The Two Faces of Park
In the process of setting up the cohesive institutional mechanism of the KCIA, EPB, and Blue House Secretariat to help him plan, execute, and monitor both political and economic policies, and also enjoying newly won electoral legitimacy in 1963, Park was South Korea’s unrivaled strong man by the mid-1960s. What occupied him thereafter was how to use the KCIA, EPB, and Blue House aides to guard and expand his power. To this end he drew up two strategies. For politics, Park adopted a negative strat-
Politics
152
egy, seeking to prevent DRP faction leaders as well as opposition NDP politicians from becoming his political equals.30 In the economic realm, by contrast, he developed a mobilization strategy with the positive goal of value creation, constructing a “market” driven by politically formulated goals operated from the top down by the dirigiste state and casting state and societal actors in the complementary roles he thought were necessary to make the dirigiste economy deliver his desired results. Surprisingly, Park got away with the two-track strategy for a long time, partly because he held overwhelming power through his control of the KCIA and the EPB.
In addition to this structure of dominance, Park’s strategic mind mattered a great deal. Had he not always thought ahead of others and adjusted his moves in anticipation of how others would interpret and react to them, KCIA, EPB, and Blue House aides could not have served successfully to facilitate political preemption and economic mobilization. The three institutions realized their potential to wield power only because their boss, Park, acted with a strategic mind.
A Race against Time
Park’s intention not to let anyone challenge him was nowhere more clearly revealed than when he named Chông Il-gwôn, a retired general from the Hamgyông region, as prime minister in May 1965. “Do not socialize with generals who command key military units, nor with chaebol leaders,” Park warned Chông. “Delegate the task of political fund-raising to EPB deputy prime minister Chang Ki-yông.” Then Park added, “Be wary when people of the northern regions approach you, lest others perceive you as building a personal political power base.”31 Nor did Park hide his political calculations from Kim Chong-p’il. When Kim Chong-p’il returned in December 1964 from his second oeyu, or sojourn abroad, forced upon him by political rivals six months earlier for his shady role in negotiating diplomatic normalization with Japan, Park said the words Kim wanted to hear: “You will be my successor.” Then he said: “Stay on guard. People let you alone now because I am here. When I am no longer here, everyone will try to go after you and slander you. That is why you should not get your hands dirty. Stay away from money. Do not appoint your people to any posts.”32
Park was warning Chông Il-gwôn and Kim Chong-p’il to stay away from the three critical sources of political power in South Korea: guns, money, and regionalist organization.
The gentle Chông Il-gwôn obliged and served an essentially ceremonial function, for which he was handsomely rewarded; he stayed on as prime minister until December 1970 and even functioned as foreign minister dur-
The Labyrinth of Solitude 153
ing early 1967. The young, charismatic, and ambitious Kim Chong-p’il obliged, too, when Park—after years of evasion—revealed his intention not to step down by changing the constitution through a referendum in 1969 to allow himself a third term. Kim Chong-p’il could not do otherwise, because having built a factional following through money-based politics, he could be charged with corruption and purged if he rebelled against Park. Besides, the KCIA was by then led by Kim Hyông-uk, who was waiting to topple Kim Chong-p’il from the position of first among equals in the political leadership of the DRP political coalition. To hang on to what power he had, Kim Chong-p’il had to shelve his presidential aspirations and campaign for Park’s constitutional revision in 1969. He had reason to fear Park. Only a year earlier, Park had expelled National Assembly member Kim Yong-t’ae from the DRP on the charge of damaging party interests by clandestinely engaging in factional activities to back Kim Chong-p’il’s presidential candidacy in 1971. Then, in April 1969, only three months before the DRP publicly endorsed Park’s proposal for the constitutional amendment, Park expelled five more legislators when they led some forty DRP assembly members to vote with opposition NDP politicians to dismiss his education minister as part of a vote of no confidence against Park’s plan for a constitutional change.33 Behind these acts was the KCIA.
