With the Army of Reserve at Ivrea, the First Consul determined to keep the initiative, despite his shortage of artillery. He could choose between three courses of action. He might advance immediately on nearby Turin; he could march for Genoa; or he had the opportunity of moving off at a tangent toward Milan. The third course was selected as by far the most advantageous in the long-term view. The occupation of Milan would be unexpected by the enemy under present circumstances and it would free Bonaparte’s hands for future operations, besides cutting Melas’ lines of communication along the north bank of the Po from the River Var to Brescia. The great city would provide the army with a great deal of urgently needed material from its depots—“the army went to find guns in the enemy’s arsenals”—and its proximity to the vital strategic area of Stradella (commanding Melas’ main communications with Mantua) might well induce Melas to abandon the siege of Genoa. Further advantages included an earlier link-up with Moncey and Béthencourt, and the option of using a safer set of communications running through the Simplon and St. Gotthard passes. On political grounds the move on Milan also had a great deal to recommend it; the Milanese were notoriously discontented with Austrian rule, and the liberation of the area might provide a nucleus for a reconstituted Cisalpine Republic. The other options possessed few comparable advantages but would expose the army to greater perils. An immediate advance on either Turin or Genoa would inevitably lead to a premature battle with Melas under conditions favorable to the Austrians; with few guns, a decisive French victory would be very unlikely, and in the event of a repulse their line of retreat over the Great St. Bernard would be hopelessly compromised by the continued resistance of the Fort of Bard in the French rear. Taking all these factors into account, an advance on Milan appeared the wisest course, even though it would afford Melas several valuable days in which to complete his concentration.
In preparation for the move, the reserve’s order of battle was partially reorganized. Monnier’s division was added to Victor’s corps in replacement of Chabran (still besieging Bard), and Lannes was deprived of part of his Italian contingent; these were sent off under General Lecchi to protect the Reserve’s left flank from the foothills of the Alps with orders to make contact with Béthencourt and Moncey. Ivrea was designated as the centre des opérations for the forthcoming phase. To guard the right flank, Lannes was instructed to move west to Chivasso as if presaging a drive on Turin. These precautions did much to protect the army during its dangerous flank march from Ivrea to Milan, but on the other hand led to a considerable dispersal of force.
In the days that followed, Lannes carried out his orders with his customary élan. His men covered themselves with glory on May 26 along the banks of the Chiusella, and pushed on for Chivasso. Commandant Brossier described the moves in his Journal: “The troops of the advance guard entered Chivasso on the 28th May so as to make a show a strength in the face of the enemy, who was in occupation of the Po’s right bank, and keep him persuaded that the French army was moving on Turin.”28 By this time, Bonaparte was putting into execution his major moves. Feeling confident that Massena could hold out until June 4, which meant that the army had ten days in which to cover the 90 miles to Stradella by way of Milan, the First Consul ordered the army to march to the south-east. Riding ahead, Murat captured Vercelli on the 27th, and two days later crossed the River Sesia, followed by Duhesme’s corps, and advanced cavalry units penetrated as far as Novara. Bonaparte remained at Ivrea until the night of the 29th. “I am in bed,” he wrote to his wife; “In an hour’s time I leave for Vercelli. Murat should be in Novara this evening. The enemy is completely baffled and still cannot guess what we are at. Within the next ten days I hope to be back in the arms of my Josephine, who is always charming, except when she is crying or playing the ‘coquette.’ …”29
Murat reached the banks of the Ticino on the 30th, and the next day forced a crossing at Turbingo over the last obstacle separating the French from Milan, covered by Duhesme’s diversionary attack against the Austrians at Buffalore. The same day the Reserve began to transfer its communications from the exposed St. Bernard to the safer Simplon and St. Gotthard passes, the depots of Brieg in the Upper Rhine valley replacing Geneva as the army’s source of supply.
