by J E Kaufmann
MAJOR FORTIFICATIONS
The East Wall
The West Wall
The Coast Defenses
LOCATION
1. The East Wall
In East Prussia, Pomerania, and parts of Poland, glaciation from the last Ice Age left a region of moraines dotted with lakes with no unusually rough features. Nonetheless, on the edges of the North European Plain, there was no lack of natural defenses, despite the fact that most of the moraine did not exceed more than a couple of hundred meters in elevation. In fact, the terrain turns to mud after heavy rains, seriously impeding progress off the roads. To overcome this problem the German government built an autobahn running from Berlin past Breslau and Stettin to Konigsberg and Elbing. The segment between Konigsberg and Elbing remains in its original state to this very day, only one double lane completed for most of its length. Another autobahn ran from Berlin to Frankfurt-on-the-Oder, making possible rapid reinforcement of all the defensive positions in the east.
The East Wall occupied large sections of the frontier, including the isolated defensive positions of East Prussia primarily protecting Konigsberg. Although it continued to be developed throughout the war, it was never actually completed. The East Wall consisted of three distinct lines: the Fortified Front of the Oder-WartheBend, the Pomeranian Line, and the Oder Line. In addition, the Ortelsburger, Lotzen and Christburg Positions formed the border defenses of East Prussia. Finally, the position known as Fortress Samland constituted the final interior line running from the Frisches Lagoon (Vistula Lagoon) to the Kurisches Lagoon (Courland Lagoon) well in front of Konigsberg. The small. positions of the Heilsberg Triangle south of the fortress area, which were of little value by the end of the 1930s, are usually overlooked. At Konigsberg, the old fortress ring acted. as the last line of defense.
The main defensive line of the East Wall was the Oder-Warthe-Bend (OWB) Line, which was intended to cover the direct route to Frankfurt-on-the-Oder and Berlin. Intended to be the main defensive front, this position received the most attention. It was planned as a quadrangle extending from Kustrin on the Oder, along the Netze River to the Warthe. Directly to the south the main lines of fortifications covered the gap between the Warthe and the Oder rivers. The intended path of the defenses followed the Oder downstream past Frankfurt to Kustrin. Most of the area consisted of hilly and swampy terrain dotted with a number of lakes.
Before 1939 the OWB Line was the only German fortified front, representing the main defenses on the Eastern Front. It extended for approximately 80 km. The sides of the quadrangle remained uncompleted. The heavily defended sections began near Schwerin (Skwierzyna), at the confluence of the Warthe and Obra Rivers and ran south along the west bank of the Obra to the vicinity of Meseritz (Miedzyrzecz). The line then continued southward to the Oder passing west of Schwiebus (Swiebodzin), a road junction on the main highway toward Frankfurt on the Oder, and then reached the Oder east of Krossen (Krosno Odrz).
The OWB Line included three sectors: Northern, Central, and Southern. The Central Sector, about 15 km long, was the shortest, occupied the terrain with the most relief, and had the heaviest concentration of modern fortifications. Dominated by hills more than any other, this sector was covered by fields, and had hardly any woods at all before the war. The other sectors, also running in the midst of fields, relied heavily on the many lakes and watercourses for defense.
The Oder Line hugged the river between the cities of Glogau and Breslau and was located over 20 km behind the border in most places. South of Breslau the terrain became hilly and more easily defended, especially in the industrial region of Upper Silesia. Between Breslau and Frankfurt there were some low and marshy patches along the river, particularly on the east side of the Oder, down river from Glogau.
The Pomeranian Line began where the Netze River merges with the Warthe River and followed the line of lakes to a point north of Scholochau where the terrain became hilly and began to resemble the morainic regions of East Prussia. For the most part, the main positions were not near the river but ran close to the border. The small wooded moraines that dominated the region were amenable to defense. The plan to extend the line to the sea was never carried out.
