by Ian Smith
I was being kept busy. On 8 May I had a visit from two influential Americans, the heads of Superior Oil and Falconbridge Mines, who believed that we were about to gain recognition from the USA. They were going back to do what they could to assist this process.
By 11 May, there had been a series of investitures over the previous few days to clear up the backlog before the new government takeover. An incredible act of bravery from a fifteen-year old schoolboy earned the Conspicuous Gallantry Decoration, one of our top civilian awards. He took on a gang of terrorists single-handed, wounded two of them, and when they retreated pursued them and continued the fight. As one of our senior commanders commented, listening to that citation brought on one a sense of humility. There were also a number of awards to security force personnel involving tremendous bravery and, as on previous occasions, I sensed strong emotional feelings. It was all coming to an end, this tremendous nation of Rhodesians with their epic history of fighting a lone battle for freedom and Western civilisation, and they were wondering what the uncertain future would hold.
There were two worthwhile awards in the civilian field, to men who had consistently over the years made tremendous efforts on behalf of Rhodesia and had played a big part in helping to bring the various factions together for the 3 March agreement. Ken MacKenzie, a big industrialist in both Rhodesia and South Africa, and Andy Andrews, who was at the head of Aleghany Ludlum, the big smelters of Pittsburg, USA, had both achieved spectacular successes in the battle to overcome sanctions. While grateful for the honour, both assured me that they had been motivated by their love of our country, and the principle for which we were fighting.
On 12 May there was some good news from the UK, USA and South Africa. Margaret Thatcher said that it served no purpose in looking back; they must now assess whether we had complied with the ‘six principles’. Into the bargain, there was her reply to a question during the Conservatives’ recent election campaign. She said her assessment was that we had done enough for the Conservatives to recognise us and remove sanctions. And Carter, the real slippery customer, now said that he would make a decision on Rhodesia in a few weeks. His timing was right because, in a few weeks, he would be dealing with a black prime minister instead of a white prime minister, and that solved his problem. Finally, there was an encouraging message from Hawkins indicating that the South Africans had realised, albeit belatedly, that they could not trust their free world ‘friends’. They were now working for the formation of a constellation of states in southern Africa, with the object of promoting the common interests of the countries involved, and bringing their peoples closer together. Hawkins said: ‘I refrained from commenting that at last they were accepting our advice!’
There also were personal matters to consider: the family got Alec to the airport in time to catch his flight to Oslo for his wedding. We would be moving out of ‘Independence’ at the end of the month, so we had a happy family dinner on the night of the twelfth — Alec would not be returning to this residence.
On 13 May I reflected on the South African problem with some of my colleagues. There was a strong consensus that the South Africans’ first priority should be to start talking internally with their various races and hammer out something acceptable to the majority. They would be agreeably surprised at the result, we thought, as many of their black people were hoping for peace and a better way of life. A system of meritocracy which removed racial discrimination and preserved decent standards of civilisation would be acceptable to the free world. The longer they procrastinated, the more difficult it would become. The release of Mandela seemed to be a necessary, albeit unpalatable, prerequisite. I had made the point to Vorster that while Mandela was incarcerated, with the passage of every day his martyrdom increased. It served no purpose to point out, as he had done to me, that according to the law of the land Mandela had been sentenced to death, and was therefore lucky to be alive. Against the ‘evil of apartheid’, that one was laughed out of court.
By mid-May there was a bit of in-fighting and juggling for position among the various parties, and I had to devote much time to arbitrating and counselling reason and patience. The last thing we wanted at this stage was any break-up, especially as the main problem was in the UANC, the incoming government — nothing could be more prejudicial to our hopes for recognition. Sithole was also being petulant:
16.05.79 — Heard the incredible story, as yet unconfirmed, that Sithole has sent messages to the UK and US Governments and UN and OAU urging them not to recognise the new Government and remove sanctions, as the election was bogus! If so this is absolutely evil and unforgivable, done in a pique of anger, attempting to seek revenge because of his poor showing in the election.
There were other problems with the new order. Gaylard told me that Muzorewa had suggested in a most considerate manner that, because of his close association with me and the Rhodesian government, it might be undesirable for him to continue as secretary to the cabinet. This, in spite of the fact that he had concurred with me previously on the desirability of retaining Gaylard, even if only for a short period, to enable him to become established in his new position. There was no problem for Gaylard, who had indicated to me his preference for retirement with the advent of the new government. If the Prime Minister wished for a change, that was his prerogative. Gaylard informed him so, indicating that the likely candidates, judging from experience, ability and seniority, were George Smith and Malcolm Thompson. Gaylard undertook to inform the public services board of Muzorewa’s wishes, so that they could process his request. On 16 May, Gaylard conveyed to Muzorewa the board’s recommendation that the post should go to Smith. He was a bit taken aback when Muzorewa said he wished to have a black man. But Muzorewa must have been even more taken aback when the board chairman informed him that such action would be in violation of the 3 March agreement, and in conflict with what Muzorewa had said in public during the recent election campaign. Fortunately, he accepted this gracefully. Evidently he had hoped that his brother-in-law could be given the position — a man with absolutely no qualifications or administrative experience. This would have been a gross violation of laid-down procedure for the civil service. We both shook our heads in disbelief. It was a classic example of how easy it would be for our country to degenerate into a banana republic if there were no laws and regulations and rules to control and guide governments, and equally important, no civil service bound by integrity, tradition and experience.
