Stalin's Nemesis

by Michael James Melnyk

  […] On our first day in the trenches our company lost one member. He was careless and a sniper in no-mans-land shot him in the head. Next day Ziemba, as the best shot, asked us all for our tracer bullets. He put them in his MGs bullet belt and by shooting continuously on the same spot, the roof of the building in no-mans-land was set ablaze. After that we had no big problem with snipers.[…]8

  The presence of Red Army sharp-shooters also aided the removal of the most detested Germans. These were shot at an opportune moment by their Ukrainian comrades using captured Soviet Finkas (machine pistols), the cause of such a death then being incorrectly attributed to a Red Army marksman.9

  For most of those manning the front, a rather dull routine set in consisting of watches, sleep, collection of rations, eating and long conversations about the unknown future that lay ahead.

  For the units stationed in its immediate vicinity, Schloss Gleichenberg and its associated outbuildings, acted as a magnet for the inquisitive soldiers. Set high up, after the early fighting the castle which was under constant enemy observation had lost most of its windows however the occupants enjoyed the relative safety of large slabs of thick granite which even the Soviet heavy mortars and anti-tank weapons could not penetrate. With the Red Army units continually probing to gain access day and night, the main gate, back gate and walls had to be carefully guarded. To get to the castle it was necessary to negotiate the exposed sections of the main access road which meant crawling on hands and knees to avoid the snipers who would shoot at anything in their sights. It was even dangerous to cross the yard to reach the main door of the castle, as this too was also under the watchful eye of the enemy. Several of those who acceded to their curiosity, or visited in the hope of finding souvenirs returned with minor bullet or shrapnel wounds for their troubles.10

  To the rear, supply units were reorganised and together with all reserve units were engaged in the construction of trenches and bunkers in secondary and tertiary lines of defence, often at night which in turn were protected by extensive minefields laid by pioneer units in order to establish a defence in depth. In this way the Division slowly gained control of its sector, which although it was outnumbered by a ratio of three to one11 it effectively defended until the end of the war. During this period the Soviet attacks became progressively weaker and all minor advances were successfully repelled.

  It should be noted that the strength of the new defensive line varied considerably and in extreme cases there were severe shortages of weapons and equipment, especially in the scratch infantry units organised as the result of the heavy losses. Waffen-Oberscharführer Myron Pasij who was serving with WGR 29 wrote:

  I was assigned about a platoon of soldiers. I did not know them or where they came from. As it turned out, they were loyal to each other and we spent the last days of the war together. We came to the [company] command post and were told where to take our positions. We dug in and for a few weeks held our flank position. We had about enough ammunition to defend ourselves for about ten minutes, no hand-grenades, no compass, no binoculars and no ammunition depot close by. During that time no officer inspected our position and the company command post was about 100 metres away. It was our good luck that the Red Army did not attack.12

  Internal supply units continued to function effectively moving the matériels which were available from dumps situated in the rear to the troops in the forward units. There remained however a general shortage of munitions which was especially critical for the infantry support and heavy weapons.

  Units took turns manning the frontal positions where they were often temporarily cut off from field kitchens and hence hot food, therefore to supplement rations, foodstuffs were sometimes obtained locally.13 Occasionally livestock, especially pigs, were taken when the opportunity arose, from deserted Austrian farmsteads in no-mans-land, rather than allow them to fall into enemy hands.14

  The rotation to rear areas allowed the soldiers to rest and eat as well as essential basic weapons cleaning and maintenance and with few sanitary facilities available, the soldiers also took advantage of the opportunity to clean uniforms and wash, shave and satisfy basic hygiene needs. And as always, ‘lice chasing’ was very much a necessary activity amongst the troops.15

  The Training and Reserve Regiment which had a strength of approximately 3,00016 had around 10 April 1945, relocated to Völkermarkt. Its battalions and companies were dispersed over a wide area encompassing several villages and were billeted in schools and other public buildings. They continued their operations against Tito’s insurgent forces who no longer confined their operations to the remote hills and the suppression of the partisan’s ever more daring exploits in the rear areas, kept all the Reserve Regiments units fully occupied.17

