by Kiran Nirvan
Sikh Signallers with Captain Pratt. Heliographs and their tripods are placed in front.
Tactics of the Tribesmen
Before moving forward and discussing the initial attacks on the forts at Samana, certain peculiar characteristics about the warfare methods followed by the tribesmen must be understood to answer the question – why did the tribesmen not fight a conventional war with all their strength concentrated in one place at one time?
The tribesmen, though clever fighters, believed in sticking to their age-old tactics of mountain warfare. They were dwellers of the hills who knew all defiles, ravines, passes and boulders of Tirah like the back of their hands and had discerned how to use the same to their advantage. The very basis of their tactics was that they were said to retreat as their foe advanced and then press upon him as he retired. Their initial withdrawal gave a sense of superiority to the advancing enemy even as the tribesmen tactfully channelized them into a predefined killing zone. Once inside this zone, the tribesmen attacked their enemies with all their might. This time, as the enemy withdrew, the Afghans attacked them from a position of strength. If the enemy decided to press upon them again, they withdrew again, thereby harassing the enemy enough to cause panic among their ranks and force them to commit mistakes.
Another particularity of their form of warfare was the use of long range rapid firing breech loaders. In the revolt of 1897, all the tribesmen were fairly well armed with the Martini-Henry rifle, besides their iconic ‘Jezail’.
Martini-Henry Rifle, 1880
Rifles used in the 1880s: From the top, the ‘Jezail’, the Lee-Metford and the Snider
These rifles were said to have been stolen from India by thugs who had sold them across the frontier to the Afghans. Some rifles were also stolen in the many raids conducted by the Pathans on British convoys. Along with the rifles, a huge stock of ammunition was also smuggled across the border, along with some explosives. They were also equipped with a quite a few Snider rifles, the weapon whose ammunition inflicted shattering wounds in the enemy, lowering their overall morale in battle. Hence, it is clear that, in terms of fire power, the tribesmen had the ability to hold their own against the British.
Arms and ammunition wasn’t the only thing the British had to worry about. The tribesmen were also expert marksmen. An Afridi or an Orakzai offspring was introduced to arms at a very early age. Marksmanship was a qualitative requirement for them in order to be able to survive in their raiding tribes and feudal families. Ever since the British decided to induct Pathans in their border police and army, they had heavily enlisted in their regiments to the extent that at one time an entire company of Sappers and Miners was made of Afridis. Hence, when these soldiers retired, they rejoined their tribes with valuable experience that included knowledge of British battlefield tactics as well as their basic drills and battle procedures. This knowledge, when combined with knowledge of the terrain, made them a formidable enemy.
The tribesmen were natural mountaineers, and made the best possible use of this skill by attacking the British transport columns from advantageous positions, knowing that these columns would march through defiles or river beds at the bottom of the valley. To counter this, British adopted a technique in which they marched in parties where each party had an advance guard and flank guards for protection. The flank guard parties were sent almost two kilometres in either direction to detect an attacking party at safe distances from the main body. Any surprise attack, therefore, gave them enough reaction time to either resist it or withdraw without suffering grave casualties. The tribesmen, however, were clever and would attack the enemy from a higher ground; when flank protection parties were sent in for a counter attack, they would withdraw back to the hills.
In the meantime, another group of tribesmen would attack the party from the rear. When flank protection parties who had earlier gone uphill would return to engage them, the hill attackers swooped down on them, thereby inflicting heavy casualties. They would quickly fall back in case the British advanced and only attacked when they retired. At times, they would appear all of a sudden to use the element of surprise in their favour. Another infamous tactic of the tribesmen was to shoot the enemy from behind a rock, then rush in with a sword to slay the survivors, finally retreating as swiftly as they had attacked, displaying caution as well as shrewdness.
The tribesmen were, therefore, smarter in the hills, not only while attacking, but while defending as well. Due to the difference in the geographical positions that the Orakzais and Afridis occupied in Tirah, both had adopted their own unique system of defence. The Orakzais sought refuge in the hillsides, particularly in caves that existed in the mountain wilderness. The Afridis, on the other hand, sought refuge in the valleys in the north, and considered the use of small passes or backdoors to retreat across the Safed Koh mountains if they feared an invasion at any time.
