[12] Dio. And that to refuse to obey and give heed and to act contrary to that which is divine and from the guardian spirit is a mark of the bad and foolish?
Int. How could we say anything else?
Dio. And that those who obey the guiding spirit, since it is of this character, are ‘fortunate and happy,’ and that those who disobey are ‘unfortunate and unhappy?’
Int. Necessarily so.
Dio. Therefore, here also it turns out that the wise and sensible man is ‘fortunate and happy’ in every case, but that the worthless man is ‘unfortunate and unhappy,’ not because his guardian spirit is bad, but because, although it is good, he does not heed it.
THE TWENTY-FOURTH DISCOURSE: ON HAPPINESS
ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΣ.
THE TWENTY-FOURTH DISCOURSE: ON HAPPINESS
This Discourse, like the fourteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth, begins by saying that the majority of men act wrongly in respect to something and then proceeds to set them right. This same admonishing attitude is found also in Discourse .-, where Dio tells of the beginning of his ‘preaching’ activity during his exile. For this reason von Arnim believes that all these Discourses, except the last of course, belong to the period of Dio’s exile.
The great majority of men, says Dio, select their occupation in life without first considering the important question of what the life of man should be, and what is the highest good for him, the ideal toward which he should strive. Only the man who knows what this highest good is and subordinates everything else to it can gain true success and happiness.
[1] Οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι καθόλου μὲν οὐδὲν πεφροντίκασιν ὁποίους χρὴ εἶναι οὐδὲ ὅ,τι βέλτιστον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστίν, οὗ ἕνεκα χρὴ πάντα τἄλλα πράττειν, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐσπουδάκασιν οἱ μὲν ἱππεύειν, οἱ δὲ [p. 277] στρατηγεῖν, οἱ δὲ περὶ ἀγωνίαν, οἱ δὲ περὶ μουσικήν, ἄλλοι περὶ γεωργίαν, ἄλλοι δύνασθαι λέγειν. ἥντινα δὲ χρείαν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τούτων ἕκαστον ἢ τί τὸ ὄφελος ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίγνοιτ̓ ἂν οὐκ ἴσασιν
The Twenty-fourth Discourse: On Happiness
The majority of men have not as a rule concerned themselves at all with the question of what kind of men they ought to be, nor of what is ideally man’s best good, to the attainment of which he should direct all his other activities; but, each in accordance with his taste, they have devoted themselves, some to horsemanship, some to military commands, some to athletic competitions, others to music, or farming, or expertness in oratory. But what practical utility each of these pursuits has for themselves, they do not know or even try to ascertain.
[2] οὐδὲ ζητοῦσιν. τοιγαροῦν ἱππεῖς μὲν ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται τινές, οἳ ἂν φιλοπονῶσιν αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκμελετῶσι, καὶ παλαῖσαι ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἱκανώτεροι καὶ πυκτεῦσαι καὶ δραμεῖν καὶ τἄλλα ἀγωνίσασθαι, καὶ τοῦ σπόρου μὴ διαμαρτεῖν, καὶ πλέοντες μὴ διαφθεῖραι τὴν ναῦν, καὶ τὰ κατὰ μουσικήν τινες ἐπίστανται βέλτιον ἑτέρων: ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἄνδρα καὶ φρόνιμον, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰδότα ὅστις ἐστὶν ὁ χρηστὸς
[2] The consequence is that while some become good horsemen — in case they work hard at that and train diligently — and some become more efficient in wrestling than others, or in boxing, or running, or in other contests, or in avoiding crop failures, or in sailing the seas without wrecking their ships, and in knowledge of music some surpass others; yet the good and prudent man, one who can answer the all-important question, ‘What man is he who is virtuous and intelligent?’ cannot be found among them all.
