by Kiran Nirvan
Here, it is important to note who these people were, where they came from and what peculiar characteristics made them a potent and terrifying enemy.
The Orakzai Pashtun Tribe
A group portrait of an Orakzai chief and three tribesmen, ca. 1900
There are numerous accounts that explain the origins of the Orakzai tribe but the most popular one states that in around tenth century AD, a Persian prince named Sikandar Shah came to be referred to as ‘Wrakzai’ or ‘lost son’ after he was exiled by his father for his mischievous deeds. Sikandar travelled eastwards and reached the town of Kohat, a city in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in present day Pakistan, where he was appointed as a courtier to the king. When the king sent Sikandar Shah on an expedition to Tirah to punish tribals involved in looting travellers, he instead found a place for himself and settled there. As years passed by, he eventually became king. His descendants came to be known as Orakzais.
The Orakzais can be further categorized into eighteen main clans: Ali Khel, Uthman Khel, Feroz Khel, Zemasht, Sturi Khel, Abdul Aziz Khel, Daulatzai, Muhammad Khel, Lashkarzai, Massuzai, Alisherzai, Mulla Khel, Akhel and Ismalizai. The tribe was made up of both Shia and Sunni muslims, and the Orakzais also formed a part of the Mughal army; in fact, they are said to have established the state of Bhopal in India with the Nawabs of Bhopal belonging to the Orakzai ancestry. The British observers of the Orakzai tribe, in their many references and documents, express admiration for the fighting skills of this tribe but also condemn their bellicosity. British Colonel C.E. Callwell described them as ‘marauding cut-throats’, ‘exceptionally fine mountaineers’, admirable marksmen and ‘ferocious adversaries’.2 As per an estimate by the British India government, the tribe was made up of 28,000 fighting men. Not much is known about those who were recognized as the ‘commanders’ in this tribe, though, in typical tribal fashion the men probably formed lashkars of five to fifty around a local influencer, a religious leader or a skilled planner. Many of these were well acquainted with weapons and mostly armed with the traditional jezail, the long rifled musket of the high hills around the tribal region.
The Orakzais were the reason for various British military expeditions to Waziristan, notably in 1855, 1868, 1869, 1891 and the Tirah Campaign of 1897.
The Afridi Tribe
Afridi warriors, ca. 1895
While the true origins of the Afridis are not clear, it is generally believed that Indian Buddhists of Aryan origin converted to Islam in the tenth century and formed the Afridi tribe. Said to be the oldest among Pashtun/Pathan tribes, traces of Turkish, Mongol, Greek and other travelling tribes have been found in their ancestry due chiefly to their location on the Khyber Pass which, at the time, was a major east-west trading route. With an avid interest in trade, their tribe was also believed to be clever smugglers and this credit lies largely with the Adam Khel tribe of Afridis. As per the Baburnama, a treatise on the life of Babur, the first Mughal ruler to invade India, the emperor held a strong desire to bring the Afridis under his control mostly because they were a smart, daring tribe of well-built warriors. These tribesmen were exemplary in the use of weapons which they learned to yield very early in life. Unlike the Orakzai tribesmen, they were seemingly well behaved and some of them were surprisingly modest, but mostly superficially. Afridi tribesmen were stern followers of the Sunni sect of Islam.
Strategically, the geographical position of Afridi tribe was extremely advantageous. The Khyber Pass to the west of Peshawar, which gave access to the Kabul road, and the exit to Kohat towards the south, controlling the road from Waziristan to Baluchistan, was dominated by the Afridi tribe, which was why the British were interested in their territory. Afridis had eight important tribes under them namely Kuki Khel, Malik din Khel, Qambar Khel, Kamar Khel, Zakha Khel, Aka Khel, Sepah and Adam Khel, with their own ancestral villages in the Tirah valley extending down into Khyber Pass and Maidan.
