In addition to his chief of staff, Bonaparte’s entourage included a number of brilliant young officers all destined to achieve high rank and military fame. The lively Gascon cavalryman, Joachim Murat, who with superb nerve had suggested his own appointment, was serving as a colonel aide-de-camp. Murat made up with his dash and personal courage for certain deficiencies of imagination and intellect. Then there was Major Junot, aged twenty-four, who had served as a sergeant at Toulon and followed Bonaparte to Paris in the lean year that followed, and finally the general’s brother, Louis Bonaparte and the young Marmont, just twenty-two, a close personal friend of several years’ standing, a fellow gunner. Rarely had such a galaxy of military talent served together at one time and place. All these staff officers were destined to achieve distinction, and many more leaders of future renown were to emerge from the demi-brigades of the Army of Italy.
Recognizing the need for a minimum period of reorganization and re-equipment, Bonaparte announced that the campaign would open on April 15 and was insistent that every effort should be made to meet the deadline. However, fine words were not enough; he at once ordered a small issue of pay from the limited financial resources entrusted to him by the Directory, and commanded his chief commissary, Chauvet, to investigate the contractors and attempt to secure sizeable loans from the wealthy merchants of Genoa. A captured privateer was sold for £5,000 to swell the military chest.
As was mentioned in the last chapter, the Directory’s overall plan of operations for 1796 was in many respects similar to that of the previous year, and the dominant influence was again that of Carnot. The main effort was to be made on the German front, while, on the secondary Italian front, General Bonaparte was to try out the theories he had formulated during his spell at the Bureau Topographique in Paris. It was hoped that Austrian attention would be diverted from the crucial northern theater by the Army of Italy’s action against Piedmont and Lombardy, and that after the successful “pacification” of North Italy, General Bonaparte would be free to march over the Alps to join Moreau in the Tyrol for the final drive on Vienna, the ultimate objective. Two small reserve armies—one on the slopes of the Western Alps under Kellermann, the other further back in the region of the River Var—would support these operations by at least partially protecting Bonaparte’s lines of communication with Provence.
This plan of campaign appeared impressive on paper, but in sober practice it contained several flaws. In the first place, the two French offensives were not in any real sense within supporting distance of one another, separated as they were by the immense barrier of the Alps where the main passes were all firmly in Austrian hands. Secondly, if either offensive flagged, the weight of the enemy’s forces could be transferred over these same passes to the support of their harder-pressed comrades on the second front. Finally, the plan assumed the willingness of the French generals to act in concert, but in the event the two commanders on the German front proved suspicious of their colleague in Italy and failed to afford him their fullest cooperation; and, for his part, Bonaparte tended to regard his theater of operations as the only one of consequence. The Directory refused to appoint a supreme commander to coordinate these complementary offensives, and these problems were to become only too clear with the passage of time. Their cumulative effect on the operations of the Army of Italy was to be most pronounced, and it was to take all the genius and application of the young General Bonaparte to overcome the ensuing difficulties.
The Italian Campaign, 1796-1797
The scene of the First Italian Campaign presented marked contrasts of terrain. The foothills of the Maritime Alps and the first ranges of the Appenines ensured that the major fighting in the west would center on the control of the six passes and valleys which penetrate the mountain barrier between Genoa and Nice. Furthest west lay the Col di Tende, its northern exit leading into the heart of Piedmont, guarded by the fortress of Cuneo. Twenty-five miles to the east stretched the valley of the River Tanaro, also leading into Piedmont, the river’s upper course commanded by the town of Ceva. Between the coast town of Savona and the important road junction at Carcare lay the Col di Cadibona, affording access to either Piedmont through Ceva or to Lombardy down the two branches of the River Bormida. Through the town of Sassello ran the more difficult Col di Giovo, and further east again lay the Turchino Pass, running north from Voltri on the coast into the Stura valley; finally, linking Genoa with the Lombard Plains, stretched the historic Bochetta Pass. Joining the southern ends of all these valleys ran the narrow and hilly coastal strip containing the road from Marseilles and Toulon to Genoa, the vital lateral communication of the Army of Italy. Although the inhospitality of the area has sometimes been exaggerated—the valleys and foothills were in fact quite fertile by eighteenth-century standards—the local resources were not sufficient to supply the needs of both the population and a resident army of occupation unless the latter was equipped with a comprehensive and efficient system of rear depots and supply convoys. In both these respects, the Army of Italy was notably deficient, and this left its commander with the stark alternatives of moving to more fertile enemydominated areas or seeing his men starve.