  No large scale actions were conducted by either side at this point, instead minor skirmishes occurred as the result of regular armed reconnaissance missions and patrols which were carried out with the purpose of capturing soldiers to discover Soviet intentions and unexpected troop movements. Some of these perilous raids ended in failure and further losses in dead and wounded.18 Understandably, the Ukrainian soldiers were not always eager to participate in these actions. Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Hawrylak who commanded the Jagdzug (WGR 31) was given one such assignment:

  […] Following an order received by our regiment (31) my assault platoon was chosen to launch a surprise attack at night on a section of the enemy trenches and capture one or more Soviet prisoners. Our plan was to attack at a segment of the front opposite the sector held by a company commanded by another Ukrainian Waffen-Untersturmführer, who had submitted some beautiful sketches of the location of enemy trenches in front of his company. There was no time to acquaint myself with the terrain and enemy position, however I was reassured by everyone that the information contained in his sketches which had been compiled as the result of scouting missions (Spähtrupp Unternehmen) conducted by his company, was correct. I was also promised that our artillery would concentrate its fire on the chosen location prior to the attack to soften up the enemy positions. This was to commence following a signal given by radio, or at an appointed time.

  We prepared for our mission, checking our weapons and covering our faces with soot. After midnight we left our lines. Following a route that I had memorised from the maps and sketches, we advanced in attack formation. The night was quiet except for occasional single rifles shots. We passed some of our dead and Soviet dead lying in the woods. The terrain was covered with sparse trees and hedges. We moved forward taking special care not to stand on any dry branches until we reached our staging positions for our attack. So as not to alert the enemy to our presence, I forbade the radio operator to use his set.

  At the agreed time we heard the artillery shells exploding a short way in front of us. After five minutes the artillery stopped shelling and we moved forward. When we arrived at the target area we found no sign of enemy positions, only a few holes made by our artillery which had alerted the enemy. We continued to advance for some considerable distance from our staging area and still found no enemy trenches. We entered some denser woods and began to climb a slight incline when suddenly we heard the alarm and the enemy started to fire tracer bullets and flares which lit up the battlefield as though it were daylight. At the same time we began to receive heavy machine gun fire. We dropped to the ground and started to run back the way we had come. Rolling down the incline under enemy fire I joined my troops at the bottom of the hill. After a hasty check I established that no one had been killed but two injured, although they could both walk by themselves.

  We managed to return hastily to our lines without any further incident. The Waffen-Untersturmführer was waiting for me and I gave him a piece of my mind. As a company commander he had not gone on these scouting missions himself but sent his subordinates, who not wanting to expose themselves to excessive danger had not ventured too far and reported something that looked plausible. He in turn had dressed up their reports in beautiful form and sent them to the reg
imental command.[…]19

  Freitag’s ‘reliable’ Germans also proved to be equally unwilling to risk their lives in such missions with the war so close to its inevitable conclusion. A commando unit assembled by the commander of WGR 29 from the regimental Jagdzug comprised entirely of Germans attempted a similar raid into enemy territory which also ended in failure. The Germans who were extremely reluctant to risk their lives, drank heavily before the raid began and during the night they persuaded a unit of Volhynian Ukrainians to undertake the task whilst they covered the flanks. The Ukrainians duly approached the enemy lines and opened fire, whereupon the Soviets responded with a heavy fusillade forcing a retreat.20 Eventually, the mission was accomplished in another sector.

