The supply and equipment of this huge army presented further daunting problems. The French soon resorted to gaining their requirements at the expense of the newly conquered regions of Germany. Huge financial exactions were levied from the prosperous Hanse towns, Hamburg suffering particularly severely. From Prussia and her allies 160 million francs were exacted to help feed and finance the Grande Armée, and a total of 560 millions was eventually dragged out of German pockets. Windfalls such as confiscated British merchandise and assets increased the total, but in addition to specie, great demands were made for goods in kind. One example will show the scale of these requisitions: to shoe the French armies, 600,000 pairs of footwear and 37,386 pairs of gaiters were eventually acquired from German sources.10 Requirements on this scale, coupled with the restrictions of the Berlin Decrees, did nothing to enhance the popularity of the First Empire in Central and Northern Europe.
These measures, however, did little to improve the sinking morale of the French army. The initial exhilaration caused by the rapid conquest of Prussia soon disappeared, leaving in its place a weary, despondent and homesick army. As General Rapp noted: “Our soldiers were less satisfied; they showed a lively distaste to crossing the Vistula. Misery, the winter, the bad weather, had inspired them with an extreme aversion for this country.”11 Indeed, the physical conditions of campaigning in Poland were largely to blame for the widely reported breakdowns in military discipline and the soaring rate of marauding. The earthen roads of Poland turned first into morasses of mud and then into frozen miles of deep ruts as the torrential rains of October gave way to the hard frosts of mid-November. General Duroc’s coach overturned in the road, breaking its occupant’s collarbone. “All the letters I received,” recorded Bourienne, snugly at Hamburg, “were nothing but a succession of complaints on the bad state of the roads.”12
Napoleon tried to rally the morale of his men by ordering a sizeable pay bonus for all ranks, doubling the commissariat equipment, and issuing every soldier with a new shirt, sleeping bag and pair of boots for the cavalry, or three of shoes for the infantry. “Papa Noël” had made an early appearance, but was no less welcome for that. However, the men still grumbled. Food was short, and the French soldiers wryly remarked that they needed to know only four words of Polish: “Kleba?” “Niema.” “Vota?” “Sana.” (“Some bread?” “There is none.” “Any water?” “We will go and fetch it.”)
What of the armies of Muscovy meanwhile? A fuller description of the forces of Holy Russia will be provided later* but a few of the more striking features require some introduction here. In 1806, the immediately available Russian forces were divided into 18 so-called divisions, each of which theoretically contained 6 infantry regiments (divided into a total of 18 battalions), 20 cavalry squadrons (10 heavy and 10 light), and 82 guns. The proportion of these divisions allocated to the Polish front in the late autumn of 1806 was as follows: General Bennigsen’s army comprised the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Divisions, making a total (according to the nineteenth-century German authority, von Höpfner) of 49,000 infantry, 11,000 regular cavalry and 4,000 Cossacks, 2,700 artillerymen serving 276 guns and 900 pioneers. Dumas, however, doubts that the effectives of this army came to more than 55,000. The second army was that of Marshal Buxhowden, made up of the 5th, 7th, 8th and 14th Divisions, consisting of 39,000 infantry, perhaps 7,000 cavalry and 1,200 artillerymen with 216 guns, or possibly 46,000 men capable of taking the field. At the outset of the campaign of 1806-07 both these armies were under the overall command of the veteran Kamenskoi, who could thus deploy some 90,000 men in late November. The balance of the regular forces were disposed as follows: the Russian Imperial Guard (also known as the 1st Division) under the orders of the Grand Duke Constantine was still at St. Petersburg; General Michelson had five divisions facing the Turks in Moldavia (two eventually were drafted to join Bennigsen in January 1807); the remainder (four divisions) were stationed in Russia under Count Apraxim, forming the nucleus for the proceeding creation of a reserve army.
The basic characteristics of the various arms of the Russian service were as follows: the infantryman was tough and brave, but totally devoid of education, poorly uniformed, badly armed and hardly paid at all. The Russian cavalry was well-mounted and quite as good as its French counterpart, while the Cossack, armed with lance and sword, was often superior to the French hussar, man for man, when properly led. The Russian artillery was also of a very high order; there were plenty of guns (at Eylau there were six pieces for every 1,000 men), the horse teams were well organized and the gunners extremely proficient.