Then good news came from the US Senate where, on 15 May, a resolution in our favour was carried by 75 votes to 19. This was a major victory, giving us a great boost. It seemed that it must pressurise Carter to move in our direction. After a meeting with Antony Duff of the British Foreign Office, Gaylard told me the next day, 16 May, that the British attitude had changed completely since their last discussion. The British were most co-operative and seeking assistance in finding a modus vivendi for recognition. This gave us reason to be optimistic about the difference between a Thatcher government and the others! The honeymoon, however, would not last long.
I had a taste of the new British attitude on the morning of 18 May, when Duff came in for a discussion. He appeared relaxed and helpful. He thought an all-party conference was now irrelevant, that Nkomo was a spent force who had missed the boat, and that Sithole was making a fool of himself and would fade into oblivion. He agreed with me that if the US removed sanctions this would solve the problem and end Britain’s predicament. Into the bargain, there would be no conflict with Margaret Thatcher. But, he warned, Britain would still be saddled with selling the packet to the OAU. My counter was to point out that, if it were a fait accompli, any problem would endure for a couple of days and then be overtaken by the appearance of a new Bocassa or Idi Amin. He smiled in agreement. I went on to point out the dangers which would be associated with the impending Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference, to be held in Lusaka in August, if our problem were not finalised. This would be an emotion-creating occasion in the middle of Africa, w
ith the spectre of the OAU hovering in the background. The British, I predicted, would be backed into a corner from which it would be difficult to extricate themselves. It seemed to me to be absolute madness to run that risk, when an obvious opportunity for evasion presented itself. Moreover, such an atmosphere would provoke the terrorists, and in return we would be compelled to retaliate, obviously exacerbating the security problems associated with the conference. By grasping the nettle now the problem would be eliminated. I recounted that Kaunda had said to me at one of our meetings in Lusaka that the problem with the British government was that they lacked the guts to implement their own plan! Duff showed no inclination to disagree, and undertook to relate my views to his political masters, indicating that these days his task was much easier.
On 19 May there was a hint of what was to come: Duff had been misleading me. I had a message from Hawkins to say the South Africans were convinced, through a message from their Washington embassy, that the British were planning to do a deal with the US at the coming Vance–Carrington meeting in which they would support the USA on the UN plan for Namibia in return for the Americans agreeing to hold their hand on the lifting of Rhodesian sanctions. I found this unbelievable. Maybe a Labour government would resort to this kind of treachery in an effort to connive with the OAU in their desire to bring down our new government and supplant it with the communist terrorists they were supporting, but not a Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher — such a thought was totally ridiculous and I wondered who could have concocted it. Then I recalled that some of our old and trusted Tory friends had expressed concern that Peter Carrington was being lined up for the job of Foreign Secretary. He had recently visited Rhodesia in this capacity on a familiarisation tour and had interviewed me. He was certainly smooth, considerate and supportive of what we were doing, but I would not have believed that he could be party to the Machiavellian scheming associated with the cynical plot of which we had been told. However, the fact that his reliability had been questioned by certain of his parliamentary associates gave me cause for concern.
There were other distractions, however. On 20 May, as part of my final duties, we took the early flight to Bulawayo for our annual visit to the national trade fair, which was always a most worthwhile occasion. The usual warm reception awaited us when we arrived at Government House, but we noticed a special feeling associated with this occasion, because everyone knew that this was the end, our last such visit.
Government House in Bulawayo is indeed a special place, full of history, tradition and atmosphere. It was built by Rhodes, and everything about it depicts the British Empire: its greatness, its glory, the beauty of old England, Rhodes’s furniture, pictures, treasures. It was one of the most gracious houses we had ever occupied. To the one side stood Rhodes’s hut with its thatched roof, his first home in Rhodesia. A short distance away the big tree under which Rhodes and Lobengula talked and made their treaties. In the distance, on a clear day, one can see Thabas Induna, ‘the Mountain of the Kings’, which was the home of the Matabele Kings, Mzilikazi and Lobengula. The horse stables were magnificent, with ironwork, woodwork, doors and enamel drinking troughs imported from England. When we moved in we found that these outside buildings were not in a good state of repair, but that was quickly remedied with the placement of notices indicating matters of interest to encourage the public to visit and enjoy this lovely part of their heritage. The big tree was not looking in good health, either, with evidence of the dreadful modern cult of name carving. In quick time a guard rail was erected, and the tree experts brought in for advice. There were approximately 300 acres of estate land, and I was surprised to learn that it was never put to any use — a constant veld fire problem in the dry winter months. We quickly solved that by establishing a herd of pedigree Africander cattle, and a flock of pedigree Persiona sheep — both breeds indigenous to Africa. This was achieved with wonderful co-operation from the nearby Matopos agricultural research station, and kind donations of female stock from certain members of the Rhodesian Africander Breeders’ Association. Not only were the magnificent animals a joy to see, but the scheme grew to be economically viable. Moreover, the residents living in the suburbs surrounding Government House not only enjoyed the pleasure of looking out on the beautiful animals on the other side of the fence, but they no longer lived with the anxiety of raging veld fires and the associated unpleasant smoke and fumes.