Map depicting the extent of the Afridi and the Orakzai along the ‘Safed Koh’ or the ‘white mountains’ in NWFP
Now that the geographical location and history of these tribes is clear, it is important to understand the characteristics of this potent and vicious enemy. Much has already been said about the warrior skills of the Pashtuns, but there also exists documented proof of the same. The Pashtuns, primarily a fighting race, were best suited to fight in their own hilly terrain. Their guerrilla tactics were legendary, and did from time to time baffle even the most organized of armies. In the nineteenth century, Colonel H.D. Hutchinson, a British officer well acquainted with the ways of Pashtuns, said that ‘these men were extremely bold and they were cunning and clever as they were audacious. They showed much patience in watching and waiting for their prey and great dash and impudence in their attacks when they made them’3. This warring way of life percolated into their social behaviour as well. For instance, if a Pashtun man died of old age and not while fighting, it was considered shameful.
In Afghanistan, the Pashtuns were also cunning politicians and theologians. They purposed their lives with vengeance and believed in not leaving any business unfinished or any debt unpaid. Hence, family feuds were common among large families of the tribes. H.W. Bellew, a British medical officer, once remarked, ‘The pride of a Pashtun is a marked feature of their national character. They eternally boast of their descent, their prowess in arms and their independence.’ These Pashtuns were regarded by British officers as natural hill fighters who, they believed, could prove beneficial in Britain’s army given adequate training and discipline. In one of the dispatches to The Telegraph, Winston Churchill, then a 22 year old young officer in the Tirah campaign, stated, ‘Their swordsmanship, neglecting guards, concerns itself only with cuts and, careless of what injury they may receive, they devote themselves to the destruction of their opponents.’
However, even though Britain badly wanted the Pashtuns to be a part of their armies, they could not get them to agree, apart from few of them enlisting in border police, because these tribesmen felt nothing but hate for the British. By the end of nineteenth century, this hate erupted into a revolt against the British occupation of Pashtun lands as the tribesmen declared ‘jihad’ against British India, with more than 10,000 warriors rallying to the cause. Encroachment of tribal lands by the British in the mid-nineteenth century had sounded alarm bells among the Pashtun tribes who not only feared an invasion, but also felt that their way of life and independence would be destroyed by the British. The Pashtuns had always been sensitive about the occupation of their lands and, in the case of British encroachment, they strongly believed that the British government had deliberately and knowingly done so in order to dishonour and divide them. Decades after the annexation of Punjab by the British in 1849, extraction of land revenues from tribes caused anxiety among the tribesmen of the frontier region as they feared it was their turn after Punjab. As a part of the ‘Forward Policy’ employed by the British to build fortifications and roads in the vicinity of these tribal lands, the Pashtuns believed that it was only a matter of time before the British imposed their rule throughout the region and their tribes would be deprived of their ancestral rights to independently follow their culture.
This direct threat to their territorial integrity and cultural freedom is why the Pashtuns developed an aversion towards the British which, over the years, resulted in rallying and rising in revolt against the British forces deployed at the edge of these tribal areas. What is important to note at this juncture is that the British had mainly positioned their troops to thwart a possible attack by Russians or other ambitious nations. To do so, brave, responsible and time-tested Indian soldiers had been charged with this responsibility – Indians who the British knew were loyal to those to whom they promised their service. This loyalty would soon prove to be unmatched and unparalleled, as will become evident in the second part of the book.
1Hutchinson, H.D., The Campaign in Tirah 1897–98, London: Macmillan and Co., 1898.
2Johnson, Robert, The Afghan Way of
War: How and Why They Fight, Oxford University Press, December 2011.
3Hutchinson, H.D., The Campaign in Tirah 1897–98, London: Macmillan and Co., 1898.
3
Know Thy Battlefield
History is often prone to interpretation which, as a consequence of personal prejudice or as a deliberate attempt by people to influence others with their own version, can result in fluid narratives. It is therefore crucial to explain all aspects of a historical event so the correct conclusions can be made. With that in mind, let us know shed some light on another crucial aspect of this battle – the terrain.
