U.S. Gini for 1774 and 1860 from P. H. Lindert and J. G. Williamson, 2012, “American Incomes 1774–1860” (Working Paper 18396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA), tables 6 and 7; for 1935, 1941, and 1944 from S. Goldsmith, G. Jaszi, H. Kaitz, and M. Liebenberg, 1954, “Size Distribution of Income Since the Mid-Thirties,” Review of Economics and Statistics 36 (1): 1–32; for 1947–49 from E. Smolensky and R. Plotnick, 1993, “Inequality and Poverty in the United States: 1900 to 1990” (Paper 998–93, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty, Madison); and for 1950–2015 from B. Milanovic 2016a, “All the Ginis (ALG) Dataset,” https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/all-ginis-dataset, Version October 2016.”
United Kingdom/England Gini for 1688, 1759, and 1801–3 from B. Milanovic, P. H. Lindert, and J. G. Williamson, 2010, “PreIndustrial Inequality,” Economic Journal 121 (551): 255–72, table 2; for 1867, 1880, and 1913 from P. H. Lindert and J. G. Williamson, 1983, “Reinterpreting Britain’s Social Tables, 1688–1913,” Explorations in Economic History 20 (1): 94–109, table 2; for 1938–59 from P. H. Lindert, 2000a, “Three Centuries of Inequality in Britain and America,” in Handbook of Income Distribution, ed. A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon, table 1; and for 1961–2014 from Milanovic 2016a.
NOTES
Preface
1. J. Gramlich, 2017, “Most Americans Would Favor Policies to Limit Job and Wage Losses Caused by Automation,” Pew Research Center, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/09/most-americans-would-favor-policies-to-limit-job-and-wage-losses-caused-by-automation/.
2. K. Roose, 2018, “His 2020 Campaign Message: The Robots Are Coming,” New York Times, February 18.
3. C. B. Frey and M. A. Osborne, 2017, “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 114 (January): 254–80.
4. B. DeLong, 1998, “Estimating World GDP: One Million BC–Present” (Working paper, University of California, Berkeley).
5. D. Acemoglu and P. Restrepo, 2018a, “Artificial Intelligence, Automation and Work” (Working Paper 24196, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA).
6. Quoted in G. Allison, 2017, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, chapter 2, Kindle.
7. D. S. Landes, 1969, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), introduction.
8. Quoted in Roose, 2018, “His 2020 Campaign Message.”
9. R. Foorohar, 2018, “Why Workers Need a ‘Digital New Deal’ to Protect against AI,” Financial Times, February 18.
Introduction
1. “Lamplighters Quit; City Dark in Spots,” 1907, New York Times, April 25.
2. B. Reinitz, 1924, “The Descent of Lamp-Lighting: An Ancient and Honorable Profession Fallen into the Hands of Schoolboys,” New York Times, May 4.
3. B. Reinitz, 1929, “New York Lights Now Robotized,” New York Times, April 28.
4. W. D. Nordhaus, 1996, “Do Real-Output and Real-Wage Measures Capture Reality? The History of Lighting Suggests Not,” in The Economics of New Goods, ed. T. F. Bresnahan and R. J. Gordon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 27–70. On the early uses of electric light, see D. E. Nye, 1990, Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880–1940 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), chapter 1.
5. Lamplighters and Electricity,” 1906, Washington Post, July 1.
6. J. A. Schumpeter, [1942] 1976, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3d ed. (New York: Harper Torchbooks), 76.
7. Quoted in R. J. Gordon, 2014, “The Demise of U.S. Economic Growth: Restatement, Rebuttal, and Reflections” (Working Paper 19895, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA), 23.
8. D. Comin and M. Mestieri, 2018, “If Technology Has Arrived Everywhere, Why Has Income Diverged?,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 10 (3): 137–78.
9. Quoted in Nye, 1990, Electrifying America, 150.
10. Robert Gordon has called the period 1870–1970 the “special century” in American history (2016, The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press]).
