The ML and the rest of the party had returned to their forward base at Tek Naf. Two days later, on 3 November, Lieutenant Ponsonby went back to the island with Peter Young—now deputy commander of 3 SS (Commando) Brigade—and 32 marines of ‘No.42(RM)’ with their CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas Drysdale. One marine was lost when a Burmese in the pay of the Japanese gave away the commandos’s position, but he shot several of the enemy before he was hit. The raiders had intended to take a prisoner but were unable to find her propeller on the kedge warp. This was freed by ‘a gallant Indian seaman who worked for 40 minutes in the water’.
Nigel Clogstoun-Willmott has compared this tour of duty for COPPs ‘as not unlike those of crews in bomber command’, and so Nos.7 and 8 were replaced in south-east Asia by Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 9. The unhealthy water of the Arakan—plagued with disease and Japanese ambushes—took their toll of boating parties. In daylight a canoe might be easily ambushed and this limited almost all intrusion to night raids. It was on a night recce the rise and fall of tides over a 12-hour period, was set. Cork floats between small poles allowed the high tide to push the top cork up, where it stuck on its inverted pins, while at low water the bottom cork fell to a position where its pins held it against the rising tide. The tide height could then be checked the following night. By such ingenuity, the parties added details to the otherwise scant information on the tidal conditions and terrain of the Burma coasts. The intelligence gathered in these difficult conditions was used in the Fourteenth Army’s campaigns in the Arakan, and canoeists would provide similar information for the major river crossings.
The Fourteenth Army’s advance south and east through Burma was in two main directions: operation ‘Capital’ the advance to gain central Burma and so relieve Japanese pressure on the supply roads to China; and ‘Dracula’ the recapture of Rangoon. These campaigns were largely possible because the 20 Chindit battalions, with a few guns (a battery of 25-pounders each and a light anti-aircraft battery) and four squadrons of British and Indian Engineers, had prevented the Japanese from using their inland communications routes: had the Japanese been able to do so, they might have gathered superior forces to defeat in turn the Allied advances moving into Burma in 1944. That spring the men of Bernard Ferguson’s Chindits, the 16th (Long Range Penetration) Brigade, marched 360 miles to prepare the ‘box’ near Indaw in north-east Burma. Here, they and other Chindit forces aided General Stilwell’s Chinese divisions. As the campaigns developed, the Chindit boxes—defended camps sited where enemy artillery concentrations would be difficult to bring together—were overtaxed by Army commanders who kept them in the field long after senior Chindit officers considered the men had more than done their duty. In June, a medical survey revealed ‘all ranks both British and Gurkha were physically and mentally worn out’ and the brigades were withdrawn. Also in the early summer of that year (1944), the American long-range penetration group—some 3,000 men of 5307th Composite Unit, Merill’s Marauders—fought a series of battles in these hills of north-east Burma, supporting the Chinese. But the Marauders were kept in action far longer than the three months expected of troops in such an unhealthy climate, and by the end of May they had lost half their number through disease and casualties while those still on their feet and lost an average of some 35 pounds (12kg). This unit was disbanded, as were the Chindits, but the American special force was given no encouragement by authority: they did not have a unit badge; nor were their administrative arrangements adequate for the men’s rehabilitation after months in the jungle. Yet this superb effort by Chindits and Marauders paved the way for more than a flow of oil along the Ledo road pipeline to China.
The Arakan coastline was marked for the commando forces by several key features the island of Akyab west of the Kaladan river delta; the Myebon peninsula to its east with the Kangaw track junctions just inland; Ramree island with its port of Kyaukpyu on the island’s northern tip; and Rangoon. Further south by 600 miles (965km) lay Phuket island on the Malayan coast, and another 400 miles (480km) into the Malacca Straits were the Morib beaches in the Port Dickson area. The Small Operations Group made reconnaissance raids and diversions along these coasts and in the neighbouring major islands.
