When we put this information together, we derive the following evidence index table which tells us, for example, that CE 543 is also referred to in other (FBI) contexts by the designation C6 as well as Q6:
Because we have this table, if I ask you the question “CE 545 was given what ‘Q’ number by the FBI?” you will have no trouble in answering . . . Q48!
So, now that we understand which designations match up with which, let’s take another look at our model of the testimony given by Day on April 22, 1964, but this time with the “Q” numbers from the table above referenced to the “CE” numbers:
With this revised version of our model, it should now be no problem to answer the question, “in terms of Q numbers, which shells delivered at 10 PM were to be sent to Washington?” And, since the model above says that Q7 = CE 544 and Q48 = CE 545, we have our answer:
The shells sent to Washington — CE 544 and CE 545 — should respectively have been identified (per the 11/23/63 FBI Evidence Received letter) as Q7 and Q48.
But your memory should be telling you a different story, and when we take a second look at the 11/23/63 FBI Evidence Received letter, we are absolutely astonished to verify that in fact this was not the case (CE 2003, p. 132: 24 H 262): 56
Instead of “Q7” and “Q48,” we see instead “Q6” and “Q7.” Oops!
At first, one might think there was a typographical error by the agents in Washington (even though the sequential nature of the numbers [6 to 7 to 8] would belie that possibility), but, in fact, the highest “Q” number listed in that first receipt of evidence by the FBI was Q15 (CE 2003, p. 132: 24 H 262): 57,
and therefore on that day (November 23), from the FBI’s perspective, Q48 did not exist at all, and therefore could not possibly have been sent to Washington!
Further verification that the FBI correctly reported the receipt of “Q” numbers Q6 and Q7 is provided by CE 717, the envelope used to transmit the evidence to the FBI: note on the right-hand side the “Q” numbers “Q6, Q7” (CE 717: 17 H 501): 58
Ouch!
This is what we call a major, major, MAJOR problem for the Fritz story. Here’s why: when we view the model of Day’s testimony, we see that one, and only one shell, should have been in Fritz’ drawer, and that shell would have been CE 543:
Remember, there are only three shells according to the official story, and if CE 544 and 545 have been sent to Washington, the only one left that could be conceivably found in Fritz’ desk drawer has to have been CE 543.
Now let’s look at the Model with the “Q” numbers referenced again (to better able you to see the problem, I will highlight the area on which you should focus):
Note that as we saw earlier, CE 543 is identified as “Q6,” and surprise of surprises, the FBI has told us in more than one way (the property inventory record as well as the notations on CE 717) that shell Q6 (along with Q7) was actually in . . . Washington!
And so now we have direct from the FBI itself absolutely positive confirmation that the story that Fritz is telling cannot possibly be true:
CE 543, a/k/a Q6, could not possibly have been in Fritz’ drawer in Dallas, Texas when CE 2003 (the 11/23/63 FBI Evidence receipt) and CE 717 (the transmittal envelope) prove it was in Washington, DC!
Besides conclusively destroying the story told by Fritz, this testimony by Day coupled with the evidentiary record also destroys the legitimacy of the marks supposedly representing the actual chain of custody.
This is because we know that the shells that were sent to DC according to the FBI evidence receipt and the transmittal envelope — CE 543 [Q6] and CE 544 [Q7] — had contrary marks, one by “GD,” the other by “Day,” when in fact according to the official story as told on April 22 by Day, both should have had the same mark, “Day” (Day marked only the shells that were to be sent to Washington, as you will remember, but Q6, which was in Washington, did not have Day’s mark, it had “GD”s!)
This would indicate that at least one shell was sent to DC without the necessary mark required to establish a chain of custody (again, according to the story, because it was sent to Washington, Q6 should have had the mark “Day” and not “GD”), and therefore Q6 had to have been surreptitiously introduced into the evidentiary mix!
Furthermore, if in fact there was a shell in the desk drawer of Fritz, that would be an extra “Q” number, since the others had been accounted for, and so we can be absolutely sure that that bullet was not fired from the rifle owned by Lee Harvey Oswald, since the evidence shows that, at maximum, only three bullets were fired in that rifle, and if there was an extra bullet, then it was not fired in that rifle on that day, as its marks would indicate, but rather, was planted there!
Wow.
This, folks, we can term with no fear of contradiction, is an evidentiary debacle.
Needless to say, if this story with its multiplicity of continuity errors were left to stand on its own, the credibility of the Warren Commission could have easily been destroyed with the application of a small dose of elementary deductive logic. However, it appears that some sharp-eyed attorneys in Washington noted that this story would essentially destroy The Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald, so it seems they decided to dispatch a Hollywood script doctor to do reconstructive surgery on the narrative.