The main border defenses of East Prussia began east of Elbing, near the coast at Braunsberg (Braniewo), followed the Passarge River to Wormditt, turned eastward along the Alle River to Bartenstein (Bartoszyce), then hooked around and covered the town of Allenstein. They were known as the Christburg Position.
The Lotzen Position ran north to south using the heavily wooded Masurian Lake Region for defense. An intricate network of marshes and lakes and a tangle of moraines turned much of the area into a wilderness. This formidable terrain, which extended from Lyck to Osterode and included the Ortelsburger Forest Position, covered the border southeast of Allenstein, joining the Lotzen Position. Access through this region was via easily defended narrow defiles. Both of these positions ran from 20 to 40 km behind the border. The main line, Fortress Samland, began near the sea at Brandenburg, hugged the Frisching River to its source, turned north to Tapiau, and followed the Deime River to the sea.
2. The West Wall
According to German propaganda, the West Wall ran from the Swiss border to the point where the Rhine enters the Netherlands and consisted of the Army Position, which closely followed the border, and the Air Position which was further back and formed an air defense zone. In reality, the strength of the first position was grossly exaggerated and the second position was never developed beyond an el ementary stage. Nonetheless, in World War II the West Wall was the fortified line with the greatest depth in relation to its length.
The West Wall ran along the Rhine and the elevated terrain of the Black Forest in the Upper Rhine Valley and through the wooded and low rolling terrain of the Saar region. Further north it passed through the wooded and rough terrain of Hunsriick and Eifel, along the remainder of the Belgian border to the Dutch border, and on to the sea'. The West Wall almost ceased to exist along most of the relatively flat terrain near the Dutch border, before it reached the point where the Rhine enters the Netherlands.
The West Wall, which spanned over 400 km, consisted of four major sections: Aachen, Trier, Pfalz (the Palatinate), and Oberrhein (Upper Rhine). The main defensive positions were the Aachen Advanced Position, the Orscholz Position in the Trier sector, the Hilgenbach Position, the Sprichern Position in the Pfalz, the Fischbach Position, the Ettlinger Position, and the Korken Wald (Forest) Position on the Upper Rhine. Most of these positions formed switch lines or oblique lines running off the main line of the West Wall.
The West Wall was located in excellent defensive terrain consisting of hills, many woods, and forests with the Rhine barrier forming a front line on the Upper Rhine or a final defensive position in other sectors. Only in some sectors, such as the Pfalz, did the Germans sacrifice the advantage of good defensive terrain to move their fortifications closer to the border at the insistence of Hitler2.
3. Coast Defenses
In the North Sea, the German island base of Helgoland was restored to its role as the main position for the protection of the approaches to the ports of Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, and Hamburg. It was located about 50 km from both the mainland to the south, southeast and east. The East Frisian Islands, beginning with Borkum Island in the west and Wangerooge in the east, covered the North Sea coast up to the approaches to Wilhelmshaven. Borkum, Norderney, and Wangerooge mounted the main defenses. The North Frisian Islands, with Sylt Island serving as the main defensive position, shielded much of the coastal region along Schleswig-Holstein. This coastal defense region was known as the Coast Defense-Naval Command North Sea. The fortress commander for the East Frisian Area was headquartered at Wilhelmshaven and the commander of the North Frisian Area, in Cuxhaven. In September 1939 the fortress commands became coastal commands and in February 1941 the two regions were unified as the Coast Defense, German Bight.
On the Baltic Sea, the pre-war Coast Defense-Naval Command Baltic in
cluded three autonomous zones: the West Baltic Coastal Command, which covered the coast of Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg, and the main defenses near Kiel, the Pomeranian Coastal Coniniand, concentrated at Swinenmiinde (Swinoujscie), and the East Baltic Coastal Command, centered at Gotenhafen with additional sections at Pillau (Baltikysk) and Memel (after the annexation of the latter in 1939).
