Three years later, amid a presidential election campaign, Park recollected:
“Had we decided not to dispatch our troops to South Vietnam, I assume that two combat divisions of the United States forces stationed in South Korea would have been transferred to South Vietnam . . . If we had turned down the request, we would have risked a power vacuum in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), giving another chance for the North to attack.”15
In the end the National Assembly approved the bill for the second dispatch by a vote of 106 to 11. Eight assemblymen abstained, while fifty legislators opted to waive their right to vote. The four opposition political parties were unable to mend their factional differences to come up with one collective voice. In fact, for the opposition, the more critical of the two political issues was the impending normalization of relations with Japan, which galvanized the opposition parties, chaeya dissidents, and student activists. By contrast, the ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) showed strong unity on the issue of troop dispatch, once Park showed his resolve to build a robust alliance with the United States through the expansion of South Korean military intervention in the Vietnam War.
On the other hand, the command structure of the allied military forces
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was a contentious issue from the very start of South Korea’s military intervention. The U.S.–South Korean talks in early 1964 failed to establish a combined command structure, because South Korea held on to the right to command its own military troops in direct opposition to South Vietnam’s proposal to put the South Korean armed forces under South Vietnamese operational control. The United States accommodated South Korea, scrap-ping the idea of a combined command structure.
First Dispatch of Combat Troops
As Park was eagerly waiting for the United States’ request for troops in early 1964, the United States was busy with the construction of a multinational military coalition to fight in South Vietnam. Initially, Johnson worked to send U.S. ground forces with support from some twenty-five allied countries, including South Korea. The goal was to widen international support for the U.S. war effort so as to mute domestic opposition to the war at home. But unable to convince most of its allies, especially the Western Europeans, the United States had to settle for a small contingent of supporting nations.16
Ironically, the United States discounted the value of South Korean support in the initial stage of international coalition building. Not only was South Korea not a member of the United Nations or SEATO, thus lacking the international status that would lend legitimacy to U.S. war efforts, but its armed forces were under the USFK commander’s operational control, which made its troops look more like a proxy of the United States than like an independent force. To discourage the United States further, South Korea had a security problem of its own as a divided nation under threat from the superior North Korean armed forces, which the United States thought would prevent its active military intervention elsewhere. The South Vietnamese, for their part, were reluctant to see South Korean forces operating on their soil.17 But with most other countries declining the United States’
request for troops, Johnson turned to South Korea for major support. In early 1965 the U.S. secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, recommended that the total number of foreign combat troops in South Vietnam be increased to 175,000 from 75,000 soldiers. To meet this new target, Johnson needed Park.18
Throughout 1964, the two allies had engaged in informal discussions on the issue of combat troops. During this period Park encouraged U.S. officials to send a larger number of U.S. combat troops along with South Korea’s in order to bring about a swift resolution of the Vietnam War. In Oc-
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tober 1964, he told the State Department’s assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, William P. Bundy, that the United States seemed to lack the resolve to win the conflict. Park went on to say that he was
“ready to support the United States if President Johnson requests our military cooperation.”19
To be sure, from the very outset of the bilateral talks Park defined the issue of intervention primarily in terms of military security, but at the same time, it was also true that he showed much interest in the potential economic benefits of troop dispatch. In late 1964, foreign minister Yi Tongwôn recommended that Park focus primarily on economic side-payments if the dispatch of combat troops was inevitable. By contrast, defense minister Kim Sông-¤n advised Park to consider the troop dispatch more from the perspective of improving South Korean military capabilities than of resolving the Vietnam conflict. Park agreed on both counts, but added that
“it would be selfish to stress benefits too much when the United States is facing a critical situation on the battlefield.”20
In April 1965 the bilateral negotiations for troop dispatch became public. Henry C. Lodge, a special envoy of Johnson, visited Park to discuss the conditions for South Korea’s expansion of its military intervention. Park followed with a summit meeting with Johnson in May. Although the two leaders’ joint statement did not mention the issue of troop dispatch, it was agreed at the summit that South Korea would send one combat division. In return, the United States stipulated in the joint statement that it would continue to maintain its forward-deployed force posture in South Korea, that it would amend the Military Assistance Transfer Program to equip South Korean troops with cutting-edge military equipment, and that it would provide a loan of $150 million through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).21
Then, on June 23, 1965, defense minister Kim Sông-¤n met with USFK
commander Howze to present the following ten conditions for the first dispatch of combat troops:
• Maintain the current level of United States and South Korean military troops in South Korea;
• Make three South Korean reserve divisions combat-ready by fully arming their troops, as well as modernizing South Korea’s seventeen regular army divisions and one marine division in firepower, maneuver, and signal capabilities in order to avoid any weakening of the South Korean defense posture by the troop dispatch to South Vietnam;
• Maintain the same level of aid through the Military Assistance Pro-
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gram (MAP) as before the deployment of South Korean troops in South Vietnam;