“Director Kim Hyông-uk resorted to all possible means,” former DRP
president Chông Ku-yông recalled. “Kim Hyông-uk even dug up legislators’ private lives for irregular or unethical activities to threaten them.
Sometimes he pleaded. Other times he coerced. He won over legislators with money, too. Kim Hyông-uk approached different people in different ways.”34
After taming Kim Chong-p’il in 1969, Park took on Kim Sông-gon as his next target. This power struggle ended even more swiftly and brutally because Kim Sông-gon, as the DRP’s central political fundraiser, had become extremely vulnerable to charges of corruption. The purge came after Kim Sông-gon helped Park isolate Kim Chong-p’il. The opportunity to strike was ironically provided by Kim Sông-gon when he mobilized his faction within the DRP to dismiss the minister of home affairs, O Ch’i-sông, as a show of force against Park and even as a prelude to a transition to a parliamentary form of government after Park’s third presidential term. With Kim Chong-p’il’s faction disintegrating and the end of Park’s third term expected in 1975, Kim Sông-gon thought he had the legislative support to enact a parliamentary governance structure. Suffering from a shady political image as a deal maker behind closed doors, but in command of political funding, Kim Sông-gon believed the establishment of a parliamentary government would be in his interest. To his surprise, Park
Politics
154
struck hard, ordering the KCIA to bring him in for interrogation, along with twenty-two other DRP legislators, and forced his retirement from politics. Kim Sông-gon could only accept Park’s verdict, lest he lose even more, including his business empire—the SSangyong Group.35 Then, in December 1973, even Yi Hu-rak—who had led Park’s campaign against both Kim Chong-p’il and Kim Sông-gon while serving as Blue House chief of staff and subsequently as KCIA director—had to retire from politics as well, once Park began to regard him as a political liability.36 The fate of Kim Hyông-uk was far more tragic. Fearing revenge at the hands of those he terrorized while serving as KCIA director and also alarmed by a possible KCIA investigation into his illicitly amassed wealth, Kim Hyông-uk went into exile in New Jersey in 1973 and appeared in U.S. congressional hearings to testify against Park’s regime in 1977, only to be kidnapped by unknown people in Paris in 1979 and never heard from again.37
The silse, or real power wielders, under Park were thus caught in a nowin situation if they harbored any ambition larger than serving Park’s political interests. To build a factional power base, a silse had to raise money and attract supporters. But in doing so, he also put his political life in Park’s hands. The silse had to surrender to Park’s will, lest Park hand over the KCIA’s secret file on the silse’s illicit activities to public prosecutors for criminal investigation. Understandably, no one dared to oppose Park when he clamped down. Having served as KCIA directors, Kim Chong-p’il, Kim Hyông-uk, and Yi Hu-rak all knew what was at stake.38 The political game as structured by Park had no place for successors. Even before Park began preparing for his second presidential election in 1967, the first DRP
president Chông Ku-yông—seeing no challenger emerging from within the DRP or from the fragmented NDP—became concerned about the political uncertainty that might ensue after Park’s completion of his projected second term in 1971. Chông Kyu-yông urged Park not to lift the two-term restriction on presidential tenure “in spite of Park’s ability to do so, because Park would only be disgraced if he revised the constitution.”39 Park understood Chông Ku-yông’s concern, but evaded the question
of constitutional revision. However, Park’s intentions became clear through his political actions, letting Kim Hyông-uk crush Kim Chong-p’il in 1969 and Yi Hu-rak terrorize Kim Sông-gon in 1971. Park made these moves not because Kim Chong-p’il and Kim Sông-gon challenged his leadership, but because South Korea’s constitution stood in his way to lifetime presidency.
He was racing against the limits set by constitutional restrictions on consecutive presidential terms.
