by J E Kaufmann
FORTRESS
EUROPE
FORTRESS
EUROPE
European Fortifications of
World War 11
J.E. Kaufmann
Robert M. Jurga
Translations by
H.W. Kaufmann
Da Capo Press
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Chapter 1. France
Chapter 2. Germany
Chapter 3. Belgium
Chapter 4. Netherlands
Chapter 5. Switzerland
Chapter 6. Great Britain
Chapter 7. Italy
Chapter 8. Scandinavia
Chapter 9. Czechoslovakia
Chapter 10. Poland
Chapter 11. Yugoslavia
Chapter 12. The Balkans
Chapter 13. Finland
Chapter 14. Soviet Fortifications
Chapter 15. Atlantic Wall
Appendix: Iberian Peninsula
Notes and Further Reading
Bibliography
Glossary
Index
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book would not have been possible without the help of a number of people who have done everything from giving us photographs, to sending documents and summaries, and escorting us through the fortifications. We are listing our informants in alphabetical order but we want them to rest assured that their contributions were of equal importance and greatly appreciated. Next to their names we list the area in which they contributed information. "Photos" indicates that they also provided photos of the fortifications.
John Aalbu (photos), Markku Airila* (Finland & photos), Colin Alexander (England), William Allcorn (Western Europe & photos), Captain A.D. Balgarnie, RE Press Officer, British Forces Gibraltar, Libor Boleslav (Czech), Dr. Martin Buren (Germany), Brian Burr Chin (Belgium), Jean-Louis Burtscher (France & photos), Dr. Carlo Alfredo Clerici* (Italy & photos), Olle and Colonel Gunnar Dahlquist* (Sweden & photos), Clayton Donnel (France & photos), Dr. Martin Egger (France & Russia), LTC Ove Enqvist* (Finland), Kommanderkaptein Odd Terje Fjeld (Norway), Bryan Fugate (USSR), Alessandro Gazzi (Italy), Peter Gryner (Czech), Joseph de Hasque (Belgium & photos), John Hellis (England & photos), Raul Heymes (France), Leif Hogberg (Sweden & photos), Alex Horak (Czech), Herbert Jager (Germany), Anna Kedryna* (Netherlands, Poland and Russia), Dr. Machiel Kiel (Netherlands), Armin Kilian (Germany), Jurgen Kraft (Photos), Patrice Lang and his friends of the Association "Le Tiburce" (France), LTC Iikka Lansivaara* (Finland), Staff Sgt. Edmund Leizens and son (copies of AOK 1 June 1940 report), Colonel Andrezej Lisiecki (Poland), Bernard Lowry (England & photo), Michael J. Luke (Denmark), George Maistret (France), Jose Matran Bea & Colonel Juan Antonio Gomez Vizcaino (Cartagena & Spain's defenses), Wes Micket (photo), Raymond Mersch (France), L.C.A. van Midden (Germany & photos), Svein Wiiger Olsen* (Norway & photos), Frank Philippart (Belgium), Margaret Pinsent (Photos), Jason Pipes (German coast defense units), Gunther Reiss* (Switzerland and Italy, photos), Charlie Robbins (German Denkshrifts), Rene Roede (Spain), LTC Nuno Rubin (Portugal), John Sloan (Russia), Dag Sundkuist* (Norway), LTC Philippe Truttmann* (France), Lucas Tsatiris* (Greece), Lee R. Unterborn (reference material), Karol Vasata (photos), Jean-Bernard Wahl (France), Peter Waltje (Germany & Photos), Patrice Wijnands (Belgium & Germany), Charlie Woods (Belgian artillery).
The Genie of Metz, Grenoble and Nice many years ago graciously provided us with some important documentation on the Maginot Line which has always been important in our writings on the French fortifications. We also thank the various civilian associations that are preserving the forts of Hackenberg, Fermont, Rohrbach, Schoenenbourg, Simserhof, and Immerhof in France and the fort of Bouda in the Czech Republic.
