by Tom Clancy
At a “lager” (an encampment of combat vehicles, typically in a circle facing outward—think of covered wagons) near Goldstone, the leaders of the OPFOR were also planning for tomorrow’s battle. After several hours of work by the operations (S-3) staff, it was decided that the battle would begin with aggressive counter-reconnaissance against the 3rd ACR to the east (whoever wins the reconnaissance battle usually wins the fight). Vehicles of the 60th Guards Motorized Rifle Division would dig in on hills north of the pass. Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) teams would hide among the rocks at the mouth of the pass. When the 1st Squadron came through the next morning, they would enter an ambush with interlocking fields of fire.
Lieutenant Colonel Toby Martinez, the commander of the 3rd ACR’s 1st “Tiger” Squadron, after the defeat in Brown’s Pass. He had “jumped” from four vehicles that had been “hit” during the force-on-force engagement.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
As both sides moved up to their initial positions that night, a series of little actions began that would have a decisive impact on the following day’s battle. Along the line of hills and ridges north of the pass, the reconnaissance teams that 3rd ACR landed from 4th Squadron’s Blackhawk helicopters were quickly snatched up by counter-reconnaissance teams from the 60th Guards. At dawn the next morning, as 3rd ACR’s 1 st Squadron moved west up into the pass, they were relatively blind.
Their only reconnaissance came from 4th Squadron’s aero scouts, who reported an enemy security outpost in the pass itself, and enemy armored vehicles in fighting positions to the west of the pass. But they could not get close enough to see more, due to the threat of simulated SAM and anti-aircraft fire from OPFOR positions.
At dawn the next morning, 1st Squadron blasted right through the pass, losing only a few vehicles to the OPFOR troops there. They then made a long bounding movement to the northwest towards the dug-in armored vehicles reported by the aero scouts. Lieutenant Colonel Martinez rode into battle in his M3 Bradley. Just behind came Colonel Young’s regimental command section, a pair of Bradleys.
During the bound towards the northwest, M1059s (M113 APCs with smoke generators) ran along the flanks of the lead vehicles laying down smoke, and all seemed to be going well. But suddenly all hell broke loose, as the hills to the north of the pass erupted in a hail of simulated ATGMs. A number of Abrams tanks and Bradleys were “killed” in this first barrage, and the plain to the west of the pass became littered with unmoving vehicles topped by blinking yellow strobe lights. Worst of all, the command tracks of Colonel Young and Lieutenant Colonel Martinez were knocked out in the missile barrage.
Toby Martinez is not a soldier who gives up easily. As soon as his command track was hit, he “jumped” to another vehicle to keep the momentum of the attack rolling. He would do this three more times before the day’s battle ended. Back on the command radio net, he ordered the survivors of A, B, and C Troops to attack and clear out the OPFOR missile teams from the rocks in the hills. While they were doing this, he sent D Company, the reserve of fourteen tanks, to continue the attack towards the dug-in armored vehicles to the west.
Unfortunately for Lieutenant Colonel Martinez and the troopers of 1st Squadron, the failed reconnaissance of the previous evening returned to haunt them. When the tanks of D Company reached the line of dug-in T-72 tanks and BMP fighting vehicles, they found not the expected company-sized unit, but almost a whole battalion of OPFOR fighting vehicles. Split into two widely separate groups, the squadron’s units were defeated in detail before they realized what had happened. The ATGM teams had pulled the cavalry troops in like flypaper, and the iron fist of OPFOR crushed them against the rock walls of the pass. Less than four hours after 1st Squadron left the line of departure, it had been decimated. Around the western mouth of the pass, the blinking “killed” lights of 3rd ACR vehicles bore mute testimony to the prowess of the OPFOR.
Nobody in the regiment had a tougher break that day than Toby Martinez. Not only did he have to “jump” four times from vehicles that were shot out from under him (he was looking for a fifth when orders terminating the battle came in over the radio net); but while he was jumping down from the fourth vehicle, an Abrams tank, he pulled muscles in his side and back and injured his right knee. This mishap would leave him in severe pain for days- still commanding his squadron. For now, though, he and Colonel Young rushed back to the After-Action Review (AAR) at the “Star Wars” building to take their knocks.