When the old story fails, it’s time to roll out a new one! And now, consequently, we are about to see a completely different version of events designed to rehabilitate the prior analysis.
Unfortunately for them, the story-masters were only digging themselves into an ever greater ditch, a ditch that the wise Kennedy assassination student would be careful to examine closely. As Bugliosi noted (Reclaiming History, pp. 899-900):
accurate memories of an event or statement tend to fade with time. So how do we deal with the many Warren Commission witnesses . . . whose memory supposedly got better with time? Assuming their first statement was intended to be a complete one, and there is no question that the witnesses said what they are reported to have said, we must, almost by definition, reject sensational additions to their original story.
Are these “additions” by witnesses in the Kennedy case always flat-out lies on their part? In many cases, yes, just as some of their original statements are often completely fabricated in the hope of getting five minutes of fame or attention. But many times, witnesses are not knowingly telling a falsehood. As time goes by, they naturally forget some of what they saw or heard, and these new voids in their memory are frequently filled in with details derived from the power of suggestion or their own imagination, or from knowledge of later events that make the details more likely or even inevitable, or from the recollections of others that witnesses unconsciously embrace as their own — that is, the witness ends up saying he saw something that he himself never saw. . . .
[T]he addition of new elements to their stories, particularly important details that would never have been omitted by them in the original telling if they were true, has to be taken, as they say in Latin, cum grano salis (with a grain of salt). . . .
No hard and fast rules can be employed, without exception, to determine the credibility of the various witnesses . . . other than the dictates of logic and common sense.
Witnesses sometimes are coached to change their testimony; however, there is such a thing as a bad coach, you know, the kind who calls for a “Hail Mary” pass on the one-yard line. This makes it easy to tell when coaching has occurred, and this final paragraph gives us the way to tell the true from the false, particularly when the revisions are spun purely from thin air. Logic, as Bugliosi noted, is absolutely key in this regard. Vincent Bugliosi noted, “[t]he problem with fabricated stories is that inconsistencies frequently occur. As opposed to the truth, which is compatible with its environment, falsehoods, as Daniel Webster said, not only disagree with truths, but usually quarrel among themselves.” (RH 882; emphasis supplied).
Logic is the spotlight that makes these inconsistencies visible for all the world to see. No better example of t
hat can be given than the following.
The rehabilitation effort began very quietly with an affidavit by Day given on May 7, just over a month after his Warren Commission testimony.
Here is the pertinent part of that affidavit, which introduces only one subtle change, anticipating more significant changes which will come in a later affidavit (7 H 401-402; pages consolidated by author): 59
This version has only one small change from the previous story. In the previous story, only two hulls were returned to Day at 10 p.m., but in this new version, three hulls were returned. Just a small change, which results in the following revision of the model, a change from “2” to “3”:
But this subtle shift was only a precursor to that yet to come.
A far more interesting set of changes, one to be reflected in a later affidavit, was handwritten on the version that is archived at the Dallas Municipal Archives website: 60
Now, the handwriting at the bottom of the May 7 affidavit reveals some profound differences in the model. According to the original model, “Day” appeared only once on each of two shells, and “GD” appeared only once on one shell. But these changes anticipate a different, forthcoming affidavit, with writing on one more shell each by both Day and “GD.” From the top to the bottom, the handwriting reads as follows:
We will go in depth regarding these changes more in a moment, especially the point about the “bent [place]”, but now let’s look at the revised affidavit which officially incorporated the notations of this handwriting, delivered over a month later on June 23, 1964 (don’t be intimidated by all these words, I will highlight the important lines in the next screen capture) (7 H 402): 61
At a heavy cost to the credibility of J. C. Day, but a necessary expense for the Warren Commission, this affidavit seeks to salvage the legitimacy of the chain of custody by revising the initial story in its most fundamental aspects. Alas for the authors of this new version of events, who probably thought that this would address the issues raised in the previous affidavit, it only served to seal an already well-nailed coffin.
Let us zoom in on and highlight the most relevant portion of this testimony:
In this testimony, we come across no less than four reversals in the story:
Day’s name was not on two hulls, but three;
Doughty’s initials were not on one hull, but two;
Doughty’s initials were now said to have been placed on the two shells because they were going to be sent to Washington, but in the old version those initials were to be placed just on the one shell said to have remained in Dallas;
Shells CE 543 and 545 were sent to Washington, not shells CE 544 and 545;
Quite the makeover, n’est-ce pas?
