Meanwhile, Murat was making famous progress on the other flank. Bianchi proved incapable of withstanding the fury of Marshal Victor’s attack; his line broke, and a large part of his command found themselves pinned with their backs to the swollen Weisseritz near the village of Dolzschen. As the key bridge at Plauen had already fallen into French hands, the Allied center was relegated to the role of helpless spectators as Bianchi’s men were driven into the river. Meanwhile on Murat’s right, General Teste’s division and Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry made short work of the remaining Austrians despite the difficulty of advancing through thick mud, and by midafternoon the Allied left had ceased to exist. Thirteen thousand prisoners fell into French hands in the sector, and all the rest of Bianchi’s troops were dead or scattered.
However, the battle in the center was not going so well for the severely outnumbered St. Cyr and Marmont. Three assaults failed to recapture the village of Leubnitz, and when Napoleon rode back into Dresden at 4:00
P.M. he fully anticipated a third day’s fighting on the morrow.
The Allied commanders, however, had experienced enough. Plans to launch a heavy attack designed to sever the French left from the French center were abandoned owing to the appalling condition of the ground which would have made the forward movement of artillery practically impossible. Then a cannonball narrowly missed the Tsar Alexander, and this near escape damped what little ardor the Allied high command could still muster. Reports that Vandamme was slowly pushing back Ostermann and Eugen reinforced their caution. Accordingly orders were issued for an overnight retreat toward Bohemia. Over the two days’ fighting the Allies had lost some 38,000 men; the French had emerged lightly with barely 10,000 casualties. It appeared that the legend of French invincibility had been fully re-established.
Early on the 28th therefore, French patrols found nothing but a handful of rear guards facing them. Napoleon at once set about organizing a pursuit; if only Vandamme could reach Teplitz ahead of the enemy, the Army of Bohemia would be hopelessly trapped amid the mountains. However, the Emperor was far from well; furthermore, distressing details of Oudinot’s failure against Billow on the 23rd had now reached headquarters. No sooner had these been assimilated than news of another blow arrived. In complete disobedience of his orders, it appeared that Macdonald had rashly pushed ahead over the Katzbach pursuing Blücher. The French columns became separated, and the commander of the Army of Silesia had seized the opportunity to wheel about and catch his pursuers at a disadvantage. By the end of the 26th, Macdonald’s Army of the Bobr had suffered a severe and costly defeat (losing 15,000 prisoners and 100 cannon), completely reversing the strategical situation. Marmont’s gloomy prophecy of a fortnight earlier was being fulfilled only too accurately; Napoleon’s success at Dresden was already being overshadowed by the failures of his subordinates on other sectors. His mind filled with the need to devise new measures to offset these setbacks, Napoleon returned to Dresden on the afternoon of the 28th, leaving the conduct of the pursuit of Schwarzenberg to his underlings.
Two days later, fate dealt another blow. In the absence of the master, the French pursuit of the various columns of the Allied army proceeded with fair élan but insufficient coordination. As a result, Vandamme’s corps became increasingly isolated, and, when Ostermann suddenly turned at bay near Priestena (merely five miles from Teplitz), the Allies were able to collect sufficient troops to withstand Ist Corps’ assaults. During the 29th Vandamme was eventually forced to give a little ground, falling back toward Kulm. Here, on the 30th, he suddenly and wholly fortuitously found himself beset from the rear by Kleist’s column. This officer, desperately attempting to escape from St. Cyr’s pursuing troops, had swung eastward from his original line of retreat in the hope of slipping across Vandamme’s rear. Instead, he blundered into Vandamme’s main body at the very climax of his renewed battle with Ostermann, who had already been reinforced from the south to 44,000 men. Vandamme, with only 32,000 troops with which to oppose a total of 54,000 Allies, manfully tried to fight his way out of the trap, but although over half his men escaped the commander of Ist Corps and 13,000 of his troops fell into Allied hands.
And so it was that Napoleon heard of a third defeat of one of his subordinates—but several observers noted how coolly he took the news. In the allied camp, of course, there was much rejoicing fraught with heartfelt relief. Their successes at Grössbeeren, the Katzbach, and now Kulm—relatively small though they had been—inspired one and all to new efforts. As General Butturlin, the Tsar’s aide-de-camp, reputedly described the effect of Vandamme’s defeat: “The battle of Kulm changed into a cry of joy the despair which was spreading through the valleys of Bohemia.”30 Thus Dresden joined Lützen and Bautzen on the growing list of practically valueless French victories.