The lessons learned at this particular AAR included suggestions on:• Improving the regiment’s reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance plan.
• Better use of artillery and close air-support missions, which had almost no effect on the action in the pass.
• Better use of the terrain in the pass to avoid exposure to ATGMs during long transits in the open.
With this fight over, their fourth in just a week, 1st Squadron made preparations to switch with Norm Greczyn’s 2nd Squadron up at Drinkwater Lake. This would involve a 30-mile/50-kilometer road march by all of the squadron’s vehicles to the other end of Fort Irwin. During this time, Colonel Young and the regimental tactical operations center (RTOC) team would stay behind to work with 2nd Squadron for another ten days of force-on-force battles. It had been a tough week for the troopers of the 1st Squadron, and they were already tired, dusty, and dirty. The previous few days had been extremely hot and it would get hotter as they moved east to the live-fire range. Temperatures topped 115°F/46° C. But inside a tank or Bradley, the temperature can get up to 20°F /11° C hotter! For myself, I must confess that the heat was devastating. I was still getting into the “groove” of the hydration cycle, and more than once I wished I had stayed back in the air-conditioned luxury of the VIP quarters at Fort Irwin. As we flew back to the main base in a UH-1 helicopter for a “dining-in” that evening, I kept thinking about the young 3rd ACR troopers who would not have a fresh meal, a shower, or an air-conditioned room to sleep in. At the same time, I found myself wishing better luck to Toby and his squadron in their first live-fire at Drinkwater Lake on Sunday morning.
The author with General Coffey (left) and series illustrator Laura Alpher (center) at a field meeting of NTC observer-controllers after an exercise.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
Daytime Live-Fire, Sunday, September 12th, 1993
If Lieutenant Colonel Martinez had hoped for better luck following the 1st Squadron’s force-on-force phase of the NTC deployment, then he had some cruel surprises coming his way. His injuries from the fall on the 8th were still hurting badly, and he was getting only a couple of hours sleep a night. Sleep deprivation is a serious matter when you are making life-and-death decisions, and the pain in his side did not help. Worse yet was the news about the availability of tanks and Bradleys. By Sunday morning, due to shortages of spare parts at Fort Irwin, only 60% of his tanks and 55% of his Bradley fighting vehicles were operable. This meant that engineer support and indirect artillery fire would play a much larger role than usual. It would be the deciding factor in the success or failure of the squadron.
What the squadron faced that Sunday morning is the mother of all shooting galleries: Drinkwater Lake Live-Fire Range. Nestled in a valley in the northeast corner of Fort Irwin, it runs east to west, with hills on the north side and rugged mountains to the south. At the eastern end of the valley, at the bottom of a long slope, is Drinkwater Dry Lake, a seasonal lake dried smooth and white by the vicious summer heat. On the floor of the valley are a series of 1,500 computer-controlled “pop-up” targets that simulate visually the advance of an MRR down the valley towards the positions of the Blue Force.
The targets are controlled by the O/C team at the range control center perched atop a hill on the western end of the valley. When a target is hit by one of the training-practice (TP) rounds fired from a tank or fighting vehicle, it is scored as a “kill” and does not appear again in the line of “pop-ups.” To win, the Blue Force has to destroy three full battalions of targets, or about 160 simulated ene
my vehicles. The conditions at Drinkwater Lake are as real as range safety regulations will allow. Live artillery is allowed (as we would see later), and even chemical warfare is simulated, with the use of tear gas grenades requiring the troopers to fight in MOPP-IV suits.
