τετειχισμένην οἰκεῖν πόλιν ἢ καθάπερ ὁ θεὸς παρῄνεσε Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἀτείχιστον, καὶ περὶ ἀσκήσεως τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ τάξεως οὐ μόνον ὁπλιτικῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἵαν Ἐπαμεινώνδας εὑρεῖν λέγεται, τοὺς ἐραστὰς μετὰ τῶν ἐρωμένων τάξας, ἵνα σῴζοιντο μᾶλλον καὶ μάρτυρες ὦσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς κακίας: καὶ τὸν λόχον τοῦτον ἱερὸν ἐπονομασθέντα κρατῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίων τῇ περὶ Λεῦκτρα μάχῃ, ξυμπάντων ἐκείνοις

  [2] for Aristeides, Lycurgus, Solon, Epaminondas, and others of the same sort should be regarded as philosophers in politics, or orators in the noble and real sense of the term. And I use the word ‘philosopher’ of men who, for example, deliberate and legislate about the training of the young, just as Lycurgus did at Sparta, and about the association of ‘lovers,’ about the acquisition of money — how much one should make and in what manner — about marriage, about the duties of citizenship, about coinage, about civic rights and the loss of them, about the setting up of households, and as to whether one should live in a walled city or, as the god advised the Spartans, in an unwalled one; about training for war and the organization of not merely the heavy-armed troops in general, but also of the formation which Epaminondas is said to have invented, in which he put the ‘lovers’ along with their beloved in order that they might have a better chance of coming through safely and might be witness to one another’s courage or cowardice — and history tells us that this Sacred Band, as it was called, conquered the Spartans in the battle of Leuctra though these were supported by all Greece.

  [3] ἑπομένων τῶν Ἑλλήνων: τὸ δὲ δὴ κεφάλαιον, καὶ πολλάκις πολλοῖς παρέπιπτε, περί τε εἰρήνης καὶ πολέμου, ὃ νῦν τυγχάνει ζητούμενον. πᾶν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καλεῖται περὶ τοῦ προσήκοντος, οἷον εἰ γαμητέον, εἰ πολιτευτέον, εἰ βασιλείᾳ χρηστέον ἢ δημοκρατίᾳ ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ καταστάσει πολιτείας: ἐν οἷς ἐστι καὶ τοῦτο, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, εἰ πολεμητέον. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἁπλῶς οἱ φιλόσοφοι ζητοῦσι περὶ τούτων, ἀλλὰ πηνίκα καὶ πρὸς τίνας καὶ τίνος συμβάντος ἢ μὴ συμβάντος ἕκαστα τούτων πρακτέον. διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι οἵ γε ῥήτορες ἐπὶ τῶνδε ἢ τῶνδε σκοποῦσιν, οἷον εἰ συμφέρει πολεμεῖν Ἀθηναίοις πρὸς Πελοποννησίους ἢ βοηθεῖν Κερκυραίοις πρὸς Κορινθίους ἢ Φιλίππῳ συμμαχῆσαι Θηβαίοις ἐπὶ Φωκέας ἢ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ διαβῆναι εἰς τὴν

  [3] But the main question of all, and one with which many have often had to deal, concerns peace and war; and this now, as it so happens, is my theme.

  All problems of this sort are called by the philosophers questions of propriety: for example, whether one should marry, whether one should go into public life, whether a monarchy should be adopted, or a democracy, or some other form of government; and in these subjects, in my opinion, is included this one too, whether war should be entered into.

  Indeed the philosophers not only considered these questions in their general aspect, but also these: when, with reference to whom, and after what occurrence or non-occurrence each separate action should be taken. But there is this important difference — that the orators consider definite cases; for example, whether it is of advantage for the Athenians to make war on the Peloponnesians, for the Corcyraeans to go to the help of Corinthians, for Philip to support the Thebans in the war against the Phocians, or for Alexander to cross over into Asia.

