By May 4 it was becoming clear that a considerable number of the enemy were in fact retiring on Dresden as suspected, but there was still no definite news of Bülow’s or Kleist’s movements. Nevertheless, being in possession of the initiative, Napoleon felt justified in splitting his forces into two parts in order to cover all possible eventualities. Ney, joined by Victor and Reynier, Sébastiani’s cavalry and a detachment from Ist Corps, would hasten to Torgau as well as Wittenberg, force the river line, assimilate the neutral Saxon army into VIIth Corps and simultaneously create a threat to Berlin. The inclusion of the Prussian capital in these orders is of twofold significance. In the first place Napoleon hoped such a development would induce the Prussians to break away from the Russians and move north to defend Berlin—thus affording the French with the opportunity to destroy the Allies in detail. Secondly, it reflects Napoleon’s continuing mental preoccupation with his original “master plan” of a massive advance toward Danzig; there are signs that he still hoped to implement this grandiose scheme. In the meantime, however, the remainder of the French forces would continue to head for Dresden. Lauriston’s Vth Corps was to take up an intermediate position linking the two main French forces by initially moving from Leipzig to Grimma on the River Mulde, with particular orders to watch out for the untraced General Kleist.
By this time the Allied high command was split into bitter factions on the subject of their future moves. The Prussians were not unnaturally anxious for the safety of Berlin, but in the end it was decided to withdraw the whole Allied army back over the Elbe through Dresden to Bautzen, where a new stand would be made. As for Berlin, General Bülow’s 30,000 men (who had been left without orders near Magdeburg and Halle throughout the 2nd owing to the general excitement) were to reunite near Rosslau and then proceed to cover the approaches to the Prussian capital.
The Allied withdrawal was not unduly hasty, and there was a sharp action at Colditz on the 5th when Eugène caught up with Miloradovitch and the Russian rear guard. In spite of this, the Allies made good their withdrawal through Dresden on the 7th—8th, but less competently bungled the demolition of the main bridges behind them. By the 8th Napoleon was in the suburbs of Dresden, and the next day saw two French bridgeheads driven over the river on to the east bank. All this time Napoleon’s emissaries had been bombarding the wavering King of Saxony with alternate glowing promises and dire ultimatums, demanding his immediate return to his duty as a member of the Confederation of the Rhine. By the 10th, the hesitant monarch made up his mind in Napoleon’s favor, handing over both his army and the city of Torgau into the Emperor’s care. This was a considerable material and propaganda victory for the French, and Napoleon lost no time in converting Dresden into his new center of operations, further easing the strain on his communications running back to Mainz. Meanwhile the main Allied army continued its withdrawal to Bautzen, where a strong position was being surveyed by the Russian engineers. On arrival there, Wittgenstein found a welcome reinforcement awaiting him in the form of Barclay de Tolly and 13,000 more Russian troops.
By the IIth, there were 70,000 French troops over the Elbe in the Dresden area, and 45,000 more under Ney at Torgau. A short pause then ensued while Napoleon reconstructed the French forces. With the intention of enabling simultaneous operations to be carried out toward Berlin and Bautzen, he decided to end the present division of his corps into the Armies of the Elbe and the Main, and in their place create a single army of more than 203,000 men. Prince Eugène was removed from the scene by being transferred to Italy to prepare for any possible Austrian attack over the Alps. “Leave this evening,” wrote the Emperor to his stepson on the 12th, “and make your way to Munich, and from there to Italy. I have ordered the minister of war to place under your command the troops that are in my kingdom of Italy and the Illyrian provinces.”18 A strong Corps of Observation was to be formed there (including between 80 and 90 battalions) in the hope of overawing the Schönbrunn and thus reduce the likelihood of Austrian intervention in the war.
The new French Army of the Elbe was to operate in two wings. The northern force—commanded by Marshal Ney—would be brought up to a strength of 79,500 infantry and 4,800 cavalry (IInd, IIIrd, Vth and VIIth Corps, the 2nd Cavalry Corps and one division of light cavalry). The IVth, VIth, XIth, XIIth Corps, the Imperial Guard (horse and foot) and the Ist Cavalry Corps—a total of almost 110,000 infantry and 12,000 horsemen—would remain under the Emperor’s personal command, with Marshal Macdonald as his deputy.