[3] ἀνὴρ καὶ νοῦν ἔχων, οὐδένα τούτων ἔστιν εὑρεῖν. αὐτίκα περὶ τὸ λέγειν πάντες ἐσπουδάκασι πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ φιλοτίμων εἶναι δοκούντων, οἱ μὲν ὥστε ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἀγωνίζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς δῆμον λέγοντες, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἰσχύειν πλέον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ πράττειν ὅ,τι ἂν αὐτοὶ θέλωσιν, οἱ δὲ τῆς δόξης ἕνεκα τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος, ὅπως δεινοὶ νομίζωνται. τινὲς δὲ αὐτῆς φασι τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐπιθυμεῖς ἐπιθυμεῖν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ συγγράφοντες μόνον, οὓς ἔφη τις τῶν πρότερον μεθόρια εἶναι τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν: ὅ,τι δὲ συμφέρει πράττουσιν ἢ πρὸς ὅ,τι ἡ δόξα αὐτοῖς ὠφέλιμος ἢ τί τῆς ἐμπειρίας ταύτης
[3] Take oratory, for instance. There are many well-born men and, in public estimation, ambitious, who are whole-heartedly interested in it, some that they may plead in courts of law or address the people in the assembly in order to have greater influence than their rivals and have things their own way in politics, while the aim of others is the glory to be won thereby, that they may enjoy the reputation of eloquence; but there are men who say they desire the mere skill derived from experience, some of these being indeed speakers, but others only writers, of whom a certain man of former times said they occupied the borderland between philosophy and politics. But what their activity profits them, or to what end the glory is of use to them, or in what respect this experience is worth their while, all this they fail to consider.
[4] ὄφελος οὐ σκοποῦσιν. ἐγὼ δέ φημι πάντα τἄλλα δίχα τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιμελείας καὶ ζητήσεως ὀλίγου ἄξια εἶναι, τῷ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἐννοήσαντι καὶ ξυνέντι, τούτῳ καὶ τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὸ στρατηγεῖν καὶ ὅ,τι ἂν ἄλλο ποιῇ ξυμφέρον τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπ̓ ἀγαθῷ γίγνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐπαινεῖσθαι καθ̓ ἑαυτὸ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων ἀνοήτων, οἷοίπερ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί, ἢ τὸ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἢ τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν οὐδὲν ἂν διαφέροι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦ ψέγεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἰσχύειν καὶ ἐπιπόνως ζῆν. [p. 278]
[4] But as for me, I claim that without this knowledge of which I speak and the quest for it, all the other things are little worth; but that for the man who has reflected upon that important point and has come to understand it, then practicing eloquence, exercising military command, or any other activity that may occupy him, is to his advantage and is directed toward a good. For the truth is that, for and of itself, receiving the approbation of senseless persons, which is just what the majority are, or having influence with men of that kind, or leading a pleasant life, will not, so far as happiness is concerned, be one whit better than being censured by them, or having no influence, or leading a laborious life.
THE TWENTY-FIFTH DISCOURSE: ON THE GUIDING (OR GUARDIAN) SPIRIT
ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΟΣ.
THE TWENTY-FIFTH DISCOURSE: ON THE GUIDING (OR GUARDIAN) SPIRIT
This Discourse, like the twenty-first, twenty-third, and twenty-sixth, is one of the twelve Discourses which are in the form of a dialogue reported directly and are believed to belong to the period of Dio’s exile, although in this case after the first few exchanges Dio does all the speaking. He introduces and illustrates the apparently original view, a suggestion for which he may have got from Plato’s Republic 540B, that the ‘guiding spirit’ (δαίμων) is not something within the man himself, but is some other ma
n who controls him and determines his destiny. One man may even control a great number of men, such as are found in a city, a race, or an empire, and be the cause of their faring well or ill. In this case he is their δαίμων.
Even though Dio does not in this Discourse keep his promise given at the outset, to tell about the view of the philosophers that only the wise man is happy, yet the Discourse appears to be complete in the form in which we have it.
[1] Φασὶ τοὺς φιλοσόφους λέγειν ὡς ἄρα εὐδαίμων εἴη μόνος ὁ σοφός. — Δ. Λέγουσι γάρ. — Ἆῤ οὖν ἀληθῆ σοι δοκοῦσι λέγειν; — Δ. Ἔμοιγε. — Τί οὖν οὐχὶ κἀμοὶ ἔφρασας τὴν διάνοιαν ἀ τῶν; — Δ. Ἐὰν ἐμοὶ σὺ πρῶτον εἴπῃς ὅ,τι νομίζεις τὸν δαίμονα εἶναι. — Ἐγὼ μὲν τὸ κρατοῦν ἑκάστου καὶ καθ̓ ὃν ζῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστος, ὁμοίως μὲν ἐλεύθερος, ὁμοίως δὲ δοῦλος, καὶ πλούσιος καὶ πένης καὶ βασιλεὺς καὶ ἰδιώτης, καὶ πράττει ὅσα ἂν πράττῃ. — Δ. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ νομίζεις εἶναι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ κρατοῦν ἑκάστου, ὃ δαίμονα καλεῖς, ἢ ἔξωθεν ὂν ἄρχον τι καὶ κύριον τοῦ
The Twenty-fifth Discourse: On the Guiding (or Guardian) Spirit
Interlocutor. People say the philosophers maintain that really only the wise man can be happy.
