The pre-assault bombardment had destroyed only a couple of houses in St Aubin, and the Canadians who landed at H-hour were battling around a major strongpoint undamaged by a bombardment on the esplande. But there was no firing from Langrune village, where the Commando after establishing their base in a stone farmhouse on the eastern and landward side of this village 1,000 yards (900m) from the beach, would begin clearing the houses along the shore. Two Troops worked their way through the beach houses, finding little opposition until they were under fire from the Langrune strongpoint on the seafront road. As they cleared the houses, an officer and a marine were killed by fire from their support craft, impatient perhaps at the slow progress, but by this point in the plan the craft were only supposed to fire into the houses on request. At the crossroads in the streets and houses behind the strongpoint the Troops were held, although some men broke into a house near the corner. Most of these had been fortified with bricked-up doors and windows, and inside there were booby traps. Time was passing quickly, and the patrol sent eastwards to contact 41(RM) Commando at the planned inland meeting-point found they were not there. Two RM Armoured Support Regiment Centaurs helped B Troop break into the south-east corner of the position, but a 5 foot 6 inch (nearly 2m) concrete wall, over a yard wide, blocked the road to the sea and a tank was lost on the minefield inland of the road barrier. Captain J.L. Perry leading B Troop was killed early in this attack.
As dusk came about 2100 hours, the Commando were withdrawn from house-clearing, for an armoured counter-attack was expected and they took up positions to hold Langrune.
The leading three companies of the 2nd Rangers were to land at H-hour, 0630 on the Omaha American beaches, below the cliffs of the Pointe du Hoc battery. The naval bombardment had opened 40 minutes earlier with the battleship USS Texas’s 14-inch (355mm) guns shelling the battery before a strike by 19 medium bombers of the US Ninth Air Force went in at 0610. The Rangers, who had trained at Swanage, Dorset, for this 85- to 100-foot climb, came ashore in 10 British-manned LCAs that put them on the narrow beach only 30 yards wide below the cliff. Eight craft were each fitted with three pairs of rockets that could lift a ¾-inch (7mm diameter) rope or a toggle-rope attached to a grapnel. They carried 112 feet (34m) of light tubular ladder in sections (see Appendix 3) and two DUKWs came in with 100-foot (30m) London Fire Brigade turntable ladders carrying a pair of Lewis guns where the fire-hose normally fits. The rangers themselves carried a minimum of gear, their rations and demolition charges being in two supply craft. LCA 860 sank during the three-hour run to the beach. Four-foot waves were breaking over the heavily laden supply craft and one also sank but, as with 860, most men were rescued. Then, 10 minutes later, the second supply craft foundered with only one survivor. By now, the rangers were baling with their helmets, and although the control craft should have clearly seen Texas’s shells falling on the point, she headed for a landfall three miles (4.8km) eastward; 30 minutes were lost while this distance was recovered. At 0710 hours the companies of the 2nd and the 5th Battalion following in received the message ‘Tilt’ sending them to their alternative landing at Vierville.
There would be no quick climb or major perimeter formed as the leading rangers’ seven LCAs ran a gauntlet of fire 100 yards offshore while heading back to the east side of the Pointe. The destroyers HMS Talybont and USS Satterlee, seeing their plight, both closed the point and shelled enemy troops moving to defences around the battery.
The LCAs got ashore on a 500-yard (450m) strip of narrow beach accompanied by the Rangers’ commando instructor, but the DUKWs with their great ladders could not cross the cratered beach. Three or four Germans at the top of the cliff were chased off by the stern gunners in LCA 861 before the rangers fired her first pair of rockets aft. Heavy with sea-water, the line refused to lift, as did the second and third grapnel’s rockets fired in succession; non pulled enough line out to lift the rope ladders with the climbing ropes. The rangers then ran ashore across the sliver of beach and, as ‘potato-masher’ stick-grenades were tossed and rolled down on them, fired the first of their hand-rocket lines a mere 15 yards from the cliff. Pfc (Private first class) Harry W. Roberts climbed some 25 feet up this rope against a near perpendicular cliff when it slipped or was cut. He went back up the second hand-rocket line and in 40 seconds—his estimate—he was in a crater forming a niche just below the clifftop. As he scrambled for a foothold, the line was cut above him, and his attempt to fix the free end to a picket failed when the next man’s weight pulled it out. His team managed to negotiate a great mound of clay and throw him a third line which he anchored by spread-eagling himself across it as they climbed up to the niche. They then went over the clifftop for their objective, a heavily fortified OP at the inland (eastern) tip of this fortified area.
