The Campaigns of Napoleon

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The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 83

by David G Chandler


  As we have already noted, Napoleon was not taken in a state of complete unreadiness by this imminent resumption of hostilities by Austria. Ever since early 1806 he had expected Austrian interference in his plans at some future stage. Fortunately for France, Vienna’s preparations were not sufficiently advanced in either October 1806 or during the subsequent winter and spring campaigns of 1807 to permit her active intervention. From 1808 onward, however, the threat became increasingly serious. Consequently Napoleon had already taken steps to warn his allies of what might transpire, deluging his viceroy in Italy and the princes of the Confederation with demands for munitions and men.

  The French Government was already feeling the pinch for soldiers, and the prospect of a war to be fought on two fronts simultaneously—in Spain and in Germany—was not exactly calculated to cheer the recruiting authorities. Already in September 1808, a senatus consultum had called up 80,000 more conscripts from the Classes of 1806 to 1809, and in December a further 80,000 of the Class of 1810 were called forward almost two years in advance of their proper date. Even these sweeping measures did not prove sufficient to meet all requirements. Napoleon was determined to increase his infantry regiments to a strength of five battalions apiece—four of six companies for front-line service, one of four companies to serve at the depot as a training unit for future drafts. Although this expansion was originally decreed on February 18, 1808, it was not until July the following year that the measure was fully implemented, for the steady drain of losses incurred in Spain and the need to create a new army for service in Germany absorbed all available replacements. It was only by ordering the mobilization of a further 110,000 conscripts of the Class of 1810 in the New Year of 1809 that all requirements were even approximately met—even on paper.

  The need to extemporize an army for the German front exercised all the Emperor’s ingenuity. With 200,000 men, many of his best leaders and the Guard tied down in Spain, the front-line units available for immediate service elsewhere were understandably few in number. On October 12, 1808, the old Grande Arrnée had been disbanded in Germany and Poland and most units hurried back to France en route for Spain, its place being taken by the creation of the stopgap Army of the Rhine. In essentials, this comprised Davout’s IIIrd Corps and various smaller formations. In deference to the Tsar’s known susceptibilities about Poland and East Prussia, the greater part of this slight armament was redeployed to the west of the Elbe, although certain key garrisons and covering forces were left beyond the Oder. St. Hilaire with one division was still in occupation of Stettin; a further division was in Pomerania; General Rapp held several thousand men to garrison Danzig, and a further 10,000 were stationed along the River Oder itself to maintain vital communications with the Grandy Duchy of Warsaw. On paper, the Army of the Rhine consisted of 120,000 men, but when various distant detachments are deducted, most notably a further 10,000 French and Dutch troops under Bernadotte engaged in occupying the Hanse towns, it will be seen that Davout was in effectual command of rather less than 80,000 troops with which to keep both Austrian and Prussian nationalistic aspirations in check. Small wonder that Napoleon relied heavily on the influence of Tsar Alexander to redress the unfavorable balance, or that he was led to adopt extreme measures in his search for men during the spring of 1809 when it became clear that the promised Russian support was unlikely to materialize.

  Napoleon set himself an ambitious target: before the opening of hostilities he planned to have 260,000 troops in Germany (100,000 of whom were to be produced by his German allies) and all being well, 150,000 more in Italy under Eugene. No time was lost in setting about this mammoth task. During late January and early February, orders were sent to Marshal Bessières in Spain instructing him to be ready to send the Imperial Guard toward Strasbourg if the need arose. Meantime, imperial edicts were creating the nucleus of the Young Guard—recruited from the cream of the conscript classes. Secondly, an entirely new major formation of four infantry divisions and one of light cavalry, to be named the Corps of Observation of the Army of the Rhine, was brought into existence on February 23 and subsequently entrusted (under the title of IVth Corps) to the experienced Marshal Massena.4 On March 3, a new decree ordered the creation of a reserve corps, 17 regiments strong, all of them to be raised from the conscripts of 1810. Oudinot’s division received reinforcements and was reconstituted as the IInd Corps. It was no easy matter to find sufficient officers for these new or enlarged formations, but the problem was partially solved by stripping the depots, recalling pensioners, emptying all the French military academies and by commissioning a large number of sergeants and warrant officers. In due course these various units were merged with the Army of the Rhine and various allied contingents to form the new Army of Germany—perhaps 174,000 strong—and on the penultimate day of March this title was changed to La Grande Armeé de I’ Allemagne.