Once these mountains were conquered, however, the rich plains of Lombardy presented a remarkable contrast. The dominating natural feature was the great River Po with its series of Alpine tributaries—the Sestia, Ticino, Adda, Oglio and Mincio watercourses, and beyond them the rivers Adige and Brenta, flowing independently into the Adriatic. To any attacker from the west, these waterways appeared to present a formidable series of water obstacles, their flanks protected by the Alps to the north and the Po to the south. A series of smaller streams similarly linked the Appenines with the Po, but these were less well placed from the viewpoint of the defense, for they provided an invader from the Ligurian coast with a number of easy approaches to the Lombard Plain once he had successfully negotiated the intervening mountain crests. The crossing points over the major rivers were obviously of the greatest military importance; Alessandria dominated the Bormida system, and the town of Valenza provided the best crossing over the upper Po, while further east on the river lay the cities of Piacenza and Cremona, and beyond these again was Mantua on the Mincio, the administrative and military center of Austrian rule in North Italy and the most southerly fortress of the famous “Quadrilateral.” The importance of this strategic area enclosed by the Mincio and Adige, the one river guarded by Mantua and Peschiera, and the other by Verona and Legnano—the last three of these fortresses belonging to the Republic of Venice—was ensured by its geographical position athwart the approaches to the key Alpine passes linking Italy with South Austria, most particularly the valleys of the rivers Chiese, Adige and Brenta. The key to the military domination of the North Italian plain lay in the control of the area of land enclosed within the “Quadrilateral.”
In the last years of the eighteenth-century, the Italian peninsula contained twelve major principalities. Apart from Austrian-occupied Lombardy, three states stood out above the rest in importance; the Kingdom of Sardinia (which included Piedmont and Savoy), the Papal States, controlling the central regions of Italy, and the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily. Of the remainder, only the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Serene Venetian Republic controlled sizeable territories, and the smaller principalities, such as Genoa, Parma and Modena, were either forced into the position of satellites to their more powerful neighbors or attempted to maintain a tenuous neutrality. A unified Italy still lay far in the future, and the only sentiment shared by the various reactionary rulers of this “patchwork quilt” of disunited states was fear of the French Government’s revolutionary doctrines. The peoples of Piedmont and Genoa were not, however, as averse to these dangerous ideas as were their rulers, and the existence of this latent sympathy explains the Directory’s orders to Bonaparte to deal carefully with the former in the pious hope that the country of Victor Amadeus might be enticed from the Austrian alliance of its own free will. Elsewhere, even in the Milanese, discontent with t
he Austrian yoke had produced the very first signs of Italian nationalism. It was hoped that these encouraging movements might materially further the ambitions of the French Government and the operations of the army.