Owing to their crippling lack of cavalry, the French were still largely in the dark concerning the exact location of their foes. Considering all the possibilities, Napoleon thought it most likely that the mass of the Allies would be falling back through Dresden towards Bautzen, detaching only a part of their forces to cover Berlin; the alternatives—a general northward concentration or a division of their armies into two equal halves—seemed rather less probable, for the Russian depots were situated in Silesia and the Russians at least would also be eager to keep in close proximity to the Austrian frontier in the hope that their presence might induce the Emperor to join the common cause.
The first thing to do was to glean accurate information, and so on May 12 the VIth, XIth and IVth Corps were sent forward to find the enemy while Ney’s forces moved off to concentrate at Luckau ready for the drive on Berlin. Lauriston’s Vth Corps would simultaneously move forward to preserve the link joining the two wings. Partly to confuse the enemy during these moves, and partly to forestall any Allied agreement with Austria, Caulaincourt, Master of the Horse, was sent off on a diplomatic mission to the Tsar, with orders to suggest the conclusion of an immediate armistice and the summoning of a general peace conference at Prague. The sinuous Metternich had already offered to mediate between the warring parties—at a price—but Napoleon hoped to open direct negotiations with Alexander thus avoiding any reliance on third parties. “We are consequently determined,” wrote the Emperor to his emissary on the 18th, “to conclude an armistice or suspension of hostilities with Russia and Prussia for the duration of such a congress. In order to avert the battle which the enemy’s position would seem to make imminent and thus prevent an unnecessary effusion of blood in humanity’s name, our intention is that you should go to the advance posts and demand to be admitted to the presence of the Emperor Alexander to make him this proposition….”19
Before Caulaincourt could be sent off on his mission, Marshal Macdonald (commanding the reconnaissance in force) had run the Allies to ground at Bautzen (May 16). On receipt of this firm news, Napoleon instructed his three leading corps to pin the enemy while Oudinot worked his way round to the south of the enemy position. He also warned Ney to be ready to march south with his own corps, picking up Lauriston en route, but indicated that IInd and VIIth Corps (Victor and Reynier) should continue to move on Berlin in case the Prussians were still in fact moving north. A fine mix-up of orders ensued, and in the end Ney marched south with all his corps trailing along behind, not really comprehending what was expected of him. On the 18th Napoleon sent the Prince of the Moskowa further orders, requiring him to march on the 20th in such a way as to make the enemy believe his intent was to rejoin Macdonald near Bautzen, but on the 21st he was to swing eastward toward Drehsa so as to place himself on the enemy’s rear. If this move succeeded, the Allied communications running through Löbau and Görlitz would be in deadly peril, and the foe might well find himself forced back on to the neutral Austrian frontier where he would have no recourse but to accept annihilation or capitulation.
However, delays and misunderstandings on the part of Ney were to rob Napoleon of what would otherwise have been a decisive victory, and by the evening of the 20th the confused Gascon was planning to place his men in a defensive position at Maukendorf, facing eastward instead of south, thus totally misunderstanding his intended role in the approaching battle.
By 10:00
A.M. on the 19th Napoleon was already close to Bautzen, and the whole of the day was spent in a de
tailed reconnaissance of the enemy position. From his observations he placed the enemy strength at about 150,000 (in fact a gross overestimate, as Wittgenstein disposed of only a few more than 96,000 at this juncture); secondly he saw that his opponents had drawn up their forces along a series of fortified spurs and ridges, with the River Spree to their front and the town of Bautzen as an occupied outwork slightly in advance of their center. He further appreciated that there were two main lines of defenses, running along a front almost seven miles in length. And, lastly, that the distant hamlet of Hochkirch was the key to the rear areas, commanding as it did the main road running to Görlitz.
