[6] For I might almost say that most of the Greeks also feel as you do about this matter, and their familiarity with the sight does not keep them from teasing or even insulting whenever they spy a man of that appearance — I mean, whenever they see one of the common sort of no repute, whom they do not fear as being able to retaliate; for of course those who have that ability they virtually cringe before and admire!
Well, possibly what goes on is like this: the sailors and the farmers and shepherds, yes, and the Persians and Nasamonians too, the people believe do not look down on them or have any concern with them, and so they do not give them a thought.
[7] λόγον, ὅθεν οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. τοὺς μέντοι φιλοσόφους ὑπονοοῦσιν, [p. 186] ὡς καταφρονοῦντας αὐτῶν καὶ καταγιγνώσκοντας πολλὴν ἀμαθίαν καὶ δυστυχίαν, καὶ ὅτι φανερῶς μὲν οὐ καταγελῶσιν, ἰδίᾳ δὲ παῤ αὑτοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὡς πάντας ἀθλίους ὄντας τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους, ἀρξαμένους ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων δὴ καὶ μακαρίων δοκούντων, οὓς αὐτοὶ ζηλοῦσι καὶ σμικρὸν διαφέρειν οἴονται τῶν θεῶν εὐδαιμονίας ἕνεκεν: καὶ ὅτι ἀτιμάζουσι καὶ διαγελῶσι τοὺς πολυτελῶς ἐσθίοντάς τε καὶ πίνοντας καὶ καθεύδειν μαλακῶς βουλομένους καὶ μετὰ γυναικῶν ἑκάστοτε ὡραίων καὶ παίδων ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ πολλὰ χρήματα ἔχειν καὶ θαυμάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ ὄχλου καὶ περιβλέπεσθαι: ὧν οὐδὲν ἡγοῦνται μεῖζον οὐδὲ
[7] The philosophers, however, they view with misgivings, suspecting that they scorn them and attribute to them vast ignorance and misfortune; and they suspect that, though the philosophers do not laugh at them in public, privately among themselves they view them in that light, holding that the unenlightened are all pitiable creatures, beginning, in fact, with those who are reputed to be rich and prosperous, persons whom these mockers themselves envy and believe to be little different from the gods in felicity; furthermore, they suspect that these philosophers disparage and ridicule them as being extravagant in eating and drinking, as wanting a soft bed to sleep on and the company of young women and boys whenever they repose, and plenty of money, and to be admired and looked up to by the mob, things which they believe to be more important and better than anything else.
[8] κάλλιον. διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ὑποψίαν δυσχεραίνουσι τοὺς μὴ ταὐτὰ σφίσι θαυμάζοντας μηδὲ τιμῶντας μηδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἔχοντας διάνοιαν. οὐκοῦν προκαταλαμβάνουσιν αὐτοὶ λοιδοροῦντες καὶ τωθάζοντες, ὡς ἀθλίους καὶ ἀνοήτους, εἰδότες ὅτι εἰ μὲν τούτους ἀποφανοῦσιν ἄφρονας καὶ μαινομένους, ἅμα καὶ αὑτοὺς ἀποδείξουσι σωφρονοῦντας καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντας: εἰ δὲ παραχωρήσουσιν, ὡς τούτων ἃ χρὴ γιγνωσκόντων καὶ πολλοῦ ἀξίων, ἅμα καὶ αὑτοὺς ὁμολογήσουσι δυστυχεῖς καὶ ἀναισθήτους καὶ οὐδὲν
[8] Because of this suspicion they of course dislike those who do not admire or prize the same things as they do and do not hold the same opinion about the things of chief importance. Therefore they seize for themselves the initiative in reviling and jeering at the philosophers as being luckless and foolish, knowing that if they succeed in showing that the philosophers are senseless and daft they will at the same time also prove themselves to be prudent and sensible; whereas if they give way to them, recognizing that the philosophers know what they should and are highly estimable, at the same time they will be admitting that they themselves are luckless and thick-witted and know absolutely none of the things free men should.