The other seven landing teams had equally gripping moments. Some heard a massive explosion above their heads, as probably one of the German 200mm (8in) shells was dropped from the wires suspending it over the beach in—as far as I can trace—a unique form of cliff defence. Others fell over their head into water-filled craters as they stepped off the landing craft ramps, but they got ropes and the sections of ladder—the ranger climbing the lower section to pass the next one over his head before securing it—up the cliff. They were hardly aware of the support fire, although Colonel James Rudder, leading these companies, had a great slab of cliff brought down on him by a naval shell. Again—as with ‘No.48(RM)’—the naval gunners were over-keen in their willingness to help those ashore. Despite the complexity of the operation the rangers made progress. The rockets and line manhandled ashore from LCA 887, had to be fired by Tech Sergeant John I. Cripps using his hot-box three feet (1m) from each rocket’s base with the result that they blinded him temporarily and covered him in mud. Sergeant William L. Petty came ashore over LCA 887’s ramp, falling with his BAR into a crater, and later slipping down the cliff on his first climb. But the automatic fired when he needed it, despite the buffetting and the mud.
Landing of 2nd Ranger companies, Pointe du Hoc (Normandy), 6 June 1944.
The Rangers lost between 40 and 50 men of the 200 who were intended to land on the point. Many slipped on the wet, muddy ropes or lost their footing, if there was one, for in places they had to climb up vertical ropes away from the cliff face. But 30 minutes after landing they had enough men on the clifftop to launch an attack over a ‘no-man’s land of incredible destruction’. The big shells from Texas had made this a moonscape in which men had difficulty in keeping contact, and barely three yards apart a man might lose touch with his neighbour. Across this surface the squads drove the Germans to the ruins of the gun emplacements, but no big guns had been installed. These they found later, still in their coverings, waiting installation. The rangers pressed on 800 yards (720m) to their second objective astride the road from Vierville to Grandcamp. Two men scouting from this position found a German battery with five cleverly concealed guns and large stocks of shells ready to fire on Utah or Omaha beaches. No gun crews were there and the battery was disabled. However, the enemy were now beginning to recover, and one strongpoint on the cliff remained in action until it was blown into the sea, along with part of the clifftop hit by naval fire later that morning. Several rangers had been killed or captured in trying to take an anti-aircraft battery west of the Pointe in a couple of separate sub-Section attacks, there being too few men to mount anything stronger for the rangers were virtually cut off for the rest of D-day. Understandably, therefore, their only message to reach V Corps caused some concern: Located Pointe du Hoe (Hoc)—mission accomplished—need ammunition and reinforcements—many casualties. The anxiety at Corps was not misplaced, for these three Ranger companies were down to 70 men and had fought off two counter-attacks from the direction of St Pierre du Mont while awaiting the advance of the 5th Rangers with the US 116th Infantry Regiment.
After ‘Tilt’, the 5th Rangers 10-mile (16km) approach run from HMS Prince Baudouin and HMS Prince Leopold swung towards Vierville, Lieutenant West RNVR,
‘leaning over the side of the craft … directing (the LCAs) progress by hand signals … through an intricate system of mine-laden obstacles’—an appreciation from the ranger Major R.P Sullivan of the crew of HMS Prince Baudouin who ‘gave a magnificant performance’. The sea was rough, and the tide at H + 75 minutes (0745) covered most of the anti-boat obstacles. One LCA was awash so she tran-shipped her cargo of rangers to an LCT before they were halfway inshore, and Lieutenant-Colonel Max Schneider got the flotilla commander to land east of the target beaches, which were under heavy fire. As a result of the scrub and grass being set afire by the bombardment, a pall of smoke hung over the shoreline obscuring targets on shore, although the Germans had a clear enough view of the Omaha beach approaches. Small-arms fire rattled against the armour plate and mortar bombs burst nearby as the landing craft threaded their way slowly through the obstacles.
