The Battle of Wagram, July 6, 1809, Midday. Napoleon sees Marshal Davout’s firing line pass the church tower at Markgrafneusiedl—the crisis of the second day’s fighting.
The problem of converting barely-avoided disaster into a full-blooded victory still remained to be solved. Away on the right, Davout had launched his attack on Markgrafneusiedl at ten o’clock as planned, but was forced to fight bitterly for every yard. The Duke of Auerstadt’s horse was killed under him, and General Gudin, at his side, received four wounds. Yet pressure was steadily maintained and the Austrian left recoiled step by step until Charles arrived at the head of his reserve cavalry and launched a desperate countercharge. For a time it seemed that the French IIIrd Corps was lost; the Austrian troopers broke through Davout’s front line and fell upon his second, but their efforts were badly directed and the French reserves withstood the pressure. After a pause to reorganize, the French again moved inexorably forward. Shortly after midday, Napoleon saw through his spyglass the line of smoke revealing Davout’s firing line pass beyond the tower of Markgrafneusiedl church. At that moment the French battle line resembled a large letter “Z.” The Emperor closed his glass with a snap. He now knew that the Austrian left flank was fatally compromised, and that the moment had come for the coup de grâce in the left center. There was fortunately still no sign of Archduke John, the only unknown factor that might have complicated the issue.
Imperial aides spurred frantically over the plain. Orders were carried to Massena, telling him to attack as “the battle is won since the Archduke John has not appeared.” Oudinot was instructed to storm the heights immediately to his front on the eastern side of Wagram; but the critical main attack was entrusted to Macdonald’s corps, now drawn up close by Lauriston’s battery. Macdonald had only 8,000 men, but his objective was clear. If he could penetrate the Austrian line at the point (near Süssenbrünn) where the Austrian grenadiers abutted Kollowrath’s IIIrd Corps, the victory would be won and Charles’ army shattered beyond redemption.
The drums beat the pas de charge, the hot July sun flashed from the points of a myriad bayonets, and Macdonald was on his way. In front moved eight battalions deployed in four pairs; battalion columns of nine and four battalions respectively supported the right and left of this force, while a further three brought up the rear. To the left rode Nansouty’s cuirassiers, to the right spurred Walther’s Guard Cavalry.* This huge hollow square of 8,000 men presented an easy target for the Austrian gunners, but the unreliable quality of the troops’ morale made it impracticable to adopt a more deployed formation. Torn by shot and shell it rolled on over the plain, repulsed the Austrian skirmishers, crashed into the main line beyond, but failed to break through. A determined French cavalry charge might now have won the day—but there were no reserves available. The main attack therefore ground to a halt; the expected total victory had not yet materialized. Very soon a furious Macdonald, his command reduced to a mere 1,500 men, was demanding reinforcements. Napoleon found them. Some of Eugène’s troops, presently attacking Wagram, were pulled back, and added to the Young Guard and Wrede’s command to constitute a supporting force. Napoleon’s message to General Wrede is typical of the excitement of the moment. “You see the unfortunate position of Macdonald. March! Save the corps and attack the enemy; in fine, do as seems to you best.”40 This left Napoleon with exactly two regiments of the Old Guard with which to face John’s army, should it appear from the east. It was a calculated risk to reduce his reserves to such a low level.
There was, however, no real cause for anxiety, for the battle was already almost won on other parts of the field. On the right flank Davout was still rolling back the Austrian wing; on the left, by two o’clock, Massena had fought his way back into Aspern; the Army of Italy, supported by Oudinot and Marmont, was practically in possession of Wagram in the center.
Pained by a slight wound, despairing of his brother’s arrival with the promised 13,000 fresh troops, and realizing that it was now too late to summon up the 8,000 unused men of the Vth Corps, who had spent the whole battle in idleness near the Bissam, the Archduke Charles was already ordering a phased withdrawal. The beginnings of this movement coincided with Napoleon’s renewed advance along all his line, and this persuaded Charles to convert his withdrawal into a general retreat toward Bohemia. There was still heavy fighting to be endured however; in one clash, General Lasalle, the beau sabreur of the French light cavalry, was instantaneously killed (the last but not the least of Napoleon’s irreparable losses from the higher-command echelons during this campaign). Nevertheless the issue was decided. Napoleon had won the battle of Wagram.