Park, however, could not have held on to power for so long had he only been ruthless. He was ruthless solely when power was at stake. Even for
The Labyrinth of Solitude 155
fallen silse, Park could be a caring father figure if the silse repented and vowed their loyalty to Park. Once Kim Chong-p’il was disgraced before his faction in 1969 as a weak leader unfit to challenge Park, Park made him prime minister, a post in which he served from June 1971 to December 1975. When Yi Hu-rak ended his seclusion in December 1978 to run for a National Assembly seat in the district of Ulsan and Ulju as an independent, Park had the DRP nominate an obscure figure as its candidate for the district and gave Yi party membership when he won a huge victory. Nonetheless, it was to those who did not harbor independent political ambitions that Park was the most benign. To win their loyalty and reward them for support, Park consistently built up the image of a boss who did not betray loyal followers. Among the 162 men who served as vice ministers or higher between 1963 and 1972, 37 held such posts twice and 35 more than three times. During the yushin era, consecutive post holdings increased even more. Among 91 vice ministers and higher-ranking officials of the yushin regime, 22 served in such posts twice and 24 more than three times. Moreover, once appointed, Park’s power elite typically stayed. Before 1972, 50.4 percent had a tenure of two or more years; under the yushin regime, the share increased to 60.9 percent. Park tried to link the destiny of the political elite with his own personal political fate as consciously and as systematically as possible. For his political elite, joining Park was a lifetime commitment. They rose and fell together.
As Park tried to prolong his regime against the timetable set by the constitution, first in 1969 against the two-term limit and then in 1972 against the three-term, politics turned repressive, with NDP opposition politicians as well as DRP factional leaders selectively harassed, bribed, and blackmailed at each critical juncture. Behind every major political plot stood the KCIA. In his memoir, Kim Hyông-uk wrote:
When Park made up his mind to push for a constitutional amendment to allow a third presidential term, I put all my energy behind it. The money required to buy support came from DRP’s fund-raiser, Kim Sông-gon, under Park’s orders . . . I chose not to suppress but to tame journalists with money
. . . Only Dong-A Ilbo’s Ch’ôn Kwan-u remained faithful to his principles.
Converting opposition politicians into supporters for constitutional change was easier. I won over NDP National Assembly member Cho H¤ng-man and Sông Nak-hyôn . . . I also had intermediaries to persuade Yôn Chu-h¤m, Im Kap-su, and Han Tong-sôk. I had to give not a little sum of money to do so.40
Against the opposition party’s drive to mobilize popular support to defend the two-term limit, Kim Hyông-uk lined up veterans’ associations, religious organizations, labor and business federations, and anticommunist
Politics
156
leagues to come out in support of constitutional change.41 Meanwhile thirty-eight universities were closed down on September 10, 1969, in order to stop the spread of student protests. Kim Hyông-uk was chagrined when all the members of the opposition NDP members except for Sông Nak-hyôn, Cho H¤ng-man, and Yôn Chu-h¤m agreed to withdraw their party membership and regroup into a parliamentary negotiation bloc, thus causing the dissolution of the party at an extraordinary party convention.
This crafty procedure ensured that the three betrayers’ National Assembly membership would be revoked under the law that canceled assembly membership in the case of party dissolution. To Kim Hyông-uk’s relief, however, two other opposition legislators he had recruited to Park’s side, Im Kap-su and Han Tong-sôk, survived and joined the newly regrouped Sinminhoe (New Democratic Society) to vote on the bill for the constitutional amendment, because the opposition was unaware of their deal with Kim Hyông-uk. With their support, the DRP could meet the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds’ majority in the National Assembly to initiate the process of constitutional revision. Even then, the DRP had to gather its 118 legislators plus previously expelled Kim Yong-t’ae and the two opposition legislators at 2:27 a.m. in an annex building to pass its bill, because the opposition occupied the National Assembly’s plenary session hall. The vote took six minutes.42 The constitutional amendment was put to a national referendum in October 1969, in which 77.1 percent of the electorate participated and 65.1 percent of the voters approved.
