‘Nos.1 and 6’ had their heart-racing moments in Tunisia, for when ‘No.6’ took over 75 square miles (200km) of the fertile Goubellat plain, patrolling in front of the British lines, Derek Mills-Roberts, their new CO, decided they must use 30-man patrols in active probes of enemy positions. One of these Section patrols was surprised by a strong force of Germans at dawn on 26 February. Derek Mills-Roberts counter-attacked at once, leading his Headquarters Troop and organising his other Troops for a drive to push the attackers back eastwards. But the ambush turned out to be stronger than the Colonel expected, for the Germans were about to launch an attack on a fifty-mile (80km) front. Against the commandos were Koch III and IV parachute battalions of the Herman Goering Jäger Division, a unit that had seen extensive action. They succeeded in breaking up the Commando into pockets of resistance among steep-sided hills and isolated farmhouses, yet the commandos held them off with the help of some armoured cars and carriers from the Reconnaissance Corps, long enough for a regiment of British Churchill tanks and a battalion of Grenadier Guards to move forward and redress the balance of forces, although ‘No.6’ had lost more than 40 per cent of their strength—100 men of the 250 who started the action.
Their numbers were now far below strength, and after making further patrols in March they were withdrawn from Africa along with 1 Commando late in April 1943. They were replaced in the Med by 3 Commando, brought up to strength after Dieppe. Bill Darby’s Rangers were training their new battalions, and in Scotland men of 40 and 41 Royal Marine Commandos were being trained for spearhead landings. All these Special Forces would be deployed in Sicily, where their roles not only included the capture of flank batteries but also the establishment of links between various landing points within a beachhead.
The Sicily landings were to put the American Seventh Army on the west of the island’s southern promontory and the British Eighth Army to the east and around this point. The 30-mile (48km) gap between the British left and the American right was to be closed—according to the plan—by the evening of D-day 10 July 1943. From this southern point, Sicily may be seen as a triangle stood on its apex; the size of Wales or Vermont, its rugged mountains rising to 3,000 feet (1,000m) with the volcano Mount Etna (3,279ft, 1,000m) in the north-east. In 1943 the Sicilians were mostly barefoot peasants, providing the bulk of the defence forces, the soldiers being stationed near their families. These lived in homes with few modern services; a hole outside, often near the door, might sometimes have to serve as a privy.
3 Commando held rehearsals in Sfax, where they were welcomed, for in their Colonel’s words, ‘the Eighth Army took its tone from its commander, and Monty’s influence spread right down to the lorry drivers who would always stop and give you a lift’. He might have said the same for any military unit—or business organisation—and his own Commando always had a dedicated professionalism, more efficient for their kind of warfare than the paperwork of regular battalions. The army commandos were volunteers, however, and they resented—and some still do—the Royal Marines’ redesignation of battalions as Commando. Perhaps the army were not aware of the RM volunteer’s usual welcome in 1942-43 at a recruiting office: ‘It won’t be big ships for you, y’know—it’ll be wading ashore.’ (Not until 1944 were any conscripts directed to the Royal Marines.)
Other services’ commando units had been formed by November 1942, including the RAF Servicing Commando units. Their first deployment was in the Torch landings where they took over forward airfields, bringing in stores and equipment to service Allied planes. Details of these RAF units and Naval Beach Party commandos are shown in Appendices 2 and 7, but in later years attempts were made to limit any further use of the name ‘commando’ to units of the Special Service Brigade.
The Special Forces’ orders for Sicily have a familiar ring. Furthest west were the 3rd Rangers under Major Herman W. Dammer who landed on the flank of the American 3 Division; Bill Darby led the 1st and 4th Rangers, whose initial target was the pier at Gela; the 40 and 41 RM Commandos were to land on the left flank of the Canadians, with 3 Commando landing on the north-east extremity of the invasion to take the machine-guns overlooking the 5 Division’s beaches in the Gulf of Noto. Each special force had a second objective, 3 Commando having to move inland three miles (5km) to take a battery north-west of Cassibik.
