The II battalion passed Kronnersdorf and headed northwards towards Krusdorf and Ebersdorf, encountering en route the broken Hungarian units which were fleeing the front. At Ebersdorf its marching columns unexpectedly clashed with forward Red Army elements and a short skirmish ensued following which the enemy was forced to retreat. It then continued northwards through Poppendorf towards Gleichenberg, passing burning buildings set alight by artillery fire.
Exploiting the element of surprise, the Ukrainian troops quickly overran the advanced Red Army positions in the early morning which were abandoned in such a hurry that several enemy cannons were captured intact.198
A minority of the very few locals who had not fled ahead of the advancing Red Army, remained aloof towards the appearance of foreigners in German uniforms whom they called ‘Kriegsverlänge’ (war prolongers).199 Most of the small number that remained were however friendly and proffered their assistance, especially those women who had already briefly come into contact with Red Army soldiers and experienced rape and torture at first hand.200
Once passed Straden, the I and III battalions veered to the right at Krusdorf to Waldsberg, then on to the town of Trautmannsdorf201 from where they began their approach towards Bad Gleichenberg from the south. The reconnaissance forces led by the 1./I./WGR 29 commanded by Waffen-Obersturmführer Volodymyr Kosak captured Trautmannsdorf railway station without loss and then a height named ‘Sulz’ (elevation 348 m) which overlooked the Sulzbach Valley (Sulzbachtal).202 Waffen-Grenadier Volodymyr Keczun 4./I./WGr 29:
[…] When we crossed into Austria, air raids started and we sometimes had to take evasive action. Late in the afternoon we arrived at a small settlement on a very low hill covered sparsely by trees. This was going to be the starting point of our advance, once the patrols had found out where the Red Army positions were. This was the second time that our Division had to correct and establish a front, but this time at least we would be sure that our adversary would be in front of us and not all around us. We were told that to our left and right the Divisional units were positioned and ready to attack.
Once we settled down a few of us went to the verge of the wood to see the terrain. We noticed two mountain chains running parallel, divided by a valley which was roughly 1 km wide. We were positioned on a lower slope of the left chain and 2 company was positioned on the right mountain chain. In front of us the valley stretched for about 2 kilometres. Beyond the valley was another, higher mountain chain, which seemed to close the valley at that end. From that chain ran a sloping ridge towards the valley, forming ravines on each side. Although they were distant we noticed some houses in both ravines. We presumed that this was where the Red Army troops were. A road ran roughly through the middle of the valley with a few houses along it to the right hand ravine. During the night our patrols confirmed that the Soviets were where we suspected and warned us that in the centre of the right hand ravine they had two small calibre cannons pointing our way.
Orders arrived that the offensive would start the next morning. It was the beginning of April 1945. Our 4 company203 as the most experienced, was ordered to leave the mortars and lafettes in camp and attack along the valley as a light company. Because of his bad sight we left Miecek behind to guard our mortars. Ziemba, as the best shot had the MG 42, Lischynsky and Dacko had Sturmgewehrs [latest semi automatic rifles] and the rest of us had rifles and one canister of ammo for the MG 42. Each group had on average ten or more soldiers.
Our company had practised assaults so many times that we could do it in our sleep. In the early morning our company was laying on the ground, sparsely placed across the valley. On command, units on both wings jumped up and ran forward about 100 metres to where you could find the slightest cover and set up the MG 42 to give fire cover for the next group to run forward, until it was your turn to run forward again. At first no shots came our way, so it felt as if we were on exercises. Suddenly we heard bullets and then the sound of shooting. At last the cannon woke up and tried to find our range but we were moving fast and in staggered formation. Our attack probably surprised the Red Army units so much that they left their two small cannons for us as ‘souvenirs’. As far as I can remember we had no fatalities in our sector, just a couple of flesh wounds. When we at last occupied the ravine, it turned out to be a small circular valley with some houses in it.