  The penultimate edition of the Divisional newspaper Do Boyu entitled ‘Before Our First Lines’, summarised the events in its sector during this period:

  The Styria sector has been quiet for sometime. Our own raids and reconnaissance were successful. Many attacks by the enemy were repulsed by our defenders. In the sector south of Straden, our troops broke through two fortified enemy positions. Our troops destroyed three houses in which the enemy was stationed. The enemy retreated before our fighting group which crossed the River Mur near Radkersburg and reached Neidorfl via Prentlhof. In our whole sector our raiding and reconnaissance groups captured 5 anti-tank cannons, 1 infantry cannon, 3 mortars, 23 heavy machine guns, 9 light machine guns, 5 sub-machine guns and many rifles. They took 15 Bolshevik prisoners of war. The Bolsheviks suffered 68 killed before our lines.21

  A New Tactic

  At this point the frontline in this sector consisted of a series of static defensive positions, which were sometimes as little as 200 metres apart. Opposite the Division’s lines was the Soviet 20 Guards Rifle Division (VI Guards Rifle Corps/3 Ukrainian Front) and with the positions so close together, verbal exchanges often took place as did mutual attempts to encourage desertion. In this respect the Soviets had the upper hand and soon showed themselves to be far more adept and resourceful, utilising a variety of methods. In one sector where the soldiers of the 2./II./WGR 29, were deployed in a valley, their NCOs used the terrain to put some ‘offending’ troops through some gruelling exercises. Having discovered that Ukrainians were manning the front line, the Soviets were able to witness the goings-on and in the mountainous landscape they could clearly hear the commands shouted in German at the unfortunate soldiers undergoing the punishing regime. This resulted in a veritable barrage of comments from the Red Army soldiers emphasising Ukrainian servitude to the Germans and urging them to desert.22

  In an attempt to make them melancholy, Red Army intelligence units also placed speakers in trees and played gramophone recordings of romantic Ukrainian folk songs and melodies especially at night. They also addressed the soldiers with loudhailers telling them that if they deserted to the Red Army, together they could be victorious over the Germans and amnesties were promised to those who surrendered.23 To give the broadcasts a personal slant individuals were named, especially officers, as were relatives and friends living under Soviet occupation who were an easy target for reprisals by the NKVD. Waffen-Untersturmführer Bohdan Kutny recollected:

  When I was at the front in Austria the Soviets were broadcasting through loudspeakers in Ukrainian. The message was ‘You are fighting against your brothers. Comrade Stalin will forgive you if you stop fighting and return home. There you girlfriends will be awaiting for you. Come, cross the line to our side’.24

  The overwhelming majority who had bitter experience of life under Stalin’s regime proved to be completely impervious to the enticements, but others did not and susceptibility varied from unit to unit.25 Soviet agents and sympathisers within the Division of all ranks, those of eastern Ukrainian descent and those with no stomach to fight on, availed themselves of the first opportunity to abscond as did others who had only recently joined. They harboured the mistaken belief that as they were amongst those who had been conscripted into the Galician Division against their will, upon surrendering to the Red Army they would indeed be pardoned and permitted to return home. Waffen-Untersturmführer Walter Motyka recalled:

  […] Here and there individual soldiers or groups went over to the enemy. To add insult to injury some of the turncoats voluntarily or under duress, helped the Communists with their propaganda. They would call from the enemy side over loudspeakers, identify themselves stating their names and units and tell their former comrades that no harm had come to them and they were ‘proud to have become soldiers of the victorious Red Army’. They suggested their former comrades kill their officers and desert. They would name the Ukrainian officers. I heard that my name was mentioned on several occasions.26

  As always some had the ultimate intention of joining the UPA while others who fled to the enemy lines, took with them their light arms and important information about the tactical disposition of individual units and other details. One group from the 9./II./WGR 2927 led by a former Red Army officer was persuaded by the propaganda, as was a squad of thirty men from 1./I./WGR 31.28 Instances of officers deserting were rare but they did occur and their number included Waffen-Untersturmführers Jurij Holub and Ivan Bendyna. From the beginning of the defensive fighting in Austria until the end of the war 98 instances of desertion of all ranks (officers, NCOs and enlisted men) were recorded from the Division.29 It should be noted that this number included the first Germans (including officers) who had already begun to go absent without leave. For some with families living in the now Soviet occupied regions of Germany their motive was concern for the safety of their loved ones, whilst for others like the Gestapo agent SS-Hauptsturmführer Heinrich Wiens who served with the Divisional staff, it was self-preservation.30

  Viewed in perspective, this number was however negligible considering the large number of soldiers in its ranks, the critical time of general disintegration and the incidence of desertion in the corps German divisions.