Late in June the COPP reconnaissance parties of Don Amer and Ralph Stanbury made a detailed reconnaissance of the British target beaches south of Syracuse, and on the night of 9-10 July they were on station as canoe markers for the landings, or at least all the canoeists believed they were in the correct positions despite the dangers, and Sub-Lieutenant Saice was lost, probably run down by a landing craft. The day before there had been rough seas and most of the rangers were wretchedly seasick aboard the LSI(S)s HMS Prince Charles and HMS Prince Leopold heading for Gela. These two, small 3,650-ton carriers had eight LCAs each and accommodation for an assault force of 270 men. They, ships and men, reeled and tossed on a sea described in the log of Gunboat 658 as ‘Harry roughers’, although the armies might have expressed the conditions in stronger terms. Yet despite the storm, the Rangers’ ships reached their dropping zone, two of many fine pieces of seamanship that night.
Herman Dammer’s 3rd Rangers came ashore three miles (4.8km) west of Licata and formed the spearhead force in the 7th Regimental Combat Team of the US 3 Division. They were landed from British ships in LCAs, as was Lieutenant-Colonel Brookner W. Brody commanding the 7th RCT, taking all their beach objectives on the morning of Saturday, 10 July. In the next few days they were in the van of the 3 Divsion’s sweep along the coast—Compobello di Licata. Naro, Favare, Monteparte fell to the Rangers, some after little resistance, others in company and several in battalion assaults. By the time they reached the outskirts of Porto Empedocle they had taken more than 600 prisoners and 10 armoured cars, and other vehicles were overrun with a dozen artillery batteries along the coast road. The senior army commander—the British General Alexander—ordered General Patton to hold the Seventh Army as Alexander did not want the left (west) flank of the invasion exposed in heavy fighting. However, he did allow General Patton to make a reconnaissance in force. The 3 Division’s commander, General Truscott, who 14 months before had recommended the formation of Rangers, now sent their 3rd Battalion forward as his reconnaissance in force. The port of Empedocle was held by several hundred Germans and Italians, of whom the German artillery was experienced and working with an Italian railway battery. The ship-to-shore fire of the cruiser USS Philadelphia and two destroyers did not shift these gunners, and any prolonged bombardment might destroy the harbour installations Patton would need in landing supplies for his army’s drive north to Palermo.
Although they had no artillery support, the 3rd Rangers attacked the town, relying on their own 60mm (2.4in) mortars. These opened the attack which moved forward at about 1420 on a hot July afternoon—Friday, 16 July, Herman Dammer—with one company protecting his left flank and rear—led two companies into the east of the town, where snipers and several strongpoints had to be cleared before they reached the port area: moreover, they were handicapped by some 200 prisoners. The other three companies of the battalion, under the Executive Officer (2 i/c), Major Miller, had circled the port and came in from the west down the opposite side of the draw running north-south out of the town. Meeting tough opposition from Germans holding a walled cemetery and in coastal defences, these companies used fire-and-movement tactics with determined probes exploited when enemy strongpoints were isolated in turn. Miller’s men eventually broke the resistance, and the port was taken. At about 1900 hours, a US Navy spotter plane was ‘induced to land in the harbour’, being surprised to find it in Ranger hands. The Navy willingly supplied medical stores and food urgently needed by the battalion whose CO was flown over to the cruiser USS Philadelphia which was in touch with 3 Division’s HQ.
The British crews carrying the 1st and 4th on D-Day were to land the 1st on the left and the 4th on the right of the Gela pier.
