Fortress Europe- European Fortifications Of World War II

by J E Kaufmann

  Toulon was protected by a number of gun batteries, including eight 240-mm coastal defense guns. Its defenses were increased during the latter part of the 1920s. Two new twin gun turrets with 340-mm guns were taken from the Normandie Class battleships and installed in the Cepet Battery at Toulon. The other minor ports along the coast up to Menton were given smaller batteries that included no gun larger than 120-mm. As in the other districts, all the batteries of the 3rd Naval District were also designed for landward defense. Unfortunately most of these batteries were also obsolescent. In 1943 they were modified and put to use by the Germans.

  WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

  155-mm Model 1887 (turret) 105-mm Model (German Metz forts) 105-mm Model (Re-armed forts of Thionville) Supporting Field Artillery 105-mm Model 1935 120-mm L Model 1878 155-mm L Model 1932 280-mm Mortar Railroad Guns (reinforced Maginot and coastal defenses) 274-mm Models 1987-93 320-mm Model 1874 9,000 9,700 10,800-13,000 10,300 9,000 27,500 10,000 26,400 24,800

  THE MAGINOT LINE IN WORLD WAR II

  1. The Maginot Line and the Extension

  In September 1939, as the army mobilized, the troops of the Maginot Line quickly occupied their defenses. However, as no German attack materialized in 1939, the defenders of the Maginot Line soon became bored with garrison duty. The only major action at that time consisted of a barrage of German propaganda. While waiting for something to happen, the Maginot troops were put to work creating a number of intermediate positions of non-standard type and improving the existing defenses.

  When the German offensive finally took place in May 1940, the French fortress troops were ready, only to find that they would not be in the main theater of operations: the Maginot Line had forced the Germans to avoid a direct assault on the French frontier and seek a different invasion route.

  In the meantime, the garrisons of the ouvrages of Schoenenbourg and Hochwald, bored with routine operations, sought and received permission to install old 120-mm guns in open positions on their forts and fire upon German positions. Some forts of the RF of Lauter, which were within reach of the German border, also fired occasional volleys from their 75-mm turrets.

  As the German offensive broke through the Ardennes, a German infantry division went after the last ouvrage on the Maginot Extension, the petit ouvrage of La Ferte, with heavy artillery and air support. On May 17, 1940, two huge 210-mm mortars joined in the bombardment, inflicting little damage to the ouvrage, except to the surrounding obstacles. On May 18 the two nearby casemates with 75-mm guns were abandoned by their garrisons. German assault engineers worked their way up to Block 2 of La Ferte. The neighboring ouvrage of Le Chesnois strove to drive them off with its 75-mm gun turret but it was too far away to be effective. The mixed arms turret of La Ferte was partially blown out of its well and its weapons destroyed with hollow charges. By May 19, after a whole day of fighting, the Germans penetrated Block 1 and found the crew dead, apparently asphyxiated in the subterranean gallery. Between June 12-14 the garrisons of the other three ouvrages received orders to sabotage them, and the extension was abandoned completely. Thus came about the Germans' first victory against the Maginot Line, a victory that had more value in the war of propaganda than in actual fact.

  On May 14 the Germans bombarded the ouvrage of Schoenenbourg with 280mm guns, and later with a 420-mm, in. an effort to divert attention from their offensive through the Ardennes'. It wasn't until a few days later that it became clear that the Germans were crossing the Meuse between Sedan and Dinant and had no intention of assaulting the Maginot Line.

  Between May 20 and May 23 the four petits ouvrages at Maubeuge fought valiantly until they were eliminated one by one. In some cases the Germans deployed Stuka bombers, assault engineers, flame throwers and/or heavy artillery against them. Further north, the isolated petit ouvrage of Eth lasted until May 26, fighting off the German attacks for four days. Ironically, while the men of the Maginot Line resisted undaunted, the Germans continued their race to the sea and the bulk of the Allied forces floundered and retreated.