More than a mere touch-up job, this is a complete overhaul of the prior testimony, necessitated by the apocalyptic effect the previous testimony had on the chain of custody sequence. This testimony, when consolidated, results in the new, supposedly final model of what transpired in Dallas on November 22 at the Dallas Police Department with reference to the empty shells:
The dramatic difference between the “before” model and the “after” model can be revealed when we compare them side-by-side:
Well, the most complimentary thing that can be said about this June 23 model and its myriad changes is that at least, on the surface, it solves the problem of why the FBI reported that Q6 (CE543) and Q7 (CE 544) were sent to Washington. And, if one does not examine the story too closely, that is just what it does. However, conversely, when one does examine the story too closely, it does not.
Here is the gotcha with this new version:
It cannot possibly be true!
How do we know this?
For this reason: the legitimacy of the “I confused the shells” story depends on the plausibility of the notion that Day could have confused CE 543 with CE 545 on April 22. The record shows, however, that Day did not confuse the shells; to the contrary, he correctly identified them. And since they were correctly identified, he obviously did not have them confused.
The reason we can be absolutely sure that the cells were identified correctly was due to the fact that there is no possibility those shells could have been confused. To be more specific, it is logically impossible to have confused those shells. And because you can’t confuse what’s impossible to confuse, the “confusion” was therefore nonexistent.
To illustrate the point, let’s consider the following imaginary dialogue between Belin and Day, referring to the following exhibits, three geometrical figures with identifying marks:
Mr. BELIN: I am going to ask you to state if you know what Exhibit 100 is.
Mr. DAY: That is a circle.
Mr. BELIN: And are the initials “GD” on it?
Mr. DAY: Yes.
Mr. BELIN: And why were they placed on it?
Mr. DAY: Because it is a circle, and because it is neither a square nor a triangle.
Mr. BELIN: And is your name on it?
Mr. DAY: Well, I don’t see it there, and I can’t imagine why I would see it there, because I was not to put my name on the circle. I was only to put my name on the square and the triangle.
Mr. BELIN: All right, now can you tell me what Exhibit 101 is?
Mr. DAY: That is a square.
Mr. BELIN: And is your name on it?
Mr. DAY: Yes, it is, just like it was supposed to be.
Mr. BELIN: Finally, Mr. Day, can you please tell me what Exhibit 102 is?
Mr. DAY: That is a triangle.
Mr. BELIN: And is that your name on it?
Mr. DAY: Plain as day! I scratched it on there myself with a diamond point pencil.
Mr. BELIN: Very good, Mr. Day. You are dismissed.
Now, imagine, a month after this testimony has been given, the following affidavit is received by the Warren Commission:
The following affidavit is made to clear up confusion regarding the testimony I gave regarding the three geometrical figures. When I appeared before the Commission, I could not find my name on one of the figures, the circle identified as Exhibit 100. Close examination with a magnifying glass under a good light disclosed that my name “Day” actually was on Exhibit 100, even though under my original testimony my name was not supposed to be there in the first place. In that testimony, I had Exhibits 100 (the circle), and 102 (the triangle) switched because I didn’t find my name on Exhibit 100, even though my testimony, again, was that the geometrical shape I did not write my name on was a circle. Now that I know my name is actually on Exhibit 100, I realize the confusion I created. Therefore, I now modify my testimony to say that Exhibit 100, a circle, is actually Exhibit 102, a triangle, and that Exhibit 102, a triangle, is actually Exhibit 100, a circle. I sincerely hope this clears up the confusion.
Absurd? Absolutely! But no more or less absurd than the June 23, 1964 affidavit signed by Day appearing on page 402 of the 7th volume of the Warren Commission exhibits.
The example above simplifies the issue to make it more clear, but the point it makes pertains to any exhibits which are self-identifying due to their unique properties. A circle, which has an infinite number of sides, the most number of sides possible for a geometrical figure, could never be confused with a triangle, which has three sides, the least number of sides possible for a polygon. Furthermore, if someone wants to tell you that a circle is a triangle, and that a triangle is a circle, pull out the straitjacket — or the lie detector.
So, the question now is, do either CE 543 and CD 545 have any unique properties like our geometrical figures that render them also self-identifying, and therefore impossible to confuse?
As it turns out, they both do.
Let’s first take a look at CE 543. When we examine the testimony given by Day on April 22, 1964, we find that CE 543 can be completely separated from the other two cartridge cases through the unique combination of three properties:
Impossible: The Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald Page 25