  [4] Ἀσίαν. ἐν γὰρ ταύταις ἁπάσαις ταῖς βουλαῖς οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐμπίπτει καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ προαδικήσασι πολεμεῖν: εἰ συμβέβηκεν ἀδίκημα παρὰ τούτων οἷς διανοοῦνται πολεμεῖν, πηλίκον τι τοῦτο τὸ συμβεβηκός. οἱ φιλόσοφοι δὲ πόρρωθεν τὰ πράγματα ὁρῶσιν, ἐπ̓ αὐτῶν ἐξετάζοντες ὁποἶ ἄττα ἐστίν. πολὺ γὰρ κρεῖττον τὸ βεβουλεῦσθαι περὶ ἁπάντων ἐκ πλείονος καὶ διεγνωκότας ἐπειδὰν ἥκῃ τινὸς πράγματος καιρός, αὐτούς τε εἰδότας [p. 273] ἔχειν χρῆσθαι καὶ ἑτέροις παραινεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τρόπον τινὰ ἐξαίφνης

  [4] Then too, in all these deliberations the following sort of question is apt to crop up: Is it right to go to war with those who have not provoked a war by some wrongful act? if a wrong has been done by those against whom you propose to wage war, how serious is this wrong which has been done?

  But philosophers look at events from a distance and examine into what their character is in the abstract; for it is much better to have already deliberated about everything a long time in advance and since they have already reached a decision, to be able, when the moment for any action has come, with full knowledge either to handle the situation themselves or to give advice to the others, and not to be caught off their guard, as it were, and so be in a state of confusion and obliged to resort to improvising measures concerning situations of which they have no knowledge.

  [5] ληφθέντας ταράττεσθαι καὶ αὐτοσχεδιάζειν περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ῥήτορες, ὅταν δέῃ σκοπεῖν περί τινος, οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῶν ἄλλων πλέον οὐδὲ ἐσκεμμένοι πρότερον, ἅμα τε αὐτοὶ βουλεύονται τρόπον τινὰ καὶ συμβουλεύουσιν ἑτέροις. οἱ φιλόσοφοι δὲ περὶ τῶν πράξεων προοίδασι καὶ πάλαι βεβουλευμένοι τυγχάνουσιν: ὥστε ἄν τις αὐτοὺς παρακαλῇ συμβούλους τῶν πόλεων ἢ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἢ τῶν βασιλέων, κρεῖττον ἕξουσι καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ἀποφαίνεσθαι οὐ τὸ ἐπιὸν αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ νῦν μὲν ταῦτα, πάλιν δὲ τἀναντία, δἰ ὀργὴν ἢ φιλονικίαν ἢ χρήμασι πληγέντες, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τρυτάνης, ἔφη τις οἶμαι τῶν ῥητόρων αὐτῶν, κατὰ τὸ λῆμμα ἀεὶ ῥέποντες. λέγω δὲ οὐ ψέγων ῥητορικὴν οὐδὲ ῥήτορας τοὺς ἀγαθούς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς φαύλους καὶ τοὺς προσποιουμένους τὸ πρᾶγμα.

  [5] For whenever the orator-politicians have to consider any question, since they know nothing more than anybody else and have not considered the matter before, in a sense they both deliberate themselves and give advice to the others at one and the same time. The philosophers, on the other hand, know in advance about the course to be adopted and have deliberated upon it long beforehand. Consequently, if they are called in to advise cities, nations, or kings, they are in a better and safer position to set forth, not just what occurs to them, nor one thing at one moment and the opposite at the next, influenced by anger, contentiousness, or bribery, acting just as the tongue of a balance
does, as I believe some one of the orator-politicians themselves said, ever tipping according to what is received. And I say this, not to criticize the art of oratory, or the good orators, but the poor ones and those who falsely claim that profession as their own.

  THE TWENTY-THIRD DISCOURSE: THAT THE WISE MAN IS FORTUNATE AND HAPPY

  ΟΤΙ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ Ο ΣΟΦΟΣ.

  THE TWENTY-THIRD DISCOURSE: THAT THE WISE MAN IS FORTUNATE AND HAPPY

  This is one of the twelve discourses that are in the form of a dialogue between Dio, the teacher, and one of his pupils, reported directly. It would appear to reproduce an actual experience of Dio’s in which he sets forth the Stoic doctrine that only the wise man is happy.

  The line of thought is as follows: Homer and Euripides have said that man is unfortunate and unhappy; but just the opposite is true, or rather, partially true. For each man has a fortune or guiding spirit; and if this fortune or guiding spirit is good, then the man is good-fortuned (i.e., fortunate) and happy. But if the man has a bad fortune or guiding spirit, then the man is bad-fortuned (i.e. unfortunate) and unhappy. But if the guiding spirit is good in the sense that it gives good fortune, it is also good as meaning ‘just and useful and sensible’ — which is a non sequitur — and since it apparently gives its own qualities to the man who has it, this man is at the same time also just and useful and sensible, in other words, wise. The good δαίμων, to use the Greek word, being good in both senses, gives both happiness and wisdom. The two are inseparable.