[9] εἰδότας ἁπλῶς ὧν προσήκει ἀνθρώπους ἐλευθέρους εἰδέναι. ἔτι δὲ ἐὰν μέν τινα ἴδωσιν ὡς ναύτην ἐσταλμένον, ἴσασι τοῦτον πλευσούμενον, κἂν ὡς γεωργὸν ἕτερον, γεωργήσοντα: τόν γε μὴν ποιμένος ἔχοντα στολὴν ἴσασι καὶ τοῦτον ὅτι ἄπεισιν ἐπὶ τὰ πρόβατα καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα διατρίψει, ὥστε ὑπ̓ οὐδενὸς λυπούμενοι τούτων ἐῶσιν αὐτούς: ὅταν δέ τινα ἴδωσι τὸ σχῆμα ἔχοντα τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, λογίζονται ὅτι οὗτος οὔτε πρὸς τὸ πλεῖν ἐστιν οὔτε πρὸς γεωργίαν οὔτε προβάτων ἕνεκεν οὕτως ἔσταλται, ἀλλ̓ ἐπ̓ ἀνθρώπους παρεσκεύασται, ὡς νουθετήσων τε καὶ ἐξελέγξων καὶ οὐδέν τι θωπεύσων οὐδένα αὐτῶν οὐδὲ φεισόμενος οὐδενός, τοὐναντίον δὲ κολάσων ὡς ἂν δύνηται αὐτοὺς μάλιστα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐπιδείξων [p. 187]
[9] Again, if they see a man rigged out as a sailor, they know that he is about to put to sea, and if they see some one else rigged out as a farmer, they know that he is about to engage in farming, and of course they know also that he who is clad in shepherd’s garb is on his way to his sheep and will spend his time attending to them, and so, since they are not irritated by any of these, they let them alone; but when they see a man in the garb of the philosopher, they reason in his case that it is not for sailing or for farming or for tending sheep that he is thus arrayed, but rather that he has got himself ready to deal with human beings, aiming to admonish them and put them to the test and not to flatter or to spare any one of them, but, on the contrary, aiming to reprove them to best of his ability by his words and to show what sort of persons they are.
[10] οἷοί εἰσιν. οὔκουν δύνανται ἡδέως ὁρᾶν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ προσκρούουσι καὶ διαμάχονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ̓ οἱ παῖδες ἡδέως ὁρᾶν δύνανται οὓς ἂν ἴδωσι παιδαγωγῶν σχῆμα ἔχοντας καὶ παρεσκευασμένους οὕτως ὡς ἐπιπλήξοντας αὐτοῖς καὶ οὐκ ἐπιτρέψοντας ἁμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν. εἰ γάρ τοι καὶ τοῖς παισὶν ἐξῆν τῶν τοιούτων καταγελᾶν καὶ ὑβρίζειν, οὐδὲν ἂν πρότερον τούτου ἐποίουν. οὐ μέντοι ἅπαντες ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς διανοίας προσέρχονται καὶ ἐνοχλοῦσιν, ἀλλ̓ ἔστι γένος ἀνθρώπων πολυπραγμονοῦν τοιαύτην
[10] They cannot, therefore, look upon the philosophers with any pleasure, but instead they clash with them and fight with them, just as boys too cannot look with pleasure upon any whom they see in the guise of tutors and prepared as if they meant to rebuke them and not to allow them to go astray or be careless. In truth, if the boys were at liberty to mock at and insult such persons, there is nothing they would rather do than that.
However, not all have this motive in coming up and making themselves a nuisance; on the contrary, there are persons who indulge in this kind of curiosity and, in a way, are not bad persons either.
[11] πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ τρόπον τινὰ οὐ πονηρόν: οὗτοι προσίασιν οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται φιλοσόφους ἀπὸ τῆς στολῆς, ὡς ἀκουσόμενοί τι παῤ αὐτῶν σοφόν, ὃ οὐκ ἂν παῤ ἑτέρου ἀκούσειαν, πυνθανόμενοι καὶ περὶ Σωκράτους, ὅτι σοφός τ�
� ἦν καὶ διελέγετο τοῖς προσιοῦσι λόγους φρονίμους, καὶ περὶ Διογένους, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἅπαντα εὐπόρει λόγου καὶ ἀποκρίσεως. καὶ τὰ μὲν τούτου καὶ διαμνημονεύουσιν οἱ πολλοί, τὰ μέν τινα ἴσως εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ,
[11] These approach any whom, because of their dress, they take to be philosophers, expecting to hear from them some bit of wisdom which they could not hear from any one else, because they have heard regarding Socrates that he was not only wise but also accustomed to speak words of wisdom to those who approached him, and also regarding Diogenes, that he too was well provided with statement and answer on each and every topic. And the masses still remember the sayings of Diogenes, some of which he may have spoken himself, though some too were composed by others.
