41
“LE BATAILLON CARRÉ”
By the end of the first week in October everything was in readiness for the initial stage of the campaign, the passage of the Franconian Forest. During the first four days of the month, the corps had moved up to four forward concentration areas—Kronach, Forcheim, Würzburg and Schweinfurt, and were concentrated in an area approximately 37 miles square. On the 5th, Napoleon had sent a detailed order to Soult revealing his plan for crossing the natural obstacle to their front.
I have caused Würzburg, Forcheim and Kronach to be occupied, armed and provisioned, and I propose to debouch into Saxony with my whole army in three columns. You are at the head of the right column with Marshal Ney’s Corps half a day’s march behind you and 10,000 Bavarians a day’s march behind him, making altogether more than 50,000 men. Marshal Bernadotte leads the center, followed by Marshal Davout’s corps, the greater part of the Reserve Cavalry, and the Guard, making more than 70,000 men. He will march by way of Kronach, Lebenstein and Schleiz. The Vth Corps* is at the head of the left, having behind it Marshal Augereau’s Corps. This wing will march by way of Coburg, Grafenthal and Saalfeld, and musters over 40,000 men. The day you reach Hof the remainder of the army will have reached positions on the same alignment. I shall march with the center.
With this immense superiority of force united in so narrow a space you will realize that I am determined to leave nothing to chance, and can attack the foe wherever he chooses to stand with nearly double his strength….
If the enemy opposes you with a force not exceeding 30,000 men, you should concert with Marshal Ney and attack him…. On reaching Hof, your first care should be to open communications between Lebenstein, Ebersdorf and Schleiz….
From the news that has come in today it appears that if the foe makes any move it will be against my left; the bulk of his forces seem to be near Erfurt….
I cannot press you too earnestly to write to me frequently and keep me fully informed of all you learn from the direction of Dresden.
You may well think that it will be a fine thing to move around this area in a battalion square of 200,000 men. Still, this will require quite a little art and certain events.21
The disposition of his forces revealed by this document is justly celebrated. The Grande Armée’s formation into a bataillon carré of some 180,000 men would enable it to meet an enemy attack from any direction. The component parts of each column were within supporting distance of one another even if the lateral links between columns would be very weak during the actual crossing of the forest. Napoleon anticipated that the Prussians might possibly be awaiting the arrival of the head of each column at the further side, hoping to defeat each detachment in detail as it emerged, but he was confident that any of his columns could deal with an enemy of up to 30,000 men without undue danger. If they were opposed by a stronger foe, his marshals were under orders to fight a defensive battle—even surrendering ground if necessary—while the Emperor moved his disengaged columns against the enemy’s rear. Should the foe attack from the west, the Vth and VIIth Corps would comprise the advance guard, their duty being to pin the enemy while the 1st and IIIrd felt for the exposed flank and the IVth and VIth remained in reserve. Similar combinations were devised to meet an assault from any other point of the compass. Napoleon’s mastery of strategical all-round defense has seldom been better illustrated. As his knowledge of the exact location of the enemy remained vague, Napoleon was sensible to adopt this wedge-shaped formation. By dividing his army into three columns he saved at least four precious days in effecting the crossing of the forest. The flexibility of the formation was later proved shortly before Jena when the Grande Armée was suddenly required to concentrate for battle two days earlier and in a different direction than had been anticipated.
At first light on October 8, the three columns swung into motion and crossed the Saxon frontier. Ahead rode the light cavalry squadrons under Murat’s personal direction, charged with the tasks of reconnoitering the roads between Saalfeld, Saalburg and Lebenstein, and discovering the exact whereabouts of the foe. On this day a few cavalry skirmishes comprised the only actions as Murat pushed back the Prussian picquets, and by dusk the heads of the three columns had reached their designated halting places, namely Coburg, Lobenstein and Münchberg. The first real opposition was encountered next morning, when Bernadotte and Murat ran into Tauenzien’s command consisting of 6,000 Prussians and 3,000 Saxons at Schleiz. Two brigades of light cavalry (led by Lasalle and Milhaud) supported by two divisions of dragoons and part of the 1st Corps infantry, soon cleared a way through this exposed enemy detachment and opened the road toward Gera. Elsewhere the French advance continued apace and by nightfall Lannes’ corps on the left and Soult’s on the right were fast approaching Saalfeld and Hof respectively. Napoleon was by this time convinced that the leading troops of his left column would encounter a strong enemy force the next day, and he warned Lannes to be ready for a battle at Saalfeld, adding that he was to await Augereau before engaging.