Throughout the day, the corps d’armée of the main force made their respective appearances and were eventually drawn up in the following order. Bertrand’s corps formed the northern wing; Marmont and Macdonald were holding the center, and Oudinot was fast moving up on the right; the Imperial Guard was kept in central reserve around Forstgen. The initial French front was about a mile shorter than the Allied line.
Apart from one series of sharp incidents, there was little activity on the 19th. At one stage Barclay de Tolly and General Yorck issued forth from the Allied defenses with a strong exploratory force, and set out to reconnoiter the French positions on the left of the line. This was the sector which should shortly see the arrival of Lauriston’s corps, and it was important that it should remain clear of snooping Allies. Accordingly Marshal Bertrand detached his Italian division and sent it off to meet Ney and Lauriston, but this operation was badly mishandled and the Allied reconnaissance force soon reduced it to a mass of fugitives. However, Kellermann now arrived on the scene with a French cavalry division, and this force, together with the advance guard of Ney, soon drove the inquisitive Barclay back through Königswarta and to the Spree. In similar fashion the French Vth Corps sent Yorck about his business, and by nightfall Lauriston was camped around Weissig, while Ney had reached Maukendorf (with Reynier a short distance to his rear). Thus the envelopment of the Allied right was proceeding apace, even though Ney still failed to appreciate the real situation.
Bautzen was a two-day battle of great ferocity and repeated variations of fortune. If the Allies were at a decided numerical disadvantage throughout, they were well entrenched with a river to their front, while most of Napoleon’s formations were of very poor quality, being both tired and inexperienced. From the outset, Napoleon set himself two tasks, namely, to turn the Allied right and to seize the village of Hochkirch. These measures should suffice to isolate the foe from Silesia and thus place them completely at the French mercy. His plan was straightforward enough—following the principles of the “system” of Castiglione.* While Marmont, Macdonald and Oudinot attacked the enemy frontally, pinned him down and wore out his strength, Ney and the secondary force would turn the Allied right, thus compelling Wittgenstein to commit his reserves and weaken his right center to form a new line facing the threatened sector. Then, at the critical moment, Bertrand’s fresh corps would launch the main attack against this weakened part of the main Allied line. Owing to the strength of the enemy position and the fact that Ney was not properly in position on the 19th, the Emperor decided that the whole of the first day should be devoted to a battle of attrition, and that the actual envelopment and final attack should be held over until the 21st, by which time everything should be ready. For their part the Allies planned to contain and exhaust Napoleon’s assault before launching a counterattack around the French left. The Tsar was convinced that Napoleon would make his main effort against the Allied left in order to drive them away from Austria. Troops were accordingly massed to the south, leaving their right flank relatively weakly held.
The Battle of Bautzen, May 20-21, 1813
Until noon on the 20th, the French deliberately marked time, but shortly after midday the bombardment of the enemy line opened and about 3 :00
P.M. the first major attacks went in. Aided by the great gallantry of the sappers, who constructed trestle bridges over the Spree under very heavy fire, the French infantry stormed into the first line of Allied positions using frontal assaults, and by 6:00 in the evening were in possession of the city of Bautzen and the whole front line. By that time the enemy commanders had become obsessively anxious for their left flank which Oudinot was pulverizing, and as a result most of their reserves were already committed to the southern sector. Ney’s approach toward Klix was no longer a secret, but the Allies completely miscalculated his strength and accordingly continued to ignore this development. Napoleon could hardly have hoped for anything better.