  In addition to this armament, Napoleon could call on the services of 68,000 troops forming the Army of Italy, 10,500 more under Marmont in Dalmatia, Bernadotte’s 16,000 Saxons (now gathered at Dresden) and 18,000 Poles led by Poniatowski. In round numbers, therefore, by April 1809 Napoleon could deploy over 275,000 men against the Hapsburg armies, and although this figure falls well below the 400,000 men originally envisaged it represents no mean administrative achievement. However, in terms of quality, the new forces left much to be desired; the speed with which they were raised made this inevitable. Even in the Grande Armée itself there were 11,300 raw conscripts, sent from the depots before even the most rudimentary training could be completed, and a further 54,000 of its strength were drawn wholly from allied states. There is evidence to show that the cavalry (29,000 strong) retained most of its standards and reputation, but there was a marked decline in the quality of the infantry. Toward the end of the campaign Napoleon attempted to compensate for this by increasing the allocation of corps and regimental artillery. “The worse the troops are,” he wrote to General Clarke, minister of war, “the more guns they require.”5 But at the outset of operations there was a great and telling shortage of artillery, merely 311 guns being available. Only by the time of Wagram was a satisfactory weight of metal secured.

  Despite these inadequacies in men and material, the caliber of the available senior generals remained undimmed. Davout, Massena and Oudinot were all old and tried commanders of several years standing, and many of their divisional generals were almost equally distinguished. Inevitably Berthier was nominated chief of staff, but to these duties were added those of acting commander in chief—an appointment that was to have near-fatal results. The reason for the creation of this post was that Napoleon did not yet feel able to leave Paris and take command in person. On the one hand he realized that news of his arrival east of the Rhine would almost certainly precipitate the Austrian offensive, and the present poor condition and unprepared state of the French army made it desirable to delay this event for as long as was possible; on the other hand, it was important for propaganda purposes that the Austrian attack, when it came, should appear unexpected and unprovoked. The Emperor was aware that his position in Europe was extremely delicate, and any new French aggression might well trigger off a massive reaction throughout Germany. For the time being, therefore, Berthier was told to remain with headquarters near Strasbourg, where he would be in contact with Paris through the military telegraph and, at the same time, not too close to Austrian spheres of interest.

  This caution did not prevent Napoleon from considering his strategy for the forthcoming campaign. As in 1805, he was determined to make the Danube the principal theater, relegating Italy to a secondary role. He hoped that the Austrians would pursue their customary strategy of sending at least 100,000 of their best men over the Alps into North Italy where they would be tied down by Eugéne and Marmont. He relied on Bernadotte and Poniatowski to neutralize at least their own number of Austrians on their respective Bohemian and Polish sectors. These diversions, all being well, should leave the Grande Armée with a slight numerical advantage over the
enemy in the critical Danube theater. These calculations, as will be seen, fell wide of the mark. It also appears that Napoleon badly misjudged the physical conditions he would experience in the Danube valley during the spring and summer. His own experiences in 1805 were restricted to the autumn and winter months, and he failed to heed the warnings of his experts about the behavior of the Danube in times of flood following the spring thaw.

  After his troops had absorbed and halted the initial Austrian onslaught, Napoleon intended to switch to the offensive and advance down the Danube in order to capture the vital crossing place of Passau, at the confluence of the Inn and the Danube, en route for Vienna. As a preliminary move, therefore, intended to place his army in the best possible starting position for both its offensive and defensive roles, he ordered the greater number of its units to make for the Upper Danube region during late February and early March. Davout marched with his 65,000 men from the locality of Erfurt toward Nuremberg to form the northern part of the concentration, while Oudinot’s 20,000-strong provisional IInd Corps was routed for Augsburg, with Massena’s 40,000 men of the new IVth Corps (from Strasbourg) to its left rear around Ulm. To shield these moves, and to serve as a link between the Nuremberg and Augsburg forces, Marshal Lefebvre was pushed forward to the line of the River Isar with the 30,000 Bavarians of his VIIth Corps, while part of the cavalry reserve made probes in the direction of Ratisbon, seeking information of the enemy’s whereabouts.