The day prior to the live-fire exercise, Lieutenant Colonel Martinez, his commanders, the S2, the S3, the fire support officer, the direct support field artillery battalion commander, and the engineer company commander walked the battlefield and decided on the engagement area where they intended to kill the enemy. After the leaders’ reconnaissance of the terrain, the squadron commander directed the positioning of the vehicles, identified the limits of the engagement area, and divided it into three separate kill zones. The first zone, out of range of direct-fire weapons, was dominated by the artillery and the close air support (CAS) F-16s. The intent was to mass on the enemy the indirect fires of the regiment’s field artillery battalion (consisting of three artillery batteries) and the squadron’s own howitzer battery (thirty M109 tubes total). Lieutenant Colonel Martinez made it clear he wanted all artillery batteries massed on enemy formations using “linear sheafs”1 for maximum destruction. If the enemy was allowed to enter within the range of direct-fire weapons unharmed, there would be too many targets for the tanks and Bradleys to kill and the enemy would roll over the positions. The fire support officer, Captain Joe Feistritzer, positioned the fire support teams (FISTs) on the high ground to the flanks of the engagement area, to ensure long-range and overlapping fields of observation. Artillery targets were identified and surveyed, and trigger points were marked on the ground. The second kill zone was dominated by the M1 Abrams and TOW missiles from the M3 Bradleys, based upon the maximum range of these weapons. The priority targets for this kill zone were the enemy tanks. The intent was to destroy the enemy tanks before they could close within their effective fire range. Artillery and mortars would continue to provide suppressive fire and smoke. The squadron commander expected to destroy the remaining enemy within the third kill zone. This is where the majority of the obstacles were emplaced, and where all weapons systems could reach the enemy. The squadron commander knew that if the artillery could kill at least 20% of the targets at long range, and if the engineer obstacle plan could keep the enemy in the engagement area for at least ten extra minutes, the troopers manning the tanks and Bradleys would finish the destruction of the enemy.
(1) 3rd ACR M1A1 HC tanks (the one on the left is equipped with a mine plow) after a force-on-force engagement in Brown’s Pass.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
(2) 3rd ACR troopers in chemical-warfare suits work around their M 109 self-propelled howitzers.
JOHN, D. GRESHAM
(3) A 3rd ACR M1A1 HC tank dug in on the Drinkwater Lake Live-Fire Range at the NTC.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
Once the plan was set, all components of the squadron were put in motion toward the same objective-preparing the battlefield to destroy the enemy. Late that night, Lieutenant Colonel Martinez met with his commanders—the artillery battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Twohig; the Tiger Squadron operations officer (S3), Major Brossart; the fire support officer, Captain Feistritzer; and the squadron intelligence officer (S2), Captain Whatmough—and one more time went over in detail the engagement area, fire control, engagement priorities, every artillery target trigger point, and the synchronization matrix. Following the meeting, he met with his squadron executive officer, Major Sandridge, to get the latest combat power report; and then he boarded his M3 Command Track with his fire support officer and moved to his position for the morning’s fight. The following morning at “Stand To” (the designated time in which all weapon systems and personnel must be ready to fight), he received status reports from all commanders, and an intelligence update from the S2. At this point, Lieutenant Colonel Martinez realized there was nothing else he could do to prepare the Tiger Squadron for battle. He tried to relax and waited for the enemy.
The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment’s fight with the NTC’s live-fire target array on September 12th, 1993. The fight developed (1) with the first wave of two simulated motor rifle battalions (MRBs) being hit by well-planned and directed artillery fire. Then (2) 1st Squadron destroyed the rest of the two MRBs with fire from positions on the north side of the valley and Sabot Ridge. The last assault (3) came from the reserve MRB along the south side of Drinkwater Lake. Due to a stop in the artillery fire for safety reasons, a few (about 25 out of 160) simulated vehicles got through.
JACK RYAN ENTERPRISES, LTD., BY LATRA ALPHER
With less than 60% of his direct-fire weapons available that morning, the squadron would have to come up with something special to just break even in this battle. As we chatted on the flight out, General Taylor (himself a former NTC commander) told me that with their vehicle availability problems, he had little hope of 1 st Squadron doing very well that day, and that he was looking forward to seeing “how much character Toby and his troopers have.” All of us were going to get an education on just how much they did have.
By 0700 (7:00 AM), we had landed and were having coffee with the O/C team at an observation area overlooking the valley. The O/C team’s plan for defeating the crippled 1st Squadron was brutal and simple. The target controllers would run one battalion of targets along each side of the lake from east to west. And they would commit their “reserve battalion” to whichever thrust got the farthest. This is consistent with the Soviet-style doctrine of reinforcing success with combat reserves. As the first line of targets “popped up” on the saddle of the pass leading into the western end of the valley (called the “S-Band” of targets), the O/Cs were confident that they would blow 1st Squadron right out of the valley.