The Jena Campaign; le Bataillon Carré in action
Meanwhile, in the Prussian camp confusion was, as usual, paramount. News of the discomfiture of his subordinate, Tauenzien, who was falling back in disarray to the vicinity of Auma, caused Hohenlohe to prepare a general advance over the River Saale in his support. During the night of the 9th-10th, Prince Louis Ferdinand also reported numerous enemy campfires beyond Saalfeld towards Grafenthal, and this strengthened his superior’s conviction that an immediate Prussian concentration between Rudolstadt and Kahla, preparatory to crossing the river, was the correct course to adopt. Unfortunately, Hohenlohe’s orders to Prince Louis were ambiguously worded, and in consequence the commander of his advance guard believed that his mission was to hold the Saalfeld defile and win time while Hohenlohe moved his main body toward Auma (in support of Tauenzien), and while Brunswick brought up his army to fill the vacated area on the Prince’s left. In the event, however, Brunswick remained hesitantly in the vicinity of Erfurt, and Prince Louis became increasingly isolated. By next morning, Hohenlohe had also had second thoughts about the wisdom of his proposed moves over the Saale. In fact, Brunswick had bluntly forbidden the move, and in consequence he canceled the advance. The new orders only reached the unfortunate Louis at 11:00
A.M. on the 10th; he was now instructed to hold Rudolstadt and refrain from attacking Lannes. But it was already too late; since 10:00 o’clock the battle of Saalfeld had been joined.
Laboring under the conviction that his task was to cover Hohenlohe’s move toward Auma and at the same time protect Brunswick’s advance toward Rudolstadt against any possible intervention on the part of Lannes’ corps, at 7:00
A.M. Prince Louis moved his force of four Prussian and six Saxon battalions, ten squadrons and 44 guns (perhaps 8,300 men in all) to take post on the left bank of the Saale so as to command the exit from the defile leading toward Grafenthal. Lannes’ leading division (Suchet) came under fire as it emerged from the hills, but the corps’ commander did not hesitate to order an immediate attack even though Augereau’s corps had fallen behind and was not within close supporting distance. Sending forward one battalion and the light cavalry behind a screen of skirmishers, Lannes ordered Suchet to move his remaining infantry to the westward through the wooded hills, seeking to envelop Prince Louis’ flank. By 11:00
A.M. Louis was aware of this threat and took steps to strengthen his right, at the same time advancing his center to occupy the hamlet of Beulitz. A bitter struggle raged for the rest of the morning in this area and around Croesten, but shortly after one in the afternoon the French began to prevail. In a desperate attempt to check the growing disorder of his force, Prince Louis in person led up five squadrons in the center, but was killed in hand-to-hand combat by quartermaster Guindet of the 10th Hussars. So perished potentially the best soldier of Prussia.
With Prince Louis’ death, the action was lost. Remnants of the Saxon and Prussian battalions fled for the Saale to
escape as best they might. For a cost of 172 killed and wounded, the French captured some 1,800 prisoners and 33 guns, and probably killed half as many more. This action was the first serious affair of the war and its outcome had important repercussions on Prussian morale. Although Louis had been faced by 14,000 French troops, or odds of about two to one, the news of his death and the virtual annihilation of his corps was received with the greatest consternation at Prussian headquarters. Added to the tidings of the action at Schleiz the previous day, it appeared that the French were going to break through toward Leipzig, and thus emperil the Prussian communications. Hohenlohe lost no time in falling back to Kahla en route for Jena, while Frederick William and Brunswick decided to reconcentrate at Weimar. The Prussians appeared everywhere off balance, and the needless panic that took place among the Saxon troops at Jena on the 12th proves the low state of their morale.