Once we stabilised the line of the front, its defence and sentries, we went to check the houses and there we found scenes that really shocked us. A few women that we met were sick and crying. All of them were gang-raped, even the old ones.204 We knew about the Red Army policy for their troops: ‘advance forward and you will have spoils of war’, but what they did was inhuman. They thanked us for liberating them and would have liked to prepare something for us to eat but the Red Army men took nearly everything. Eventually they collected among themselves enough eggs and prepared for us scrambled eggs in two large baking tins. We appreciated that very much because our main supplies were too far away. We advised them to move over to Trautmannsdorf, which lay beyond the ridge because this area would be very volatile for a few days until the front settled. When it got dark they all departed.
But for a few firearms exchanges we spent a fairly calm night, although everybody was on edge. Early in the morning another company arrived to relive us and we were ordered to march to Trautmannsdorf, where our transport and field kitchen were now stationed.[…]205
At the same time that WGR 29 moved towards the front in the vicinity of Gleichenberg, the bulk of WGR 30 joined the Artillery Regiment, Panzerjäger Abteilung and Pioneer Battalion, quartered in Maribor. On 2 April the regiment was in position within the city itself and on its south eastern outskirts,206 where all three of its battalions took part in the erection of defensive emplacements and fortifications, assisted by the bulk of the Pioneer Battalion which oversaw the specialist work. The commander of WGR 30, SS-Obersturmbannführer Forstreuter, who was stationed at the bridgehead on the outskirts was appointed the local commander and allocated the task of defending Maribor which on the morning of 2 April was declared a ‘Closed City’ to be defended to the last man.207 On the same day, in readiness for its move to the front sector, the regiment despatched its advance party which included its 13 company to Mureck.208
The third infantry regiment, WGR 31 had been recalled from the Konice district on 1 April209 and was proceeding by a gruelling continuous forced march with short breaks along the main route Ljubljana—Trava—Celje—Maribor. Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Kolisnyk recalled: […]
We marched day and night, sleeping in ditches for an hour or two, eating under the trees hastily, hiding from aircraft. Making on aerage 70 kilometres per day. We learned to sleep marching.210
As it was not expected to arrive for several days,211 it was designated as the Divisional reserve.212
Of its remaining combat units, part of the Pioneer Battalion stayed in position north of Maribor, where it mined the bridges for demolition.213 Meanwhile, the 1 and 4 companies and the Jagdzug of the Fusilier Battalion, were temporarily subordinated to the command of Major General Josef von Radowitzs’ 23 Panzer Division in the area of Radkersburg214 so that neither of these independent battalions were therefore available to take part in the first wave of the counterattack in their entirety which critically compromised the Division’s overall effectiveness.
In order to complete the construction of fortifications around Maribor and along the Mur River, the Division had exhausted a significant part of its limited reserves of fuel and supplies which it had no immediate prospect of replacing. It was therefore authorised to stop retreating German and Hungarian units which filled the main routes and requisition fuel, weapons, ammunition, horse carts and supplies from them. Many of these formations were poorly disciplined and especially in the case of the German units, hostile to the Division and it soon became necessary to barter or buy the necessary matériel from them.215
In contrast, the Hungarians whose carts were often laden with their families and p
ersonal possessions216 proved quite amenable to giving up their Hungarian made rifles and machine guns, but these had a different calibre to the German guns and ammunition for them was in short supply. The grenades were however welcomed as were the supplies217 and useful equipment such as binoculars.218 It was also possible to form another artillery detachment from the Hungarian units (albeit with a very limited ammunition supply) from cannons and their crews which later fought courageously supporting the Ukrainian infantry in their sector until it was taken away by higher authorities in mid April 1945.