The Tsarist officer corps, however, was not so impressive. Deep social gulfs divided the infantry officers from those of the other arms and there was a distinct shortage of scientifically trained officers for the specialist corps. Moreover, most native officers were indolent gamblers, and the best soldiers in the service were of foreign extraction. The greatest weakness of the Russian army, however, lay in its administration. The staff was poorly organized and swamped in red tape. The supply services were hopeless, being deficient of funds for making purchases and of transport and depots for moving food and munitions to the front. In consequence, the Russian armies were largely committed to living off the countryside for as long as possible, and then moving on to fresh pastures. This fact, it will be remembered, had largely contributed to the rash decision to attack Napoleon at Austerlitz in 1805.
The Russian forces were also-short of good generals. Count Bennigsen, sixty-one years of age, was a soldier of Hanoverian extraction who joined the Russian forces in 1773. He was a capable commander of cavalry, and not wholly devoid of good strategical ideas, but his capacity as a practical commander in the field was limited, and consequently few of his schemes bore fruit. Marshal Buxhowden we have already met at Austerlitz, a stolid unimaginative soldier of great personal courage but little brainpower. Unfortunately for their martial fortunes, the relationship between these two army commanders was dogged by a bitter personal jealousy. Their nominal superior, Marshal Kamenskoi, was an ancient veteran of seventy-five summers, sometime lieutenant of the great Suvorov, a man of alternate rashness and indecision, of violent temper, who was not really suited to his high appointment, and indeed gave place to Bennigsen in January 1807. Of the more junior generals, Prince Bagration and Barclay de Tolly were of high potential quality, while the tough Platov, commander of the Cossacks, had an almost mystical hold over his rough warriors from the Ukraine and Caucasus. These few apart, there was little talent displayed in the higher direction of the Russian armies in Poland at this time.
See Ch. 68, pp. 749-753.
46
THE MANEUVER ON THE NAREW
At the end of the first week of December, there were still no definite signs that could be interpreted as the harbingers of a more aggressive Russian policy. With 80,000 troops already to hand and as many more on their way, Napoleon could feel reasonably confident that he could deal with any developments. On December 13, the Emperor estimated that Bennigsen’s most probable action would be to establish himself on the Rivers Narew and Passarge—and even the Ukra—with the intentions of denying the French control of the ground between the Bug and the sea, of keeping in contact with Lestocq’s Prussians, and of there awaiting the advent of reinforcements from Russia. If events did follow this pattern, Napoleon planned to fling Ney, Soult and Bernadotte through Thorn to turn the Russian right and separate them from their Prussian allies, at present hovering somewhat hesitantly near Lautenburg. He immediately left Posen and set out for Warsaw. However, the next day Murat’s cavalry probes reported that the enemy was in the act of evacuating Pultusk, a move that meant that the Russians would soon be outside the marching range of the French infantry. With commendable flexibility and decision, Napoleon decreed that the task originally designated for the three corps would now be performed by an all-cavalry force. Murat was ordered to concentrate all his horsemen with those of Bessières and the light cavalry brigades of the corps d’arrnée to form a fo
rce of 30,000 sabers and 30 light guns, and with it to lose no time in severing the Pultusk-Königsberg highway and engage the enemy advance guard. No sooner were these orders being issued than fresh intelligence came to hand on the 15th. It now transpired that Bennigsen had been reinforced by Buxhowden to the north of Pultusk, but it appeared to the French that the enemy was still intending to retire.
Acting on his assumption, Napoleon decided to mount a full-scale manoeuvre sur les derrières in an attempt to cut the Russian communications by an onslaught toward the River Narew. The plan of operations was as follows. The IVth, VIIth, IIIrd and Vth Corps, preceded by Murat’s cavalry screen, would sweep north from the Vistula and advance to a front extending from Schschotschin near the Ukra to Scherosk on the Bug, and then seize Pultusk, the point where the Russian communications crossed the River Narew. At the same time, issuing out of Thorn, the VIth and 1st Corps, supported by part of the cavalry, were to move on Bielshun and thence to Soldau and Mlava to deny the Russians a northerly line of retreat and keep them out of contact with Lestocq. Soult’s corps was charged with the duty of linking the two wings of the Grande Armée. The Emperor confidently predicted that these moves would lead to a major battle on December 21 or 22.
