[14] And at the same time Chryseïs was aware that he was insolent too in his treatment of herself, and that too at a time when he was most in love with her. For example, that he should so roughly have driven off the father of his beloved, instead of sparing him on her account, to say nothing of his not having soothed the old man by saying that his daughter had nothing to fear from him, but, on the contrary, not only threatening him but also speaking slightingly of Chryseïs by saying,
But I’ll not free her ere old age o’ertakes
Her far from home, at Argos, in our house,
Plying the loom and visiting my couch.
What overweening insolence! Why, what would he have done later on, seeing that while still in love he talks of her in such a fashion? Therefore, to guard again these things and to forecast them is the mark of a woman by no means ordinary.
[15] οὐδαμῶς φαύλης γυναικός. ἐδήλωσε δὲ οἶμαι τὰ περὶ τὴν Κασσάνδραν γενόμενα ἐν τῷ Ἄργει καὶ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα αὐτόν, ὅτι νοῦν εἶχεν ἡ Χρυσηὶς ῥυσαμένη τῶν κακῶν τούτων ἑαυτήν. οὐκοῦν τὸ μήτε ἔρωτι μήτε βασιλείᾳ μήτε τοῖς δοκοῦσιν ἐνδόξοις καὶ ἀγαθοῖς νέαν οὖσαν ἐπαίρεσθαι μηδ̓ εἰς πράγματα σφαλερὰ καὶ τεταραγμένην οἰκίαν καὶ εἰς φθόνον καὶ ζηλοτυπίαν αὑτὴν προέσθαι γυναικὸς σώφρονος καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀξίας ἱερέως εἶναι θυγατρός, παρὰ θεῷ τεθραμμένης. — Τί οὖν; ἐκ τούτων σὺ φῂς νοῦν ἔχειν αὐτὴν
[15] However, to my way of thinking, what happened in Argos both to Cassandra and to Agamemnon himself revealed that Chryseïs was a sensible woman to have saved herself from these disasters. Accordingly, that neither passion nor kingly station nor those things which are deemed glorious and good turned her head, young though she was, and that she did not plunge into perilous ventures and a disordered house and envy and jealousy — these are the marks of a prudent woman, one truly worthy of being daughter of a priest, nurtured in the house of a god.
Int. How so? Do you mean that these are the reasons why Agamemnon thought her wise?
[16] ἡγήσασθαι τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα; — Δ. Οὐδαμῶς: οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἦν λέγειν αὐτὴν τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον: ἀλλ̓ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων συνεῖναι. — Πῶς οὖν οὔ φησι χαίρουσαν αὐτὴν ὁ ποιητὴς ἀπιέναι, καθάπερ τὴν Βρισηίδα λυπουμένην; — Δ. Ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο σωφρονοῦσα ἔπραττεν, ὅπως μὴ παροξύναι τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα μηδὲ εἰς φιλονικίαν ἀγάγοι. δηλοῖ δὲ ὅμως, ὅπου φησὶν αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως τῷ πατρὶ δοθῆναι παρὰ τὸν βωμόν: ὣς εἰπὼν ἐν χερσὶ τίθει, ὁ δ̓ ἐδέξατο χαίρων παῖδα φίλην. οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι λυπουμένην αὐτὴν ὁ πατὴρ ἐδέχετο χαίρων: οὐδ̓ ἂν φίλην εἶπε τυχόν, εἰ μὴ σφόδρα ἠγάπα τοῖς γεγονόσι τὸν πατέρα.
[16] Dio. By no means, for it is not likely that she said any such thing to him; rather that he formed his judgement on the basis of her conduct in general.
Int. Why, then, does not the poet say that she departed in gladness, just as he says that Briseïs departed in sorrow?
Dio. Because in this too she was showing her prudence, her aim being not to exasperate Agamemnon or drive him to contentiousness. However, the poet makes the situation plain in the passage in which he says she was restored by Odysseus to her father beside the altar:
Thus having said, he placed her in his arms,
And he rejoicing took his darling child.
For, methinks, if she were sorrowing, her father would not be receiving her “rejoicing”; nor, perchance, would the poet have called her “darling” unless she loved her father dearly for what had taken place.
