Blackstone merger and acquisition firm, 22
wealth of, 139; bundling and fundraising
Blavatnik, Len, 12; as immigrant success, 17
by, 42, 43 t, 81; case studies of, 54– 76,
Bloomberg, calculation of wealth levels by,
117– 24; centrist political speech and,
157n4
31; centrists or liberals, atypical among,
Bloomberg LLP, 11
128; characteristics of, 10– 24; consen-
Bloomberg, Michael: age of, 15; on bringing
sus among on immigration policy, 97;
back the estate tax, 48; as champion
conservative economic policy aims of,
talker and actor on social issues, 84– 85;
2– 3; democracy and, 25– 26; difficulty of
contributions to Democratic Governors
studying, 3– 4, 33; economic interests of
Association by; economics- based support
concerning immigration, 94; fair com-
for DREAM Act and opposition to
pensation of, 23– 24; free speech of, 141;
deportations by, 87; financial services as
full disclosure and political accountabil-
source of fortune, 11; four statements on
ity of, 143; fundraisers hosted by, 42, 43 t,
Social Security by, 39; frequent speech on
81; gender of, 14,16; general political
social issues by, 98; frequent speech on
activity of, 42– 44; high- visibility excep-
taxes by, 38; political activity of, including
tions among, 7– 8; inclusion of among in-
as Republican mayor of New York, 11– 12;
fluential “affluents,” 51; inferences from
as pro- choice for women, 86;
multimillionaires study concerning,
BNSF Railway, 58
30– 31; insulation of from immigration
Bonica, Adam, 4– 5
concerns, 94; lack of political account-
border protection, 80
ability of, 52– 53; as libertarians, 83;
boundary control: barriers to entry and,
major achievements of, 138– 39; methods
112– 13; as a case of stealth politics,
of studying, 32– 37; misleading impres-
124– 25; case- study evidence concern-
sions of, 7– 8, 25; new findings concern-
ing, 117– 24; comparative politics theory
ing, 128– 29; number of in United States,
of, 175n59; expectations concerning,
1; political reforms concerning, 138– 43;
111– 13, 111 t; magnitude of effects on
privileged backgrounds of, 14– 15; public
from regulatory environment and party
interest and, 52– 53; race and ethnicity
affiliation, 116– 17, 116 t; market struc-
of, 14, 16– 17; reluctance of to express
ture and, 112– 13; measures of variables,
unpopular opinions, 39– 40; as rich, old,
113– 14; number of billionaires studied
white, Anglo men, 14– 18; self- interest
regarding, 114; policy effects of, 120– 21;
of, 28, 95; separation of from ordinary
quantitative evidence concerning, 113–
citizens, 14– 15; as social liberals or liber-
17; regulatory structure and, 111– 13;
tarians, 80– 81, 87; state and local activity
Republican billionaires and, 113; social
of between elections, 105– 6; systematic
costs and, 112– 13; strategy of, 109– 25;
study of, 128; top 100 wealthiest studied,
study of, 117– 18; use or nonuse of, 114
index
205
boundary control theory, 109– 11; contribu-
from consumer exposure, 61; limited po-
tion strategies in, 110– 11; dominant
litical contributions by, 60– 61; no worri-
state or local parties and, 110; Edward
some measurement errors concerning,
Gibson and, x; limiting federal govern-
60; number of statements by on social
ment as element in, 110; national vs.
issues, 85; opinions of as aligned with
local contributions in, 110; neat fit of
general public, 61; on payroll taxes, 47;
Harold Simmons with, 120; role of ex-
personal background of, 57– 58; philan-
tremely wealthy in, 109; special state or
thropy of, 57; on plutocracy, 60; reasons
local favors as element in, 109– 10
for case study selection of, 56, 58; on
boundary controllers: all found in
role of lucky opportunities and social
Republican- dominated states, 115;
cooperation in economic success, 139;
amounts of political contributions by,
search terms in case study of, 166– 67n2;
115; number of, 114; prediction of by
seven statements on Social Security by,
regulation index and party affiliation,
38; and “snowball” image concerning,
115– 17, 115 t, 116 t; Robert Rowling as
167n9; solar electricity in Nevada, 61;
typical case of, 122, 124
support of higher taxes on the wealthy
boycotts: incentives to be silent and, 31; on
by, 58– 59; support of progressive taxes by,
social issues, 78; of Warren Buffett, 61
58; support of redistributive policies by,
Bradley, Lynde and Harry, 3
58– 59; as unusual center- left billionaire,
Breitbart News, 104
54; on the wealthy as protected bald
Bren, Donald, 12
eagles, 59
Bridgewater Associates hedge fund, 12, 22
bundling by billionaires, 42, 43 t; predictors
Brin, Sergey: co- founder of Google, 12; as