  The interval troops had been on the defensive since the campaign began, and were in the process of being removed from the Maginot Line Proper and the Rhine Defenses when the German Army Group C finally struck in June. At the time, German Army Groups A and B had already started a new campaign, breaking through the final defensive positions between the Maginot Line and the sea. The German infantry divisions that had begun to move around the Maginot Line in the vicinity of Longuyon were engaged by the gros ouvrage of Fermont.

  In a retaliatory move, Fermont was placed under heavy bombardment. Highvelocity German 88-mm flak guns, which proved successful in penetrating the cloches of La Ferte, were trained on the rear face of Fermont's artillery casemate. They almost succeeded in penetrating the concrete wall after firing repeatedly at the same spot, but they withdrew one round too soon. The crew of the damaged block effected repairs under cover of darkness. A few days later, on June 21, Fermont withstood another heavy bombardment and beat back a German ground assault.

  The Germans showed little interest in engaging the great forts in the RF of Metz. On June 14, Operation Tiger was launched in the Sarre Gap. Several German divisions forced back the remaining French covering forces and fanned out behind the Maginot Line. On June 21, the Germans laid siege to several petits ouvrages on the end of the RF of Metz, which were well beyond the artillery range of the gros ouvrages. A couple of these small forts were saved by the 81-mm casemate mortars of the petit ouvrage of Laudrefang. Nonetheless, the Germans, attacking from the rear, were able to reduce and capture a few of these petits ouvrages with the help of their high-velocity 88-mm guns. Two of the petits ouvrages on the Sarre end of the RF of the Lauter also fell between June 21-24.

  In the RF of the Lauter, German troops were able to penetrate through the lightly defended gap in the Vosges, between Bitche and Lembach. Heavy artillery, including the 420-mm howitzer, was trained on the ouvrages of Hochwald and Schoenenbourg. The latter, heavily bombarded between June 20 and 23, sustained only one damaging hit when a shell penetrated near an artillery block leaving a fracture in the combination M-1/M-2 magazine below. The aerial Stuka bombardment only succeeded in damaging the fosse of an infantry block.

  June 15 marked the beginning of Operation Bear, an assault across the Rhine. The undermanned garrisons of the Rhine Defenses strove to repel the invaders, but were no match against the 88-mm guns that quickly knocked out the vulnerable casemates on the river. The Germans succeeded in taking the first line and penetrating the next line of casemates because most of the supporting troops had been ordered to withdraw with the French Second Army Group.

  When France surrendered, many ouvrages still held on, not giving up until directed to do so by a representative of the French government. The Germans soon occupied the forts and began to exploit them for propaganda purposes. They removed many of the weapons and some of the equipment for use elsewhere. The Germans also found other uses for a few of the forts. For instance, Hackenberg became an underground factory and Four-a-Chaux was used as a target for weapons tests.

  In 1944, the Germans failed to use the Maginot Line systematically even though the ouvrages could have been useful against the advancing Americans since many of their weapons fired toward the flanks and rear. One of the few ouvrages to be turned against the Allies was Hackenberg, whose artillery casemate (Block 8) with its three 75-mm guns stopped the American advance in November. The day was saved by a French officer who directed the Americans to a blind spot from which 155-mm self propelled artillery blasted away the weak rear wall of the block.

  The Germans made a belated attempt to defend their old forts of the Metz ring, previously renovated by the French for use as headquarters and support bases. They also defended the forts of Thionville; which had been rearmed by the French to support the Maginot Line. The Americans had a difficult time eliminating these forts, but they succeeded in capturing; both Koenigsmacker and Guentrange.

  In the RF of Lauter, the ouvrage of
Simserhof and Schiesseck changed hands in combat in 1944. The American 100th Division found these ouvrages impervious to their artillery despite the fact that they were not fully armed. Finally, a major battle raged over Simserhof. The American troops had to fight on its surface, destroying the positions occupied by the Germans one by one with explosives.