11. S. Landsberg, 2007, “A Brief History of Economic Time,” Wall Street Journal, June 9.
12. E. Hobsbawm, 1968, Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day (New York: New Press), chap. 3, Kindle.
13. Hobsbawm has called the period 1789–1848 the “dual revolution” (1962, The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848 [London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson], preface, Kindle. The term refers to the political changes of the French Revolution fused with the technological changes of the Industrial Revolution.
14 T. Hobbes, 1651, Leviathan, chapter 13, https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/chapter13.html.
15. A. Deaton, 2013, The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
16. W. Blake, 1810, “Jerusalem,” https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/54684/jerusalem-and-did-those-feet-in-ancient-time.
17. For more on living standards during the Industrial Revolution, see chapter 5.
18. For more on the causes of the living standards crisis, see chapter 5.
19. J. Brown, 1832, A Memoir of Robert Blincoe: An Orphan Boy; Sent From the Workhouse of St. Pancras, London at Seven Years of Age, to Endure the Horrors of a Cotton-Mill (London: J. Doherty).
20. D. S. Landes, 1969, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 7.
21. For examples of preindustrial resistance, see chapter 1. For a discussion of why British governments began to side with the innovators, see chapter 3.
22. Quoted in E. Brynjolfsson, 2012, Race Against the Machine (MIT lecture), slide 2, http://ilp.mit.edu/images/conferences/2012/IT/Brynjolfsson.pdf.
23. Bruce Stokes, 2017, “Public Divided on Prospects for Next Generation,” Pew Research Center Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey, June 5, http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/05/2-public-divided-on-prospects-for-the-next-generation/.
24. R. Chetty et al., 2017, “The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940,” Science 356 (6336): 398–406.
25. For more on disappearing middle-income jobs, see chapter 9.
26. For more on communities where jobs have disappeared, see chapter 10.
27. C. B. Frey, T. Berger, and C. Chen, 2018, “Political Machinery: Did Robots Swing the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election?,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 34 (3): 418–42. For how automation has increased support for nationalist and radical-right parties in Europe, see M. Anelli, I. Colantone, and P. Stanig, 2018, “We Were the Robots: Automation in Manufacturing and Voting Behavior in Western Europe” (working paper, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy).
28. E. Hoffer, 1965, “Automation Is Here to Liberate Us,” New York Times, October 24.
29. “Danzig Bars New Machinery Except on Official Permit,” 1933, New York Times, March 14.
30. Quoted in “Nazis to Curb Machines as Substitutes for Men,” 1933, New York Times, August 6.
31. P. R. Krugman, 1995, Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations (New York: Norton), 56.
32. On the distinction between productivity-enhancing and worker-replacing technological changes, see H. Jerome, 1934, “Mechanization in Industry” (Working Paper 27, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA), 27–31.
33. Ibid., 65.
34. D. Acemoglu and P. Restrepo, 2018a, “Artificial Intelligence, Automation and Work” (Working Paper 24196, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA).
35. Ibid.
36. J. Bessen, 2015, Learning by Doing: The Real Connection between Innovation, Wages, and Wealth (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), chapter 6.
37. Schum
peter, [1942] 1976, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 85.
38. Quoted in D. Akst, 2013, “What Can We Learn from Past Anxiety over Automation?,” Wilson Quarterly, Summer, https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/summer-2014-where-have-all-the-jobs-gone/theres-much-learn-from-past-anxiety-over-automation/.
39. Quoted in J. Mokyr, 2001, “The Rise and Fall of the Factory System: Technology, firms, and households since the Industrial Revolution,” in Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 55 (1): 20.
40. Ibsen. H., 1919, Pillars of Society (Boston: Walter H. Baker & Co.), https://archive.org/details/pillarsofsociety00ibse/page/36.
41. The adoption of the printing press in the empire had to wait until 1727. Even in the late nineteenth century, Ottoman book production was primarily undertaken by scribes. The consequences of the long absence of the printing press become obvious when we examine regional disparities in literacy rates. In 1800, about 2–3 percent of the population of the Ottoman Empire was literate, compared to 60 percent of adult males and 40 percent of adult females in Britain (D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson, 2012, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty [New York: Crown Business], 207–8).