Coming inshore—they were launched at about 0130 hours—the craft alternately ‘sank into a deep trough, then shot skyward into the piercing gleam of a searchlight’. Several large beams swept across the wave tops as Bill Darby, aboard a support landing craft, chivvied the assault boats towards the beach. Five miles (8km) from their carriers they reached their forming-up line at 0245, coming line abreast for the final half-hour’s run-in. Mortar fire began to fall among the craft, lifting some bodily and hurling men, helmets, and rifles to one side and back to the other as the LCA slammed back on to the water, buckling the craft’s armoured shields around the raiders. A British support craft forged ahead of the line and fired into the searchlight beams. The water was calmer now in the lee of the land and when some craft sank, others—against orders, no doubt—slowed to pick up the drowning men. Near the right side (east) of the pier several machine-guns and other quick-firing weapons caught F Company (4th Rangers) as their landing craft approached these pill-boxes. D Company, however, landed without casualties in a dash to the shelter for some low cliffs; they were five minutes ahead of H-hour (0315). Lieutenant Walter Wojak—who had made the night reconnaissances finding the hill route behind the Senad Pass positions—led his platoon across the soft sand and half of them were tripping the wires of a minefield before they realised they were in it. Walter Wojak was killed along with four others, men were blinded, and many wounded before a platoon sergeant found a route and led the rest of the company safely over the dunes. One young officer went to pieces and was quietly sent to the rear of his company. Then, in one of many—if not the inevitable—changes of plan vital for success in assault landings against strong resistance, D Company abandoned their planned objectives in Gela. First they must clear the machine-guns firing on F Company’s boats. All seven of these strong-points were knocked out, but the troops of the 429th Italian Coastal Battery fought hard, losing half their men. Their commander in this sector—Captain Della Minola—refused to surrender before he was killed by rangers’ grenades. D Company then moved into Gela.
F Company, coming ashore late after picking up survivors, were shaken by an explosion as the Italians blew a gap in the pier. But the company took no further casualties on the beach as they moved off, and by 0344 they were warily making their way towards the cathedral square in Gela.
The 1st Rangers landed on time, although two LCAs had been hit with consequently heavy losses. The destroyer USS Shubrick shot out two searchlights as the first waves of assault troops landed to smash through the line of mines, wire and pill-boxes into the cobbled streets of the town. In the pitch-dark streets one soldier looked like another: a mere darker patch of shadow which flitted momentarily into vision. One BAR-man was joined by another soldier as he fired from a window, but when the American suggested they move forward to another building he found his companion was an Italian. Knocking him to the ground with the butt of his automatic rifle, the ranger dodged clear of this Italian-occupied building.
Another American called out in the language of his grandparents: ‘Veni qua supits!’ Four Italians came running into captivity. Confounded, one kept repeating: ‘But we’re Italians, too.’ Dawn was breaking by the time the skirmishes in the square died down, and several rangers got the last defenders out of the cathedral about 0600. The rangers were then formed up in files and marched to their defensive positions ‘a few blocks north of the square’. Artillery fire from the open plain beyond these positions was beginning to hit the town, and three German planes made a low-level attack on the beaches where the American 1 Division were—and had been—landing. For the Rangers at Gela the battle was just beginning, further east along the coast the RM Commandos were landing in their first spearhead roles of World War II.
The Royal Marine 40 and 41 Commando came ashore on rocky shelving beaches west of Punta Castellazzo, the direction of the enemy coast lit by flares and bombs from an RAF raid inland. Both Commandos were lifted in the 22-assault craft of the transports Derbyshire and Durban Castle. Lost in the dark and with some lack of resolution by the crews in forming a line for the last stage of the run-in, the craft carried ‘No.40 RM’ eastward to land among the Canadians on the Commando’s right. 41(RM) Commando was ashore first, although half an hour late at 0300, drenched by spray and water slopping into the craft from the strong swell. Wirelesses and 3-inch mortar bombs were damaged by the soaking. Although put ashore at the wrong point, Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. (Pops) Manners—who had been at Dieppe—quickly had them assembled in a hollow surrounded by dunes. From here they moved off to capture machine-gun posts in a sharp dawn action. Bob Laycock had come out with a small headquarters staff, leaving Lord Lovat as his deputy in England. The wealth of experience now ran through all commando ranks, and this Mediterranean Brigade staff landed with 40 RM Commando. They were scattered over a wide number of landing points but their CO, Lieutenant-Colonel B. (Bertie) J.D. Lumsden, got them to their objectives where in the full light of day ‘No.41(RM)’ were seen to have taken both Commandos’ objectives—including some ‘heavy guns’ which turned out to be machine-gun posts.