of, 46, 46 t; unreported, 5
immigrant success, 17; relative youth
Bush, George W., and regressive tax cuts, 27
of, 16
business group alignments, as unrelated to
Broockman, David, 96
affluents’ preferences, 51
Brownback, Sam, 107
bubbles, protected, billionaires’ lives in, 15
Camp, Garrett, achievements of for society,
Buckeye Technologies, 11
138
budget cutting, Social Security and, 3
campaign contributions. See contributions
budget deficits: disagreement of multimil-
campaign finance reform: limits to the ef-
lionaires with most Americans concern-
fects of, 76; Supreme Court restrictions
ing, 136; multimillionaires’ worries
on, 139– 40; through public funding, 140
about, 40
campaign infrastructure, billionaires’ invest-
Buffett rule, 59
ments in, 104
Buffett, Warren: advocacy of estate tax by,
Canadian National Railway, 10
59– 60; advocacy of full gay and lesbian
capital: leap of ahead of labor, 21; returns
rights by 86; Berkshire Hathaway and
to, 23
sources of fortune of, 10; boycott of over
capital gains: billionaires’ political actions on
Planned Parenthood, 78; businesses
tax rates for, 44 t, 44; billionaires’ silence
indirectly owned by, 58; case study of,
about tax rates for, 38, 39 t; exemption of
57– 62; center- left stands of, 47; on class
from payroll taxes, 161n14; Warren Buf-
warfare, 59; contributions to Democrats
fett on raising tax rates for, 59
by, 60– 61; drop behind Jeff Bezos in
capital mobility, investment opportunities
Forbes rankings, 57; on dynastic wealth
resulting from, 21
and equal opportunity, 59– 60; early in-
capitalism, achievements of, 138– 39
vestment activities of, 57– 58; and estate
capitalist ethic, 23
tax, 48; finance as source of wealth of,
carbon taxes: billionaires’ political actions
22; fortune of, 10, 57; frequent state-
on, 44, 44 t; billionaires’ silence about,
ments about taxes by, 38; insulation of
38, 39 t
206
index
Carnegie, Andrew, 17
Citizens United decision, 76; and dark
case studies: choice of billionaires for, 8– 9;
money, 166n72
and confirmation of stealth politics
citizenship, path to for undocumented
theory, 74– 75; as illustrative of theory,
workers, 80; billionaires’ support for,
54– 55, 118; methods used in, 55, 118;
85, 85 t
new information about billionaires’
civil unions, 79– 80
political activities from, 75– 76; no
class, economic, billionaires and, 14– 15
serious measurement errors revealed
class warfare, Warren Buffett on, 59
by, 129; selection criteria for, 56– 57,
climate change, Koch brothers’ opposition
117, 118; use of to illustrate theory, to
to combatting, 72
improve causal inferences, and to detect
Clinton, Hillary, Warren Buffett’s contribu-
measurement errors, 54, 55, 117, 118;
tions to, 60– 61
usefulness of extreme cases for, 55– 56,
coastal residence of most billionaires, 18
117; usefulness of outliers or deviant
Coca- Cola, 58
cases for, 55– 56; usefulness of typical
coding methods, 37, 113– 14
cases for, 118
Cohen, Steve: family fund managed by, 22;
Cathy, S. Truett, and division of fortune,
insider trading by, 22
170n5
Cohn, Gary, 1
Cato Institute, 71
college access, disagreement of multimil-
Catsimatidis, John, 17
lionaires with most Americans concern-
causal inference, use of case studies to
ing, 136
improve, 55, 117
compensation, fair, 23– 24
causal mechanisms, case studies as illumi-
computer revolution and first wave of tech
nating, 55, 117
billionaires, 20
Center for Public Integrity, as monitor of
confiscation of wealth, 23– 4
money in politics, 142
confounding variables and case studies, 117
Center for Responsive Politics: data on
congressional districts: reducing one- party
billionaires’ political actions from, 36; as
domination of, 140; role of Republican
monitor of money in politics, 142; on top
Party in redrawing boundaries of, 106
thirty billionaires’ contributions, 2
Connecticut, billionaires residing in, 18
centrist billionaires: as atypical among all bil-
consensus among billionaires on immigra-
lionaires, 48, 128; more political speech
tion policy, 97
by, 31, 38; misleading impression from, 48
consistency between billionaires’ words and
CEO pay, Carl Icahn critique of, 68, 69
actions on social issues, 87– 88
Chambers, Anne Cox, 12
constituencies, sizes of, 101– 2
chance, role of in acquisition of wealth, 23
consumer exposure: and frequency of
Chang, Valerie, x
statements about tax policy, 40 t, 41; as
charitable donations, estate tax as encour-
predictor of fewer billionaire statements
aging, 48
on same- sex marriage, 91, 91 t
Cherng, Andrew and Peggy, 17
consumer pressure as reason for political
Chicago, billionaires residing in, 18