French headquarters was still ignorant of the detailed enemy positions. From the right column, Soult sent in news that the Prussian garrison at Plauen was in full retreat toward the north, and after this report, Napoleon was at first convinced that a general enemy concentration would take place around the town of Gera to protect the approaches to Leipzig and support Tauenzein. “I doubt, however, whether he can unite before I can.”22 As a result, the Grande Armée continued its northward march in the hope of reaching Gera first and catching the Prussian corps one by one as they made for the rendezvous. The Emperor was correct in his basic assumption that Brunswick would fall back to the north, but in the event his calculation of his eventual destination was erroneous. Of course, had Hohenlohe’s plan of the 9th been implemented, Napoleon would have been correct in every particular. On this one occasion, however, the Prussian lack of decision and loose control contributed to mislead the French.
The position became slightly clearer on the 11th. A close analysis of reports of the actions at Schleiz and Saalfeld and the fact that Murat’s probing cavalry reported Gera clear of troops seemed to indicate that the enemy main body was still located further to the north or west, not to the northeast as originally anticipated. Further cavalry probes as far as the approaches to Leipzig revealed no sign of enemy forces on the River Elster. That night Lannes reported from the left that the foe had not crossed over to the east bank of the Saale either. On the basis of this intelligence Napoleon concluded that the Prussians were not retiring to protect their communications with Leipzig after all, but that their main body was situated still further to the west. The conviction grew upon him that Brunswick would now offer battle in the vicinity of Erfurt.
The orders issued to the army for the 12th therefore called for a wheel to the left to bring it face to face with the foe and forestall any attempt by the enemy to make a break for the Elbe. Auma was designated the new center of operations for the coming movement, Berthier writing to Intendant General Villemanzy, that “The Emperor’s desire is that you should bring to Auma all the corn and bread which is at present on the road, form a magazine in that town, which is destined to become the ‘central point’ for our army. Give orders for the immediate establishment of a hospital there.”23 While Murat and the mass of the cavalry reserve continued to search for enemy convoys and couriers between Leipzig and Naumburg, Davout’s corps was ordered to press on for the latter town. Bernadotte was to move from Gera to Zeitz with Kosen as his eventual objective. Once in position, these two corps would be in place to support Lannes and Augereau, who now formed the new advance guard of the army under orders to make for the Saale crossing-places at Jena and Kahla.
However, Napoleon was still not completely convinced that he had divined the foe’s intentions correctly, and so Soult was ordered to remain in the vicinity of Gera to watch for any signs of activity to the north or east. “I am completely enveloping the enemy,” wrote the Emperor, “but I have to take measures against what he might attempt to do.”24 Although Soult was out of immediate supporting distance of Jena, the rearmost corps of the right column, that of Marshal Ney, was to leave Weyda for Mittel-Pöllnitz, and be ready to move to the intermediate position of Roda, some three leagues from Lannes’ position. Napoleon’s broad intention at this time seems to have been to cross the Saale on the 14th, move on Weimar and attack Brunswick in the vicinity of Erfurt (his presumed location) on the 16th. He calculated that the Prussian commander might attempt one of two things; he could either accept battle before Erfurt—in which case the Vth, VIIth and VIh Corps would fix the enemy frontally while the 1st and IIIrd swept down from the north against the enemy’s left flank and rear—or he could try to retreat toward Halle (where the Prussian reserves were still located), and thence to Magdeburg and the comparative safety of the right bank of the Elbe. To counter this second possibility, the main body of the Grande Armée, moving through Jena, would hotly pursue the enemy while Davout and Bernadotte headed them off from the Elbe, in due course forcing them to accept battle. Reasonably confident that these calculations covered all likely eventualities, Napoleon arrived with headquarters at Gera about 8:00
P.M., and at once went to bed for four hours before rising to issue provisional orders for the next day’s movements and receive the latest situation reports from his commanders.