  2. The Little Maginot Line

  Since the Southeast Front had been stripped of most of its divisions even before the Germans embarked on the last phase of their campaign in the West, the Italians, who entered the war in early June, believed they could easily penetrate the French defenses. However, they soon found out how wrong they were. On June 20, when the Italians launched their assault, many parts of the Alpine front were still covered with snow, severely hampering their maneuvers. Their effort to penetrate the Arc Valley and take Modane failed dismally. They never even penetrated the line of avant-postes at Mont Cenis. The old masonry fort of La Turra, firing its two 75-mm guns through galleries in the cliff brought them to a standstill. One gun was pulled out and positioned to fire down on art advancing column of Italian light L-3 tanks. Further down the front, on June 24, Italian troops tried to overrun the two ouvrages of Pas du Roc and Arrondaz near the border south of Modane. However, the two forts, mutually supporting each other, successfully repelled the attack.

  At Briancon the French ouvrages engaged in a duel with the huge Italian fort of Chaberton, despite the fact that they had not been designed for this purpose. With the help of the ouvrages' observation positions, a battery of French 280-mm mortars destroyed most of the 149-mm gun positions on top of Mount Chaberton between June 21-24.

  In the Southeast the Italians concentrated their effort against the SF of Alpes Maritimes. Here again, the main attack, which began on June 22, failed to even break the line of avant-postes. Near Menton the tiny avant-poste of Pont St. Louis held out until the end of the campaign, denying the Italians the use of the coastal road. However, despite Pont St. Louis's valiant stand, the Italians took the railroad tunnel beneath it and attempted to advance behind it to take Menton. Alas, victory would elude them once more. As they emerged from the tunnel, they ran into a barrage of fire from several of the ouvrages in the area. To counter the cannonade, the Italians brought forth a naval artillery train, which was promptly damaged. Italian forces actually managed to storm the last ouvrage of the line, Cap Martin, but had to withdraw after a desperate fight. It must be recognized, however, that during the attack the Italians achieved something the Germans never did: to reach the superstructure of a gros ouvrage.

  Thus the Alpine forts remained undefeated. Unfortunately, their victorious campaign was negated by the surrender of the French armies and government to the Germans.

  3. The Coast Defenses

  Some of the coastal defenses took part in the defense of Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. At and near Dunkirk the Battery of Bray Dunes fired its three 164-mm guns at German troops from May 28 until its ammunition was expended on June 4, 1940. The Battery of Zuydcoote, with three 149-mm and two 75-mm cannons, did likewise. The 155-mm guns of the 3rd Naval Mobile Battery also took part in the action until June 3, when they were destroyed. If the events of the Pas de Calais area took on epic overtones, those off the coast of Menton owed more to the comic opera. In late June 1940 the Italians assembled an armada of fishing boats, motor boats, and other private vessels as well a squadron of MAS (motor torpedo) boats, and two submarines. The armada departed on June 22, but it soon became clear that the mismatched fleet would not be able to travel in unison. The smaller vessels were soon left behind, some, not equipped for such a long voyage, were actually stranded in high seas. By the time Menton was sighted, what remained of the small armada was too widely scattered to be effective. In addition, it became apparent that the engines on many of the vessels were too loud to approach the French coast undetected. Finally, the troops on board were too exhausted by the long trip and seasickness to consider swimming ashore. Thus the operation was aborted with no bloodshed.

  After the fall of France, the Germans worked on the unfinished defenses and restored the completed ones for use in their Atlantic Wall by 1942.

  GO of Hackenberg. Main Gallery. Access gallery to the left enters the M-1. (Kaufmann)

  PO Immerhof. Mixed Entrance. Interior showing JM removed and the 47-mm AT gun, attached to overhead rail, in the firing position. Raymond Mersch, curator of the ouvrage for many years, holds a round for the weapon. (Kaufmann)

  GO Fermont. Block 4, Artillery Casemate. Interior view back at all three gun positions. The gun can be seen in the first position with gunners seats and platform for loaders. (Kaufmann)

  GO Metrich. Block 1, Artillery Casemate. 3 x 75-mm guns. (Kaufmann)

  Above: GO Soetrich. Block 5, Artillery Turret. Turret for 2 x 75-mm guns. This was the largest type of turret in the GOs. Note armored air vent to left rear flush with the surface of the block. (Kaufmann)

  Below: PO Bois du Four. Monolithic ouvrage with MG turret and weapons positions on both flanks. The upper embrasures are for a 47-mm gun with a JIM and FM. The two below were in the fosse and each mounted an 81-mm mortar. This was the standard position for the mortar in the casemates of both French and Czech positions. (Kaufmann)

  France and defensive lines

  Hackenberg, Block 5 Artillery casemate for 3 x 75-mm guns.