A typical reconnaissance was made in December 1944 when canoeists of C Group of the Special Boat Section (SBS), while under the command of 26 Indian Division, visited Law’s Island. They had made a number of forays during the previous weeks, as had A Group (see Appendix 7), going into the tunnel of mangroves where the river outlets were hard to find even on a moonlit night and Japanese motor sampans patrolled with searchlights. Much of their information was obtained by their guides from V Forces talking to the local natives, this Force having volunteer officers from the police or army, with each group organised in the Arakan around a platoon of the Tripura Rifles who were joined by locally raised forces. Three successful landings had already been made on Ramree before C Group came to Law’s Island a mile from Kyaukpyu’s jetty. They could see the Japanese sentries and noted their routines. On the day after they landed a local fisherman was found living on the island, and Stan Weatherall, now a lieutenant in C Group, beckoned him into the cover of some scrub bushes. The native was not allowed to leave, but he seemed happy enough when the commandos treated some of his body sores. Captain Livingstone—who had also made the raid more than a year earlier on the Italian railway tunnel—went across by canoe to contact a village headman on Ramree. While he was away the fisherman’s father-in-law (with their family) came to Law’s Island, where he agreed to go back to Kyaukpyu and mark the Japanese defence positions on a large-scale map. This English-speaking Burmese then provided the SBS with much of the data they needed and was rewarded by a visit to Calcutta, later returning to Ramree on the bridge of a battleship, HMS Queen Elizabeth. By then the Japanese had withdrawn, the island was secured on 21 January 1945.
Earlier that month 3 Commando Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Campbell Hardy, had landed on Akyab in the van of the 26 Indian Division, an airborne artillery observer having realised that the Japanese had quit this island, landed to confirm their going. The advance of XV Corps was accelerated as they continued to embroil Japanese who might otherwise have been evacuated.
General Christison’s objective on the Arakan coast early in 1945 was to prevent the Japanese 54 Division’s 5,000 men, including the well-led Matsu Detachment, and their guns and transport, escaping through An and the An river delta. Nor did he want the Japanese armies from central Burma to escape through the An Pass for evacuation by sea. However, before their escape route could be cut, the small Japanese force on the Myebon Peninsula had to be isolated so they could not interfere with a major amphibious landing nearer Kangaw. Here the motorable track, after coming out of the hills, followed the Kangaw river into the coastal plain. A second track went south from Kangaw through Kyweguseik to Dalet and on to An. There was also a track that bypassed Kangaw before rejoining the An road at Kyweguseik. If these routes were cut, the Japanese 54 Division would be caught by the West Africans of XV Corps driving down the coast from the north.
The Brigadier made a personnal recce of the beaches where his 3 Commando Brigade would land on the tip of the Myebon Peninsula, borrowing a launch from the Royal Indian Navy.
The launch returned with some casualties, but the Brigadier had personal knowledge of the beaches to amplify the canoeists’ reports from earlier recces. These had shown there were heavy coconut stakes set just above the low-water line and 300 yards (270m) from the proposed landing-points. On the morning of Friday, 12 January 1945, a COPP party blasted a 25-yard gap in these stakes and at 0830 hours HMIS Narbada and her companion sloop HMIS Jumna began a bombardment, while further offshore a destroyer and cruiser (HMS Napier and HMS Phoebe) protected the assault force—3 LCIs, 5 LCTs, 12 LCMs, and 25 other minor craft and motor boats. The bombardment and a strafe by fighter-bombers reduced the village of Agnu to ruins before aircraft dropped smoke to cover the leading craft, with 42(RM) Commando, coming ashore.
; The craft found the gap in the stakes and only one was hit by a Japanese 75mm (3in), although several other casualties were caused by mines on the beach before a beach-head was established. Attempts to land some tanks failed as quickly ebbing tide exposed a wide stretch of mud. However, 5 Commando was ashore and passed through ‘No.42(RM)’s’ beach-head. The units following—including 1 and 44(RM) Commandos—were taken to the wrong beach and, in following 42(RM) Commando, took three hours to get ashore through three feet or more of ‘thick slime, grey mud covered by about a foot of water’—in the words of SQMS Henry Brown. Many men stripped of their clothes, and all their weapons needed cleaning. The plans for developing the beach-head had not been cut and dried, as little was known of the Japanese dispositions, but ‘elaborate loading tables’ had been worked out by Douglas Drysdale and Tony Pigot. These provided, in Peter Young’s view, an example of excellent staff work. Peter Young came ashore on a rocky little beach west of the promontory, getting ashore dry shot on what would become the vehicle landing beach. Elements of 50 Brigade of the 25 Indian Division followed the commandos into both beaches, while 5 Commando advanced through thick jungle to a point some 800 yards (7km) south-west of Myebon village. They were held by machine-gun fire from a hill they code-named ‘Rose’, and the rest of the day was spent getting the Brigade’s ashore. In four hours, Madras Sappers, with a company of Gurkha porters, humped material by muscle power to build a road from the vehicle beach to the main landing point, enabling three Shermans—a fourth had bogged down on the main beach mud—to join the Commando Brigades advance next morning.