The 10 Fallschirmjäger Division
Despite the successful deployment of WGR 29, as Wächter had feared, Hitler remained resolute with regards to his plans for the 14 Galician Division. Mistakenly believing that it had already surrendered its small arms, his focus now was on using part of its weaponry to expedite the formation of new Fallschirmjäger Divisions which were forming within the jurisdiction of Army Group South. A series of directives to accommodate this which emanated directly from Hitler now followed in quick succession. The first dated 30.3.1945 read:
Notes from the Führer’s talk afternoon 30.3.45
The Führer approves the gathering in Varasdin of the FallschirmJäger units coming from Italy and Agram [Zagreb]. The small arms which are in short supply will be provided from the stock of the disarmed 14.SS Waffen- Gren.Div. (Galiz .) from Marburg on the Drava.[…]219
The following day on 31 March further details were given specifically about the formation of the 10 Fallschirmjäger Division by OKH, which reiterated the proposed source of its manpower and light weapons:
Op Abt (1a) 31. Marz 1945
Notice
For H. Gr. South envisaged paratroops. (Specification OB paratroop, Org Dept. Chef Tr W)
10.Fallschirmjägerdivision […]
Situation:
a) Cadre personnel will come from the 1 and 4 Fallschirm-jäger. Div.
b) Heavy weapons are available
c) Light weapons will be provided from the stock of the dissolved 14. SS—Div. from Marburg (Drau).220
During the night of the 31.3./1.4.45, Hitler, impatient with a lack of progress reiterated his position. In a directive issued by the OKH operations section under the heading ‘Army Group South’ it stated:
Notice after Führer Talk Night of 31.3./1.4.45
In the opinion of the Führer the process of formation of the 10. Fsch.Jg.Div. is too slow. The Luftwaffe has been ordered to proceed with the formation in an accelerated way.
Note the Führer wants the fastest possible utilisation of the weapons stock of 14.SS-Div. from Marburg.[…]221
The next day, still believing that his orders has been carried out, Hitler’s intention was reaffirmed:
Notice after Führer conference on afternoon of 1.4.45
Army Group South: […]
On the Fuhrer’s order, the weapons of the 14. SS-Waffen-Gren.Div. are to be transported to the west. This excludes the 8,000 rifles reserved for the Fallschirmjäger formations.222
Later that day an instruction was issued which acknowledged the on-going transportation problems which had thus far prevented the execution of these orders. At the same time it specified instead that the weapons were to be used locally. It read:
1.4.45
Regarding: Waffen 14. ukr. SS-Div.
Notice
1.) The weapons and equipment of the 14 Division (without hand weapons) are to be transferred to the west as anticipated.
2.) For loading a total of 22 trains will be needed in the area south of Marburg on the Drau (12 of them for horses)
The first transports are to be ready for loading on 2.4. The delivery of teaching materials (Lehrmaterials) has met considerable difficulties.
3.) In the developing situation it is anticipated that the transport out of all weapons and equipment (waffenausstattung) can not be carried out according to plan.
It is therefore proposed to arrange for the weapons to replenish the weakened units of Army Group South.223
Alarmed by this latest development, Wächter, visited the headquarters of Army Group South East the same day. Acutely aware that the preservation of the Galician Division was still under threat, he wanted to make certain that his plans were not thwarted at the eleventh hour. His presence there on 1 April is confirmed in a message from SS-Gruppenführer Von Kammerhofer to Rösener which read:
‘SS Gruf . Dr BAECTER [sic] today at OB [Oberkommand] south east to ensure that the weapons [of the] 14. Div. remain. No decision yet from OKW’.224 Until there was, the Division’s fate could not be assured.
With the Division’s deployment orders for its new combat assignment already underway, OKW issued a new directive on the basis of Hitler’s latest instructions. The promised ‘further orders’ then followed via the SS-FHA, which once again threatened to bring about its premature liquidation. On 3 April 1945, its command received a new instruction to surrender its best hand weapons to the 10 Fallschirmjäger Division which was forming within 1 Cavalry Corps/2 Panzer Army in the Graz area some 60 kms distant. It read:
To Kdr.d.14 Waffengren.div.d.SS Ukrain Nr.1, Marburg/Drau
From SSFHA, Amt. II Org.abt.I.B, 3 April 1945
On the order of the OKW, the following weapons are to be handed over from the arsenal of the 14 Div: 6,600 MPi [sub-machine guns], 80 Zielfernrohrgewehre, [rifles with telescopic sights] 54 k.Karabiner 43. [semi-automatic rifles].225 The aforementioned weapons are to be surrendered to the 10 Fallschirmjg. Div. and rapidly transported to Graz. Army Group E has been notified and is responsible for overseeing this order.226
Signed SS-Obersturmbannführer Pruss.
