Operations against Tito’s Partisans
In March 1945, HSSPF Rösener issued orders for the Division to participate in large scale anti-partisan operations, some in conjunction with other German Wehrmacht and Polizei units and local garrison forces, including ‘Operation Donnerwetter’104 (Thunderstorm).105 German intelligence had reported a significant concentration of partisans in two areas north east of Ljubljana. In the Mozirske Planine106 the Šercer and Bračič Brigades were present having been ordered to go to the Mozirje Mountains and the Pohorje to deceive the Germans into believing that they had abandoned the idea of going to the Dolenjska region.107 A little further south, in the Menina planina region the ‘Zidanšek’ and ‘Šlander’ Brigades had assembled to collect weapons, munitions and supplies air dropped by Allied aircraft.
The objective was to destroy the partisan groups by surrounding and gradually constricting their operational area, at the same time the German forces would break into the encirclement, split the area in two smaller pockets and push the insurgents back into their last defensive positions where they were to be eliminated. Rapid movement and surprise were the crucial factors that were needed to ensure the success of these operations, neither of which the Division was ultimately able to achieve.
On 8 March the Division suffered its first casualties, some elements including 2 battalions of WGR 29, were moving by train in daylight to their starting positions when around 1000 hrs it was spotted by two enemy fighter aircraft which attacked killing several Division members and wounding approximately 20 men.108
The remaining sub-units advanced on foot, some for over 100 kms,109 on the few roads which circumscribed the upper Savinjska dolina and Saleška dolina Valleys in the Mozirje Mountains. The mountainous and thickly forested approach routes were both arduous and hazardous for the soldiers to traverse and also ruled out the use of trucks and horses for the transportation of heavy weapons, field kitchens and supplies of food and ammunition. For this purpose, mules were available but in such limited quantity that they could only transport a small fraction of the total of the Division’s requirements, the remainder had to be carried. These conditions limited progress to a few miles per day and greatly restricted the ability to bring up fresh supplies and heavy infantry support weapons. To ensure the availability of sufficient provisions, it was also necessary to leave behind the heavy radio equipment which meant the Division was forced to adhere rigidly to a prearranged plan which once commenced, could not be altered.
Having cleared the towns of Solčava, Mozirje, Ljubno and Šmihel the Division’s units advanced towards their target area. As they climbed the Boskovec massif (elevation 1,587 metres)110 the movement of the lengthy columns that slowly snaked through the mountains below them, was observed by the Šercer and Bračič Brigades, consequently although these units were surrounded on the south side of the Mozirje Planine, the Division was not able to engage with the main body of the partisan force.
There was however contact between the Division’s units and elements of the Šercer Brigade near the villages of Gostencnik and Radegunda where from 9–11 March the Brigade desperately defended its positions from constant attacks by utilising women—medical nurses, cooks and other auxiliary personnel. In the fighting both sides suffered casualties, the Ukrainians losing several wounded during a sharp encounter with the partisans on Bela Peč including Waffen Unterscharführers’ Wasyl Sirsky and Myroslav Bekesh together with several grenadiers from 13./WGR 29. In addition to their losses, the partisans were forced to jettison some rifles, machine guns and ammunition,111 although the core group managed to break out whilst others spread out singly and dispersed into the dense spruce forests.
From 11 March 1945 the Divisional elements were also reported to be fighting against the Bračič Brigade on the Medvedjak Mountain (1,564 m). Due to heavy pressure and bad connections between the Bračič Brigades’ battalions, all its units and the HQ of the ‘14 Partisan Division’ were forced to retreat to the south in the direction of the village of Poljane, under the protection of its 3 battalion. Pursued by the Division’s units which launched attacks with heavy artillery and mortar support from the direction of Mozirje and Šoštanj, the fighting continued in the region of Bela Peč. At night on the third day, the partisan units were finally able to retreat from the Mozirje plateau in difficult circumstances and most of the men of 3 battalion of the Bračič Brigade which formed the rearguard, were lucky to escape near Terske peči as reported by the battalion commander:
[…] Due to the critical position on the Medvedjak the commander gave orders to the political commissar of the 2 Company that the company must hold its position, against heavy attacks by units of the 14 Waffen SS Division Galizien.
Well-armed group from an infantry unit of the Galician Division in a village in Slovenia, March 1945.
March 1945, Slovenia. This picture from the Divisional newspaper shows Ukrainian soldier dressed in white snow overalls in typical terrain during operations against Tito’s partisans.
Operations of the Galician Division against the 2. SNOUB ‘Mirko Bracic’ at Medvedjak/Slovenia, 11 March 1945.
The scenes above the ridge, defended by the partisans, were amazing. The enemy was coming from the other side of the rock ridge and throwing grenades from a distance of around 15–20 metres which the partisans picked up and threw back. The attack of the Ukrainians was covered by their MGs. This went on for several hours during which time two partisan MG gunners and their assistant were killed the Ukrainians suddenly appeared on the left side and were seriously threatening the right flank too. The battalion retreated at the edge of the wood and defended itself.