Under such circumstances, it became difficult for the British forces to follow their standard drills since it was a new terrain for them, as well as a new and fierce enemy. Such tactics of skirmish attacks by the tribesmen also prevented the British forces from reinforcing their other units. However, despite the losses, the British continued to move their transport columns through this region due to the lack of other viable options. Another annoyance caused by the tribesmen was that they denied the British the use of messengers to send communications across safe distances since the terrain was useless for horsemen and the messages had to be sent by foot which was decidedly unsafe. Moreover, the security of camps and garrisons was another major concern for the British. The tribesmen would attack the camps in the night, taking advantage of reduced visibility. They would hide in the cover offered by the terrain and use long range rifles to shoot at sentry posts or at patrolling guards with the sole purpose of wreaking havoc on the camp. Before the crack of dawn, they would retreat.
However, the British were resilient and it only required one serious blow to make them realize that they had had enough. This came in the form of the attack on the Samana forts.
The Samana Attack
The entire Samana ridge gained importance when the British built forts all along the ridge dominating the valleys on either side. To weaken the British, the tribesmen decided to attack the forts at Samana and capture them.
On 25 August 1897, the British government received information that a sufficiently armed force of almost 12,000 Orakzai men was gathering at Kharappa, near Khanki Valley. As a precautionary measure, a preliminary attack was thought of and discussed, but attacking such a large force without administrative and logistical support was not advised at the time. Things remained quiet until two days later when, on 27 August 1897, the Orakzais attacked all the posts along the Samana ridge. The very first attack was made right after daybreak and the Samana Suk, a post almost one and a half kilometre west of Fort Cavagnari, was targeted. The border police, constituting of Pathans, withdrew from the post, choosing to save their own lives. Inside Fort Cavagnari, Major Des Voeux, the second-in-command in the 36th Sikhs, and 150 Indian soldiers stood prepared for an impending attack. Upon receiving a distress message, Lieutenant Colonel John Haughton, along with two British officers and 130 men, immediately set out for Fort Cavagnari to reinforce it. Lieutenant Colonel Haughton always knew the importance of the forts; therefore, even with a scarcity of men, he always took bold decisions that he thought necessary for the protection of the forts.
When the party led by Lieutenant Colonel Haughton arrived at Fort Cavagnari, he immediately withdrew the troops inside the fort after assessing that they were heavily outnumbered. After they had dealt with Samana Suk, the Orakzais opened fire on Fort Cavagnari from almost a kilometre away. Instantly, Haughton charged two young officers with the task of checking this fire. Three to four hundred yards west of Fort Cavagnari a hillock known as Piquet Hill – this was the point chosen for this action. The officers retreated shortly afterwards, though, since one of them had been shot at and was severely wounded. Shortly afterwards, in the after
noon hours, the Orakzais attacked the eastern part of the Samana range as well. They began to fire at Fort Lockhart from a distance. As a consequence, half of the men Lieutenant Colonel Haughton had taken along with him to Fort Cavagnari had to be sent back to Fort Lockhart as reinforcements.
The Orakzais continued their attempts to capture the forts and withdrew only after last light. The day was saved, but the apprehension of impending attacks kept the 36th Sikhs awake at nights. Though a major attack was not carried out by Orakzais for the next few days, they continued sniping at posts and carrying out minor raids only to inflict casualties.
The next major attack came on 3 September 1897. At first light, a large force of Orakzais began to advance towards Fort Cavagnari from the west. As soon as information about it reached Lieutenant Colonel Haughton, he at once sent reinforcements to strengthen Fort Cavagnari and the Saragarhi post. Heavy firing began from both sides only within a few yards of Fort Cavagnari. The soldiers of the 36th were relying on the thorn abattis2 placed around the perimeter of the fort walls to slow the enemy down. However, a few Orakzais made a dash towards the abattis and set it on fire. As it burned, the smoke clouds rose up and surrounded the fort, reducing the visibility of the soldiers inside. Sensing the need of the hour, two Sikh soldiers, Sepoy Harnam Singh and Sepoy Sundar Singh, in a display of absolute courage, volunteered to rush outside and put out the fire. Facing heavy enemy fire at close range, these two brave soldiers put out the fire not once but twice under cover fire – this was one of the many gallant acts of 36th Sikhs. The two sepoys were later awarded for their bravery.