80
THE BATTLE OF THE NATIONS
It was high time for Napoleon to reconsider his strategy. He could adopt one of two main courses. He might mass the bulk of his forces for a drive against Prague, hoping to complete the defeat of the Army of Bohemia which was still very shaken despite its success at Kulm; if successful this might drive Austria out of the war. Or, alternatively, he might renew the advance against Berlin. Once again, the old lure of his April “master plan” won the day. It offered palpable advantages. To the northward the countryside was still relatively unravaged and could therefore be expected to yield considerable supplies. The French would also be able to assume a more central position overall in the face of the three Allied armies. And even if Schwarzenberg did decide to double back along his tracks and head for Dresden once more, the mounting of a new offensive over the Bohemian mountains would take a considerable period, by which time the French could be in Berlin and on their way to achieving the relief of Stettin. Such a threat must surely draw the Prussians and Russians north, leaving Austria precariously isolated. A sudden move south would then place Napoleon in a commanding position, with power to end the war in a blaze of success.
To lead the advance on Berlin, Napoleon placed Marshal Ney over the head of Oudinot. On 2nd September he ordered the Prince of the Moskowa to reach Berlin within a week or eight days at the most, moving through Baruth. He promised him a total force of 80,000 men (exclusive of Davout). Macdonald was meanwhile to hold the line of the Bobr, Davout to advance east from Hamburg, while Murat, St. Cyr and Marmont held the line of the Bohemian mountains to defend Dresden. These dispositions should hold the other enemy armies at bay.
However, the whole project proved totally unrealistic from the very outset, and it was only twenty-four hours later that the Emperor felt compelled to cancel the concentration of 25,000 men at Grossenhain—the force intended to bring Ney up to full strength for the Berlin drive. The reason for this change of plan which threw everything out of balance was the sudden realization that Macdonald was still truly a beaten man, and that Blücher’s advance westward was continuing unchecked. Consequently Napoleon once more rushed eastward from Dresden to Bautzen to rally Macdonald’s shattered conscripts, taking with him the Guard, Marmont’s corps and some cavalry. This meant that only two and a half corps could be left to protect Dresden itself—namely St. Cyr, Victor and what was left of Ist Corps (now temporarily commanded by Souham in Vandamme’s place). Thus not only was Ney about to march on Berlin understrength, but the security of Dresden was no longer assured.
Still, if Napoleon succeeded in rallying Macdonald’s forces and then proceeded to force Blücher to fight an all-out battle, something useful could still emerge from the mass of contradictory plans and confused orders that were now flying to and fro. The first part of this program was carried out perfectly; meeting Macdonald’s baffled troops to the east of Bautzen, Napoleon rallied their morale with all his old skill and led them back eastward again toward Hochkirch. Unfortunately for the development of Napoleon’s latest plan, however, Blücher correctly guessed the reason for Macdonald’s sudden change of mood, and promptly fell back. Napoleon was furious to find his Prussian adversary eluding him,
but there was little he could do; so, leaving Macdonald to follow the Army of Bohemia, he returned to Bautzen to recommence his interrupted preparations for the move on Berlin.
Once again circumstances intervened before anything could be achieved. No sooner was the Emperor back at Bautzen than an alarming message from St. Cyr reported that there were distinct signs of a renewed onslaught by Schwarzenberg against Dresden. There was some truth in this report, for the Austrian general had indeed recrossed the Elbe at the head of 60,000 men heading northward, while his subordinate Barclay de Tolly marched toward Pirna en route for Dresden.
Napoleon’s reaction was swift. After studying the general situation he determined to try conclusions with Barclay. Leaving the Dresden area on September 8, the French rushed for Kulm, their leader being determined to reach Teplitz well in the Allied rear. The Army of Bohemia lost no time in ordering a precipitate retreat on all sectors, and very soon all of Schwarzen-berg’s troops were once again on the left bank of the Elbe, falling back on their threatened depots along the roads over the mountains. The French followed them with all dispatch, but when a battle situation against Barclay at last materialized near Kulm on the 10th, Napoleon had second thoughts. Aware of the dubious stamina of his conscripts and temporarily deprived of his artillery by the frightful roads over the mountains, he decided not to risk action in view of the strength of the enemy’s position. Leaving St. Cyr to mask the town, the Emperor consequently fell back on Dresden.