It was not, however, the complete victory that he desired; there was to be no repetition of the triumphs of Austerlitz or Jena. There was not even an attempt at immediate pursuit, apart from the cavalry. The troops had been fighting for more than sixteen hours when the last firing died away at eight in the evening. The great heat of much of the day had added considerably to their state of exhaustion, which by evening was so far advanced as to make any further exertion out of the question. Moreover, Napoleon still expected Archduke John to make an appearance, being unaware that a combination of muddled orders and dilatory marching had kept this opponent at a safe distance for most of the day. Only at 4:00
P.M. did he make a fleeting appearance near Siebenbrünn. After a brief moment of panic, the French troops in the vicinity rallied and soon sent the newcomers about their business. However, it was not until the 7th that Napoleon fully realized that he was not facing a third day’s fighting. In consequence, Charles was allowed to withdraw the greater part of his men from the stricken field without immediate interference. Had fate ordained it the campaign might have dragged on for some considerable further time.
Napoleon had won his victory, then, but only at a terrible price. However much his bulletins might bluster, claiming minimal casualties, the truth was that at least 32,500, or 24 per cent of the Grande Armée actually engaged in battle, lay dead or wounded. These casualty figures included no less than 40 generals and a further 1,822 more junior officers, and did not take into account a further 7,000 prisoners borne off by the Austrians, together with 12 eagles and 21 guns. Inevitably, the Austrians had fared even worse; their casualty lists admitted the loss of 37,146 men, killed, wounded and taken prisoner, or rather over one quarter of their effective strength—and the actual figure was probably several thousand more. Four generals, including Wukassovitch, were listed with the slain, and a further 13 senior officers were included among the wounded; in all 730 Austrian officers had become casualties. Ten standards and 20 guns also fell into French hands. In recognition of his stalwart service in the field, Macdonald received his marshal’s baton from the Emperor.
The serious pursuit of Charles only got under way late on the 7th, after Napoleon had made the necessary arrangements for a new set of communications running back to Vienna, and this lack of vigor on the part of the French gave Charles a considerable start. Moreover, Napoleon was not at all certain exactly where the Austrians had gone, and as a result on the 8th he directed Massena towards Znaim, Davout and Marmont toward Brünn, with the Guard and Oudinot in central reserve, in order to cover every possible bolt hole. The 8th saw several sharp rear-guard actions, proof that Charles’ corps were still capable of offering resistance, but only on the 9th did it become clear that the Archduke was heading for Znaim, hoping to put the River Thaya between his army and the French. Napoleon at once directed his central reserve to support Massena. Marmont, in the meantime, was on his own initiative determined to forestall Charles at the Thaya and close the crossings to him. After passing the river well to the east of Znaim, Marmont raced down its left bank, heedless of the potential dangers he was courting by acting on his own: it was virtually a repetition of the maneuver of Landshut. On the 10th, he reached Znaim, only to find that much of Charles’ army was already over the river, but notwithstanding this Marmont rushed his men into an unequal action in the hope of holding the Austrians
until the French main body could come up from the rear. In this he was successful, for early on the next day Massena arrived and reopened the battle.
The new battle was not destined to be of long duration. If his army was still capable of fighting a new action, the Archduke Charles most certainly was not, and hardly had the firing opened than he asked for an armistice. To this Napoleon agreed, after assessing that his men were too exhausted to ensure a complete victory. The articles were signed at two in the morning of the 12th, and in this way the active phase of the Campaign of 1809 came to an end.