• Confirm as early as possible the mission, bivouac area, and command channels of KFV troops in South Korea, and provide a U.S. plan for logistical support for South Korean combat in South Vietnam;
• Establish a small planning group to determine the organization of the South Korean army division destined for service in South Vietnam;
• Provide communication equipment for the Korean Forces in Vietnam’s (KFV’s) exclusive use, with the goal of facilitating communication between the South Korean military establishment and its troops’
headquarters in South Vietnam;
• Provide transportation for the dispatch of South Korean military troops and for their subsequent rotation and replacement, as well as assisting with the transport of military supplies;
• Provide the South Korean soldiers in Vietnam with combat-duty pay at the same rate as paid to U.S. military personnel, pay gratuities and compensation for line-of-duty deaths or disability, and cover for the salaries of South Vietnamese workers hired by the KFV military units;
• Provide the South Korean air force with four C-123 aircraft for the purpose of medical evacuation and liaison between South Korea and South Vietnam;
• Provide a field broadcasting installation with the goal of enabling the South Korean military troops to conduct anticommunist broadcasts, psychological warfare, and jamming operations, as well as bringing South Korea’s home news, war news, and entertainment programs to its soldiers in South Vietnam.22
The United States’ acceptance of these ten conditions helped Park in preventing the public’s anger over the speedy passage of his 1965 bi
ll to dispatch combat troops. To ensure the prompt deployment of these troops, the United States also had to agree with South Korea on July 13, 1965, that there would be no reduction of USFK military troops without prior consultation; that the MAP for 1966 would include an additional $7 million to finance the provision of combat equipment for three South Korean reserve divisions; that the South Korean armed forces would be modernized in firepower, communications, and mobility; and that the United States would share the financial burden of transporting South Korean military troops to South Vietnam.23
There was, however, a clear limitation on what the United States was prepared to give in return for the South Korean dispatch of combat troops.
As Park readied for the dispatch of troops to South Vietnam in early 1965,
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his foreign minister, Yi Tong-wôn, had requested that U.S. ambassador Brown begin negotiations to include a new clause in the Mutual Defense Treaty that would require each of the allies to dispatch military troops automatically when the other party faced armed aggression.24 The United States did not respond favorably to the idea of such a revision, although it was willing to reaffirm its commitment to the defense of South Korea ver-bally. On July 16, three days after the agreement on South Korea’s dispatch of combat troops, the United States tried to satisfy Park by having Ambassador Brown and USFK commander Howze write a letter that reconfirmed the U.S. commitment.25 Park was disappointed, but not discouraged from dispatching combat troops to South Vietnam.
Having secured political, military, and economic rewards, Park presented the National Assembly with bills on the dispatch of combat troops to South Vietnam and the normalization of relations with Japan on July 14, 1965. The action triggered a heated debate in the National Assembly.
Dissenting views emerged even within the ruling DRP. The DRP chairman, Chông Ku-yông, warned of heavy casualties. Park’s response, however, was resolute. Obviously displeased, Park remarked: “A powerless ruling party that fears challenges should be dismantled.”26 With public hostility against the proposed treaty of diplomatic normalization growing and with university students demonstrating fiercely in the streets in ever larger numbers, the opposition political parties chose to boycott the vote on the two bills. The ruling party, enjoying a majority in the National Assembly, rammed through the treaty bill on August 11 without the presence of opposition members. Ignited by this cavalier action, most of the opposition party legislators submitted their resignations. Park was not persuaded to negotiate. Two days later, the DRP-dominated National Assembly approved the bill on the dispatch of combat troops to South Vietnam by a vote of 101 in favor, 1 against, and 2 abstentions—again with the opposition legislators boycotting the session.
With the first dispatch of combat troops in 1965, the issue of combined command resurfaced. This time, it was the United States that requested South Korea to turn over its operational control in order to bring about greater effectiveness in the allies’ war efforts. South Korea rejected the request, because it believed that placing its combat troops under a de facto U.S.-centric combined command structure made it look like a “mercenary.” Moreover, defense minister Kim Sông-¤n argued that “if we give our operational command to the United States, our forces might end up being deployed in extremely dangerous areas, resulting in a higher number of casualties. To avoid unnecessary military casualties and to protect the South Korean civilians dispatched to rehabilitate damaged areas, our
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forces should remain autonomous and be deployed in relatively safe rear-areas.”27
Reflecting the concerns of the Ministry of National Defense, KFV commander Ch’ae Myông-sin maintained that “the Vietnam War [was] fought mainly at the political rather than at the military front. [The task] was preventing South Vietnam from being overthrown by the North Vietnamese.” By extension, South Korea’s rehabilitation activities in damaged areas were as vital as U.S. combat activities on the front for the survival of South Vietnam as a sovereign state. Consequently, it was critical that public support for its military troops both at home and within South Vietnamese society did not get damaged by the allies’ dispute over the issue of operational control. General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of the United States Forces in Vietnam, and Major General Stanley R. Larsen eventually agreed with Ch’ae Myông-sin to recognize South Korea’s right to command its own troops independently.28 The two allies established a Free World Military Assistance Policy Council to give each a fair share of decision-making power in military operations. Even then, they agreed to recognize each other’s right to command their respective military units.