Since the days when most of the world’s most profitable trades were conducted via the Silk Route, Afghanistan has been strategically important, benefiting from the fact that it is home to a chief road providing access to all parts of central Asia. The same route that led to India provided trade opportunities to the British by connecting them to the Mediterranean Sea and Europe. Anything that passed through this route had to go through the tribal areas and, therefore, these strategically well-positioned tribes benefited by looting and raiding trading parties and British transport columns. This is one of the major reasons why the British executed their ‘Forward Policy’ and decided to take over the ancestral lands of the Pashtun tribes – The Kohat Pass.
The Silk Route
The Kohat Pass lies between the cities of Kohat and Peshawar on the Khigana mountain range in the North West Frontier Province of present-day Pakistan. The Kohat Pass led to Saragarhi, a border village on Samana mountain range, via Hangu. It was 50 kilometres from Peshawar, 52 kilometres from Kushalgarh, almost 100 kilometres from Tal and 135 kilometres from Bannu, a city towards the south of Kohat. The Kohat Pass was important to the British from both an economic and militaristic point of view. From the military’s perspective, Kohat held importance as forces deployed ahead of Kohat in Fort Lockhart in the Samanarange, Fort Gulistan in the Sulaiman range – in Saragarhi, to be precise – could deny an enemy uninterrupted access to the pass and thwart any impending attacks from Central Asia. Commercially, the Kohat Pass was crucial in the trade of salt and other raw materials being sent to Kabul. Hence, the British came into an agreement with the tribes which allowed them to use the pass but they wanted a more permanent solution to the problem. When they decided to construct a road on the Kohat Pass in the year 1849–50, they began to face violent opposition from local tribes.
Ahead of the Kohat Pass lay the Samana mountain range, on top of which was situated Saragarhi, a small bordering village. The Samana range runs east to west, south of Khanki valley, marking the southern edge of the Tirah region. About 20 kilometres in length, its highest feature goes up to 6,000 feet. To its north lies the Khyber Pass. The Samana hills were captured by British in the year 1891 and fortified by building Fort Lockhart in the middle and Fort Gulistan towards the west. Rectangular in shape, these forts had stone walls that stood 15 feet tall with loop-holed bastions at each corner. Fort Lockhart had a holding capacity of about 300 men and Fort Gulistan could hold not more than 200 men. These two forts were almost five kilometres apart, with an outpost called Saragarhi between them.
The caravan trade routes – a major reason for the British to divert their attention towards the outer edges of tribal hilly areas ahead of Kohat Pass – lay in and around the Khanki valley lining the Samana hills, in close vicinity to the north of Saragarhi. The valley was inhabited by the Orakzai tribe and, in terms of terrain, had nothing more to offer than rocky, rough mountains that were dust-coloured and tipped with snow on extremely cold winter days on its flanks. The mountain spurs gradually transformed into flat, plateau-like terraces with steep-sided ravines and a few streams and brooks rambling along the sides. The Khanki valley formed a part of the frontier strategically dear to British in the late nineteenth century.
Knowing the importance of this frontier, the British annexed Punjab in 1849 only to further its control in the bordering areas of the NWFP. After the annexation of Punjab, their first concern was to keep the pass closed for those looking to act against the crown. This was why the British formed a ‘Three Fold Frontier’ – the first being the outer edge of the directly administered territory of India; the second included the indirectly administered territory that was the tribal areas; and the third was the area demarcated by a linear boundary, i.e. the Durand Line. However, the British policies of levying taxes and fines, and sending punitive expeditions to suppress the tribes because of their interest in this geographical area is what gradually enraged the tribesmen and led to a battle where, in 1897, 10,000 Pashtuns declared war on the outpost of Saragarhi.