A combination of armies under Austrian control provided General Bonaparte with his military problem. The Austrian commander in chief was the newly arrived 72-year-old General Beaulieu, a reasonably competent soldier whose greatest drawback was his complete lack of initiative, so tightly were his movements controlled by the Aulic Council. Three armies made up Beaulieu’s command. Some 19,500 soldiers were under his direct control, half of them dispersed on garrison duty at Alessandria and elsewhere, the remainder available for use as a field force under Generals Pittoni and Wukassovitch, but still, in early April, in winter quarters. The second force was formed by the 11,500 men of General Argenteau, based on the town of Acqui, and currently deployed after the usual Austrian fashion in a long outpost cordon along the hills from Carcare to the heights above Genoa. The third component was the army of General Colli—made up of some 20,000 Piedmontese troops strengthened by an Austrian detachment under Provera—stretched in a long and thinly-held line from Cuneo in the west to Ceva and Cosseira in the east, mainly engaged in watching the western passes through which the French army might debouch into Piedmont. A further force of 20,000 Piedmontese was stationed west of Turin under the Prince of Corrigan, observing the positions of Kellermann’s Army of the Alps. Discounting these last two forces, which virtually canceled each other out, the 37,000-strong French Army of Italy faced a total of 52,000 Austrians and Piedmontese.
The enemy’s numerical superiority was deceptive, however; besides the scattered location of over half their effective forces, the Allies were weakened by mutual suspicions. There was little love lost between the two governments or their armies, and although General Colli was himself an Austrian on secondment to the Piedmontese army, Vienna had warned Beaulieu to be prepared for the defection of his ally in the none too distant future. The atmosphere of mutual distrust had led each army to set up an independent series of communications running on divergent lines towards Mantua and Turin respectively. This arrangement doubtless served to spread the administrative burden of two field armies over as wide an area as possible, but in the prevailing political tension it only served to emphasize the independence of each wing of Beaulieu’s nominal command. A further weakness was the nature of the terrain which provided the Allies with the poorest of lateral communications, making mutual support extremely difficult, and the extent of ground which had to be covered made it impossible to maintain an effective strategic reserve.
The term demi-brigade replaced the term régiment from 1793 on the order of Carnot. This was an attempt to dissolve the ancient dynastic and regional associations of the standing army. In the chaotic early years of the wars, autonomous demi-brigades of volunteers or fédérés served alongside regular formations. These proved so unsatisfactory that shortly before Valmy in 1792 General Kellermann decided to brigade one regular and two fédéré battalions together in his army. This sensible step was eventually applied universally throughout the French land forces after the Amalgame was implemented in 1794.
6
THE DEFEAT OF PIEDMONT
If he was not sure of all the details, Bonaparte was well aware of the opportunity offered by his foes5 general dispositions, and he at once set himself to exploit these weaknesses to forestall any aggressive movement on their part. While he completed his plans, Army Headquarters was moved from Nice to Albenga, and thence to Savona on the 9th April. Despite the Directory’s cautions to use King Victor Amadeus gently, Bonaparte determined to launch a ruthless and immediate attack to drive Piedmont out of the war. He was well aware that Turin was already war-weary and likely to prove a comparatively easy victim, and if he was to carry the war into Austrian territory, it was vitally important that his communications with France should be secure. The first stage in the defeat of Piedmont involved the isolation of the intended victim. A study of maps indicated that the town of Carcare was the vulnerable link joining the Piedmontese and Austrian forces. Once this central position was in French hands, Bonaparte planned to concentrate his army’s efforts against the isolated General Colli, leaving a residual part of his force to hold off Argenteau’s Austrians in the vicinity of Dego.