We would also like to thank Brian Fugate for permission to quote from Thunder on the Dnepr, Medwyn Parry and Roger Thomas for permission to make illustrations of British pillboxes based on their drawings, and Herbert Jager for the use of a drawing by Robert Jurga from Die Kustenbatterie Fort Kugelbake in Cuxhaven.
Thanks to Maria Urbanice of the Jagiellonian Library for helping us obtain important German documents and Raymond Mersch, curator of the fortification of A10 Immerhof of Hettange-Grande, who always opened the ouvrage to us. Also, Robert Jurga's director, W. Chrostowski, made it possible for Robert to continue on the research needed for this project.
Communications were made possible with the help of Dr. Martin Egger, Jerzy Pankiewicz, and Michal Rybinski who maintained contact between us and other contributors through e-mail. Also thanks to Anna Kedryna for helping Robert process all the material needed for the drawings. Special thanks to Lee R. Unterborn not only for providing valuable reference material, but also serving as a reader of the final manuscript.
Special mention must be made for the help provided by LTC Philippe Truttmann who has continued to keep us informed on the French fortifications and clarifying details for us. Gunther Reiss, as always, was there to help us make connections and provide data. Dag Sundkuist came through with the last minute additions on Scandinavia and Spain. Dr. Carlo Clerici's books and correspondence and descriptions gave us most of the information used in the chapter on Italy. Markku Airila and Ove Enqvist handled obtaining all our material on Finland as well as translating it into English. Finally, Svein Olsen prepared special summaries of every major fortified area in Norway and the weapons employed by both Norwegians and Germans between 1940 and 1945. Like Dr. Clerici's contribution for the Italian chapter, Mr. Olsen's contribution was vital for properly completing the chapter on Scandinavia. Mr. Olsen also included additional material on Sweden and Denmark.
INTRODUCTION
This book is a survey of most of the major and minor fortifications that were prepared and used in Europe before and during World War II. It is not meant to be a technical, in-depth study of military architecture, but rather a general overview of the subject, a reference for the professional and amateur historian. Each chapter includes a brief background section, examines the location and terrain that was defended, describes the fortifications, identifies some of the key components, and gives a brief history of those defenses in World War II.
The reader may find it necessary to refer to more detailed maps to identify some specific locations since space limitations permit us only to include a selection of illustrative material. Those who need more detailed information on individual positions and lines of fortifications will find that the bibliography contains a complete list of the resources we used as well as a complete list of suggested reading. However, many of the publications are difficult to obtain and some contain limited information.
The information on some of the fortifications in this volume may soon become outdated when additional facts come to light. In other cases, such as Rumania's, very little information was available, so we have presented all the material we were able to glean. We must caution the reader, however, that some of our sources may not have been among the most reliable.
Some countries, such as Hungary, have not been included because we were not able to find any information at all about their defenses. This does not necessarily mean that they had no permanent fortifications.
If any of our readers would like to share information with us for a future revision of this book, we encourage them to contact one of us at the following addresses:
SITE 0 (Fortifications and Artillery)
J.E. Kaufmann, PO Box 680484, San Antonio, TX 78268, USA
Robert Jurga, Boryszyn 33, 66-218 Lubrza, POLAND
Chapter 1
FRANCE
BACKGROUND
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p; France's World War II era fortifications date back to the close of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. After the humiliating defeat and harsh peace terms that resulted in the loss of the province of Alsace and a large part of Lorraine, the French government and military establishment resolved to fight to restore the lost territories and national honor. Until the time for "revenge" came to pass, the French High Command decided to erect a strong defensive barrier to prevent any further intrusions that might lead to another embarrassing episode.