A further factor that reinforced this unusual degree of caution on the Emperor’s part was provided by new disconcerting tidings from the northern sector. Advancing carelessly, Ney had blundered into a trap set for him by Bernadotte near Dennewitz on September 6, and after a scrappy and confused battle had been repulsed with some 10,000 casualties after inflicting only 7,000 on the Army of the North. Despite Reynier’s sustained leadership, the French lost all chance of a successful outcome to this action when Ney insisted on plunging into the fighting, sword in hand, alongside Bertrand’s troops. The end came when Oudinot, still smarting from his supercession in command by the “bravest of the brave,” deliberately obeyed Ney’s order to move his men from the left flank to the right although he fully knew that this misguided step would throw away all chance of a French victory. According to St. Cyr, Napoleon received news of this latest debacle with the greatest sang-froid, reviewing the implications “with all the coolness he could have brought to a discussion of events in China.”31 On the 10th, he instructed Berthier to send an order to Ney. “It is necessary to write to the Prince of the Moscowa and inform him that he must take up a position on the right bank of the Elbe near Torgau,”32 where he was to hold out at all costs.
In due course Napoleon hoped to be able to join Ney there, but in the meantime other concerns were demanding his full attention. The weather had become abysmal again, making the inadequate roads quite impassable, and this was resulting in a great supply shortage. Raids by bands of roving Cossacks and partisans were further complicating the situation on the French communications. To meet the mounting administrative crisis, Napoleon ordered the transfer of vast quantities of flour from Torgau to Dresden by barge, and sent out Lefebvre-Desnouëttes with a strong cavalry force to resecure his communications. Then came tidings that Schwarzenberg was once again advancing on Dresden and the Emperor hastened to Pirna to reconnoiter the enemy’s reported position. Hardly had he reached there, however, than he heard that Bernadotte with 80,000 troops was approaching Rosslau on the Elbe. He promptly retired to Dresden, intending to join Ney as promised earlier, but then a new crisis occurred on the eastern flank where Macdonald was once again falling back in confusion before the Army of Silesia. Dropping all other plans, Napoleon rushed eastward with the Guard—and arrived in time to rally Macdonald’s forces for the second time and to drive Blucher back from a position immediately east of Bautzen (September 22). A new message from Ney then arrived reporting (prematurely as it proved) the arrival of another Swedish column at Wartenburg.
From a study of the events of the last three weeks, it must have become evident to Napoleon that he was exhausting his men and achieving very little. The Allied strategy of refusing to fight the Emperor in person but of maintaining ceaseless pressure on his subordinates was clearly paying dividends. Its net result was to keep Napoleon off balance, as again and again he had been compelled to rush from one sector to another to reinforce his marshals. His own plans had consequently been placed in abeyance time after time and not a single decisive blow had resulted. Furthermore, the indecisiveness of the military operations was having disquieting political repercussions elsewhere in Germany. More and more former French satellites were coming to terms with the Allies. News of Dennewitz had induced the Tyrol to join the Austrian cause, while the King of Bavaria had similarly come to the decision to defect; the whole of Germany—save only Saxony—was on the point of rising in revolt. The condition of Napoleon’s army was also giving good cause for alarm. Since mid-August the French had lost one way or another 300 cannon and 150,000 men—not counting a further 50,000 on the sick lists. The remainder of the forces were rapidly approaching the level of starvation, as Napoleon was himself fully aware. “Monsieur le Comte Daru, the army is not being fed,” he wrote to the army’s director of administration on the 23rd. “It would be an illusion to regard matters otherwise.”33 Instead of the regulation twenty-eight ounces of bread a day per man, only half a pound was being issued; local resources were practically exhausted by this time, making forage all but unobtainable.
Facing these unpleasant facts, Napoleon came to a momentous decision. Apart from certain bridgeheads, all troops should at once be withdrawn west of the Elbe. Napoleon still had 260,000 tired men and 784 scantily horsed guns under his command, but these resources needed careful husbanding if they were to retain any battle power. Contraction of the front was the only logical answer—and if all went well the enemy might yet be led into making decisive blunders facilitating his destruction in detail.