  Plans of Maginot Line Ouvrages

  Plans of Maginot Line Ouvrages

  Command Center in Maginot Line Gros Ouvrage.

  Turret crews for Maginot Ouvrages based on estimates of LTC Ph.Truttmann.

  Abri of Coucou in RF of Metz.

  Chapter 2

  GERMANY

  BACKGROUND

  After the Franco-Prussian War, the leaders of the Second Reich (1871-1918) expected France to seek retribution for its losses. In addition, fearing that a potential Franco-Russian alliance could lead to a disastrous two-front war, they decided to create a number of forts and associated defenses on both the eastern and western borders of Germany. In the west, the Germans established fortress rings around Strasbourg and Metz, often building on old French forts, as in the case of Metz.

  By the turn of the century, the Germans, responding like the French to advances in warfare, developed new and stronger forts. They extended the defenses of Strasbourg to Mutzig and those of Metz to Thionville. They also developed a new type of fortification known as Feste. The preliminary work at Mutzig consisted of triangular type forts and detached batteries employing turret positions. The Feste was further refined at Thionville and Metz. Located at prominent points and usually covering much of a hill top, it consisted of one or more large batteries of four guns, each in an armored turret. All its other facilities were built into the ground, including the large earth-covered casernes. Only the rear facades, a number of coffres, infantry positions, and observation points were exposed. Most of the Feste was surrounded by a ditch or moat, and infantry obstacles. A tunnel system linked most of the concrete positions, and an engine room, or usine, provided the needed power. When World War I began, these forts were still unfinished. None of them had a chance to participate in combat until World War II. At the end of the Great War, virtually all of the German Feste in the west ended up in France. The only one remaining in German territory, Istein, was destroyed, since Article 42 of the Treaty of Versailles specified that:

  "Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the East of the Rhine."

  Thus the Treaty of Versailles left the Rhineland virtually defenseless. In the west only the obsolete fortresses of Ulm and Ingolstadt were allowed to stand, in East Prussia, the obsolete defenses at Konigsberg and Lotzen, and in the east, the outdated fortifications of Kiistrin, Breslau, and Glogau.

  In addition, the treaty directed that "The fortifications, military establishments, on the Islands of Helgoland and Dune shall be destroyed," thus unmasking the approaches to the mouth
of the Elbe and Wesser Rivers and associated ports as well as the Kiel Canal. However, Article 195 allowed Germany to maintain certain coastal defenses in their "existing condition." Those defenses included positions at Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea, and Pillau and Swinemunde on the Baltic Sea. Thus, during the 1920s Germany had been virtually stripped of its defenses. With a navy of six obsolete battleships and an army of ten divisions, the armed forces could do little to defend its naval bases or frontiers.

  Nonetheless, the Germans did not give up easily. After World War I, the outlawed General Staff surreptitiously continued to operate, but defense was not its primary concern. Despite this attitude the German fortress engineers not only continued to maintain the few remaining fortifications, but also illegally improved their condition. However, the Inter Allied Commission, set up after the war, foiled several German attempts to build defenses on the eastern frontier. Until 1935, the German army was unable to build anything more than some bunkers along the Oder River and create water defenses on the Nischlitz-Obra Line, which later became part of the future Oder-Warthe-Bend Line. On the western frontier they completed only a small number of positions along the eastern side of the Rhineland, as allowed by the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. After 1933 the situation changed, but fortifications remained of secondary importance as the General Staff concentrated on resurrecting the German army and transforming it into an offensive machine to be reckoned with.