silence, 31– 32
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Continental Oil, 12
(CCGA), surveys by on imitation at-
Contran, 119
titudes, 92– 94, 93 t
contributions: amounts and frequency of
Chicago Teachers Union, 108
by billionaires, 43– 44, 43 t, 81– 82; by
Chick- Fil- A, boycott of, 78
billionaires to state and local elections,
China: immigrant billionaires from, 18; US
103– 5; FEC data on, 4; inferring bil-
investment in, 21
lionaires’ policy preferences from, 4– 5;
Citadel hedge fund, 22
by Koch brothers, 72; by labor unions,
Cities Service preferred stock, 57
72; to policy- specific groups as indica-
index
207
tors of policy preferences, 5; reporting
deliberation, billionaires’ potential contri-
requirements concerning, 36– 37; share
butions to, 83, 99
of billionaires and multimillionaires in
Dell, 12; Carl Icahn’s efforts to take over, 66
total amount of, 2; strategic, 4. See also
Delta Airlines, 58
donors, wealthy; political actions of
democracy: billionaires and, 6, 25– 26;
billionaires; political contributions by
centrality of political equality to, 50, 99,
billionaires
139; stealth politics and, 7
Cook, Fay Lomax, x
Democracy Alliance: efforts by to match
cooperation among people, the amassing of
Koch network, 104; George Soros and,
great fortunes and, 139
122
corporate governance, Carl Icahn on, 67– 68
democracy by coincidence, 162n21
corporate tax inversions, Carl Icahn’s op-
democracy vouchers, 140
position to, 68– 69
Democratic Party: efforts by to match Koch
corporate tax rates: billionaires’ political ac-
network, 104; few state governments
tions on, 44 t, 44; Carl Icahn’s self- interest
controlled by, 106
and, 70; disagreement of multimillion-
Democrats: administrations’ “grand
aires with most Americans concerning,
bargains” to cut Social Security, 52,
136; most billionaires’ silence on, 38, 39 t;
billionaires, economically conservative
Warren Buffett on raising, 59
tendency of, 109; billionaires’ limited
corporate welfare, Charles Koch’s opposi-
contributions to, 43 t, 82; mayors, billion-
tion to, 74
aires’ contributions to, 103; officials, reli-
corporations’ policy alignments, as un-
ance of upon conservative donors, 107
related to affluent individuals’ policy
deportation rules and procedures, 80
preferences, 51
Desai, Bharat, 17
Cox Enterprises, 12
deviant cases, r
easons for studying, 56
Crooks and Liars website, 163n38
DeVos, Betsy, 1; and slashing of Michigan
Crossroads GPS, 178n109
public school funding, 107
Crow, Harlan, 104
disclosure of political activities, 141– 43;
cultural anxieties, anti- immigration at-
possible effects of on political inequality,
titudes and, 94
143; protected free speech and, 142
cultural issues, 77. See also abortion; immi-
Dish Network, 12
gration; same- sex marriage; social issues
Disney, 12
districts, congressional, reducing one- party
Dalio, Ray, 12; Bridgewater hedge fund
domination of, 140
and, 22
Domhoff, G. William, 169n75
Dallas City Council, help from with financing
donors, wealthy, activities of between elec-
of Omni- managed convention hotel, 124
tions, 105– 6. See also contributions;
Dallas city government, Robert Rowling’s
political contributions by billionaires
contributions to, 123, 124
Downs, Anthony, on the inevitability of
Dallas/Fort Worth, billionaires residing in, 18
political inequality, 76
dark money: and Citizens United decision,
DREAM Act, 80
166n72; as an increasing force in Ameri-
Dropbox, 16
can politics, 50; Koch brothers and, 72;
Drutman, Lee, on narrow vs. industry- wide
methods of uncovering contributions,
lobbying by corporations, 169n74
36– 37; and underestimation of stealth
politics, 50; unreported, 5
earned income tax credit, disagreement of
death tax, as search term, 34– 35
multimillionaires with most Americans
debates, political, potential value of bil-
concerning, 136
lionaires in, 52
eBay, 17
Deere & Co., 10
EchoStar, 12
208
index
economic class, billionaires and, 14– 15
environmental regulation, Koch brothers
economic competition over jobs, anti-
and, 47
immigration attitudes and, 94
equal voice for all citizens, 99
economic conservatism, wealth level and,
equality, political, and democracy, 50, 99, 139
32
equality of opportunity, Warren Buffett on,
economic freedom, Koch brothers on, 47
59– 60
economic growth, incentives and, 24
Ergen, Charles, 12
economic hardship: expectation that demo-
Esman, Pauline, x
cratic politics will produce remedies for,
estate tax: Bill Gates’s advocacy of, 48;
137– 38; and populist revolts, 138
billionaires’ political actions on, 44,
Billionaires and Stealth Politics Page 32