In this he was mistaken. Far from continuing their retreat, the united Russian forces had in fact moved forward to reoccupy Pultusk and then advanced southwest of the town with their main force while their patrols probed as far forward as the River Ukra. As a result, the French crossing of the Ukra was hotly contested at several points. Initial delays were experenced and the forward movement really got under way only on December 22, when Davout managed to fight his way over the Narew at Tscharnovo, both sides losing about 1,400 casualties. At 1:00 o’clock in the morning of the 23rd, Napoleon left Warsaw to take over personal direction of affairs, and by 9:00
A.M. he was on the banks of the River Narew in company with Lannes’ corps. During this day, the main army enlarged its bridgehead to the north of the Rivers Bug and Vistula, while away to the northwest, part of Bernadotte’s corps fought a sharp action at Bielshun against part of the Prussian corps. On the 24th, the main body of Kamenskoi’s army was located in the vicinity of Nasielsk, and the day passed in confused brushes and skirmishes with bodies of enemy troops. On the night of Christmas Eve, however, Napoleon learned that the Russian general was retiring north toward Streshegozin. This move called for new orders. Davout was ordered to march directly on Streshegozin in support of Lannes’ move on Pultusk from Nasielsk, and the VIIth Corps was directed through Novemteste towards Schensk to intercept the Russian line of march, the IVth Corps moving over the Ukra in its support.
The 26th saw the indecisive combat of Pultusk on the right bank of the Narew. Lannes found himself taking on about 35,000 Russians and 40 guns with only his own two divisions and one of Davout’s (led by the IIIrd Corps’ Chief of Staff, General d’Aultanne), perhaps 25,000 men in all. As the bulletin of the 30th December rather exaggeratedly described it: “All the corps of Bennigsen had joined there during the night”13 and subsequently formed up in three lines with advanced wings between the town on their left and Moschin on their right. These were long odds, and although Lannes managed to take the town in the afternoon, he proved unable to retain it against the pressure exerted by Bennigsen’s serried ranks of infantry, commanded on the right by Barclay de Tolly and on the left by Bagavout. At 3:00
P.M., however, Bennigsen noticed that the division of General Gudin was marching up to Lannes’ assistance, and decided that the game was not worth the candle. That night the Russians commenced to evacuate Pultusk once more, part retiring up each bank of the Narew toward Östrolenka. In this way Napoleon’s intended “decisive action” ended in a draw, four days later than anticipated. The reason for this indecisive result lay partly in Davout’s inadequate support of Lannes and partly in Bennigsen’s desire to avoid a full-scale battle of attrition.
The same day saw another bitter fight at Golymin, 12 miles northwest of Pultusk, where Davout and Augereau with 38,200 troops clashed inconclusively with the advance guard of Marshal Buxhowden, 18,000 strong, commanded by Prince Gallitzin and General Doctorov. As might have been expected from their superior numbers, the day ended in the French favor, but Marbot relates an incident that reveals the dogged courage and unshakeable determination of the Russian infantry to execute a mission. With Augereau’s troops attacking the village on one side, and Davout threatening to sever the Russian link with Pultusk on the other, Gallitzin ordered his troops to concentrate against the latter. “Although our soldiers fired at the enemy from a range of only 25 paces,” records Marbot, “the latter continued their journey [across Augereau’s front] without replying, for to do so would have necessitated a halt, and every moment was too precious to lose. Each division, each regiment, filed across in this way under our fusilade without saying a word and without slowing their pace for an instant. The streets of Golymin were heaped with dying and wounded, but we heard not a single groan—they were forbidden to make a sound!”14 Each side lost about a thousand men, and eventually Gallitzin made good his escape, the weather proving too bad to permit the French pursuers to make any ground.