Away to the north-east on D-day, 3 Commando landed from HM Transport Dunera and HMS Prince Albert, an infantry landing ship of proven ability. John Durnford-Slater led the Commando—his craft, with the left group moving shorewards, was nearly run down by the transport Sobieski, illustrating that the hazards at sea were mounting in proportion to the size of amphibious operations. The landing craft flotilla commander, Lieutenant Holt RN, made an accurate approach, sighting first the canoe marker—making another beach—and then the silhouette of the high Scoglio rock which confirmed they were on course for the right beach. Two hundred yards (over 180m) from the water’s edge some machine-gun fire was answered by the leading flight of landing craft’s bow gunners. The Italians promptly stopped shooting and the Colonel stepped ashore to find ‘masses of wire and many pill-boxes, all useless unless manned by determined troops’. The men were formed up for their march inland. Mean-while, for Peter Young with the right-hand group of ‘No.3’, practically everything went wrong. One craft never joined up with the flotilla for the run-in. Craft came south-west of their course and never picked up their intended direction from a sonic buoy (Appendix 3). They were fired on, but the LCAs’ armour prevented casualties before they eventually landed in daylight.
The Colonel’s three Troops of the left group were out of their landing area, moving in two-column files across flat, open country with steep, stone-walled banks five feet high (nearly 2m) and four feet wide dividing the fields every hundred yards or so. Bright moonlight, the smell of wild sage, the occasional olive grove, and lemon trees made this a pleasant enough approach march. Although the commando who caught his gear on the prickly pear hedges common throughout Sicily, if not on this march, had a different view of the local flora. There were also patches of low brush that remained unseen until your face was cut by it, and invariably some ankle-twisting stones lay underfood, unnoticed on the brightest of nights.
Following two scouts 50 yards ahead, John Durnford-Slater became anxious they were not moving fast enough—he had promised to knock out the battery they were heading for within 90 minutes of landing—although each man carried the usual load of a 10lb (4.5kg) 3-inch mortar bomb in addition to his own weapons; the mortarmen had heavier loads. Padding along in rubber shoes, the column made little noise as they followed the Colonel’s hooded torch ‘showing everyone the direction of advance’. They might have been on a night exercise until a spirited Italian farmer took a shot at them; he was killed with regret, for they admired his pluck. The battery was also firing as they left the mortar Section 400 yards (365m) from these guns, each man dropping his contribution to the mortar ammunition as he passed. Ten men went down a dry river bed to open harassing fire at the front of the battery while the remainder swung in behind the guns. The attack was made using a technique devised by Derek Mills-Roberts, CO of 6 Commando. Parachute flares illuminated the site while heavy fire was concentrated on it with small arms and mort
ars. Then there was a pause, followed by silence and darkness. The defenders’ eyes were not re-accustomed to the dark as assault troops crawled nearer to them; a second burst of illuminated covering-fire and them—when the flares died down—the final assault. The moves went to plan: radioed orders brought down fire under the light of flares; a five-minute interval during which two Troops advanced with one in reserve; they cut the wire with bangalore torpedos; another burst of light and fire; when the bright light died, the bugler sounded the charge and the Troops dashed through the gap in the wire. The Italians ‘stuck it fairly well’, their automatics’ fire ceasing only on the final bayonet charge—five minutes before the Colonel’s dealine for taking the battery. The commandos met some stouter resistance from a house nearby but overcame this when the roof was set alight from a flower-pot bomb (see Appendix 3). They exploded 1,000 shells from the battery before joining the other group and returning to HMS Prince Albert next day.
Commandos and Rangers of World War II Page 21