The South Korean military forces conducted both combat and peace-keeping operations, but they did not play a leading role in the war. The Korean Forces in Vietnam had as their primary responsibility restoring order and rehabilitating damaged areas,29 and were deployed mainly in the coastal areas adjacent to three of the five major harbors in South Vietnam: Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Cam Rahn. These three harbors were logistically important for war efforts, but also relatively safe, away from the front lines. Despite U.S. complaints about South Korea’s restriction of its military operations to the defense of the harbors and adjacent areas,30
Ch’ae Myông-sin stuck to the strategy of deploying KFV troops mainly in the coastal areas. He was extremely successful, maintaining peace in an area of 7,438 square kilometers (2,872 square miles) where some 5 percent of the South Vietnamese lived. Among the military operations the KFV troops conducted, 1,171 were large-scale and over 576,000 were small, company-based actions.31
Second Dispatch of Combat Troops
Despite the escalation of foreign military presence, the Vietnam War did not go well for the United States. With the North Vietnamese forces infiltrating South Vietnam to support guerrilla warfare, Westmoreland recommended in December 1965 that the total number of combat troops be
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increased to 443,000 soldiers from 275,000. The recommendation led Johnson to request an additional dispatch of South Korean combat troops.
In addition to the rising tide of antiwar sentiment at home, the economics of troop deployment encouraged the United States to turn to South Korea for additional troops. In terms of U.S.-paid monthly allowances, the South Korean captains received $190, far below the sums earmarked for the Americans ($570), Filipinos ($475), and Thais ($407) in the same military rank. Only the Vietnamese captains received less ($123) than the South Korean captains.32 The Pentagon estimated that it cost $5,000
to support one South Korean soldier’s year-long deployment in South Vietnam, less than half of what it cost to support an American soldier ($13,000).33
The idea of sending one more combat division raised heated debate in the National Assembly. The advocates argued for committing the additional combat troops on the grounds that the fate of South Vietnam was directly tied to South Korean security, that the military intervention had thus far benefited South Korea by ensuring a strong U.S. guarantee of South Korean security, that the dispatch of a second combat division was necessary to support the military operations of the South Korean troops already deployed in South Vietnam, and that the South Korean armed forces would gain precious combat experience by fighting in the Vietnam War. The advocates were various DRP leaders and state bureaucrats, including Chairman Min P’yông-gwôn of the National Assembly’s Defense Committee and minister of defense Kim Sông-¤n. On the opposite side was once again Ch’a Chi-ch’ôl, claiming to represent the DRP’s junior National Assembly members. Prime Minister Chông Il-gwôn was also known to caution against the additional dispatch of combat troops in his typically gentle way.34
But it was from the opposition political parties that the most explicit objection was voiced. Led by Pak Sun-ch’ôn and Yun Po-sôn, the opposition argued that South Korean security would be better enhanced by adding to the Mutual Defense Treaty a provision for “automatic” U.S. interventi
on in the event of armed attack, rather than by dispatching combat troops to South Vietnam. In their eyes, moreover, it was not right to intervene in another country’s civil war without a UN resolution. Doing so, in fact, was likely to isolate South Korea in the international community for fighting in a “wrong” war. The opposition also warned that the second dispatch of combat troops would not be the end of U.S. requests for South Korean troops, because the war situation was continuing to deteriorate. The critics additionally charged that the economic benefits accruing from any additional troop dispatches would be less than what Park’s political propa-
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ganda claimed. Emphasizing the dangers of underestimating political and military risks, they noted that U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia was anything but stable and that the people of South Vietnam seemed to lack resolve in fighting communism.35
By contrast, Park welcomed the U.S. request for a second dispatch of troops as an opportunity to zero in on the issue of revising the Mutual Defense Treaty as well as on the expansion of U.S. military and economic assistance to South Korea. On January 15, 1966, defense minister Kim Sông-
¤n reported that South Korea was investigating the possibility of increasing its combat troops in response to South Vietnam’s request for additional forces. KFV commander Ch’ae Myông-sin had also supported the idea of a second troop dispatch when Park visited Saigon on January 14, 1966, for a summit meeting.36 The negotiations for the second dispatch were held not with South Vietnam, but with the United States. After tough and lengthy negotiations involving fifty bilateral consultations, Kim Sông-¤n and Yi Tong-wôn delivered a memorandum to their American counterparts with six major requests.
The memorandum called for the United States to finance the “complete”
equipping of three South Korean army divisions; to give an unequivocal security assurance that the United States would automatically intervene in case of an armed attack from the North, without prior consent of the U.S.
Park Chung Hee Era Page 59