Near Terske peči [its men] were faced with a decision of how to proceed, because they were confronted with a deep rock precipice. However a large group of the 3 Battalion with their wounded managed to save themselves by using ropes, which were hastily prepared and then by dropping themselves over the deep precipice into the valley below, taking the ropes with them. The enemy soon reached the precipice but wasn’t prepared to risk following. The 3 battalion was then safely guided towards the valley by its commander and two locals during the retreat, there were further clashes with the Ukrainians [Later] 3 Battalion later made contact with the brigade HQ, whose commander Captain Milenko Kneževič, believed it had been destroyed in the fierce battles’.112
Despite its escape, the strength of the Bračič Brigade was reduced from 472 on 9 March to 393 on 15 March a loss of 79 men (including those killed, captured, missing, deserters and transfers to other units) in less than a week.113
Like its sister formation, the Šercer Brigade also broke out from the encirclement by doubling back and slipping undetected through the Division’s lines under cover of darkness.114 For this period it reported 17 dead, 21 wounded and 55 missing (some of these later returned) together with the loss of 25 rifles, 4 machine guns and 3 sub-machine guns.115
The Division’s own losses appear to have been minimal and the wounded who required treatment were immediately despatched to its field hospital in Maribor where German soldiers from other units and even some Slovenian civilians were also treated.116
While minor skirmishes continued in the area of the Mozirje Mountains on the 11 March the Galician Division shifted its main focus onto the Menina planina in the area between the Zgornja Savinja Valley and the Tuhinje Valley.117 This major operation, led personally by SS-Obergruppenführer Rösener, was in response to German intelligence reports that a significant concentration of partisans had assembled in the Menina planina to pick up weapons, munitions and supplies dropped by Allied aircraft. Typically remote areas were chosen for the designated drop zones which together with the times and dates of the flights were arranged and co-ordinated by individual brigade HQ’s and attached liaison officers from the Allied Military Mission.118 Consequently, the partisans had a clear advantage even though it was sometimes possible to establish the location of these zones from the presence of low flying Allied aircraft circling over the t
arget area. In an attempt to remain undetected, planes would from time to time drop their supply containers from a high altitude which caused the falling parachutes to get caught in the wind and their precious cargoes of hand held weapons, ammunition, food, chocolate, clothes and medicines, to occasionally fall into grateful German hands.
As the biggest and most effective of the participating units, the Galician Division was entrusted with the most demanding part of the operation, the envelopment of the Menina planina.119 Once they had reached their staging areas, after only a brief rest its infantry units were split up and ventured into the remote mountains where they remained operational for the next three days. With inadequate footwear for mountain climbing and without hot food or shelter, the heavily laden soldiers moved into the steep, snow covered mountains in single file, through snow that was sometimes waist deep sporadically fighting in biting cold and occasional snow blizzards. Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Kolisnyk a platoon commander in 3./II./WGR 31:
The combat action ‘Donnerwetter’ took place in the mountains in pursuit of guerrillas—who else? We were in the snow covered mountains, cold. We went from mountain to mountain—on and on—to nowhere. The companies got their daily destinations from the battalion. We slept outdoors in the cold.
For this operation our company was divided into four platoons and given separate orders each day. 4 platoon was composed of soldiers from the Volhynian Legion who transferred to the Division. Our 3 company commander Waffen-Obersturmführer Taras Czmola, kept them intact under his personal command.
I had a map, but that was of little use because it was a large-scale map so I had to ask local people for directions. To be sure—from several people. I got lost twice.
At one time we met Karpynec’s 1 company. He did not divide it into platoons. It was too dangerous. He took a local guide and kept him until he reached his objective for the day. Karpynec was a former officer in the Polish Army, smart guy. We met only old people and children. In one hamlet an old woman did not see any soldiers from the First World War, so she took us for the Austrian soldiers.
Finally we reached our starting positions, from which we had to comb the terrain down driving the guerrillas onto our prepared ‘line of fire’ below.120
Another participant from 4./I./WGR 29 Waffen-Grenadier Volodymyr Keczun recalled:
[…] it was announced that early next morning that the Division was marching on a three days concerted sweep of the mountains in pursuit of partisans. The code name for this was operation ‘Donnerwetter’. We were issued with iron rations for three days:—3 packets of plain, dried, biscuits, 3 small tins of fatty pork and 3 cigarettes. Early morning the company to which we were assigned, spread out and started up the mountain and we followed behind. It was my turn to carry the mortar’s barrel in a special frame on my back. It was hell in the forest with branches hanging down. Our progress up hill was very slow because everything had to be checked.
About one third of the way we heard shooting ahead of us. We stopped and noticed [the battalion commander] SS-Obersturmbannführer Wildner walking forward to investigate. He had a machine pistol on his chest, with the strap over his neck and a long stick in his hand. Our patrol noticed a partisan sniper hiding in a tree and shot him.
About half way up, the deciduous forest ended and it was decided that we would stop there for the night. We were lucky because in the forest we found a big rangers cabin. We lit a nice fire but sadly it was taken over by our command and we were left in a small cubicle at the back.