This is hardly where the chronicle of such brave acts performed by the Sikh soldiers ceases. It was on the same day that another act of valour was performed. Fearing an attack in the dark, a pile of wood outside the fort walls was required to be lit to illuminate the battlefield. Two sepoys, Wariam Singh and Gulab Singh, volunteered to carry out this perilous task. The two young Sikh soldiers leapt over the walls of the fort and ran towards the enemy, lit the fire successfully and returned to the fort without getting killed. For this gallant display of courage, they too were later awarded.
The next morning, the Orakzais withdrew beyond the firing range of weapons. After keeping the troops engaged for a while, they withdrew completely and disappeared, only to return and attack in the night. Following their tactics to the letter, on the next morning the Orakzais withdrew again. Demoralized and disheartened by the lack of any considerable success against the British, however, they turned to the Afridi tribesmen to ask for their support. Both the tribes were aware of the fact that one would need the other in fulfilling a cause that was common to both.
Meanwhile, as the tribesmen were uniting to increase their strength, the British were sending reinforcements of almost 2,500 men, who arrived at Hangu on 7 September. From there, the reinforcement was sent to Fort Lockhart to strengthen its defences. A close reconnaissance was carried out on 9 September from the Samana Suk in which the British officers learnt that a considerably large force of Orakzais and Afridis combined had assembled in the surrounding valley. An attack on this force was not considered a wise option. Neither of the sides engaged in any activity on that day. However, the British discovered from carrying out yet another reconnaissance on 10 September, that more tribesmen had joined the force.
Now that they were a considerably large force, the tribesmen made another clever move. They began their march eastwards towards Hangu through the Khanki Valley on 11 September. When this became known to them, an alarmed British force sent back the reinforcements that had earlier arrived at Fort Lockhart towards Hangu in order to engage the enemy and check their advance. Once these men had left, the shrewd tribesmen once again turned back to attack the Samana forts. The 36th Sikhs still holding the Samana forts were, at Fort Lockhart, only 168 in number, with all ranks answering to Lieutenant Colonel Haughton and another officer; 175 at Fort Cavagnari, with all ranks answering to Major Des Voeux and three other officers; 20 men and a non-combatant housekeeper under Havildar Ishar Singh at Saragarhi; 44 men at the Sangar post; and 20 to 30 men in all other minor forts on the Samana ridge. On the night of 11 September, the tribesmen attacked the Sangar post in skirmishes. The 44 brave soldiers holding the post repelled the attack. On the morning of 12 September, the tribesmen started to gather on the east and west sides of the Saragarhi post, soon surrounding it completely. Their intent was clear – isolation. In the previous attacks on the Samana forts, Saragarhi had proven its worth in timely relaying messages between the two forts, allowing Lieutenant Colonel Haughton to reinforce Fort Cavagnari in time. Therefore, the new objective of the tribesmen lay in between the two major forts. The isolation of Saragarhi began after first light when a large number of Afridis and Orakzais swarmed up the ridge and steadily began to take positions around it even as the 21 Sikh soldiers inside remained unaware of the danger surrounding them. Fort Gulistan was severed from Fort Lockhart as hordes of tribesmen concentrated around Saragarhi. A historic battle, one that would find a worthy place among the pages of history, was only moments away.
1In 1877, when British Indian government proposed reducing the allowance paid to the Jowaki Afridi tribe for guarding the Kohat Pass, the tribe cut the telegraph wire and raided the British territory, stimulating a response in which British military sorties were launched against them. A force of 1,500 troops penetrated the lands owned by the tribe in three columns, and did considerable damage by way of punishment.
2A thorn abattis was a field fortification made of the branches of trees laid in a row, interlaced or tied with wire, with the sharpened tops directed outwards towards the enemy to act as an obstacle in case the enemy tried to sneak inside the fort.
10
The Final Call of Duty
How many infidels?’ the leader of the tribesmen asked.