We had received tremendous enjoyment and satisfaction from our association with this great place, which had the effect of stirring one’s thoughts and imagination. We rescued a number of historic items from dust heaps and resurrected them with the assistance of the historical monuments committee, who were thrilled at being given the opportunity to participate. Janet devoted her energies to organising and improving the residence, and beautifying the garden, creating a garden committee of local experts, enthusiastic at having this opportunity to contribute. Our participation and contact with this piece of Rhodesian history had been a rewarding and stirring experience — needless to say, its ending was a nostalgic and traumatic occasion. We hoped that those who followed would continue where we had left off.
The trade fair was a tremendous success, with the spirit of the people at a high peak; it was amazing to me when I knew that deep down in their hearts they must have had serious misgivings as to what the future would hold. But being intelligent people, they would realise the sterility of negative thinking, and that if ever there was a time in our history for faith and belief in the Rhodesians’ ability to overcome problems, this was it. On our final night we hosted our traditional dinner to enable us to pay our respects to a band of local people who had served their community with great credit. Indeed, this was an especially memorable event, as all those present realised that it was the last such occasion. We rose and drank a toast to Queen and country — that would never happen again. It would no longer be Rhodesia, and loyalty would be in a different direction.
On 24 May, after an early breakfast, we took our farewell from the place we had grown to love so deeply, and as we drove out of the entrance gates we held hands and, looking back, expressed our prayers and hope for the future. Janet caught the flight to Salisbury to organise our departure from ‘Independence’, and I headed for ‘Gwenoro’ for a few days’ farming.
The penultimate step in the process of standing down was to go to Parliament on 29 May for the election of the state president and president of the senate. I then set about the task of determining who to bring in as cabinet ministers from my side. I had my quota, which was small, and it was an unpleasant task to determine which of my team to drop, for they all had been wonderful and loyal supporters. For myself, I was to be Minister without Portfolio. Then, finally:
31.05.79 — My last day in office — went down this morning, had a cup of tea, and said goodbye to them all. John and Clare were clearing up the last remains. This afternoon after the last load had departed from ‘Independence’, finally Janet and I took our last walk through the house which had been our home for the past 15 years — we didn’t talk, we just felt. What a wonderful part it had played in the history of our country, meetings with Prime Ministers and many other Ministers of State. It had witnessed glorious moments, tough and stirring negotiations, depressing occasions which one would prefer to forget, but they are there and cannot be eradicated. Our staff were waiting at the back door to bid us farewell — they had become part of the family, so this was another poignant moment. A few of them were departing tomorrow — for reasons best known to themselves they were leaving government service. We drove out the back gate to our new home which was nearby, much smaller, but adequate and very comfortable. We were in bed by 11 p.m. and slept the sleep of the just — our best night for some time.
20
The Government of National
Unity and the Lancaster House
Conference
Bishop Muzorewa took office as Prime Minister on 1 June 1979 as head of the government of national unity. He faced ma
ny initial difficulties, including Ndabaningi Sithole refusing to recognise the election result. These issues would resolve themselves, but Muzorewa would enjoy only a couple of months before he was compelled to negotiate with the external nationalists at Lancaster House. This was to be his undoing.
An immediate problem facing me on 1 June was to counsel the veteran nationalist James Chikerema who, over the past few months, had on several occasions expressed to me his deep concern over Muzorewa’s lack of firmness, views which he claimed were shared by fifteen MPs, including some of the most competent in their party, the UANC. Their patience and tolerance were being severely tested to the extent that some were talking of breaking away from the party. After listening patiently, I commiserated with him but, as on previous occasions, I counselled patience in the national interest. There was clear evidence that we could justifiably expect recognition and a removal of sanctions from both Britain and the USA, and this would mean a number of other free world countries would do likewise automatically. If any action on their part prejudiced this, then responsible opinion, black and white, would condemn them, and rightly so! He said he could not fault my logic, and would attempt to convince the others who were associated with him. Chikerema also informed me that six of Sithole’s MPs were fed up with his continuing non-acceptance of the election results and the accompanying intrigue, and had indicated their desire to join any faction which broke away from Muzorewa. He hoped we could keep in contact.