The KCIA’s central political mission in more “normal” times, when neither electoral contests nor constitutional issues united opposition politicians, centered on breeding factional divisions inside the opposition bloc and, if possible, aiding those it chose to win party leadership. In the period before 1971 when Kim Sông-gon, who had once been a Liberal Party legislator with an extensive political network transcending party lines, controlled the DRP’s political funds, he too joined in as a second channel of clandestine deal making, parallel to the KCIA’s more repressive operations.
Ironically, however, Park had at best mixed results in controlling opposition politicians. Kim Sông-gon and Kim Hyông-uk had secured the support of Yu Chin-san, a leading opposition figure, for the legislation of a repressive Press Ethics Committee Law back in 1964. In doing so, however, the DRP hurt Yu Chin-san’s integrity and “inadvertently strengthened the hand of hard-liners within [the fragmented and contentious] opposition.”43 Once Yu Chin-san’s moderate Democratic Justice Party was weakened, Yun Po-sôn, a hard-liner, dominated talks on party merger among opposition politicians and eventually became the presidential candidate of the newly merged NDP three months before South Korea’s 1967 election.44
The Labyrinth of Solitude 157
In this way Kim Sông-gon and Kim Hyông-uk’s deal making, designed to breed divisions among opposition politicians, tilted the balance of power within the opposition to the hard-liners, not the moderates—albeit after three years of confusing mergers and splits within opposition parties.
Similarly, when the NDP readied for an extraordinary party convention to elect a new president after Yu Chin-san’s death in 1974, the KCIA detained Kim Young-sam for a few days while Park tried to recruit Ko H¤ng-mun and Kim £i-t’aek as proxies to block Kim Young-sam’s election as the next NDP president.45 The attempt failed, resulting in Kim Young-sam’s campaign to amend the yushin constitution. Then in 1976, amid a Red scare caused by Saigon’s fall, Park had an opportunity to tame the NDP—but, as in the past, only for a brief period. The centrist Yi Ch’ôl-s¤ng took over the NDP in 1976, only to be branded a collaborator, clearing the way for Kim Young-sam to get reelected as NDP president in 1979 despite PSS
chief Ch’a Chi-ch’ôl’s support for the moderate Sin To-hwan and KCIA director Kim Chae-gyu’s threats against the rebellious Kim Young-sam and his anti-mainstream faction.46
Modernizer
Whereas politics under Park was almost entirely driven by his will to power, economic policy showed another side of his personality: a leader with a vision. An incessant thirst for power was undoubtedly shared by most of his foes, rivals, and allies. Among Park’s contemporaries, however, he was singular in articulating a vision that all South Koreans—even his foes—could share: to transform South Korea into a “second Japan,” a militarily strong and economically prosperous state. Had Park sought power only for himself, he could not have held on to it for eighteen years. The economic vision distinguished him from all other political leaders and helped him to win absolute loyalty from his followers; it was his ultimate source of power. Park was well aware of this, and he jeal
ously guarded his prerogatives over economic policy and carefully nurtured his image as a modernizer. By supporting EPB deputy prime minister Chang Ki-yông’s refusal to join the DRP in 1964 and by protecting him from attempts within the DRP to challenge Chang with votes of no confidence in 1964 and 1965,47 Park insulated the economic bureaucracy from unruly South Korean party politics. This did not mean that politics did not intervene in economic policymaking. On the contrary, Park warned DRP chairman Chông Ku-yông not to investigate the distribution of preferential loans and the terms of government guarantees on foreign loans when Chông voiced his concerns on corruption and inefficiency.48
Politics
158
Contrary to many theories regarding developmental states, Park could not or would not let economic policy be dictated only by technocratic rationality. To build a political coalition, he needed to secure a stable inflow of political funds through the nurturing of business allies and sponsors.
Park Chung Hee Era Page 22