The main withdrawal began on the 24th, but it proved almost impossible to make a clean break from contact. That same day Bernadotte reached the banks of the Elbe and succeeded in establishing bridgeheads at Rosslau (near Wittenberg) and at Wartenburg. Another attempted crossing of the River Elster was thwarted by Bertrand, while VIIth Corps succeeded in containing the Rosslau bridgehead, but the Army of the North managed to maintain its first footholds on the west bank of the Elbe.
The Allies, in fact, were rapidly recasting their strategy. The impending arrival of General Bennigsen at the head of the 60,000-strong Army of Poland to reinforce Schwarzenberg would make it possible to detach Blücher and send the Army of Silesia north to join Bernadotte. This move began on the 25th. At the same time it was determined that the southern armies should abandon their attacks in the general direction of Dresden and head instead for Leipzig to threaten Napoleon’s vital links running west to the Rhine. In this decision lay the seeds of the great Battle of the Nations.
Over the following days a large number of clashes took place on many sectors of the front, but it was only on October 3 that Blücher arrived at Wartenburg on the Elbe with 60,000 Prussians and there inflicted a sharp defeat upon Bertrand’s skeleton force of 13,000 troops. Next day, Blücher was over the Elbe, coordinating his move with a general advance by Bernadotte from Rosslau and Barby. Faced with such formidable numbers of enemy troops approaching the River Mulde, Ney was forced to fall back on Delitsch.
Although it might appear that the Allied northern armies had successfully forced the line of the Elbe, Napoleon’s overall strategical position was in fact improving. The enemy had at last been induced to split their forces, and from his new central position based around Leipzig the Emperor could move the greater part of 250,000 men against either Blücher and Bernadotte (140,000) or against Schwarzenberg and Bennigsen (180,000). Superficially it seemed that the Allies were at last playing straight into his hands.
His mind was soon made up. Murat had already be
en given command (September 2) of the IInd, Vth and VIIIth Corps and two forces of cavalry with orders to intercept and at least delay the advance of the Army of Bohemia from the south, while the defense of Dresden against the newly operational Army of Poland had been allocated to Ist and XIVth Corps (Löbau and St. Cyr). Acting on the latest tidings, Napoleon decided on the 6th to move north with the rest of the army to join Ney with the intention of destroying Blücher and Bernadotte (still operating more or less independently of one another) in turn before Schwarzenberg could push Murat back on Leipzig.
The need to leave a garrison in Dresden worried Napoleon a great deal. On the one hand it was doubtless politically expedient to continue to defend the capital of his last remaining German ally, while militarily the place might yet play an important role in any subsequent operations against Schwarzenberg once the northern armies had been taken care of. On the other hand Dresden’s garrison would swallow up a substantial number of men whose presence on the northern battlefields might well prove invaluable. For two days the Emperor dithered over the issue, continually changing his mind. Then at length, at 2:00
P.M. on October 7, he finally settled in favor of leaving St. Cyr and Löbau at Dresden. “My intention is to conserve Dresden,”34 Napoleon wrote from Meissen. This decision was probably the most fateful one of the entire campaign; by disregarding his own principles of concentrating every possible man before battle and of ignoring all secondary (i.e., political) considerations, Napoleon was compromising his chances of success—fatally, as it ultimately proved.
The French columns hastened northward, but the energies of the half-starved and inexperienced conscripts were no longer equal to the effort required. The town of Surzen was reached on the 8th. Napoleon believed that Blücher was in the vicinity of Duben with Bernadotte’s army further to the north near Dessau. In both calculations he was basically correct—but he wholly misrepresented the numbers and the wariness of his opponents. With 150,000 men under command, the Emperor prepared to pounce on Blücher, and on the 9th the move on Duben began. The pace of his advance was relatively slow, and the Army of Silesia got wind of its peril in the very nick of time. Bernadotte wanted to recross the Elbe forthwith, but Blücher, determined not to be dominated by the Crown Prince, insisted on a very unconventional move westward toward the River Saale. So it was that October 9 ended without the decisive engagement the Emperor had so confidently envisaged. Blücher only just made good his escape (one rearguard division was decimated in the process by Sébastiani’s cavalry), but in the confusion of fighting in the growing dusk there was no certain indication of what direction the foe had retreated in. The shortage of reconnaissance cavalry was again direly felt.
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