A full peace was not immediately forthcoming, however, and it took several months of bitter wrangling before the terms could be agreed to. The Emperor Francis was particularly intransigent, and on several occasions fighting almost flared up again. The landing of a British force at Walcheren in the Netherlands caused a disproportionate furore, and encouraged the Austrian war party to call for further efforts. However, his rashest act was the dismissal of Archduke Charles from command on July 18, a step that made renewed hostilities virtually out of the question. Moreover, the Austrian Emperor became increasingly aware of his country’s isolation, and rather than face the total ruin that a renewal of the fighting would entail, he at length agreed to sign the Treaty of Pressburg at the Schönbrunn on October 14. Napoleon always marveled at the moderation of the terms he demanded, but these were grave enough and he was fortunate to gain them in the light of his campaign’s limited success. Austria agreed to cede Salzburg and the Inn-Viertel provinces (eventually made over to Bavaria), besides handing over to the French Empire large areas of the Frioul, Carniola and Carinthia, the great city of Trieste, and those parts of Croatia and Dalmatia lying to the south of the River Save. Austria’s Polish possessions were awarded to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and the Tsar received a small area of Galicia, presumably as a reward for staying at least neutral in the struggle. These cessions involved well over three million Austrian subjects, a very sizeable proportion of her total population of 16 million souls. Francis also agreed to pay an indemnity equivalent to almost 85 million francs, accorded recognition to Joseph as King of Spain, and reaffirmed the exclusion of British trade from his remaining dominions. The Austrian army was never again to exceed the figure of 150,000 men. The humiliation of Austria appeared complete.
The Marshalate—subsequent appointments (1807-1815)
Russia at this time was belatedly pretending to cooperate with the French in accordance with the Erfurt agreements; in fact, however, her generals were solely concerned with seizing certain choice pieces of Hapsburg territory.
See diagram, p. 351.
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THE ILLUSION OF SUCCESS
The lessons that can be drawn from the Campaign of 1809 are of considerable significance to any understanding of the decline of Napoleon’s meteoric career. There are aspects of this campaign which show Napoleon at his military best. The skill with which he retrieved Berthier’s near-fatal errors at the very outset and the handling of the component corps during the week of confused fighting that followed merit the greatest praise and recognition. Many commentators place Wagram among his greatest battles in terms of tactical skill, and there is no doubt that the way in which he retrieved one critical situation after another, refusing to show perturbation at even the most perilous moments, show Napoleon, the soldier, at his best.
Nevertheless, these achievements cannot conceal the reverse of the medal. It can be stated that Napoleon was guilty of more errors of judgment during these hectic three months than we have yet seen in all his earlier campaigns put together. Nobody but the Emperor bears responsibility for placing Berthier in initial command of the Army of Germany, and yet he was surely aware of his subordinate’s decided limitations as a practical commander, and thus placed his army in a critical situation which only his own great genius proved capable of retrieving at the eleventh hour. Possibly he hoped that at the last minute Russia would prevent Austria’s declaration of war, but by the time Berthier took up his unwelcome post the writing was undoubtedly on the wall. Then again, however brilliant the battles of April 19-25 may have been, there is no disguising the fact that Napoleon failed in his ultimate aim, the destruction of the Austrian army, largely because he insisted on breaking up his concentration of force (which initially he had been at such pains to achieve) by detaching first Massena and then Lefebvre on comparatively minor errands. This was a clear breach of his own principles. It is even harder to justify his subsequent decision to press on for Vienna in late April and early May instead of crossing the Danube in pursuit of the enemy’s disorganized army. It appears that for once he allowed the lure of the Austrian capital to warp his judgment and distract his attention (in much the same way as Murat had been diverted in 1805, earning Napoleon’s bitter criticism), for surely he did not expect that occupation of the Schönbrunn would ipso facto earn a victorious peace after the experiences of the Austerlitz campaign. Yet a similar error was to be committed again in 1812.