As the rangers came over the LCA ramps, they could see a low wall 75 yards up the beach and dashed to its shelter. The first wave—part of Battalion HQ with A, B, and E companies—were soon joined by the rest of HQ with C,D, and a platoon of F Company in the second wave. They has suffered few casualties, although all along this beach there were many units caught in indecision under crossfire, not knowing whether to seek cover behind beach obstacles or make a dangerous dash for the wall. With his battalion organised behind the four-foot wall, Max Schneider sent his leading platoon forward through the wire with the thickening smoke giving them cover. They ‘advanced unhesitatingly to a point near the top of the hill’ beyond this beach, but its crest was clear of smoke and swept by machine-gun fire. 1st Lieutenant Francis W. Dawson led his platoon of D Company over the crest and cleared these guns from the strongpoint beyond; the battalion followed, the many minefields forcing them to advance in a column. Nevertheless, they dislodged a number of German infantry from well-sited weapon pits among the hedgerows before reaching a point on the road 1,050 yards (1km) east of Vierville.
Turning west, the battalion fought their way into the town, but the companies trying to probe south were blocked and that evening the rangers held the western outskirts of Vierville. A platoon of A Company, however, had been separated from the rest at the seawall, and fighting their way to the rendezvous point south-west of the town, where the 5th should have met the rangers from Pointe du Hoc, this platoon got through to the Pointe.
All day Colonel Rudder’s men held Pointe du Hoc, with the help of naval support fire called in by signal lamp or the reliable SGR-284 radio. There were no means of evacuating the wounded, and that night the rangers were yet again counter-attacked at five past midnight (0005), by men yelling loudly as they walked forward after a long but inaccurate barrage of mortar and machine-gun fire on the American positions. This attack was repulsed, as was a second attack and a third put in about 0130, when the Americans had been shelled, but E Company was overrun and the situation was saved by F Company—mere handfuls of men by this time with fewer than 50 rangers in the perimeter. They held on through D + 1 (Wednesday), sending volunteers to explode a store of German ammunition and making several aggressive—if small—patrols. Major Street, from the 11 Amphibious Force, came in twice during the day, bringing ammunition and rations, and with them came another platoon of 5th Rangers as reinforcements.
At 1700 hours that evening (Wednesday) the men on the Pointe were told to fight their way the 1,000 yards (.9km) to the relief force approaching from Vierville, but they were unable to break through the German cordon. This mixed force of 2nd Ranger companies and the 5th Battalion, joined by 150 men from 116th Infantry and some tanks, had reached Au Guay when heavy enemy artillery concentrations drove them back. However, the leading sub-Section—seven scouts (pointmen)—did not receive the recall and took one of four mutually supporting machine-gun posts, despite two of these scouts being killed and three wounded. The force then took up defensive positions around St Pierre du Mont, and during the night they had to go back into this town to clear it of German infiltrators.
Next morning, Thursday, D + 2, the Rangers and two battalions of the 116th moved forward from St Pierre and Vierville, relieving the men at Pointe du Hoc. Even in this last hour of their brave stand, the rangers on Pointe du Hoc took a further buffeting when several men were killed in their own tank gunners’ fire supporting the infantry relief column’s attack on the last German positions round the Pointe. Hidden among the devastation of its defences were several severely wounded rangers who were rescued before the two Ranger battalions moved into Grandcamp—captured earlier by B and E Companies of the 5th—where they bivouacked: bed rolls, C-rations, and drinking water being brought up from the beaches.