Since the battle of the 10th, the Prussian advance guard had been falling back to the line of the River Saale. Hohenlohe passed through Kahla on the 11th, and then retired on Jena. As he was evacuating the latter on the 12th, panic gripped his remaining Saxons when the advance guard of Lannes’ corps came into sight to the southward; it was some time before the men were back under control. Frederick William and Brunswick, meantime, were advancing on Weimar, concerned for their links with the Elbe. Late on the 12th, Prussian headquarters learned with certainty that the French were in occupation of Naumburg, and this seemed to imply that the line of the River Unstrutt was on the point of being blocked. This was a dire possibility, and Frederick William ordered the reconvening of the council of war for the following morning. The anxious generals assembled early on the 13th, and although a few argued in favor of offering battle in the vicinity of Jena, consensus was definitely in favor of an immediate retreat to Leipzig by way of Auerstadt, the Kosen Pass, Freiburg and Merseburg, assimilating the reserve at Halle en route and safeguarding the threatened communications with the Elbe. There was now little thought of facing Napoleon; the bigoted confidence of September had given place to near panic-striken caution in October. Currently the one desire of Brunswick was to avoid large-scale action at any cost. To form the protective flank of the main Prussian host, Hohenlohe was instructed to occupy the village of Capellendorf, halfway between Jena and Weimar, with Rüchel in his support stationed around the latter town, until the main body was clear of Auerstadt, whereupon he would assume the function of a rear guard and fall back north. These orders became operative at 10:00
A.M. on the 13th.
Napoleon, meanwhile, was waiting for his subordinates’ latest news at Gera. As he was still not anticipating a battle until the 16th, preliminary orders for the 13th had already been issued in the early hours of the morning. By these, Bernadotte was instructed to close with the IIIrd Corps at Naumburg, Ney to move on Roda and the remainder to stop in their present locations, there to rest, round up stragglers and reprovision. About 9:00
A.M., however, news arrived from three sources which convinced the Emperor that new moves were imperative. Murat reported from the north that a secret agent had seen large numbers of enemy troops marching along the Fulda-Erfurt-Naumburg road, and that the King and Queen of Prussia had certainly been at Erfurt on the 11th, while a bridging train had been seen moving northwest from Weissenfels during the 12th. Next, Davout (from Naumburg) sent in information gleaned from prisoners, deserters and civilians to the effect that the foe was in strength between Weimar and Erfurt, that the King had indeed been in Erfurt on the 11th, but that no enemy troops were to be found between Naumburg and Leipzig. Thirdly, Augereau reported from Kahla that enemy troops, originally at Jena, had subsequently moved by way of We
imar toward Erfurt, where their main body was still situated. Although no tidings had yet arrived from Lannes stationed on the banks of the Saale near Jena itself, Napoleon believed that he now saw what the enemy was about. “At last the veil is lifted,” he wrote to Murat shortly after 9:00 o’clock; “The enemy begins his retreat towards Magdeburg. Move as quickly as possible with Bernadotte’s Corps on Dornburg.” He had long known where the enemy was mainly situated, but only now did he feel certain that he had penetrated their future intentions. However, the Emperor was still not finally convinced that the Prussians would not change their minds, halt the withdrawal and force an engagement. “I believe that the enemy will either attempt to attack Marshal Lannes at Jena or that he will retreat. If he attacks Lannes, your being at Dornburg will enable you to assist him. From two in the afternoon I shall be at Jena.”25
In addition to ordering the light cavalry and the 1st Corps to fill the gap between Davout and Lannes along the Saale, the Emperor requested Ney to hasten his march for Roda, and also directed the heavy cavalry from Auma and St. Hilaire’s division of Soult’s corps from Gera to concentrate on the same place. The remainder of Soult’s command was to move northwest to Kostritz so as to continue to keep a watchful eye toward Leipzig, while Augereau proceeded hotfoot with the VIIIth Corps from Kahla to Jena. Napoleon himself set out along the road for Jena to see personally what was happening. Speed, as usual, was the keynote. The strain of the campaign was already beginning to tell on him; the long daily marches were causing some fatigue. In a note to Josephine written shortly before leaving Gera he stated: “I am traveling 20-25 leagues a day.”26
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 59