[17] — Εἶεν: ἀλλὰ τί μᾶλλον ἡ Χρυσηὶς ταῦτα ἐλογίζετο ἃ σὺ λέγεις ἢὁ Χρύσης καθ̓ αὑτὸν; Δ. Ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν εἰκὸς ἦν [p. 142] μᾶλλον ἐκείνην πολυπραγμονεῖν: εἰ δὲ καὶ λογιζομένου τοῦ πατρὸς ταῦτα συνεχώρει καὶ ἐπείθετο, οὐδὲ τοῦτο φαῦλον. αἱ γοῦν πολλαὶ καὶ ἀνόητοι τοὺς ἐραστὰς μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσιν ἢ τοὺς γονέας. — Διὰ τί οὖν, εἴπερ ἦν φρόνιμος, οὐκ ἐκώλυε τὸν Χρύσην ἐν τῷ φανερῷ δεῖσθαι τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ἵνα ἧττον ἐχαλέπαινεν; —
[17] Int. Very well; yet why did Chryseïs reason thus rather than Chryses on his own account?
Dio. Because it was to be expected that what concerned Clytemnestra would hold greater interest for Chryseïs; but even if it was her father who reasoned thus and she agreed with him and followed his advice, that was no trifling feat either. At any rate most women in their folly are more devoted to their lovers than to their parents.
Int. Why, then, if she really was sensible, did she not try to prevent Chryses from appealing to Agamemnon publicly, in order that he might be less angry?
[18] Δ. Ὅτι ᾔδει τοὺς ἐρῶντας ἰδίᾳ μὲν πάντα βουλομένους χαρίζεσθαι τῷ ἔρωτι, τὸν δὲ ὄχλον αἰδουμένους ἐνίοτε, καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ στέμματα ἕξειν τινὰ ἡγεῖτο πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος δύναμιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγένετο. — Ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμοῦμαι πῶς συνέτυχε τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα καὶ τότε τῆς τοῦ ἱερέως θυγατρὸς καὶ ὕστερον ἐρασθῆναι τῆς Κασσάνδρας, θεοφορήτου καὶ ἱερᾶς κόρης; — Δ. Ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο σημεῖον ὑπερηφανίας καὶ τρυφῆς, τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν παρανόμων καὶ σπανίων ἢ τῶν ἑτοίμων. — Οὐκ ἀντιλέγω τὸ μὴ οὐ φρόνιμον εἶναι τὴν Χρυσηίδα, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτω γέγονε. — Δ. Σὺ δὲ πότερον ἀκούειν θέλοις ἂν ὡς γέγονεν ὄντως ἢ ὅπως καλῶς εἶχε γενέσθαι;
[18] Dio. Because she knew that, though in private lovers desire in every matter to gratify their passion, they are sometimes embarrassed in the presence of the crowd, and she believed that the fillets of the god had a certain power with the people, as proved to be the case.
Int. Still here is something that troubles me. How did it happen that Agamemnon not only fell in love with the priest’s daughter at the time in question, but afterwards with Cassandra too, a divinely inspired and holy maid?
Dio. Because this too is a sign of pride and wantonness — to desire the forbidden and rare rather than the easily obtainable.
Int. I do not gainsay that Chryseïs was prudent, if these things took place as you claim.
Dio. Would you rather hear how they assuredly did take place, or how it would be well for them to have taken place?
THE SIXTY-SECOND DISCOURSE: ON KINGSHIP AND TYRANNY
ΠΕΡΙ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΙΔΟΣ.
THE SIXTY-SECOND DISCOURSE: ON KINGSHIP AND TYRANNY
The complimentary address contained in §§1 and 3 of our Discourse could hardly have been intended for any one but Trajan. Yet the document is so abrupt in both beginning and ending and so brief when compared with the four treatises on kingship supposed to have been addressed to Trajan (Or. 1-4) that it is difficult to imagine that it ever was delivered
as a distinct entity in the form in which we have it. It is of course conceivable that we are dealing with a fragment of a fifth speech on kingship addressed to the much-enduring Trajan, but it is more likely that we have before us a variant version of a portion of one of the addresses just mentioned. Dio himself makes it plain (Or. 57.10-12) that on occasion he took the liberty of repeating to other hearers speeches previously delivered before “the Emperor.” On such an occasion he doubtless felt free to modify the original wording, and such a procedure would explain the existence of certain doublets in his text. We may conjecture that his editor, finding the substance of Or. 62 imbedded in such a variant version of one of the four speeches to which we have referred and not wishing to discard it, gave it independent existence here. Finally, it may be noted that, though the second element in the title, tyranny, is not specifically mentioned in our document, it is dealt with in Or. , and also that there is a notable similarity between Or. . and Or. ..