During and since D-day, the build-up of reserves had brought in men and supplies, for even as the tide ebbed on D-day morning, the sappers in the Jig landing gaps—among others—began clearing wider landing-beaches. One sapper platoon commander took an obstacle mine to pieces in a quiet shell-hole, and found that beneath the heavy coating of pitch, this Teller mine had a simple push igniter—when struck, it would explode the mine. But this igniter, like the igniters on old shells attached to many obstacles, could be unscrewed, and the explosive was then safe to handle. This discovery speeded up the clearing of obstacles, which were made up into bundles of six or so for AVREs to tow to large stacks; by nightfall on D-day 2,000 yards (1.8km) of the Jig landing-area had been cleared.
That night the American command considered the position around Vierville their most critical, although the Germans had not been able to mount as sharp a counter-attack as the Rangers expected. In the gap between ‘No.41(RM)’ and ‘No.48(RM)’ German armour made an advance, their leading tanks being stopped by British anti-tank guns at Bieville, four to five miles (6km to 8km) inland from the Commandos, although some elements of this German Division got as far as Luc-sur-Mer, opposite 48(RM) Commando’s positions, before turning back. ‘Next morning the scene was transformed’, Jim Moulton found as Allied vehicles streamed inland, and he led the Commando back through Langrune to renew the assault on its shore-road strongpoint. With the help of two Canadian M10 self-propelled anti-tank guns, the marines cleared these defences, working a way through the minefields to allow the guns a shot at the concrete roadblock. The M10s solid shot made a start, but the job was finished by an RM Sherman whose high-explosives lowered the wall to a height of two and a half feet, although it was still a tank obstacle after an hour and a half’s hammering. Troops then rushed and cleared the houses on the far side of the street and were able to use picks and shovels to clear a way for the tanks to get around the beach houses. This push was paralleled by Troops working their way through houses until the garrison—two officers and 33 men of the 736 Grenadier Regiment—surrendered. Some 10 others had been killed.
46(RM) Commando, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell R. Hardy, landed on D + 1, and although trained for amphibious assault they would fight an essentially land battle during the next few days. The Canadians helped to re-equip the Commando, replacing the demolition charges and light arms they had carried for an intended cliff assault on either the Houlgate or Benerville coastal batteries—an operation that was cancelled on the night of D-day. Next morning (D + 11) having taken the strongpoint at Petit Enfer, they gathered some enemy weapons. 47(RM) Commando did the same in their initial landings. ‘No.46(RM)’ then swung south of Jim Moulton’s Commando at Langrune, and later had the task of clearing a narrow wooded valley running south from Putot en Bassin through Bretteville and Villons. This enemy salient along the Mue valley into the Canadian beach-head was cleared, with help from the Chauds (the Regiment de la Chaudière) of Canada. The Commando also sent two Troops to clear Douvres la Deliverande, beyond which village lay the heavily fortified radar station. During these actions, ‘No.46(RM)’ tangled with the 12 SS Hitler Jugend, who held their fire at one point as Y and S Troop advanced in line across the wheat-fields. The marines came steadily on when the enemy opened fire at point-blank range, and later the Commando worked with a squadron of Shermans, helping them to out-ma
noeuvre two Tiger tanks, before the inland strong points at Le Hamel and Rots at the head of the Mue valley were taken at 2000 hours on D + 5, 11 June. Co-ordinated artillery shoots had enabled them to take these villages, but as they were without other support until early next morning the Brigadier doubted if the positions could be held. Even with the support of some Canadians’ carriers and anti-tank guns, the positions were exposed and so the whole force was withdrawn before dawn.
When 47(RM) Commando came ashore on D-day, four of their 14 LCAs were sunk. They spent the whole day fighting their way inland and by evening had reached a hill behind their objective: the small harbour of Port en Bessin at the extreme western flank of Gold beach. On the afternoon of D + 1 they attacked this village with the support of HMS Emerald and a smokescreen laid by artillery, and had captured two of the three strongpoints before a German attack retook the hill that had been the marines’ start line. However, Captain T.F. Cousins found a zigzag path leading into the third strongpoint, which was taken by 50 commandos as darkness fell. The German commander and 100 men surrendered, but a sniper killed Captain Cousins a few minutes later.
Commandos and Rangers of World War II Page 30