‘Twenty one Sikhs and one Musalman,’ replied an Afridi.
‘How many of our brothers have been slain?’ the leader asked another man.
‘Five hundred, and the count is on,’ answered a discouraged voice.
The fallen gate of the fort was still aflame. In the open space in front of the barracks, the tribesmen slowly gathered, edging their way towards the opening. ‘Only twenty one…’ the leader murmured almost inaudibly, ‘burn them… Burn the post.’ However, in the dead silence that had fallen inside the fort, nobody dared to carry out his order. All eyes were fixed on the motionless Sikh, Havildar Ishar Singh, who lay in front of them. The Pathans climbed over the walls and the parapets to catch a glimpse of the man whose roaring voice still rang in their ears. His motionless visage reflected tranquillity, an expression of fulfilment and acceptance, even as a drop of blood trickled down from the circumference of his kara. Ishar Singh had done his duty, as had all his brothers who lay there with him.
‘Shall I lay their turbans at your feet like you wanted?’ One of the Pathans asked his leader, finally breaking the silence.
‘No need for that anymore,’ murmured the leader, unmoving. He then turned to his awestruck men and shouted, ‘What are you waiting for? Burn everything and be done with it,’ before stomping out of the post in a hurry.
~
As a response to the ongoing situation in Tirah, the British had planted Sikhs along the border after they had learnt that both were hereditary foes. They had also been impressed by the exemplary bravery the Sikhs had displayed on numerous occasions and did not have to think twice about putting their faith in these turbaned men. After the battle of Saragarhi, the whole world was left in awe of the 21 Sikhs who had pitted themselves against the rifles of 10,000 Pathans in a daring attempt to defend the post to which they had been assigned. However, this was easier said than done. It is now time to relive the moments of the battle as they happened.
The Battle of Saragarhi
The post of Saragarhi was besieged by Afghan tribesmen on the morning of 12 September 1897, hence cutting off all communication between Fort Lockhart and Fort Cavagnari, and neither Lieute
nant Colonel Haughton nor Major De Voeux were able to move out in the open to reinforce the 21 men at Saragarhi as thousands of tribesmen had positioned themselves between Saragarhi and the forts on its either side. The post was now on its own.
With numerical superiority on their side, the Pathans attempted to rush the post in the beginning of the attack, with scores of standards flying, ready to raze everything in their path in the inferno of their discontentment. By then, the soldiers inside the post had already been warned and stood prepared to face this onslaught of more than 10,000 Pathans. Havildar Ishar Singh judged the gravity of the situation at hand and took command without delay. A seasoned soldier, he knew how to encourage the 20 men relying on him for leadership. He is said to have quoted Guru Gobind Singh’s verses about how each of them was equivalent to 125,000 foes, and the Pathans they had to fight were not even a fraction of it. He reminded them about the greatness of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and the fact that it was his legacy they needed to honour that day. He cited the tale of the brave Hari Singh Nalwa, who had fought the Afghans in these very hills not long ago1. His words were enough to ignite a fire inside the 20 young Sikh soldiers to give the impending fight their all, thereby creating military history.
Before an all-out attack, the Pathans offered the Sikh soldiers an opportunity to surrender in return for safe passage. However, no offer could lure Havildar Ishar Singh or any of his men. Singh knew that he had to hold the enemy for a few hours until Lieutenant Colonel Haughton could receive reinforcements and they were therefore ready to defend their posts until their deaths. Unsuccessful in their efforts, the aggravated tribesmen now told the soldiers that they would not survive even for a few minutes if the Pathans charged at them. This, too, did not budge the determined soldiers of Saragarhi. The tribesmen then began to charge at the fort in order to conquer the fort before reinforcements could arrive. Soon, the valley began to echo with the deafening blasts of thousands of Jezails and Henry-Martinis. The Sikhs aimed their rifles at the incoming horde and when the enemy was within effective range of their weapons, they opened fire on Havildar Ishar Singh’s order, shouting their war cry of ‘Bole so nihaal…sat sri akaal!’. Wave after wave of Pathans on the frontlines fell and the ones behind them scrambled to find cover. The battle had begun.