HISTORY
Until 1934, German improvements of their defenses were rather trivial or insignificant, not only because of the treaty restrictions, but also because the military leadership was not very interested in investing in fortifications. The eastern frontier, considered by the Germans to be vulnerable to an attack from Poland, received a limited amount of work until 1934.
This work began on the Oder Line after 1927 because the Inter Allied Commission had not specifically mentioned the building of fortifications on the west bank of the Oder. Until 1930, the German engineers contented themselves with reconnaissance work for the planning of future fortifications. The most important work carried out between 1926 and 1930 was the so-called "land reclamation and flood control project" that involved the construction of sluices, canals, and a water barrier for the future OWB Line. After that, work was initiated on the Nischlitz-Obra Line, which followed the river and defended crossing points. By 1936 this line became part of the new OWB Fortified Front, one part of it being incorporated in the main line and the remainder becoming part of the rear line.
Work on Fortress Samland had began in 1932, and shortly afterwards the border defenses of East Prussia became a priority operation, because only a single corps could be spared to defend the isolated province.
Serious work on fortifications began after Hitler took power in 1933. Concerned about the size of the Polish armed forces, he ordered the army to proceed with the construction of the East Wall despite the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. Already in 1932 the General Staff had suggested that fortifications were necessary to protect the eastern border and East Prussia from Polish aggression. The General Staff also claimed that the German army would not be ready for offensive operations until 1942. General Otto Forster was appointed Inspector of Engineers and Fortifications in October 1934, and he directed the construction of the East Wall until 1939.
Priority was placed on the Oder, Pomeranian, and OWB Lines. The Fortress Engineers Corps, only seven battalions strong, was given the task of directing the work of civilian construction firms. In the beginning Hitler and his chief military engineer apparently set out to outdo the Maginot Line, but in 1938 Hitler had second thoughts, and decided to apply his own personal touch to the final design.
Before 1936, only a limited amount of work was done along the border with Czechoslovakia and the eastern part of the Rhine valley, in accordance with treaty limitations. After the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, Hitler ordered the creation of a Limes Position that would eventually become the West Wall. It would run from Aachen to the Rhine. Even before German troops marched into the demilitarized zone, the Fortress Engineer Corps sent its men in to survey the region for the future line of fortifications. Hitler ordered the main defenses to be established between the Mosel and Rhine Rivers with light fortifications elsewhere. The work, which was undertaken between 1936 and 1937, did not include a continuous antitank barrier, but relied mostly on natural features.
In 1937 the West Wall consisted mostly of simple light defenses, including forward-firing bunkers. General Forster, Major Erich von Manstein of the General Staff, Minister of Defense Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, and Commander of the Army F.W. von Fritsch debated the best method of defense for the Reich. The disagreement between them centered mainly on whether to build a line of fortification, sectors defended in depth, or other types of fortifications altogether. Hitler, the arbitrator, settled the matter by deciding on defense in depth, but allowed the engineers to plan for heavy fortifications.
A number of the largest German fortifications, known as Werkgruppen, were already under construction on the OWB Line in the East.3 In 1937 plans were made for a number of Werkgruppen on the West Wall, some of which neared completion early in the war. In addition, work began in 1937 on the huge subterranean fort of Istein, beneath the site of Feste Istein, which was destroyed after the Great War.
Work progressed apace on the East Wall and the Pomeranian Line where the first bunkers went up in 1934 on the OWB Line. These early bunkers included twolevel models, called "Hindenburg Stands," whose lower floor was built of "fortress brick" instead of concrete to cut costs. The situation improved in 1935 after work began on the first B-Werke, large bunkers of Type B strength also known as Panzerwerke when they included one or more armored cupolas.'