  On the last day of March, Napoleon made an analysis of the general situation facing his army. Intelligence indicated that the Austrians were massing between Prague and Vienna, and this appeared to support the Emperor’s hypothesis that the main Austrian blow would be delivered north of the Danube, on some date around April 15. That being the probability, he determined to push his forces as far forward as the situation might permit and as was commensurate with the general requirement of a three- to four-day concentration of all major formations at a designated point of assembly from which they could control the Danube valley. If the enemy advanced on or after April 15 (as anticipated), Ratisbon was to be the place for the concentration of the French army, being three days5 marching distance from Nuremberg and four days’ distance from Augsburg. If, on the other hand, the Austrians entered on active operations at some date prior to the 15th, Napoleon decided that the area between Donauwörth, Augsburg and Ingolstadt would better serve his purpose. In either eventuality, Davout, the reserve cavalry and Lefebvre would be in a position to shield the French movement. He considered that final warning of Austria’s attack would be provided by a formal declaration of war or at least the withdrawal of her ambassador from Paris.

  As to the most probable Austrian line of attack, Napoleon considered three possibilities. Firstly, he anticipated that Charles might strike in force from Bohemia toward Bamberg, Nuremberg or Ratisbon. If the northerly line of attack toward Saxony was chosen, Napoleon calculated that Bernadotte at Dresden would be able to delay their advance while the main French army invaded Bohemia to sever the Austrian communications with Vienna. If, alternatively, they headed west for Franconia (i.e., Nuremberg), the Grande Armée would be in position to pounce on their rear by way of Ratisbon, Ingolstadt or Donauwörth, and Charles would be running directly into the arms of the greater part of the French army. Thirdly, if the Austrians split their forces and advanced along both banks of the Danube simultaneously, Napoleon felt confident that he would be able to isolate and annihilate each Austrian wing in turn. On the basis of these calculations he felt he had reasonable grounds for satisfaction about his provisional choice of Ratisbon as the center of operations, but the whole time he had to balance the requirements of France’s continuing commitments in Northern Europe, in Spain and Italy against what was desirable on the Danube; nor could the possibility of British intervention be entirely ruled out. The complete strategical position was undoubtedly very complex.

  The gist of this assessment was passed on to Berthier in a lengthy dispatch dated March 30,6 together with detailed instructions for the movement of the troops. Napoleon stated that he intended to mass three corps within range of Ratisbon (130,000 Frenchmen and 10,000 Allies) by April 15; that city would form the center of operations, but in the event of an emergency Donauwörth and the line of the River Lech could be adopted in lieu. If nothing occurred to the contrary, however, Oudinot was to leave Augsburg on April 5 and take his corps to Ratisbon by the 10th, where he would find St. Hilaire in possession of the city. The latter was to move thither from Nuremberg, starting out on the 5th. Thus by the 10th there should be at least 30,000 infantry and seven cavalry regiments at Ratisbon, and during that day these would be joined by Bessières and the cavalry reserve. In the meantime, Davout was to set up his headquarters at Nuremberg and spread his units in such a way as to guard Bayreuth and the Egra approaches, at the same time staying within 72 hours’ marching time of Ratisbon. Meanwhile, the Duke of Rivoli was to move up from Ulm to Augsburg. The three divisions of Lefebvre’s Bavarian Corps, presently lining the Isar, were to be disposed in echelon so as to be within one, two and three days’ march of Ratisbon respectively. In this way, Napoleon planned to form a new version of his famed bataillon carré around Ratisbon, capable of meeting an attack from any direction and of turning any situation to the French advantage.