While the French statesmen busied themselves forging alliances, the military rebuilt the army and began establishing a series of fortifications to protect vulnerable areas and major economic centers. General Raymond-Adolphe Sere de Rivieres was charged with the creation of a series of fortified rings linked together by a line of isolated forts. The most important of these rings were those of Verdun and Toul, and Epinal and Belfort. Others went up at Lille, Maubeuge, Langres, Dijon, Besancon, Grenoble, Briancon, and Nice. In addition, a number of isolated positions were established between most of these fortress rings. In most cases, Sere de Rivieres positioned the guns in open positions but placed the supporting facilities, such as the magazines, in protected locales. He used narrow and/or rear facing courtyards to reduce the vulnerability of the exposed facade to high-angled fire and surrounded his forts with dry moats or fosses with coffres at the corners of counter scarps, covering them with infantry weapons.
By the mid-1880s, Sere de Rivieres' forts-many far from being finished-became virtually obsolete, like most of the European fortifications of the period. This sudden disaster, called the "Crisis of the torpedo shell" by French historians, was caused by a new high explosive that triggered the development of more effective and destruc tive artillery shells. Beginning in 1881, the new chrome-tungsten steel shells were able to crack cast-iron armor.
As a result, between 1889 and 1914, profound changes took place in the field of military architecture. Many forts had to be redesigned and those in the final stages of construction had to be altered. After 1889 the French perfected a nickelsteel armor that could stand up to the new ammunition. They also reinforced their concrete with steel, producing a ferro-concrete that could withstand bombardment from the new shells. Other nations responded with similar developments, although methods for pouring concrete and the use of reinforcement varied from country to country. The French used metal rods near the interior and exterior edges of their concrete to prevent it from cracking badly.
In the key Sere de Rivieres forts, the vulnerable open gun positions were replaced with artillery turrets. Machine-gun turrets supplanted the vulnerable infantry positions on top of the forts. The Casemate de Bourges, usually containing two gun rooms for 75-mm guns, was developed to protect the forts' flanks. Some of the older forts received and maintained cast-iron Mougin turrets for 155-mm guns. Only the key forts between Belfort and Verdun were equipped with the new steel 75-mm gun turrets. Fixed steel turrets or cloches meant primarily as observation posts were installed in many forts. Many of the features of these defenses would persist in the period between World Wars. However, technological advances were often slowed by the increasing expense of implementing them.
Before the end of 1914 the French lost confidence in the ability of their forts to resist the new heavy German artillery that had devastated Fort Manonviller and the Belgian forts'. Manonviller, an old fort built in the late 1870s and modernized several times, was equipped with a variety of gun turrets'. It served as an isolated French border fort, becoming an easy target for the new German heavy artillery in August 1914. When the Germans turned their attention towards Verdun in 1916, launching a massive offensive, they found a fortress ring that had been largely disarmed.
Three factors of this campaign would play a key role in shaping the future French fortifications. The first was the fall of Fort Douaumont to a few bold German soldiers, who quickly overpowered the skeleton garrison. It took the French army several months to recapture its own fort, after it had endured heavy bombardment and bloody close fighting before surrendering with most of its components still functional. The second factor was Fort Vaux's spirited resistance, despite the loss of its only 75-mm gun artillery turret before the battle, and eventual surrender, caused by weaknesses in its design. The third factor was the successful performance of the intermediate work of Froideterre. Its new design, consisting of dispersed positions, reduced its vulnerability to enemy artillery and assured its effectiveness. After the Great War, France was left with a large air force and tank force that foreshadowed the future in warfare.
However, aircraft and tanks, which were offensive arms, lost their popularity in the post-war peace, a period of military retrenchment for the France. Having lost a whole generation to the war, France was disenchanted with all things military. Thus France began to reduce the size of its armed forces and its High Command concluded that its best course would be to take a strong defensive stance. The crippling effects of the Versailles Treaty on their enemies notwithstanding, the French military leaders feared a resurgence of German military power. France's occupation of the Rhineland could only be expected to keep the Germans in check until the end of the 1920s. The main object was to create a barrier to protect the recovered provinces from a future German invasion. The design and layout of these new works was the subject of much discussion among the military planners in the early 1920s. The outcome was that the government approved the creation of the Maginot Line, which would later be erroneously described as a giant "concrete trench".