After a dawn air strafe, 5 Commando, with the support of these 19th Indian Lancers’ tanks, took hill ‘Rose’. Without long-range anti-tank guns the Japanese could not prevent the tanks wreaking havoc among their defence positions. As 1 Commando advanced along the main ridge, 42(RM) Commando passed through Myebon village, which was unoccupied although they met stiff fire from three hills to the north. The tanks came forward, helping to clear these defences, but Lieutenant-Colonel H. David Fellowes, commanding the marines, was wounded and several of his men became casualties. After refuelling and re-arming, the tanks came back on to a pagoda—topped hill to help 1 Commando clear another hilltop bunker. In advancing with great dash, one tank turned turtle on the steep hillside, rolling over and over but without serious injury to the Sherman’s crew. The Brigade then moved into Kantha, straddling a chaung. The Japanese had abandoned this village, although they kept the Commandos under sniper fire for the next three days. The Commando Brigade had lost four killed and 38 wounded in driving a path for 74 Brigade, who passed over the Kantha chaung to establish a defended area north of the peninsula. The assault on Kangaw could now begin.
Kangaw lies only eight miles (13km) from Myebon up the Myebon river, but this was covered by Japanese artillery, and a surprise approach was planned up the tortuous waterways of the Thegyan river and Daingbon Chaung. This 27-mile (43km) approach route reached the target beaches where the chaung was only 100 yards wide, about half a mile (800 + m) from the key defence hill to the village, which lay a further mile from the river. The ridge of this wooded hill ran north-south above paddy fields surrounded by seemingly endless swamps. Spot height(?) ‘170’ on the Brigades maps, it overlooked Kangaw from the west. The plan was to land 1 Commando about noon on Monday, 22 January, to seize the hill, while ‘No.42(RM)’ held both banks of the Daingbon chaung. 5 Commando would follow ‘No.1’, consolidating the hold on the hill and so enabling 44(RM) Commando to advance against the village on D + 1. The support for the landing included the by now usual air strafes, shelling from the two Indian sloops, with Jumna in the Myebon river and Narbada in the Thegyn river, artillery support from the Myebon peninsula, and field guns on Z lighters—134-foot (40m) lighters designed for off-loading ships in harbour, but used on Burmese rivers as floating platforms for a troop of 25-pounders.
On the morning of 22 January the long convoys of assault craft, led by minesweepers, small support craft and motor boats, moved up the river and into the chaung. They were not seen. The route was not mined, although the line of boats ‘stretched as far as the eye could see’. The leading craft of 1 Commando touched down at 1300 hours under a smokescreen laid by aircraft, and the commandos moved quickly between two small streams towards the hill. There had been some shelling as they neared the landing-point, but Allied air attacks, synchronised with the Commando’s advance, enabled them to clear much of the hill with only three killed and nine wounded. By nightfall they more or less held this Hill 170, with 1 Commando on all but the hill’s northern end, and 5 Commando with Brigade HQ on its southern slopes. 42(RM) and 44(RM) Commandos found their positions deep in mud and so waterlogged that the only way to build roads was by scooping out mud which, when partially dry, formed bunds—embankments above the tide levels. Moreover, because the beaches were no more than gaps in the mangroves, through which vehicles could not be used, the stores had to be manhandled. Even more serious was the lack of fresh water. The marines moved forward on to Milford and Pinner, the hills east of ‘170’, but for some unexplained reason three Troops of 44(RM) Commando did not properly dig in on Pinner.