  As things turned out, a combination of unanticipated Austrian aggressiveness and plain bungling on the part of poor Berthier, hopelessly out of his depth amid this welter of instructions, was to lead to the near ruination of Napoleon’s carefully considered schemes. However, before turning to the history of events, a glance at the Austrian plans of campaign will clearly be useful.

  In the first place, Archduke Charles and the Aulic Council refused to play Napoleon’s game and sent only 50,000 regular troops supplemented by as many more Landwehr toward Italy in two corps under the Archduke John. To protect the Austrian Empire’s Polish possessions, a further force was formed in Galicia (40,000 strong) under Ferdinand. The remaining six line and two reserve corps of the regular army—or close to 200,000 men and 500 guns—remained available for operations in the Danube valley. Thus Napoleon was to find more troops facing him than he anticipated. As to what use he would make of this large army, Charles was not at first certain. To begin with, he toyed with the idea of a sudden onslaught against the Army of the Rhine (that is to say, Davout’s command) in the hope of destroying it before Napoleon could move up to its assistance. To this end, six corps were massed between Prague and the Böhmerwald north of the Danube, leaving only two on the south bank. For a time there were even hopes that Prussia might join in the struggle, but by early March these prospects had faded, and the Austrian strategists were forced to reconsider. Charles was still in favor of the main attack being launched from Bohemia. It was a bold plan more likely to lead to a rapid decision than any other, and furthermore the present location of the greater part of the Austrian army would make a surprise blow quite feasible, with the chance of isolating the French forces in North Germany at one blow and of inciting local revolts in Saxony, Hesse and Franconia. There were, however, palpable disadvantages inherent in this scheme. The broken-up nature of the Bohemian countryside would make it difficult to debouch effectively against the French, while Archduke Charles would be separated by both the Danube and a great distance from his brother John, and this would make the creation of a third linking force imperative. The pundits of the Aulic Council therefore favored an alternative plan.

  The Campaign of 1809 on the Danube

  According to this, the major attack would be launched south of the Danube. Its base and communications with Vienna would be far safer; there was more chance of thwarting any French thrust toward Switzerland or the Tyrol, and the two main Austrian armies would be in closer supporting distance of one another. On the debit side, it was admitted that the preliminary transfer of the six corps from the northern to the southern bank of the Danube would consume two precious weeks, and that the proposed area of operations was dissected by ma
ny lateral waterways which would afford the French good defensive positions. Charles argued strongly for the first alternative, claiming that an unwavering onslaught toward Würzburg or Ratisbon could lead to great events and the probable defection of several of Napoleon’s German allies, but the Aulic Council decided to play safe when news arrived of Oudinot’s and Massena’s arrival at Ulm, and induced Charles to adopt the less dramatic course. Only on March 20 could the new maneuver get under way, and a month’s invaluable time had been sacrificed. In the form the plan actually took, the main attack became in effect an onslaught on both sides of the Danube. The Bohemian corps (the 1st under Bellegarde (38,000) and the IInd (20,000) led by Kollowrath) were to attack Ratisbon from the Bohemian mountains by way of Cham; at the same time, the Austrian center and reserve (comprising the 66,000 men of Hohenzollern’s IIIrd, Rosenburg’s IVth and Lichtenstein’s 1st Reserve Corps) were to advance on the same objective through Scharding, while the left wing (Archduke Louis’ Vth, Hiller’s Vlth and Kienmayer’s IInd Reserve Corps or 61,000 men in all) moved forward toward Landshut to guard the flank. That is to say, there would be two corps on the northern banks of the Danube and six operating on the southern. Despite these delays, thanks to the way Berthier misread his master’s orders, the 200,000 Austrians were to find themselves in a strong position. As Dodge described it: “the French were in two great bodies, in the Ulm-Augsburg and the Nuremberg-Bamberg country, and Charles, having taken Ratisbon, could there cross the Danube and with his own and the Bohemian Corps cut the French apart…. Should the French meanwhile concentrate on the Lech, the ground there, in view of the Austrian superiority of forces, was not unfavorable for operations.”7 The immediate future, therefore, held the prospect of great events.

 

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