[1] Καὶ μὴν εἴ τις ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς οὐχ οἷός τε ἄρχειν ἐστί, καὶ τούτου σφόδρα ἐγγὺς ὄντος, ᾧ δὴ ξύνεστιν, οὐδὲ αὖ μίαν ψυχὴν κατευθύνειν τὴν αὑτοῦ, πῶς ἂν δύναιτο βασιλεύειν μυριάδων ἀναριθμήτων πανταχοῦ διεσπαρμένων, ὥσπερ σύ λέγεις, καὶ πολλῶν γε οἰκούντων ἐπὶ πέρασι γῆς, ὧν οὐδὲ ἑώρακε τοὺς πλείστους οὐδ̓ ἂν ἴδοι ποτὲ οὐδὲ τῆς φωνῆς ξυνήσει; ὅμοιον γὰρ ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι τὸν οὕτως ἀδύνατον τὴν ὄψιν ὡς μηδὲ τὰ ἐν ποσὶν ὁρᾶν, ἀλλὰ προσδεόμενον χειραγωγοῦ, τοῦτον ἐφικεῖσθαι βλέποντα μέχρι τῶν πλεῖστον ἀπεχόντων, ὥσπερ οἱ πόρρωθεν ὁρῶντες ἐκ τοῦ πελάγους τά τε ὄρη καὶ τὰς νήσους, ἢ τὸν οὐ δυνάμενον φθέγγεσθαι τοῖς παρεστῶσιν ἱκανὸν ὅλοις δήμοις καὶ στρατοπέδοις [p. 143]
The Sixty-second Discourse: On Kingship and Tyranny
And indeed, if a person is not competent to govern a single man, and that too a man who is very close to him, in fact his constant companion, and if, again, he cannot guide a single soul, and that his own, how could he be king, as you are, over unnumbered thousands scattered everywhere, many even dwelling at the ends of the earth, most of whom he has not even seen and never could see, and whose speech he will not understand? Why, it is as if one were to say of the man with vision so impaired that he cannot see even what lies at his feet but needs some one to lead him by the hand, that he can reach with his eyes the most distant objects, like those who at sea behold from afar both the mountains and the islands; or as if one were to say of the man who cannot make himself heard even by those who stand beside him, that he is able to speak so as to be heard by whole communities and armies.
[2] εἰς ἐπήκοον φθέγγεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἔχει τι παραπλήσιον ὁ νοῦς τῇ ὄψει: ὡς ἐκείνη διεφθαρμένη μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν πλησιαίτατα ὁρᾷ, ὑγιὴς δὲ οὖσα μέχρις οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ ἀστέρων ἐξικνεῖται: ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ἡ μὲν τοῦ φρονίμου διάνοια καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἱκανὴ γίγνεται διοικεῖν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἄφρονος οὐδὲ ἓν σῶμα τὸ ἐκείνου δύναται φυλάττειν οὐδὲ ἕνα οἶκον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις, ὅτι μὲν ἔξεστιν αὐτοῖς πάντα λαμβάνειν, πάντων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ὅτι δὲ ἐπ̓ αὐτοῖς ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον, διὰ τοῦτό εἰσιν ἄδικοι: ὅτι δὲ οὐ φοβοῦνται τοὺς νόμους, οὐδὲ εἶναι νομίζουσιν: ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκάζονται πονεῖν, οὐδέποτε παύονται τρυφῶντες: ὅτι δὲ οὐδεὶς ἀμύνεται κακῶς πάσχων, οὐδέποτε παύονται ποιοῦντες: ὅτι δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς σπανίζουσιν ἡδονῆς, οὐδέποτε ἐμπίμπλανται ἡδόμενοι: ὅτι δὲ οὐδεὶς ψέγει ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ, οὐδὲν ἀπολείπουσι τῶν οὐδὲ καλῶς λεγομένων: ὅτι δὲ οὐδεὶς αὐτοὺς βούλεται λυπεῖν, διὰ τοῦτο πᾶσι χαλεπαίνουσιν: ὅτι δὲ ὀργισθεῖσιν ἔξεστι πάντα ποιεῖν, διὰ τοῦτο συνεχῶς ὀργίζονται.
[2] In fact, the intellect has something comparable to vision — as vision, when it is ruined, can see nothing even of what is very near, although when in health it can reach sky and stars, just so the mind of the prudent man shows itself competent to direct all men whatsoever, whereas the mind of the fool cannot protect a single body, his own, or a single household.