June 2 found Bonaparte in Milan “in the midst of demonstrations of general joy. The inhabitants of all ages and both sexes flocked around the man who had brought them freedom and good fortune a second time,” recorded Brossier. The Austrians had previously evacuated the city, leaving a small garrison in the citadel which Murat promptly blockaded. The same day saw Lannes in Pavia after a forced march along the Po, exulting in the booty he found there. “Every moment we make new discoveries,” he reported; “You will be astonished to learn that we have found between three and four hundred cannon—some siege and some field—complete with their carriages.” A few of these pieces were found suitable for incorporation in the army’s artillery train; this still comprised only the six original cannon and a further four captured at Ivrea, but the guns from the siege of Bard were soon to make their welcome appearance.
The First Consul stayed in Milan for almost a week, but his time was far from idle despite the insinuations of certain critics. The first task he undertook was the formation of a “zone of security” between the rivers Oglio and Trebbia to the east and south of the city in order to ward off the danger of any Austrian intervention from the direction of Mantua. Duhesme was sent with two divisions on the 3rd to seize Lodi bridge (of hallowed memory), and the following day Murat and Boudet set off for Piacenza to establish a bridgehead over the Po. The same day Lannes was directed to march on Belgiosi to make a second crossing place, ready for the move of the army to Stradella. Important events occurred on the 5th: an Austrian attack on Vercelli was reported, demonstrating the wisdom of the switch of communications now in progress, but the same day the leading units of Moncey’s corps, which had crossed the St. Gotthard on May 29, reached Milan, and were incorporated in a new division under the command of General Gardanne. They were soon followed by the divisions of Lapoype and Lorge. Also, on June 5 the resistance of Fort Bard at last came to an end releasing the greater part of the Reserve’s artillery, and Chabran’s division moved south to perform a security role on the left bank of the Po.
Meanwhile the bridging detachments were moving on their objectives. Murat reported that he had gained the north bank opposite Piacenza after a stiff fight on the 5th, and next day Lannes, short of pontoons and artillery though he was, contrived a crossing with his infantry at Belgiosi in the teeth of fierce opposition. On receipt of these tidings, Berthier moved headquarters to Pavia and directed the remainder of the army to follow him there, leaving only Lorge’s division in Milan. Bonaparte was growing anxious about Murat’s delay in forcing a crossing at Piacenza, for he was still not sure about Melas’ movements, and was still anticipating an Austrian movement on Stradella. “I am longing to hear that there are 20,000 men at Stradella,” he wrote to Lannes. His anxiety was partially eased on the 7th, when Murat, after three days of sporadic fighting and searching for boats, at last crossed the Po and seized the city. A pontoon bridge was soon completed, and the Reserve was in possession of a second crossing place over the great river; the concentration at Stradella could now proceed.
Apart from the direction of these complex military operations, life in Milan had its lighter moments for Bonaparte. A visit to the Opera was greatly appreciated, and time was even found to give an address to 200 assembled clerics; the reverend fathers took well to their unlikely Director of Conscience, but it was perhaps just as well they did not know that similar discussions with Moslem divines had featured prominently in the young general’s timetable during his previous campaign. Captured enemy correspondence also took up a great deal of his time. Bonaparte was particularly amused to read documents satirizing the French forces; an abregée of their contents was forwarded to Paris for the delectation of his brother-Consuls: “ ‘The French troops are no more than water spaniels; thei
r generals are men without talent,’ they say. Most of all they direct their little jokes against the Army of the Reserve, even drawing caricatures; the cavalry are shown mounted on donkeys; the infantry, consisting of invalid grandfathers and mere children, are armed with bayonets stuck on poles; the artillery consists of two blunderbusses…. They are beginning to change their tune, however, and their troops appear extremely discontented.”30