Although these actions failed to inflict a real check on the enemy, they did at least persuade Kamenskoi to order a general withdrawal, and by the 27th, the French pursuit was again under way. To the northwest, Bernadotte and Bessières’ cavalry headed for distant Östrolenka to threaten the Russian line of retreat, while Ney harassed the retiring Prussians to Neidenburg, heading them off from any meeting with the Russians. In the center, Murat’s cavalry hounded Buxhowden’s columns back toward the bridges at Makov, and on the right, Lannes pursued Bennigsen up the right bank of the Narew at the head of three divisions. The Russian commander was making for Rozan where he had established his rear headquarters. In the general excitement of the chase, however, Napoleon allowed his troops to become overextended. He fully expected the Russians to turn and fight at Makov, and consequently halted the pursuit and ordered a general concentration of the widely separated corps before that town on the 28th, but the component parts of Kamenskoi’s command doggedly continued to retreat away to the northeast, en route for Östrolenka and beyond.
By this time, natural conditions were making an effective continuation of the pursuit out of the question. Freakish weather caused a rapid succession of hard frosts and sudden thaws accompanied by torrential rain, and amidst the alternation of clinging mud, frozen slush and ice-hard ground, the French pursuit ground to a standstill. “The terrible roads and bad weather have persuaded me to enter winter quarters,”15 wrote Napoleon to his minister of war on the 29th.
So ended Napoleon’s first attempt to pin down and destroy his elusive Russian adversary. The “Maneuver on the Narew” is far from Napoleon’s best, and although he achieved a limited strategical success and gave the Russians a fright (indeed Marshal Kamenskoi decided his years were too advanced for such active campaigning and forthwith resigned his command), the results were inconclusive. French supply difficulties had vastly increased in the days following Christmas, and both food and warm winter clothing were in critically short supply. Even more serious, Napoleon had broken his own principle of keeping his corps within mutual supporting distance, and was, in consequence, given no opportunity of fighting a decisive action. Further miscalculations as to the whereabouts, the strength and the direction of the Russian line of retreat had also crippled his actions. More than anything else, however, it was mud that thwarted the French Emperor, mud on a scale he had never encountered before. For once, the Napoleonic blitzkrieg attack had lost its vital speed and foundered. This comparative failure brought in its train a further deterioration in the morale of the exhausted Grande Armée, and indiscipline reached monumental proportions; the Emperor calculated that as many as 40 per cent of his men were absent from their units on the 28th, engaged in marauding. It was clearly time for a halt to re-equip his army and reconsider his plans.
With the greate
st thankfulness the rank and file abandoned active campaigning, they hoped for several months to come. A series of corps depots were built up along the banks of the Vistula and at Pultusk, and the various formations were told off to bivouac in carefully allotted areas. The bulk of Bernadotte’s 1st Corps was initially placed between Lobau and Osteröde; Ney between Mlava and Neidenburg, the light divisions of the reserve cavalry in the countryside between the rivers Orzyc and Omulev to watch Östrolenka. Most of the rest of the army was grouped to the north of Warsaw; headquarters, the Guard and the Vth Corps taking up quarters within the city, the VIIth being stationed around Plonsk, the IVth near Makov and Golymin and the IIIrd in the vicinity of Brok. Strong bridgeheads were established over the Rivers Vistula and Narew at Thorn, Modlin, Praga, Pultusk and Scherosk. A number of carefully selected assembly areas were also clearly designated to enable the army to assume battle stations with the minimum of delay in the event of an alert. The winter was not to be wholly wasted, however; Napoleon ordered General Victor (soon to be replaced by Lefebvre on January 23 following Victor’s capture by Prussian partisans) to form a new corps of 25,000 men (the Xth) and with it undertake the siege of Danzig. Bernadotte was ordered to cover these operations, extending his corps area to take in Elbing and Marienwerder. Otherwise “the avoidance of all forward movement calculated to rouse the enemy to activity” was strictly enjoined.16 Although the northernmost corps were somewhat overextended, these dispositions were well chosen. The army could rapidly move to meet a threat aimed at any of its component parts. The provision of prearranged concentration areas, rear depots, fortified bridgeheads over the Vistula, and the setting up of alternate lines of communication, running through Warsaw and Thorn respectively, were designed to meet all possible eventualities.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 65