If we simply state that fighting in NWFP region was impossible without facing the fearful odds offered by extremities of climate and terrain, it wouldn’t be enough. Understanding the difficulties offered by an unforgiving terrain, therefore, bears importance. As Colonel H.D. Hutchinson stated, ‘It is to be noted that their country is like Caledonia, “stern and wild”; high mountains, precipitous cliffs, dangerous defiles, wild ravines and rushing torrents everywhere, while roads of any kind are conspicuous by their absence – a country therefore, in which strict “formations” and “precise manoeuvres” as we find them described and defined in our drill books, are impossible; and in which marches must be performed under conditions in which they become slow, exhausting processional movements, the long trailing flanks of which are dangerously exposed to attack from start to finish. The difficulties and dangers and risks involved in waging warfare against such a foe in such a country are obvious.’1 To make matters worse, as understood from written accounts of officers who took part in operations in this terrain, the weather in the month of September of 1897 was not a very pleasant one. While sometimes the weather was bright and clear and one could see folds of rugged mountains edged against a dark blue sky, the high mountains offered nothing but the intense extremities of a cold climate. As an officer serving in the Indian Army who has served at far greater heights and in tougher terrains says, ‘Terrain is the first enemy in every battle. Having experienced it for months, I understand the difficulties of cold, continuous precipitation leading to softening of mud creating cold muddy puddles everywhere, dense fog and reduced visibility, chill blains and frostbites, thinning of air at high altitudes and its effects on human body, especially on one not bred and born among such heights. Metabolism tends to slow down and fatigue creeps in even after a little physical work. But worse than the physical effects of such terrain on the human body are the psychological problems that surface from a monotonous routine and seclusion in a cut-off, distant place, leading to anxiety.’
On very cold winter nights, the temperature in the higher regions of the NWFP fell to as low as -5 degree Celcius and fierce winds would whip hard against the skin. A person unfamiliar with such terrain would have to be acclimatized which would then only aid in survival and not in overall physical efficiency. The Pashtuns, however, being born and bred in such terrain, knew it like the back of their hand, their bodies being better suited to this climate. Keeping this in mind, it becomes evident that other than the wrath of 10,000 strapping Pashtuns, our daring and mighty 21 had another problem to face with respect to terrain where their enemy, the light-footed master of the hill, was much better equipped than the 21 could ever have been.
Having dived deep into the socio-political situation of the nineteenth century along with the behavioural distinctiveness of the Pathans, while conducting a quick walkthrough of the tough and treacherous terrain, we must now proceed to the second part of the book where the story of a legend awaits – a historical saga so extraordinary that all exaggeration ever written in verse fades away in its light.
1Hutchinson, H.D., The Campaign in Tirah 1897-98, London: Macmillan and Co., 1898.
Part II
4
Guru’s Kindred
It was the twelfth day of September in 1897. The morning sun crawled up the dark sky, returning colours to a waking earth. Golden rays streamed inside the fortress of Saragarh
i, chasing away the chill from the night before, as dusty mountains sprinkled with snow peered over the fortress walls. On the eastern bastion, a saffron flag fluttered in the light morning breeze as 21 Sikhs made final adjustments to their beautiful turbans, buttoned the shirts of their khaki uniforms, the silver karas [bangles] on their wrists reflecting the light of the sun as they silently, one after another, walked outside to offer ardaas [prayer] in the presence of Guru Granth Sahib. Their voices echoed in unison as they sang verses in praise of their Guru’s teachings, unaware of the fact that their voices would echo again later in the day as they shouted their battle cry, ‘Jo bole so nihaal…sat sri akal!’
~
The Battle of Saragarhi, made immortal by a clan of ‘Khalsa’ warriors, is one of the many testimonies to the unequalled bravery of the Sikh race. The Khalsa clan is defined by a strict moral code and well-defined ethics, and their unsurpassed dedication and loyalty has, from time to time, been immortalized in legends and folklore.