[12] τὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλων συνθέντων. τῶν γε μὴν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν τὰς γνώμας ἀκούουσι καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀνατεθῆναι πρότερον, οἷον ἀπαρχάς τινας τῆς σοφίας τῆς ἐκείνων καὶ ἅμα τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκεν ὠφελείας, ὡς τῷ ὄντι δὴ θεῖα ταῦτα καὶ σχεδόν τι τῶν χρησμῶν θειότερα, οὓς ἡ Πυθία ἔχρα καθίζουσα ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίποδος, ἐμπιμπλαμένη τοῦ πνεύματος. τὸ γὰρ αὑτῷ χρησθὲν ἕκαστος ἀκούσας ἄπεισι, καὶ οὐκ ἀνατίθεται ταῦτα, ὥστε δὴ καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εἶναι γνώριμα: τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων δόγματα κοινὰ ἀπεδείχθη τοῖς ἀφικνουμένοις παρὰ τὸν θεόν, ὡς ὁμοίως ξυμφέρον πᾶσιν εἰδέναι
[12] Indeed, as for the maxims of the Seven Sages, they hear that these were even inscribed as dedications at Delphi in days gone by, firstfruits, as it were, of the wisdom of those men and at the same time intended for the edification of mankind, the idea being that these maxims were truly divine, and if I may say so, even more divine than the responses which the Pythian priestess was wont to give as she sat upon her tripod and filled herself with the breath of the god. For the response which is made to each for himself he listens to and then goes his way, and such responses are not dedicated and thereby made known to all mankind too; but the maxims of the Seven Sages have been appointed for the common use of all who visit the god, as being profitable for all alike to know and to obey.
[13] καὶ πείθεσθαι. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ καὶ τὸν Αἴσωπον οἴονται τοιοῦτόν τινα γενέσθαι, σοφὸν μὲν καὶ φρόνιμον, αἱμύλον δὲ ἄλλως καὶ ξυνθεῖναι λόγους ἱκανόν, οἵων οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἥδιστ̓ ἂν ἀκούοιεν. καὶ τυχὸν [p. 188] οὐ παντάπασι ψευδῆ οἴονται καὶ τῷ ὄντι Αἴσωπος τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπειρᾶτο νουθετεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἐπιδεικνύναι αὐτοῖς ἅττα ἁμαρτάνουσιν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα ἠνείχοντο αὐτόν, ἡδόμενοι ἐπὶ τῷ γελοίῳ καὶ τοῖς μύθοις: ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία ταῖς τίτθαις μυθολογουμέναις προσέχουσί τε καὶ ἥδονται. ἀπὸ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης δόξης, ὡς καὶ παῤ ἡμῶν ἀκουσόμενοί τι τοιοῦτον οἷον Αἴσωπος ἔλεγεν ἢ ὁποῖον Σωκράτης ἢ ὁποῖα Διογένης, προσίασι καὶ ἐνοχλοῦσι καὶ οὐ δύνανται ἀπέχεσθαι, ὃν ἂν ἴδωσιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ὄρνεα, ἐπειδὰν ἴδωσι γλαῦκα: ἐφ̓ ᾧ καὶ
[13] And there are those who think that Aesop too was somewhat like the Seven Sages, that while he was wise and sensible, yet he was crafty too and clever at composing tales such as they themselves would most enjoy to hear. And possibly they are not wholly mistaken in their suppositions and in reality Aesop did in this way try to admonish mankind and show them wherein they were in error, believing that they would be most tolerant toward him if they were amused by his humour and his tales — just as children, when their nurses tell them stories, not only pay attention to them but are amused as well. As the result, then, of this belief, that they are going to hear from us too some such saying as Aesop used to utter, or Socrates, or Diogenes, they draw near and annoy and cannot leave in peace whomever they may see in this costume, any more than the birds can when they see an owl.