Dio. Yes, that is what they maintain.
Int. Well, do you think they speak the truth?
Dio. I do.
Int. Then why have you never stated their view to me?
Dio. I will, if you tell me first what you think the guiding spirit is.
Int. For my part, I believe that it is that which controls each individual and under whose direction each human being lives, alike whether he be a free man or a slave, whether he be rich or poor, a king or a plain citizen, and no matter what his business in life is.
Dio. And do you think that this principle is within the man himself, this thing which controls the individual, which we call the guiding spirit, or that, while being a power outside of the man, it yet rules him and is master of him?
Int. The latter is my belief.
[2] ἀνθρώπου; — Ἔγωγε. — Δ. Ἆρά γε ἄνθρωπον ἕτερον; ἔστι γάρ που ἄνθρωπος ὁ μὲν ἑνός τινος κρατῶν, ὁ δὲ πολλῶν, καὶ ἄγων ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως αὐτὸς βούλεται ἤτοι πειθοῖ ἢ βίᾳ ἢ καὶ ἀμφοτέροις. λέγω δὲ οὐδὲν ἄγνωστον, ἀλλὰ τούς τε δημαγωγούς, οἷς πάντα πείθονται αἱ πόλεις καὶ ὅπως ἂν ἐκεῖνοι ἐξηγῶνται καὶ συμβουλεύωσιν, οὕτω πράττουσιν, ἐάν τε πολεμεῖν συμβουλεύωσιν ἐάν τε εἰρήνην ἄγειν ἐάν τε τείχη οἰκοδομεῖσθαι ἐάν τε τριήρεις κατασκευάζεσθαι ἐάν τε θυσίας θύειν ἐάν τε ἐκβάλλειν τινὰς αὐτῶν ἢ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἢ καὶ ἀποσφάττειν: καὶ τοὺς βασιλέας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς δεσπότας τῶν οἰκετῶν, ὅσοι
[2] Dio. Do you mean a different person? For I suppose it is a person who in one case controls one particular man, and in another case many men, one who leads them where and how he himself wishes, by using either persuasion, or force, or both. And I am saying nothing that is unknown, but refer to the popular leaders whom the cities obey in everything and do exactly as those men direct and advise, whether they advise them to go to war, or to remain at peace, or to build fortifications, or to construct triremes, or to offer sacrifices, or to banish some of their number, or to confiscate their property, or even to cut their throats; and I refer also to both kings and tyrants, and likewise to all masters of servants, who whether by paying down money for a person or by some other means have got anybody into their possession.
[3] ἀργύριον καταβαλόντες ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τρόπῳ κέκτηνταί τινα: ὡς ἂν εἰ Λυκοῦργόν τε Λακεδαιμονίων δαίμονα καλοῖς ῾ἐκείνου γὰρ κελεύσαντος ἔτι νῦν μαστιγοῦνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ θυραυλοῦσι καὶ γυμνητεύουσι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ δόξαντα ἂν ἑτέροις ἀνέχονταἰ καὶ Πεισίστρατον Ἀθηναίων τῶν πρότερον. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι Πεισιστράτου προστατοῦντος καὶ ἄρχοντος εἰς μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐ κατῄεσαν ὁ δῆμος, ἐν δὲ τῇ χώρᾳ διατρίβοντες γεωργοὶ ἐγίγνοντο: καὶ τὴν Ἀττικήν, πρότερον ψιλὴν καὶ ἄδενδρον οὖσαν, [p. 279] ἐλαίαις κατεφύτευσαν, Πεισιστράτου προστάξαντος: καὶ τἄλλα
[3] It is just as if you should call Lycurgus a guiding spirit of the Spartans — for at his command even now the Spartans are scourged and sleep in the open and go lightly clad and endure many other things that would seem hardships to other peoples — and Peisistratus the guiding spirit of the ancient Athenians. For you know, I presume, that when Peisistratus was leader and ruler, the people did not come down to the city, but stayed on the land and became farmers, and that Attica, which was formerly bare and treeless, they planted with olive trees by the order of Peisistratus, and in everything else they did exactly as he wished.