The result was the further temporary disarmament of its units which were still in and around Maribor,227 as Waffen-Unterscharführer Vasyl Veryha recorded in his diary:
On 3 April all weapons of the 9./II./WGR 30 were taken away, except for two MG 42’s (heavy machine-guns) and the officers and NCOs pistols [which were] retained for defence purposes.228
However, even the movement of a limited amount of its best light personal weaponry to a destination ten times closer than had been originally been intended could not be put into practice.
In his narrative Heike states that the commander of the 10 Fallschirmjäger Division Oberst Karl-Heinz von Hofmann,229 whose division was to receive the weaponry, arrived at this time after his light reconnaissance plane had been shot down near the Division’s supply depot and appeared at its HQ claiming that he had been authorised to take over the weapons.230 Meanwhile during the night of the 3/4 April Hitler had further deliberated over the Division’s fate and had now decided that it would be more expedient to separate and arm its minority German contingent at the expense of the Galician Division and then incorporate the Germans into a division undiluted by foreigners. This was confirmed in an order transmitted on the following day:
Secret Command matter 4.4.45
Op abt/Ia, Nr..4178 gKdos.,
Notice
after Führer talk night 3./4.4.45
H.Gr.Sud
1.) Führer has decided that the 14.Waffen-Gren.Div. der SS (ukrainische.Nr..1) is to provide cadre for the 10.Fallsch.Jg.Div. Hereby transfer the German personnel from Waffen-SS to Luftwaffe.231
Hence, Oberst von Hofmann’s authorisation further allowed him to appropriate German Waffen-SS cadre personnel from the Division in which case it would not have to hand over any weapons, as the one thousand or so men under his command had no infantry training. The new directives for the Division to relinquish its weapons and transfer its German Waffen-SS personnel to the 10.Fallsch.Jg.Div. were no less impractical and could not be implemented.232 In view of this, and no doubt taking advantage of its recent incorporation into 2 Panzer Army and battle orders, Dr Wächter and the Division’s staff ignored this and subsequent instructions which followed,233 and at the same time they returned all the weapons which had been collected from its soldiers.234
Rösener’s Operational HQ in Ljubljana promptly responded to thi
s decision with an abortive radio message to the GOC of Uniformed Polizei in Salzburg, Oberst Wolter and the commander of Rural Polizei in Graz instructing them to ‘Stop immediate issue of arms to 14 Waffen Gren. Div. of SS (Ukraine No. 1),’235 which fortunately neither was remotely capable of doing.
Oblivious to this instruction and in defiance of its standing orders from OKW and the SS-FHA, the Division’s command then went ahead with the directive from 2 Panzer Army and gave orders for its remaining units to join the counter-attack to close the breach made by the forces of the 3 Ukrainian Front.236
Oberst von Hofmann left after having been given some supplies,237 and another potential disaster was averted, but the issue was still as yet unresolved. A Waffen-SS officer was despatched from Himmler’s command post and spent the next ten days at the Division’s staff operations department observing its general staff,238 a development which augured the final twist in the tale which was to come a week later.
The following day, under the pretext of his appreciation of Army Group South’s difficult situation Hitler finally acknowledged that his orders had not been carried out. In the absence of the Waffen-SS liaison officer at his headquarters, he was also unable to obtain the reassurance that the appropriate order had been issued by the Reichsführer Himmler. This is evident from an instruction issued by OKH Operations Department:
Notice for Führer Talk
4.4 Evening:
No major decisions only the following:
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