On the tactical level there is scant defense for his hasty and ill-considered decision to make an unprepared crossing of the Danube in mid-May. It is possible that at this time he discounted the military abilities of the Austrian “canaille” and hoped to surprise them by an unexpectedly sudden move, thus shattering at one stroke the rebellious attitude to his rule which was spreading throughout Germany; but in the subsequent battle of Aspern-Essling he was extremely fortunate to escape with only a severe shaking from an impossible situation, largely attributable to his overweening self-confidence. The bulletins might attribute all his disappointments to a faulty bridge, but in reality his defeat was due to a gross miscalculation of what was feasible and of the odds facing his men. On this occasion his famous opportunism led him to extreme rashness. In slight mitigation, the care with which he supervised the preparations for the second crossing reveals that he was aware of his earlier shortcomings and was still capable of learning from his mistakes, but the price had been 20,000 French lives and a great blow to his prestige.
His genius for inspiring the conscripts of his rank and file and rallying the shaky loyalty of allied troops remained undimmed, and he was undoubtedly the best general on either side, his errors notwithstanding, yet something of the old energy and brilliance is lacking. Many of his orders are vaguely worded and more capable of misapprehension than ever before; he shows remarkable fits of lethargy, or sheer exhaustion, after both Aspern-Essling and Wagram; his summary treatment of Bernadotte, however deserved, earned him an able man’s enmity and falls short of the great finesse with which Napoleon customarily treated his subordinates. All this would seem to make the point that Napoleon was past his military prime by 1809. His valet, Constant, tells us that on one occasion after 1805 Napoleon remarked: “One has only a certain time for war. I will be good for six years more; after that even I must cry halt.”41 As Dodge remarks, “Was the time coming sooner?” Finally there is the evidence of a very un-Napoleonic comment written in a letter shortly after Wagram: “Battle should only be offered when there is no other turn of fortune to be hoped for, as from its nature the fate of a battle is always dubious.”42 This had hardly been the policy underlying his greatest campaigns; it would appear that the master of war was becoming sick of his trade.
In addition to this weakening of certain of Napoleon’s abilities, there was also a marked deterioration in the standards of the troops he commanded. The infantry, formerly the pride of the Grande Arméee and the terror of Europe, had become far too diluted with raw conscripts to be as reliable as in earlier years. Napoleon recognized this and spared no pains to inspire a higher morale among “his children,” but no amount of personal encouragement could make up for the lack of experience of many of the men and junior officers in 1809. The provision of regimental artillery was intended to stiffen their morale in battle, but the facts that part of Macdonald’s command fled on July 5, and that next day it proved necessary to place his men in such a massive and casualty-prone formation for the final attack, wo
uld seem to show that the infantry arm had seen better days. The increasing reliance on allied troops also pointed to a growing mutation in the Empire’s armies; the numbers of Italians, Bavarians, Saxons and others were clearly increasing as the strain on French resources became too great for her to bear alone, but the price was a drop in combat efficiency and general reliability throughout the army. The headlong fight of Bernadotte’s Saxons on the second day at Wagram and the high proportion of officer casualties incurred during this battle are revealing indications that all was not well.
The decline was less marked in the cavalry. Although Napoleon’s screening troops failed to elicit vital information on several occasions (most particularly on the first day of Aspern-Essling), the mounted arm’s record in battle remained high. One reason for this probably lay in the fact that there were necessarily a smaller proportion of unwilling conscripts in the mounted arm than in the infantry. The cavalry attracted the best and most genuine recruits, while the fact that it took far longer to train a cavalryman also tended to improve the overall standard.
As regards the artillery arm, the established drawback of slow mobility remained prevalent. With the exception of the horse artillery, the French gunners were still required to walk alongside their pieces, and this obviously slowed down the speed with which guns could be moved and repositioned on the battlefield. Although there was a marked shortage of artillery at the outset of the campaign, Napoleon managed to make up most deficiencies by the time of Wagram, converting many captured Austrian cannon for the use of his forces and wheedling or hounding the remainder from his hard-pressed minister of war, General Clark. Consequently, the guns were at last able to carry out their full role in the later stages of the campaign, and it will be remembered that the Emperor made extremely skilful use of his batteries at several critical moments during the battle of the 5th-6th July.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 90