Dawn on May 21 found Napoleon early astir, dictating his final orders for the day’s battle. It was evident that Ney would not be fully available for action before 11 :00
A.M., and that even then Lauriston would still be marching from his bivouacs near Leichnam to reach his designated position near Preititz on the flank of the Allied army. Accordingly the Emperor ordered Ney to engage the enemy right with his IIIrd Corps, while the task of moving far into the enemy’s rear to block the Görlitz road was firmly laid on Lauriston’s shoulders. Napoleon calculated that the combination of these two moves would surely compel the foe to weaken his center to strengthen his flank. During this time, the stalwarts of the previous day’s fighting—Marmont, Macdonald and Oudinot—would resume and sustain their pinning attacks with the utmost ferocity on what would now become the “secondary field,” formed by the entrenched positions of the enemy left and center lying behind the Blossaer Wasser stream. The final grand attack (to be delivered by Bertrand’s IVth Corps) was to be entrusted to the overall supervision of Marshal Soult, the veteran of a similar operation on the Pratzen Heights in December 1805. Lastly, ready for any emergency, the Emperor massed his general reserve in the Basankwitz valley near Basen. This élite formation contained three divisions of crack infantry (two belonging to the Young Guard, one to the Old), three divisions of cavalry (two comprising Latour-Maubourg’s command, the third being formed by the Guard cavalry) and no less than 80 guns (14 being provided from the corps, the rest comprising the Guard reserve artillery—48 “foot” cannon and 18 pieces of horse artillery).
The battle opened very hotly for the French troops making the “pinning” attacks. Oudinot in particular, on the extreme right, was faced by the most desperate resistance, for he was in the proximity of the Allied lines of communication and the foe knew enough about Napoleon’s battle techniques by 1813 to appreciate the importance he placed on their disruption. Accordingly Gortschakoff received a strong force of reinforcements added to Miloradovitch’s command. Under the heaviest of pressure, Oudinot not unnaturally appealed to the Emperor for aid. The first request was simply ignored; the second elicited only the following reply: “Tell your marshal that the battle will be won at 3 :00
P.M. and that until then he must do the best he can”20—hardly the most cheering of replies. Not surprisingly Oudinot’s XIIth Corps began to lose a little ground but this suited Napoleon as it drew the enemy out of his prepared positions. Macdonald and Marmont fared a little better than their colleague, and by noon Marmont had begun to cross the Blossaer Wasser and was engaging the enemy’s main artillery positions. This persuaded Napoleon to send over Barrois’s division of the Young Guard to take post on the left flank of VIth Corps. By this time, the violence of the fighting on Napoleon’s left convinced him that Ney was fully engaged, and that the moment for the master stroke, le coup de foudre, had come.
Soult was ready for the order. Much of the previous day had been well spent building an elaborate earthwork on the east bank of the Spree, and this man-made feature now provided excellent cover for his sappers as they built additional pontoon bridges ready for the grand advance. Then, unnoticed by the preoccupied foe, the 20,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 30 guns of IVth Corps quietly crossed and massed themselves on the northern side of the plateau. Soult’s immediate aim was to capture the Kreschwitz-Pliskowitz area. This promised to be no easy task, and so the Emperor again sent forward Barrois’s Young Guard
division to attack Kreschwitz, and ordered up every available cannon to cover the line of advance.
At 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon the IVth Corps smashed its way up on to the plateau and stormed into the positions held by General Blücher, concentrating on the fort comprising the key to his position. After seeing this attack get under way, Napoleon advanced the 60 guns of the Guard Reserve and stationed them immediately to the west of Basankwitz, where they were protected by the neighboring formations of the Young Guard, safely massed in the valley. These cannon at once opened a heavy fire against Kreschwitz and the overlooking crests. Between 2:00 and 3:00
P.M. the cannonade continued without abatement and during this period Soult successfully took possession of Blücher’s key fort. He proved incapable, however, of pressing on to the next position because his corps artillery could not find any ground suitable for its deployment. Deprived of close artillery support, the IVth Corps suffered terrible losses and lost momentum.
Meanwhile, what had been happening to Ney and Lauriston on the extreme left? From the very outset, the operations of the IIIrd and Vth Corps were dogged with difficulties and complications. The two corps found their lines of attack confused and blocked by elements of their comrades, and it was not until 10:00
A.M. that Ney had unraveled the confusion and taken the important Gleinau redoubt. An urgent message from Napoleon then arrived indicating that the Emperor relied on Ney being in possession of Preititz village within the next hour. Ney did his best to conform, but by 11:00
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