Murat found welcome supplies in captured Piacenza, but missed a convoy of sixty field guns en route for Alessandria. His most important discovery, however, was a packet of Melas’ latest dispatches intercepted on their way to the Aulic Council. The most significant reached Bonaparte early on the 8th. The tidings they revealed were almost unbelievably bad: Genoa had surrendered. In one letter Melas wrote that he had actually ordered the abandonment of the siege on June 2 in order to concentrate against “the army from Germany,” but at that moment Massena’s envoys requested negotiations. A second missive, dated the 5th, concluded the tale: “The capitulation of Genoa, begun on the 2nd June by Commander in Chief Massena, was completed yesterday. By this morning, the place should have been evacuated by the enemy. The garrison will be escorted as far as the foe’s [Suchet’s] outposts, and from there will be free to recommence operations.”31
Massena had fought a splendid defense, in the face of increasing difficulties, since mid-April. By late May all provisions were exhausted, but he still hung on. The loss of Soult—wounded and captured in a sortie on May 11—was a heavy loss, and later in the month the starving population had to be put down by force. Patrols were ordered to shoot any gatherings of four or more people on sight. The men, however, became progressively weaker on their diet of horsemeat and sour bread made from a mixture of bran, straw, oats and cocoa. The garrison last received news from outside on May 27, when a Captain Franceschi rowed through the naval blockade and completed a colorful exploit by swimming ashore, saber between his teeth, amid the crackling volleys and thundering broadsides of his alerted enemies. The news he brought was not conclusive: the Reserve was on its way over the Alps, but that was all he could tell. Unaware of the actual proximity of Bonaparte, Massena, whose hair had gone grey during the siege, decided to hold out until the agreed date of June 4 and then capitulate, on the best terms he could obtain. Under the circumstances these were remarkably good, for General Ott did not underestimate Massena’s threat to fight his way out, and in addition, the Austrians had little time to waste. The French were to be repatriated behind the River Var and then permitted to resume combatant status. So ended an episode that greatly enhanced the doughty warrior’s reputation, although in later years Napoleon maintained that the surrender of Genoa was premature.
At first, according to Bourienne, Bonaparte refused to believe the news. “Bah!” he exclaimed. “You do not understand German!” The loss of Genoa was indeed a heavy, if not entirely unforeseen* blow to the First Consul’s plans; at a stroke it deprived him of a valuable force on the farther side of the enemy, for the River Var was several days’ march from the critical area and Massena’s men would need several days to reorganize before reopening operations. Even worse, the Austrians might be induced to use Genoa as a refuge and center of operations from which they could defy Bonaparte at Stradella; the fateful siege of Acre had taught Bonaparte not to underestimate the ability of the Royal Navy to sustain a beleagured fortress with open access to the sea. However, a close analysis of Melas’ dispatches revealed one favorable aspect: by opening negotiations on the 2nd, Massena had ensured that Ott’s corps was not available to Melas for a further vital three days despite the commander in chief’s original order. Thus, in the very act of surrendering, Massena had unconsciously rendered the Army of Reserve a signal service, winning it invaluable time for the completion of its preparations, free from enemy interference. Melas was perhaps the victim of his own propaganda, and still thought lightly of the Reserve’s capabilities, considering the capture of Genoa more important than the early completion of his army’s concentration. In the event, the business of Genoa proved to be the key to the entire campaign.
On May 6, Bonaparte wrote: “I count on Massena, I hope he will hold Genoa, but if they starve him out I will retake Genoa on the plains of the Scrivia.”