This plan had much to recommend it, being based on an analysis of the events of 1794. Speed and surprise were the vital considerations. To avoid a further deterioration in the fighting capacity of the Army of Italy, a rapid advance to the fertile regions surrounding Turin was of great importance, and it was equally necessary to catch the foe dispersed and unready, furnishing Beaulieu with the least possible warning of what was afoot. An advance over the Col di Cadibona seemed to afford the greatest prospect of success. It provided the shortest approach to Carcare, was suitable for the passage of artillery, and would give the enemy little time to achieve a defensive concentration. The alternative lines of attack presented grave disadvantages. An advance down the Tanaro valley would be hindered by very rough ground, while an onslaught over the more practicable Col di Tende would be too far removed from the target area; both would give Beaulieu time to reinforce the threatened sector. It was therefore decided that Massena’s division would move from its encampments near Savona over the Cadibona to join Augereau’s troops advancing from Finale through the village of San Giacomo for a joint attack on Carcare. In this way Bonaparte hoped to concentrate 24,000 men at the critical point within two days, calculating from a close study of known enemy positions that Argenteau would be able to gather only 11,000 at Dego, and Colli no more than 12,000 between Ceva and Carcare within the same period of time. The margin of local superiority would, however, be only narrowly in the French favor, and much depended on a series of diversionary operations to be mounted by the other units of the Army of Italy. Sérurier, from the reserve position around Ormea, would, it was hoped, divert Colli’s attention by threatening an attack up the Tanaro valley toward Ceva, while the 6,800 men of Generals Macquart and Gamier made a demonstration toward Cuneo through the Col di Tenda. Away on the Mediterranean flank, part of General La Harpe’s division was to probe toward Sassello, linking the main body with the extreme right, where Brigadier Cervoni was to continue to operate in the vicinity of Voltri as if presaging a drive on Genoa. This whole series of operations was to commence on 15 th April.
In the event, however, force of circumstances compelled Bonaparte to open the campaign four days ahead of schedule. Against all expectations, Austrian troops suddenly launched an attack against Voltri. The original advance of Cervoni’s brigade had been carried out on the order of General Schérer, immediately prior to his handing over the command with a view to forcing the Genoese into granting sizeable loans, but news of this maneuver had galvanized Beaulieu into action. The Aulic Council had provided the Austrian commander in chief with only the vaguest orders for the conduct of the campaign, but in general terms he was to drive the French back into Provence. The exposed position of Cervoni’s brigade appeared to offer a fair opening for the campaign: two columns were ordered to advance down the Bochetta Pass and the Turchino valley to envelop and destroy the French at Voltri, while General Argenteau was to swoop on Savona from the hills to cut off La Harpe and Massena. After completing Cervoni’s destruction, and leaving an adequate cavalry force to protect Genoa, Beaulieu’s forces were to fall back on Alessandria, switch to the valley of the Bormida, and advance once more in support of Colli and Argenteau for the coup de grâce. In accordance with these instructions a large Austrian force suddenly descended on the Voltri position on April 10, taking Bonaparte completely by surprise. Cervoni, however, executed a masterly retreat in the face of vastly superior numbers, while on his flank Colonel Rampon held off elements of Argenteau’s troops, and so the French general ordered his subordinates to carry out their original instructions and take the offensive despite the fact that many administrative preparations were still incomplete. Fortunately for the Fr
ench, two circumstances acted in their favor. Beaulieu’s attack on Voltri revealed the position of the Austrian commander in chief and reassured Bonaparte that he would still have time to settle with Colli before the Austrian main body could be transferred from the coast to Piedmont’s assistance; secondly Argenteau received his orders a day late, which meant that he was unable to mount the drive toward Savona until after the completion of an initial concentration on the 11th. Before these Austrian troops could advance on their objective, General La Harpe’s troops inflicted a sharp check on them. Thus the Austrian offensive got off to a confused start, and the French were still in a position to seize the initiative.
General Bonaparte’s attack on Piedmont; April 1796, demonstrating the prototype of the Maneuver of the Central Position
Ignoring Beaulieu completely for the time being, Bonaparte moved fast to secure an initial victory over Argenteau which would leave the French free to deal with the Piedmontese army, as originally planned. Early on 12th April, 9,000 French troops attacked Argenteau’s 6,000 Austrians at Montenotte. General La Harpe mounted a frontal attack on the position while Massena, at the head of Menard’s brigade, worked round the Austrian right flank. In due course Argenteau realized his peril and ordered his men to retreat, but it was too late; Massena’s troops charged and routed the Austrian lines, and by dawn the next day Argenteau had only 700 men under direct command, leaving him with no option but to fall back to reorganize his scattered men. In the meantime captured Austrian muskets were being used to arm the thousand men of Augereau’s division who had been forced to advance without firearms.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 12