We were told that this time we would have support from our artillery if we encountered stiff resistance. From the next day we had to inform our artillery about each change of our positions. We were told that our battalion was going to set up a defensive position on top of the mountain, because this was the most probable direction for the partisans to try to break out. During a boring day and night we had eaten half of our ‘iron’ ration and were still hungry. The second day was uneventful. First we had cross a stretch of barren terrain, then a stretch of snow. From time to time we could hear artillery firing and an exchange of machine guns far to our left.
Just before nightfall we reached the top. It was a very long, wavy ridge with a narrow forest belt of sparse fir trees. As we were to spend the night there, we found four fir trees close to each other, cut some young trees and stuck them in snow to close gaps, cut some branches and covered with them snow in our shelter [our beds], just leaving clear space in the middle for a fire. Then we worked out the sentry rota. Everybody sat down with feet stretched to the fire and finished our ‘iron’ ration, scraped together enough tobacco among ourselves for two cigarettes and smoked them passing them round.
When I woke up in the morning my feet were cold. Where the fire had been, there was just deep pit. As we had no food left we collected some snow in our mess tins and brought it to boil using a small oblong metal box, put a dried tablet of ersatz coffee in the boiling water and made a drink.
Suddenly shooting started. We could hear an MG 42, some slower rate machine guns and artillery. Then silence. I think it came from left of us, but in mountains it is very hard to tell. Soon after we were ordered to march down the other slope of the mountain. About half way down Wildner walked passed us to the front, looking very glum. […]121
As the operation proceeded the ‘Zidanšek’ and ‘Šlander’ Brigades, together with their operative HQ and 4 Battalion of the 3 Brigade NO [Narodna Obramba—National Defence], were successfully surrounded on the Menina planina between 13–15 March. The accounts of former members of these units describe in dramatic detail how because of the fog, snow and their white camouflage overalls, elements of the Galician Division surprised the partisan HQ, and in so doing came close to capturing the Šlander Brigade’s secret camp. With fighting all around, the battle lines were sometime as little as 50 metres apart and the partisans began to experience problems with machine guns overheating, ammunition beginning to run low and the growing number of wounded. As it got dark, (based on the observation of fires) they realised that they were facing three rings of encirclement so on the night of the 15/16, they split into smaller groups and avoiding the numerous ambushes and blocking positions established along the mountain ridges, they slowly descended in the darkness at one point ingeniously using an old log flume.122 In the early hours of the morning they skilfully managed to break through the encirclement near Češnjice, where the Galician Division had a battery of 12 howitzers. The partisans hid and then managed to move undetected right by the battery, moving so close that they could see and hear the Ukrainians speaking123
After considerable effort, this operation was called off, again without a decisive engagement having taken place. Thereafter only the Artillery Regiment and Fusilier Battalion remained in the southern sector where they successfully engaged the insurgents in the Sava River district.
Between 19 and 22 March parts of the Division were also deployed in the far south west of its district in the Jelovica area in support of ‘Unternehmen Frühlingsanfang’ (Operation Spring Awakening’), with similar results.
All the large-scale operations in which the Galician Division participated in Slovenia were according to its 1a Major Heike, fraught with difficulties and ultimately failed mainly for reasons beyond its control.124 Some of the Division’s units were comprised mostly of new recruits with very little training and a lack of communication also severely hampered coordination with ‘friendly’ units, the identification of which also occasionally proved to be troublesome.125 Providing artillery support was also fraught with difficulties as units moving forward were ordered to inform the command and artillery of any changes of positions and if support was required, they had to provide the exact coordinates of the enemy position to be shelled. However in one notable instance, one company met stiff opposition and was unable to move forward, so requested artillery support, but in the meantime they attacked the partisans again and found that they had retreated so the company moved forward but by the time they ma
de contact with the artillery it was already too late, as the first salvo was already on the way.126
Difficult terrain also negated the use of the Division’s Fieseler Storch reconnaissance plane, usually a most effective aid to orientation so contact with neighbouring units was inhibited. Gaps soon developed in the line of advance through which the enemy was able to pass so that all efforts to engage and destroy the partisans were frustrated.127 Furthermore, once the bulk of its forces were in the field, other insurgents conducted raids on the weak garrison forces left behind, villages would be set on fire, roads blocked, bridges destroyed and livestock taken and assaults launched on weakly defended emplacements which compelled its command to terminate several actions prematurely.
The uncertainty and stress of anti-partisan warfare also proved to be psychologically very demanding on all participants and in at least one instance a German battalion commander Hauptsturmführer Hans Salzinger from WGR 31 panicked during one action and was subsequently ‘released’ temporarily from his post and appointed as an officer for special assignments.128
For most of the Division’s units the secluded sites where they were operating ensured that actual engagements were rare, although in some localities sporadic contact did occur, resulting in skirmishes with patrols who would frequently disappear and pretend that they were ‘peace-loving inhabitants’ in the small mountain villages who knew nothing about the ‘partisans’. House searches seldom produced any incriminating evidence except for the silken parachutes which originated from the airdrops—the contents of the containers having been hidden by the partisans in the forests. When questioned the local women would allege that they had only found the parachutes in the mountains and wanted to use the material to make clothing. The parachutes were duly confiscated and used by the soldiers themselves to make scarves and socks.129
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