42. Ibid., 80.
43. For efforts by the ruling classes to block replacing technologies, see chapters 1 and 3.
44. J. Mokyr, 2002, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 232.
45. J. Mokyr, 1992b, “Technological Inertia in Economic History,” Journal of Economic History 52 (2): 331–32.
46. D. S. Landes, 1969, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 8.
47. Quoted in C. Curtis, 1983, “Machines vs. Workers,” New York Times, February 8.
48. P. H. Lindert and J. G. Williamson, 2016, Unequal Gains: American Growth and Inequality Since 1700 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 194.
Part 1
Epigraph: The first epigraph, from a royal edict to resolve conflicts in the town of Thorn (or Toruń) in 1523, is quoted in S. Ogilvie, 2019, The European Guilds: An Economic Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 390.
1. J. Diamond, 1993, “Ten Thousand Years of Solitude,” Discover, March 1, 48–57.
2. D. Cardwell, 2001, Wheels, Clocks, and Rockets: A History of Technology (New York: Norton), 186.
Chapter 1
1. B. Russell, 1946, History of Western Philosophy and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day (New York: Simon & Schuster), 25.
2. P. Bairoch, 1991, Cities and Economic Development: From the Dawn of History to the Present (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 17–18.
3. D. R. Headrick, 2009, Technology: A World History (New York: Oxford University Press), 32–33.
4. D. Cardwell, 2001, Wheels, Clocks, and Rockets: A History of Technology (New York: Norton), 16–17.
5. P. Mantoux, 1961, The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century: An Outline of the Beginnings of the Modern Factory System in England, trans. M. Vernon (London: Routledge), 189.
6. Quoted in F. Klemm, 1964, A History of Western Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 51.
7. Early accounts suggested that classical civilizations didn’t achieve much meaningful technological progress. See, for example, M. I. Finley, 1965, “Technical Innovation and Economic Progress in the Ancient World,” Economic History Review 18 (1): 29–45, and 1973, The Ancient Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press); H. Hodges, 1970, Technology in the Ancient World (New York: Barnes & Noble); D. Lee, 1973, “Science, Philosophy, and Technology in the Greco-Roman World: I,” Greece and Rome 20 (1): 65–78. But more recently, scholars have argued that these accounts understate the civiliations’ technological achievements. See K. D. White, 1984, Greek and Roman Technology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); J. Mokyr, 1992a, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (New York: Oxford University Press); Cardwell, 2001, Wheels, Clocks, and Rockets; K. Harper, 2017, The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease, and the End of an Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
8. Finley, 1973, The Ancient Economy.
9. Mokyr, 1992a, The Lever of Riches, 20.
10. Harper, 2017, The Fate of Rome, 1.
11. Many of these technologies, however, were borrowed from earlier civilizations like the Babylonians or Egyptians.
12. Mokyr, 1992a, The Lever of Riches, 20.
13. The Samos aqueduct, the first of its kind, was built around 600 B.C. by the Greek engineer Eupalinus of Megara.
14. Mokyr, 1992a. The Lever of Riches, 20.
15. R. J. Forbes, 1958, Man: The Maker (New York: Abelard-Schuman), 73.
16. H. Heaton, 1936, Economic History of Europe (New York: Harper and Brothers), 58.
17. K. D. White, 1984, Greek and Roman Technology.
18. Mokyr, 1992a, The Lever of Riches, 27.
19. A. C. Leighton, 1972, Transport and Communication in Early Medieval Europe AD 500–1100 (Newton Abbot: David and Charles Publishers).
20. On the importance of Archimedes to Galileo’s work, see Cardwell, 2001, Wheels, Clocks, and Rockets, 83.
21. J. G. Landels, 2000, Engineering in the Ancient World (Berkeley: University of California Press), 201.
22. Price, D. de S., 1975, Science Since Babylon (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 48.
23. B. Gille, 1986, History of Techniques, vol. 2: Techniques and Sciences (New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers). See also Mokyr, 1992a, The Lever of Riches, 194.
24. J. D. Bernal, 1971, Science in History, vol. 1: The Emergence of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 222.