[4] ὅπως ἐκεῖνος ἐβούλετο, οὕτως ἔπραττον. ὕστερον δὲ ἴσως ἄλλους τε φαίη τις ἂν καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα καὶ Περικλέα γενέσθαι ῾οὐ γὰρ ἀνήκοος δήπου τυγχάνεις περὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν̓ τὸν μέν, ὅτι ναυμαχεῖν Ἀθηναίους ἠνάγκασε πεζοὺς πρότερον ὄντας καὶ τὴν χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν προεμένους τοῖς βαρβάροις καὶ θεῶν ἱερὰ καὶ τάφους προγόνων ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ ποιήσασθαι πάντα τὰ σφέτερα πράγματα — καὶ ὕστερον τὸν Πειραιᾶ τειχίσαι πλειόνων ἢ ἐνενήκοντα σταδίων καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα προσέταξεν αὐτοῖς, ὧν τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔπραττον ἐφ̓ ὅσον ἐκεῖνος παρῆν, τὰ δὲ καὶ φυγόντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τελευτήσαντος. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἄλλους τινὰς ἴσως φήσεις δαίμονας γεγονέναι τῶν Ἀθηναίων, οἷον Ἀλκιβιάδην τὸν Κλεινίου καὶ Νικίαν καὶ Κλέωνα καὶ Ὑπέρβολον, τοὺς μέν τινας ἐπιεικεῖς τυχόν,
[4] And, later on, one might perhaps say that not only others but Themistocles and Pericles also became guiding spirits; for I take it that you have heard about these two men, how the one compelled the Athenians, who had been foot soldiers before, to fight on the sea, to give up their country and their city to the barbarians, as well as the temples of their gods and the tombs of their ancestors, and stake all their fortunes on their fleet, and afterwards to fortify the Peiraeus with walls of more than ninety stades in length and enjoined upon them by his orders other measures of the same kind, some of which they continued to carryº out only as long as he was present, and others even when he was in banishment and after his death. Yes, and at a still later time certain other men, you may perhaps say, have become guiding spirits of the Athenians, for example, Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, and Nicias, Cleon, and Hyperbolus — some few of them honourable men perhaps, but the rest utterly wicked and cruel.
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[5] τοὺς δὲ πάνυ πονηρούς τε καὶ χαλεπούς. ἔτι δὲ Κῦρον Περσῶν ἀπὸ χρόνου τινὸς δαίμονα γενέσθαι καὶ βασιλικόν τινα καὶ ἐλευθέριον, ὃς δουλεύοντας αὐτοὺς Μήδοις πρότερον εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀφείλετο καὶ πάντων ἀπέφηνε δεσπότας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν. ἔτι δὲ Καμβύσην καὶ Δαρεῖον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐφεξῆς, τὸν μὲν Καμβύσην τά τε χρήματα αὐτῶν ἀναλίσκοντα καὶ αὐτοὺς κατατοξεύοντα καὶ στρατείας προστάσσοντα χαλεπὰς καὶ συνεχεῖς καὶ μηδέποτε ἐῶντα οἴκοι μένειν: τὸν δὲ Δαρεῖον χρήματα μὲν ὡς οἷόν τε πολλὰ συναγαγόντα καὶ τῇ χώρᾳ γενόμενον αἴτιον ὅπως ἐργασθήσεται, πολέμους δὲ καὶ τοῦτον ἀναγκάζοντα πολεμεῖν χαλεποὺς καὶ ἐπικινδύνους, καθάπερ οἶμαι τὸν πρὸς Σκύθας
[5] Then again you might say that Cyrus became for a time a guiding spirit of the Persians, a spirit kingly indeed and liberal in character, who, when the Persians were enslaved to the Medes, gave them liberty and made them masters of all the peoples of Asia; and you might go on to name Cambyses and Darius and their successors; Cambyses, who squandered their money, shot his subjects down, sent them on toilsome campaigns without intermission, and never allowed them to stay at home; and Darius, who amassed as much money as possible, caused the land to be cultivated, and like the other forced them to wage difficult and dangerous wars, for instance, as I recall, the one against the Scythians and the one against the Athenians.
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 250