Hitler visited one of these positions in October 1935, examined the plans for the fortifications and for a gigantic tunnel. system, and then gave Forster a free hand. The engineer general was given approximately fifteen years to complete the fortifications. Despite this fortuitous order, work slowed on the East Wall, due mostly to competition for resources with the West Wall. The OWB Line was transformed into a fortified front in 1936 and was nearly completed by 1939. Between 1939 and 1940 the heavy A-Werke planned for the East Wall were begun, but they were never completed. Most of these fortifications were planned as batteries of three single-gun turrets for 105-mm guns and 150-mm howitzers.
Interestingly, the work on the massive tunnel system was so well camouflaged that it went undetected by the Polish agents who observed the construction of the German fortifications. The subterranean galleries linked a number of the Werkgruppen and large artillery battery blocks, which were barely laid down and never completed when the war began.
In 1938 Hitler returned to visit the site and was infuriated by the amount of money and effort that had gone into the building of a tunnel system that he deemed useless and Werkgruppen that held no artillery weapons. The Ftihrer further criticized the type of weapons used in the Werkgruppen and stated that the OWB Line would be a hiding place for war shirkers. After this visit, construction was drastically curtailed and Hitler dashed off a memorandum on the construction of fortifications.
German industry could not produce the needed cupolas for the gun battery positions planned for the East Wall in the mid-1930s, so plans for their installation were postponed until after 1938. German industry was able to produce no more than two turrets a year. Work on the first positions began just before the onset of the war, but the short Polish campaign obviated the need to complete them in a hurry.
In 1938 General Forster felt that the Limes Position, or West Wall, was little more than an "improvised line of border defense." Hitler, dissatisfied with the army's work in the West, ordered Dr. Fritz Todt of the Reich's Labor Service to take over the construction, albeit under the supervision of Forster's engineers. At this point, Hitler demanded that the defenses run right along the border and not behind it, where better defensive sites existed because he did not want the enemy to be able to set foot on German soil.
Hitler's memorandum of July 1938 set up the guidelines for all defensive structures before the war. He condemned the type of tunnel system built on the East Wall and stated that there was no need for concrete protection able to resist guns heavier than 220-mm since the enemy would not be likely to concentrate heavier weapons against small fortifications. He also called for the installation of flame throwers, which would demoralize the enemy, and gas protection devices that were already in use in the French defenses.
The summer of 1938 was hectic, as work continued on the fortifications on both fronts, many reserve units took up positions in the unfinished West Wall, and the army prepared for an invasion of Czechoslovakia. By the time the Czech crisis was over, 5,000 bunkers stood on the West Wall because the Reich's Labor Service had increased the work force on the fortifications to 342,000 men in October 1938, a number ten times larger than in June. In November plans were drawn up for ten small Werkgruppen and 14,600 more bunkers. In 1939 the numbers were increased to twelve Type A-strength Werkgruppen, fift
y small Type B-strength Werkgruppen, twelve battery positions, and over 60 km of galleries. This growth was due to the "Aachen to Saar Program "that called for upgrading the quality of positions, and building the new S-100 type bunker. When the war broke out, over 22,000 positions were completed on the West Wall, forming a long, almost continuous concrete anti tank barrier and massive mine fields. The famous concrete "dragon's teeth," and a wooden pole version, appeared both on the East and West Walls. The mine fields of the West Wall consisted mostly of anti-personnel mines and were the first major such fields to be laid by any nation before 1940. During 1940 the War Expansion Program called for the construction on the West Wall of new A- and B-strength S400 bunkers with Czech weapons and armor and the B-strength S-500 bunkers. Few of the B strength Werke were ready, and the Werkgruppe of Istein-called the "Gibraltar of the West" by Hermann Goring in the spring of 1938-was far from complete.
In the late 1930s the East Wall was all but ignored while German propaganda concentrated its attention on the West Wall. The German government released photographs and films of construction on the West Wall in order to impress the enemy. Included in the propaganda material was a film showing troops entering Panzerwerke Scharnhorst and a view of its interior. This was not the Werkgruppe on the OWB Line, but a simulated position created to misinform the world about the German defenses in the west.
DESCRIPTION