  Nonetheless, a series of countermeasures were instigated designed to eradicate this tendency and all the ramifications that it entailed. Units were rotated from frontline to reserve positions, or had their deployment sector changed at short notice and men with recent experience of life under Soviet occupation were sent to units that were deemed to be susceptible to inform their comrades of exactly what they could expect if they went over to the enemy. In characteristic fashion, to discourage desertion and to maintain ‘exemplary discipline’ Freitag issued an internal directive to all regimental and battalion commanders, encouraging them to liberally impose the death sentence for all proven cases of dereliction of duty.31 In the case of desertion, those who were caught were executed after a brief mock trial, usually by firing squads, or at this stage of the war to ‘save ammunition’ the victims were killed by hanging.32 Waffen-Untersturmführer Jaroslav Kunycky who was serving as a platoon commander with the Jagdcompanie WGR 29 was chosen to attend on one occasion:

  I was present at an execution of a young soldier who was sentenced by a military court to death by firing squad for desertion. I was ordered to take the whole platoon [to watch]. The intention was to depress and scare everybody. The firing squad was commanded by a German officer.33

  Hanging was commonplace and the bodies of those executed in this way were often left publicly displayed on a railway bridge or dangling from the bough of a tree beside a road for several days as a warning for those with similar intentions.34

  The Division’s own attempts to persuade the Red Army men to change sides were however largely ineffectual. Several prominent Ukrainian individuals including Waffen-Untersturmführer Fr. Michael Levenetz and Waffen-Obersturmführer Pidhayny were despatched to units were desertions had occurred and did their best to counter the Soviet propaganda. In a similar fashion to the Soviets, recordings were broadcast to the enemy positions and speeches were made with the assistance of loudhailers, and although some isolated instances of line crossing from the Red Army to the Division were recorded, the total number of defectors was negligible.35r />
  Between attempts at encouraging desertion there was additional banter between both sides as Waffen-Grenadier Volodymyr Keczun 4./I./WGR 29 recalled:

  […] The Soviets liked to listen to our MG 42, to its very rapid firing speed. They called it ‘Electricheskoye’. From time to time, when they got bored they would shout ‘Hey, Nazi, davay ‘Electricheskoye’’. Ziemba would establish which of their positions requested it and sent them a well aimed salvo. The air was blue from their swearing. They did not want it so close.[…]36

  Following the heavy fighting in Austria during the previous three weeks, as was the tradition on 20 April 1945, awards and promotions were given to those who had demonstrated bravery in combat. For the first and only time two Waffen-Obersturmführers’ Volodymyr Kosak and Ostap Czuczkewycz (both of WGR 29) were awarded the Iron Cross I. Class.37 The very last edition of the Divisional paper Do Boyu dated 6 May 194538 cited a further 28 awards to Ukrainians for the Iron Cross II. Class (15 to W-Grenadiers and Oberschütze, 2 W-Sturmmanns’ and 12 W-Untersturmführers). The same publication lists 11 War Merit Crosses I. Class and 189 II. Class has having been given.39

  The grounds on which the awards were made were varied but all involved a personal act of heroism, for example during an enemy attack when Waffen-Grenadier Ivan Ivashko’s platoon commander was wounded, Ivashko took command of the platoon and repelled the enemy attack. In another instance, the two messengers W-Sturmmanns Mykola Kobak and Osyp Novosad delivered an important order under heavy enemy fire, during which one was wounded, thus enabling the unit to fulfil its task.40