[14] ξυνετίθει λόγον Αἴσωπος τοιοῦτον, ὡς τὰ ὄρνεα ξυνῆλθε πρὸς τὴν γλαῦκα καὶ ἐδεῖτο τῆς μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων σκέπης ἀπανίστασθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὰ δένδρα τὴν καλιάν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτά, καὶ τοὺς τούτων μεταπήγνυσθαι κλῶνας, ἀφ̓ ὧν καὶ ᾄδειν ἔστιν εὐσημότερον: καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς δρῦν ταυτηνὶ ἄρτι φυομένην, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς ὥραν ἀφίκηται, ἑτοίμως ἔχειν ἱζάνειν καὶ τῆς χλοερᾶς κόμης ἀπόνασθαι. ἀλλ̓ οὖν τήν γε γλαῦκα μὴ τοῦτο τοῖς ὀρνέοις ποιεῖν παραινεῖν μηδὲ φυτοῦ βλάστῃ ἐφήδεσθαι ῾ἰξὸν πεφυκότος
[14] Indeed, this is why Aesop composed a fable which I will relate. The birds came together to call upon the owl, and they begged her to withdraw from the shelter afforded by the human habitations and to transfer her nest to the trees, just like themselves, and to their branches, “whence,” they declared, “it is actually possible to sing a clearer note.” And in fact, as the fable has it, they stood ready to settle upon an oak, which was just then starting to grow, as soon as it should reach its prime, and to enjoy its green foliage. However, the story continues, the owl advised the birds not to do this and not to exult in the shoot of a plant whose nature it is to bear mistletoe, a bane to feathered folk.
[15] φέρειν, πτηνοῖς ὄλεθρον̓. τὰ δὲ μήτε τῆς ξυμβουλῆς ἀπεδέχετο τὴν γλαῦκα, τοὐναντίον δὲ ἔχαιρε τῇ δρυῒ φυομένῃ, ἐπειδή τε ἱκανὴ ἦν, καθίσαντα ἐπ̓ αὐτὴν ᾖδεν. γενομένου δὲ τοῦ ἰξοῦ ῥᾳδίως ἤδη ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἁλισκόμενα μετενόουν καὶ τὴν γλαῦκα ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ τῇ ξυμβουλῇ. καὶ νῦν ἔτι οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὡς δεινῆς καὶ σοφῆς οὔσης αὐτῆς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐθέλουσι πλησιάζειν, ἡγούμενα ἀγαθόν τι ἀπολαύειν τῆς ξυνουσίας: ἔπειτα οἶμαι προσίασι μάτην ἐπὶ κακῷ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαία γλαὺξ τῷ ὄντι φρονίμη τε ἦν καὶ ξυμβουλεύειν ἐδύνατο. αἱ δὲ νῦν μόνον τὰ πτερὰ ἔχουσιν ἐκείνης καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τὸ ῥάμφος, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀφρονέστεραί εἰσι τῶν ἄλλων ὀρνέων. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἑαυτὰς δύνανται οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖν:
[15] But the birds not only did not applaud the owl for her advice, but, quite the reverse, they took delight in the oak as it grew, and when it was of proper size they alighted on it and sang. But because the mistletoe had grown on it, they now were easily captured by the men and repented of their conduct and admired the owl for her advice. And even to this day they feel this way about her, believing her to be shrewd and wise, and on this account they wish to get near her, believing that they are deriving some benefit from association with her; but if they do, they will approach her, I fancy, all i
n vain and to their cost. For though that owl of olden days was really wise and able to give advice, those of to-day merely have her feathers, eyes, and beak, but in all else they are more foolish than the other birds.
[16] οὐ γὰρ ἂν παρὰ τοῖς ὀρνιθοθήραις ἐτρέφοντο δεδεμέναι καὶ [p. 189] δουλεύουσαι. καὶ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος τὴν μὲν στολὴν ἔχει τὴν Σωκράτους καὶ Διογένους, τὸ δὲ φρονεῖν πολλοῦ δέομεν ὅμοιοι εἶναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐκείνοις ἢ ζῆν ὁμοίως αὐτοῖς ἢ λόγους τοιούτους διαλέγεσθαι. τοιγάρτοι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ βλεπόμενοι ὥσπερ αἱ γλαῦκες ὄχλον πολὺν ξυνάγομεν τῷ ὄντι ὀρνέων, αὐτοί τε ὄντες ἠλίθιοι καὶ ὑφ̓ ἑτέρων τοιούτων ἐνοχλούμενοι.
[16] Therefore they cannot benefit even themselves; for otherwise they would not be kept at the bird-catcher’s, caged and in servitude.
Just so, though each of us has the garb of Socrates and Diogenes, in intellect we are far from being like those famous men, or from living as they did, or from uttering such noble thoughts. Therefore, for no other reason than because of our personal appearance, we, like the owls, collect a great company of those who in truth are birds, being fools ourselves besides being annoyed by others of like folly.
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 356