MAJOR FORTIFICATIONS
The Maginot Line
The Maginot Extension and Maubeuge
The Little Maginot Line (Alpine Defenses)
The Coast Defenses
LOCATION
1. The Maginot Line
When completed the Maginot Line consisted of three major sections: The Maginot Line Proper, the Maginot Extension, and the Little Maginot Line.' The original Maginot Line on the Northeastern Front included the Maginot Line Proper and the Rhine Defenses.
The Maginot Line Proper was divided into two Fortified Regions (Regions Fortifiees or RF) that included the RF of Metz and the RF of La Lauter. Between the two RFs the Sarre Gap, devoid of heavy defenses, relied on a system of inundations. Along the Rhine, from the vicinity of Haguenau and Seltz, a system of light fortifications known as the Rhine Defenses extended up the river to the Swiss border.
The Maginot Line Proper spanned a variety of terrain. The RF of Metz began near Longuyon in a hilly mining region of Lorraine, made a semi-circle around the previously German-fortified industrial town of Thionville, and continued on to the edge of the Sarre Gap near St. Avold. This RF covering Lorraine occupied a largely wooded plateau region. The Moselle River cut through it as it meandered from Metz to Thionville and on to the German border. These defenses covered about 75 km.
At a lower elevation than the RF of Metz, a number of small lakes and ponds occupied the Sarre Gap. This sector spanned about 25 kilometers from the vicinity of St. Avoid to the east bank of the Sarre River near Sarralbe. Although this region is seldom marked on maps because of its small size, it has served as a major invasion route throughout history. The Germans had passed through it in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. Since the terrain was not favorable for the building of subterranean fortifications, the French opted to create a defended water barrier here.
The RF of La Lauter ran from the east end of the Sarre Gap to a point near the Rhine. On a simple map of the region this RF appears to be similar to the RF of Metz. However, it contained a smaller number of fortifications and it did not constitute a continuous line because of the terrain. The Vosges creates a major natural barrier and is more heavily wooded and dissected than the plateau of Lorraine. This RF was divided into two large fortified sectors. One of the major sections of the RF extended between the Sarre Gap and a point east of Bitche, where the Vosges becomes heavily wooded. At the other end of the difficult sector of the Vosges, which was about 20 km wide, began the next set of h
eavy fortifications that continued to a point where the mountainous terrain met the Rhine Valley. The plain created by the Rhine was covered by lighter defenses that extended up to the river itself.
The Rhine defenses, which stretched from a point down river from Strasbourg all the way to the Swiss border, were over 120 km long. They were not part of the Maginot Line Proper and included no large fortifications except older pre-twentieth century forts. The defenses covered the low terrain of the Rhine valley, the river bank, and the line of villages behind it. To the rear, the Vosges afforded a formidable barrier. The Rhine-Rhone Canal also formed an obstacle to the rear of the river line. A gap in the Vosges, to the northwest of Strasbourg, between Saverne and Sarrebourg, afforded easy passage. There was another gap near the end of the Rhine Defenses, the Belfort gap, between the Vosges and Jura Mountains. Plans were made to build a third RF and further fortifications in this area but did not materialize.
2. Maubeuge and the Maginot Extension
A limited number of fortifications along the Northeastern Front, on the Belgian border, were also set up. However, no continuous line of major defensive positions existed between Longuyon and the North Sea. The industrial city of Lille sat astride the border, making the defense of the area around it rather difficult, especially since the low terrain of Flanders was not favorable for underground works. The old forts of Maubeuge, which defended a major invasion route that passed through Liege and Namur in Belgium, were modernized. The Maginot Extension, about 20 kilometers long, was linked to the main line by a small, 30 km-long area defended by smaller works. Part of a newer building program, it was designed to expand the line of defenses towards Sedan to block a possible German invasion through southern Belgium, via Luxembourg. It was separated from the Maginot Line Proper by a small defensive sector that relied mainly on the rough terrain for its defense.