27
MARENGO
The new situation required a rapid revision of Bonaparte’s plans. Instead of waiting passively at Stradella for Melas to attempt the reopening of his communications with Mantua, the French had to assume the offensive, advance on Alessandria and compel the Austrians to fight under any conditions before they could retire on Genoa or make a break for the north bank of the Po. From Milan, the First Consul deluged Berthier (at Pavia) with precise instructions for immediate execution of an “advance to contact.” “General Lannes’ command, which is more than 8,000 strong if we include the cavalry, must march tomorrow for Voghera” (halfway between Stradella and Alessandria). He was to be supported by Generals Victor, Monnier and Gardanne with their joint 16,000 men. “Generals Murat and Duhesme—who between them have 10,000 men—will make corresponding moves. In this way you will apply pressure to Melas…. General Moncey and the Italians should place a unit north of the Oglio” (to safeguard the line of retreat); “A second detachment should continue the blockade of the citadel at Milan; a third—for the defense of the Ticino—should march up the left bank of the Po, keeping up with the main army so as to be able to assist any moves from one bank to the other; lastly, in the event of the enemy crossing the Po, this force should be ready to retire before him to join with all the men who may have arrived at Milan and undertake the defense of the Ticino.”32
This radical change of intention inevitably gave rise to a degree of confusion, and the fog of war returned with a vengeance to hamper operations and strain everybody’s nerves. Lannes received no less than four sets of orders within 24 hours; the first communication (on the night of the 7th) ordered him to march to Murat’s assistance at the Piacenza bridgehead. Watrin’s division was already on the road when fresh orders arrived early on the 8th canceling the move. This was followed later in the morning by instructions to move to the west of Stradella to forestall an anticipated Austrian attack, but that evening, following Bonaparte’s receipt of the ill tidings from Genoa, Lannes was ordered to advance as far as Casteggio, with Victor in support, to make contact with the enemy. Little wonder that Lannes took the bit between his teeth on the 9th and rushed into a rash battle beyond the town.
There were other instances of confusion in the days that followed. Bonaparte ordered the construction of three new bridges on the 9th after hearing that Lannes’ original “flying bridge” at Belgiosi was out of action owing to a spate of the Po. A harassed Berthier selected the sites, but in his haste chose one completely impracticable place; the fact that he was using a map originally made in 1668 (revised 1772) with a scale of 1⁄144,000* was no doubt partially responsible. However, other instances of staff inefficiency were not far to seek; some orders were unnecessarily duplicated—Berthier absentmindedly repeated a set of orders to Duhesme on the 11th in spite of the fact that the officer had acknowledged the receipt of the original instructions of the 9th. Other orders were not sent at all; on the 11th a furious Berthier required Dupont to explain why so important a general as Marmont had not been notified of the move of headquarters to Stradella. At the root of this confusion lay Berthier’s incurable habit of meddling in his chief of staff’s business; he never felt happy as general-in-chief, and was forever hankering, often unconsciously, to revert to his true role. Under such circumstances there is little wonder that supply arrangements also tended to break down; Lannes and Murat both complained of receiving their men’s rations days late, and Boudet’s division could be issued with only 30 rounds per man instead of the regulation 60. A combination of circumstances—the sudden move on Stradella, the abrupt concentration of a mass of units and a number of generals with little or no experience of cooperation with one another—explain the confusions that occurred. Never
theless, it is a striking proof of Bonaparte’s genius, determination and boldness that his orders were eventually carried out.
The same day that the First Consul left Milan, General Lannes was hotly engaged with the 18,000 Austrians of General Ott’s corps at Montebello. The 8,000 Frenchmen were seriously outnumbered, not even Bonaparte had anticipated that they would be confronted with so powerful a foe, but Lannes did not hesitate in plunging forward beyond Casteggio into the attack. The timely arrival of Victor with 5,000 more men turned the Austrian flank, clinching a notable victory, and Ott retired in confusion to Alessandria after sustaining heavy casualties. Brossier recorded one particular act of heroism. “We saw a young drummer, Gabriel Coctil by name, a native of Romagny, push forward all on his own through the center of the fields, beating the charge, drawing behind him a company of fine fellows who turned the enemy off a hill they were occupying.”33 In later years Lannes’ action was rewarded with the title of Duke of Montebello, but the communiqués of the day are strangely silent, probably because Lannes acted against the letter of Berthier’s cautious orders. Much of the credit was, at the time, bestowed on the First Consul. This was most unjust, for Bonaparte crossed to the south bank of the Po only late in the afternoon and took no personal part in the battle. Nevertheless, Lannes’ deeds proved of great use to Bonaparte; the battle confirmed the presence of Ott near Alessandria and revealed that Melas’ concentration was practically complete; even more significant, Austrian morale suffered a serious relapse, and Melas remained as if hypnotized around Alessandria for the next five days without making any significant move, waiting for his troops to complete their concentration.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 38