Take, for example, most men who hold unbridled power — because they have the power to obtain every thing, they crave everything; because justice is lodged in their hands, for this reason they are unjust; because they do not fear the laws, they do not even believe in their existence; because they are not compelled to labour, they never cease their luxurious living; because no one defends himself when maltreated, they never cease maltreating; because they lack no pleasure, they never get their fill of it; because no one censures them openly, they miss no occasion for unjust criticism; because no one wishes to hurt their feelings, for this reason they display ill-temper toward everyone; because they have it in their power to do anything when enraged, for this reason they are continually in a rage.
[3] ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς ἄρχων, ὥσπερ σύ, τἀναντία ἐπιτηδεύει: οὐδενὸς μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖ διὰ τὸ πάντα οἴεσθαι ἔχειν, φείδεται δὲ τῶν ἡδονῶν διὰ τὸ μηδεμιᾶς ἂν ἀπορῆσαι ὀρεχθείς, δικαιότερος δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐστίν, ἅτε πᾶσι παρέχων τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ἥδεται δὲ τοῖς πόνοις, ὅτι ἑκὼν πονεῖ, ἀγαπᾷ δὲ τοὺς νόμους, ὅτι οὐ δέδοικε. καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνει. τίνι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεως δεῖ πλείονος ἢ τῷ περὶ τοσούτων βουλευομένῳ; τίνι δὲ ἀκριβεστέρας δικαιοσύνης ἢ τῷ μείζονι τῶν νόμων; τίνι δὲ σωφροσύνης ἐγκρατεστέρας ἢ ᾧ πάντα ἔξεστι; τίνι δὲ ἀνδρείας μείζονος ἢ τῷ πάντα
[3] On the other hand, the good ruler, such as you are, practises the opposite conduct — he covets nothing for the reason that he feels he has everything; he is sparing in his pleasures for the reason that he would lack for no pleasure he might crave; he is more just than any other man inasmuch as he provides justice for all; he delights in labour because he labours of his own accord; he cherishes the laws because he does not fear them.
Moreover, he is right in reasoning so. For who needs ampler wisdom than he who deliberates on so many matters? Who needs stricter justice than he who is superior to the laws? Who needs more steadfast self-control than he to whom anything is permissible?
[4] σῴζοντι; καὶ τοίνυν τῷ μὲν ἄλλων ἄρξοντι πολλῶν τοῦτο μὲν δαπάνης δεῖ παμπόλλης, τοῦτο δὲ στρατοπέδων καὶ πεζικῶν καὶ ἱππικῶν, ἔτι δὲ τειχῶν καὶ νεῶν καὶ μηχανημάτων, εἰ μέλλει καθέξειν μὲν τοὺς ὑπηκόους, ἀμυνεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους: ἐὰν δέ τις ἀφιστῆται τῆς ἀρχῆς, καταστρέψεσθαι. τὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ κρατεῖν πάντων �
��δαπανώτατον καὶ ἀπραγμονέστατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀκινδυνότατον: οὔτε γὰρ πολυδάπανος οὔτε ἐργώδης οὔτε ἐπισφαλὴς ὁ τοῦ [p. 144] ἐγκρατοῦς ἀνθρώπου βίος: ἀλλ̓ ὅμως τοιοῦτον ὂν πάντων χαλεπώτατον πέφυκεν.
[4] Who needs greater courage than he who is the preserver of all? Furthermore, he who is to govern many others needs, not only very great outlay of wealth, but also armies, both infantry and cavalry, and in addition fortifications, ships, and engines of war, if he is to control his subjects, defend himself against the foe, and, should some one try to revolt from his authority, reduce him to subjection. However, to control one’s self is of all things least costly, least difficult, least dangerous; for neither costly nor laborious nor precarious is the life of the man of self-control; yet for all that, though so desirable, it is naturally the most difficult thing of all.
[5] ἐπεὶ Σαρδανάπαλλος ἐκεῖνος ὁ θρυλούμενος εἶχε μὲν Νίνον, εἶχε δὲ Βαβυλῶνα, τὰς μεγίστας τῶν πρότερον γεγενημένων πόλεων, ὑπήκουε δὲ αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ ἔθνη τὰ νεμόμενα τὴν ἑτέραν ἤπειρον μέχρι τῶν ἀοικήτων τῆς γῆς λεγομένων: βασιλείας δὲ οὐδὲν ἦν αὐτῷ προσῆκον, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν σηπομένων τινὶ νεκρῶν. βουλεύεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἢ δικάζειν ἢ στρατηγεῖν οὔτε ἐβούλετο οὔτε
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 343