The Japanese reaction came that night in an unsuccessful attack on Pinner. Next morning, Tuesday (D + 1) at about 1000 hours, a fierce attack on ‘170’ was beaten off, but the marines on Pinner fared badly. Their slit-trenches were only a few feet deep for the marines had not used the Japanese trenches ‘as the enemy knew the position of these’, despite the fact that they provided good cover. When a Japanese 75-gun came within close range, with great calmness Lieutenant-Colonel A. Stockley walked among his men before he withdrew them to Hill 170—they had more than 60 casualties. Later 1 Commando, with artillery support, cleared the northern end of the ridge, getting a Troop in defensive positions beyond the saddle that divided this northerly point from the main positions. In the following days many of the shells falling on commandos’ positions were dud—19 out of one stream of 21 shots—possibly due to their storage in tropical conditions, or to the poor quality of Japanese munitions at this stage of the war.
Certainly the Japanese were heavily engaged in many theatres. In the Philippines, the Americans had overwhelmed them on Leyte and were closing in on the 80,000 Japanese defending a pocket in the more northerly Philippine island of Luzon, 1,000 miles (1,600km) east of Kangkaw. Still further east the US Marines would land on Iwo Jima in February, bringing them within 650 miles of Tokoyo. In Burma, the Fourteenth Army’s corps on the central front were poised to cross the Irrawaddy. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters prepared for a war of attrition against Japan, believing that victory would go to the nations that accepted the increasing hardships when the war dragged on. They were, therefore, trying to extricate their forces where possible to build up the home defences, and in pursuit of this Lieutenant-General Miyazaki ordered the Matsu Detachment to keep the Kangaw route open. Therefore, although the 51 Indian Brigade had been brought ashore and held Melrose (a hill to the east of the Kangaw track), and there were a troop of the 19th Indian Lancers’ Shermans ashore despite the difficulties in landing them, the Japanese began to mount attacks on Hill 170. If these succeeded, the already difficult supply of the 51 Brigade would become impossible.
On 31 January, the heaviest barrage for some time fell on No.4 Troop of 1 Commando who were beyond the saddle at the north end of the ‘170’ ridge. Following the barrage came a determined infantry attack up the thickly wooded northern slope, breaking over No.4 Troop’s positions. Counter-attacks by elements of 1 and 42 Commando failed to relieve the pressure, but in the afternoon two Troops of 5 Commando restored the position. By this time three of the 19th Lancer’s tanks were on the western slope of the ridge but were stopped by marshy ground. By nightfall, the Commando Brigade’s position was serious but more or less stable. For the Japanese, the tanks posed a serious problem and next morning they infiltrated 70 engineers to hunt them. Getting behind the Commando Brigade HQ they set their charges against tw
o tanks, despite the efforts of the platoon of Bombay Grenadiers who killed one Japanese officer on a tank and saw another killed in the blast of his own pole-charger. The rest of this suicide party were killed during the morning.
Men of the Matsu Detachment put in a series of equally desperate attacks on the positions of No.4 Troop. Their long French-style bayonets, dumpy figures, and mediaeval helmets made them appear like men from another world to one English commander. They overran nine three-man slit-trenches but were held by No.4 Troop. The Troop Officer, Lieutenant George A. Knowland, rallied his men and with the 24 commandos of his forward Section set up a defence, into which a few reinforcements came forward from the rear Section. George Knowland moved from slit-trench to slit-trench firing his rifle and throwing grenades, bringing forward ammunition at one moment, firing a bren the next until its wounded crew could be replaced. Firing this bren from the hip he distracted the Japanese long enough for stretcher bearers to bring out the wounded, including the new team for the bren, all hit as they tried to get forward. He was seen firing a 2-inch (51mm) mortar, its base against a tree as he launched the bombs into the teeth of another Japanese attack. When all the mortar bombs were used he picked up a tommy-gun but was killed around 0830 when the positions were overrun. However, the Japanese never dislodged the rest of 1 Commando from the higher ground behind the saddle, and George Knowland was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.
Commandos and Rangers of World War II Page 34