With the positions of the defending Blue Force vehicles fixed (due to range safety requirements), they could not retreat or shift firing positions during the battle. This made the setup of Colonel Martinez’s already depleted force even more critical. The main line of defense ran from the base of the mountain on the southern side of the valley, along a raised piece of ground called Sabot Ridge, and then in a long crescent along the north side of the valley. The setup was designed to provide maximum interlocking fire against the widest corridor in the valley along the north side of the dry lake bed. Because the brine shrimp larvae that hibernate beneath the surface are an endangered species (no, I am not kidding), one of the rules of the live-fire range is that nobody can intrude upon the dry lake, and no heavy vehicle traffic or artillery is allowed.
Dug in to a shallow fighting position at the NTC, this Bradley prepares for battle with the OPFOR. Note the TOW launcher in its ready-to-fire position, and the blinker lamp mounted beside the commander’s hatch.
OFFICIAL U.S. ARMY PHOTO
Meanwhile, the O/Cs had us don flak jackets and helmets for protection in case a stray round should fall nearby. And at 0800 (8:00 AM), we sat down to watch the battle. It was like a slow pageant, with the first line of targets appearing and advancing silently. Occasionally, the O/Cs would have a target “pop” a smoke generator to simulate the dust of vehicles moving across the desert floor. Just then, the first ranging shots from 1st Squadron’s artillery batteries began to strike around the advancing line of targets. Immediately, the artillery began to “kill” large numbers of targets, and the northern target line began to crumble. The noise of the artillery was like distant thunder, with the black smoke and dust of the HE shells temporarily obscuring our view. Then, the first of the F-16s from Nellis AFB (near Las Vegas, Nevada) came in, hitting even more of the northern targets. To the south, the same thing was happening, with the artillery chewing up the advancing target line along the southern edge of Drinkwater Lake.
Lieutenant Colonel Martinez’s artillery and CAS plan worked so well that we almost forgot about the depleted force of tanks and Bradleys in the valley waiting for “leakers” that got through the barrage. Suddenly, the first tank opened up with a “crack” from its 120mm main gun. Almost immediately, several others fired; and we heard the �
�whoosh” of TOW missiles heading out across the lake bed to hit targets trying to move around to the south. As the simulated enemy advance reached the line of obstacles emplaced by the engineers, the last weapons to engage were the 25mm chain guns on the Bradleys. The fire discipline was perfect, with crews firing single ranging shots followed by three-round bursts when they found the range. Over the O/C radio net, we could hear the count of targets destroyed, and were surprised when the controllers announced that the first two battalions had been annihilated, and that they were going to commit the reserve battalion of targets to the southern corridor around the lake bed.
The commander of III Corps, General “Pete” Taylor, talks with Lieutenant Colonel Toby Martinez, the commander of the 3rd ACR’s 1st “Tiger” Squadron, after their NTC live-fire fight at Drinkwater Lake.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
There was a temporary lull as the O/Cs moved up the last of the battalion target arrays and the artillery crews got ready to re-engage with their big guns. When the M109s started firing again, they repeated for a time the success of the previous barrage. Even the dropping of some tear gas grenades around the defense line (causing them to don their MOPP-IV suits) and the liberal use of “God Guns” to “kill” random tanks and fighting vehicles did not slow down the 1st Squadron fire.
Then the inevitable “friction” of war came into play. Several 155mm HE rounds from an M 109 battery impacted at the wrong location, throwing up a shower of salt and brown earth. NTC safety rules require the O/Cs to issue a “Cease Fire” order to all batteries when this happens, so the artillery chain of command can sort out who is shooting at what. It only took ten minutes or so to sort it out and get the guns back firing. But in that time, the target array had moved around the lake and into the eastern end of the valley. In the end, when the order arrived terminating the battle, a handful of “leakers” had reached the defense line along Sabot Ridge. As the guns stopped firing and the “All clear” signals came in over the net, you could hear the usually calm and objective O/C team’s excitement over how well 1st Squadron had done. Clearly, we had witnessed something special at the NTC: A unit had snatched “victory” from a seemingly hopeless situation. When the final tally came in, Toby and his troopers had “killed” 135 out of 160 simulated enemy tanks. Although they had suffered some twenty-five “leakers” at the end, they had racked up one for the NTC record book.