25. Quoted in D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson, 2012, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (New York: Crown Business), 165.
26. For other examples of Roman rulers blocking replacing technologies, see ibid., 164–66.
27. A. P. Usher, 1954, A History of Mechanical Innovations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 101.
28. P. Temin, 2006, “The Economy of the Early Roman Empire,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (1): 133–51, and 2012, The Roman Market Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
29. Mokyr, 1992a, The Lever of Riches, 29.
30. Ibid., 31.
31. On Roman roads, see Cardwell, 2001, Wheels, Clocks, and Rockets, 33.
32. Mokyr, 1992a, The Lever of Riches, 31.
33. Cardwell, 2001. Wheels, Clocks, and Rockets, 48.
34. On the three-field system, see Mokyr, 1992a, The Lever of Riches, 31.
35. L. White, 1962, Medieval Technology and Social Change (New York: Oxford University Press), 43.
36. Although some Roman plows had wheels, the complete heavy plow didn’t make its appearance until the sixth century.
37. L. White, 1962, Medieval Technology and Social Change.
38. Ibid.
39. The collar’s being placed on the horse’s neck instead of its shoulders meant that heavy strain almost choked it. On Richard Lefebvre des Noëttes and advances in horse technology, see Mokyr, 1992a, The Lever of Riches, 36–38.
40. For an analysis of the economics of horse technology relative to that of the ox, see J. Langdon, 1982, “The Economics of Horses and Oxen in Medieval England,” Agricultural History Review 30 (1): 31–40.
41. See Mokyr, 1992a, The Lever of Riches, 36–38.
42. On the Domesday book, see M. T. Hodgen, 1939, “Domesday Water Mills,” Antiquity 13 (51): 261–79.
43. Cardwell, 2001, Wheels, Clocks, and Rockets, 49.
44. L. White, 1962, Medieval Technology and Social Change, 89.
45. On Burchard and Pope Celestine III, see E. J. Kealey, 1987, Harvesting the Air: Windmill Pioneers in Twelfth-Century England (Berkeley: University of California Press), 180.
46. Usher, 1954, A History of Mechanical Innova
tions, 209.
47. L. Boerner and B. Severgnini, 2015, “Time for Growth” (Economic History Working Paper 222/2015, London School of Economics and Political Science).
48. L. Boerner and B. Severgnini, 2016, “The Impact of Public Mechanical Clocks on Economic Growth,” Vox, October 10, https://voxeu.org/article/time-growth.
49. J. Le Goff, 1982, Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
50. L. Mumford, 1934, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World), 14.
51. On markets and clocks, see Boerner and Severgnini, 2015, “Time for Growth.”
52. There was significant productivity growth in watch making from the late seventeenth century onward, but the industry was tiny. See M. Kelly and C. Ó Gráda, 2016, “Adam Smith, Watch Prices, and the Industrial Revolution,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 131 (4): 1727–52.
53. On the price of books, see J. Van Zanden, 2004, “Common Workmen, Philosophers and the Birth of the European Knowledge Economy” (paper for Global Economic History Network Conference, Leiden, September 16–18).
54. Cardwell, 2001, Wheels, Clocks, and Rockets, 55.
55. On the numbers of books published, see ibid., 49.
56. G. Clark, 2001. “The Secret History of the Industrial Revolution” (Working paper, University of California, Davis), 60.
57. J. E. Dittmar, 2011, “Information Technology and Economic Change: The Impact of the Printing Press,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (3): 1133–72.
58. Quoted in F. J. Swetz, 1987, Capitalism and Arithmetic: The New Math of the 15th Century (La Salle, IL: Open Court), 20.
59. Dittmar, 2011, “Information Technology and Economic Change,” 1140.
60. Quoted in W. Endrei and W. v. Stromer, 1974,“Textiltechnische und hydraulische Erfindungen und ihre Innovatoren in Mitteleuropa im 14. / 15. Jahrhundert,” Technikgeschichte 41:90. See also S. Ogilvie, 2019, The European Guilds: An Economic Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 390.
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