On 20 April the Division was still listed as being under the command of the 2 Panzer Army/1 Cavalry Corps.41 With the reorganisation of the 1 Cavalry Corps, the Division was subordinated to the 6 Army commanded by Panzer Army General Balck which in turn assigned it to the 4 SS Panzer Corps under SS-Obergruppenführer Herbert Gille.42 Its operational sector now extended to Feldbach and included the east/west railway line.
The Ukrainian National Army
General Shandruk and his entourage arrived in Völkermarkt on 17 April after a ten day journey via Prague and Linz having been joined along the way by Dr Wächter, Dr Arlt and Oberst Bisanz near Spittal.43 Temporarily quartered in a local hotel, Shandruk was to oversee the incorporation of the ‘14 Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (ukrainische Nr.1)’ into the ‘Ukrainian National Army’. The headquarters of the Division’s Training and Reserve Regiment had relocated to the town a week earlier, so the first senior German officer whom Shandruk encountered was its commander SS-Obersturmbannführer Carl Marks. Informed of the arrival of a ‘Ukrainian general’, Marks simply ignored Shandruk and left him waiting. Thus slighted by this act of gross insubordination (which would have automatically brought about court martial proceedings against a Ukrainian in similar circumstances), Shandruk returned to his hotel determined to remove Marks from his command. His intended replacement was Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Volodymyr Tatarsky,44 however actually effecting his dismissal proved to be a far more formidable proposition than he had anticipated. Upon learning of Marks’ conduct, both Dr Wächter and Dr Arlt intervened on his behalf and placated Shandruk with profuse apologies and ultimately he got away with little more than a written reprimand. This was a clear indication that for reasons of expediency they were determined to preserve the Division’s internal command structure, at least temporarily.45
In complete contrast the reception that Shandruk received from the older Ukrainian officers in the reserve company who had gathered to meet him was very enthusiastic. After brief talks he gave orders for them to change their German ranks and insignia for the Ukrainian equivalent (that is those of the Army of the Ukrainian Peoples Republic 1919–1921) and by the following day this had been done.46
Two days later on 19 April he visited SS-Brigadeführer Freitag at his field HQ near Obergnas where Dr Wächter, Dr Arlt, Oberst Bisanz, Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Makarushka and Colonel Mychailo Krat were also present. Although Krat had not seen active service since 1920, Shandruk intended to appoint him as the new Divisional commander in place of Freitag.47 Forewarned of the visit the previous evening by Wächter and Arlt, Freitag’s general demeanour was uncharacteristically approachable. He gave a written and oral report on the Division, its position, contact with neighbours and an estimate of opposing enemy forces which was supplemented with a full description by Major Heike of frontal fortifications and deployment of its units and reserves. The reports and various tactical details were then discussed with Freitag, after which Shandruk insisted that henceforth the formation be known as the ‘1 Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army’.48 So as to leave no doubt, he later issued a written instruction to Freitag to announce this and several other points in the next Divisional orders which appeared a few days later.49
To acquaint himself with organisational and internal matters from a Ukrainian perspective, Shandruk invited Makarushka50 to join him for a private talk lasting several hours during which Makarushka expounded on a long list of grievances. These included; the Division was firmly in the hands of the Germans who held almost all command posts and amongst whom there was a marked propensity to treat the Ukrainians of all ranks with contempt; all supplies were in German hands: provisioning and sanitary service were inadequate; Freitag’s predilection for court martial proceedings when dealing with transgressions by Ukrainians; and the Division’s almost total dependency on horse drawn transportation which impeded logistics and movement.
The single most important issue to be broached throughout the extended consultation was the proposed change in command. Although Krat would have served as a figurehead for the Ukrainians, he did not have any recent experience as an operational Divisional commander and it was therefore decided that in the present situation and in view of the expected early end of the war, such a move would not serve the interests of the Division. Similarly, Shandruk later rejected the idea of replacing all German commanders with Ukrainians on the basis that any hostile activity towards the Germans would deprive it of essential provisions. Since the Division was surrounded by large units of German troops, the possibility existed that the orders and directives issued by Ukrainian officers could have been sabotaged by Germans at all levels.51 Shandruk therefore permitted Freitag to retain his command and Krat returned to the Army staff in Völkermarkt.52 As a token gesture, Freitag then requested two German NCOs should stand in place of the Ukrainian enlisted men who stood guard outside the farmer’s house near Maierdorf which served as Shandruk’s HQ and above which the Ukrainian national flag now flew.
Even though few knew anything about Shandruk, over the next six days the presence of a ‘Ukrainian general’ became known throughout the Division. Together with Major Makarushka he dutifully visited many units at the front (a practice that Freitag did not engage in after Brody), as well as the graves of the fallen, initiatives that helped raise his profile and boost morale. At the same time he distributed limited quantities of a new cap badge embossed with the Trident emblem to every group he could reach as a direct replacement for the traditional German SS Deaths Head insignia. With the chief chaplain Father Levenetz, he also visited the graves of soldiers killed in the fighting and attended the services held for them.
On Wednesday 25 April 1945, Shandruk ordered the Division to be sworn in as the 1 Division of the Ukrainian National Army (Persha Ukrainska Dyvizija Ukrainskoi Nacional’noi Armii). The swearing of a solemn oath of allegiance to Ukraine completed the final formality of its transferral to the ‘Ukrainian National Army’.53
This was a further indulgence that his German sponsors were prepared to accept as like the name change, it had only a symbolic meaning and overall tactical control of the Division remained German until the final surrender which occurred two weeks later. Notwithstanding this, it did ensure that the Ukrainians would officially end the war as soldiers of the ‘Ukrainian National Army’ and although the timing may have been unfavourable, the Ukrainians were understandably very proud.
As most of the Division was holding the front line, the ceremony was conducted in the presence of WGR 30, which the previous day had been pulled out of action at Unter Giem and temporarily moved into reserve.54 During the course of the morning the participating companies rapidly put themselves in order, shaving, cleaning weapons, boots and uniforms after which lunch was eaten feverishly in eager anticipation of the event to come later that afternoon in an open field surrounded by hills and woods near the village of Oedt. In the middle of the field a small mound and a makeshift pulpit had been constructed flanked by two tall poles on which flew the Ukrainian flag on the right and German flag on the left and in front of which stood a mortar and around which the soldiers of WGR 30 formed a large hollow square. Also present were representatives of the Division’s staff and delegates from WGR 29 and WGR 31 and the other sub units.
Accompanied by the occasional sound of cannon fire and muffled explosions from the nearby front, Holy Mass was then conducted following which the oath was repeated by all those present including some of the Germans, with a raised right hand and the first two fingers pointing up. Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Hawrylak later wrote:
[…] I had the honour of representing my regiment—WGR 31, and Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Prypchan was representing WGR 29. In the middle of the square a medium calibre mortar was deployed which Prypchan and myself laid our hands on before repeating the words of the oath after Father Levenetz together with all the assembled troops. This was a very touching, deep felt and profound moment for all of us. After many, many disappointments this represen
ted the accomplishment of our dreams and longings to become soldiers of a truly Ukrainian Army.[…]55
The text of the new oath was:
I swear to Almighty God on His Holy Gospel and His Living Cross, sparing neither life nor health, always and everywhere to fight with weapons in my hand under the Ukrainian National Banner for my people and for my homeland, Ukraine. Aware of my great responsibility as a soldier of the Ukrainian National Army, I swear that I will carry out all orders of my superiors obediently and without question, and to keep secret all service orders. So help me God and the Holy Virgin, Amen.56
Chaplain M. Levenets delivered a brief sermon about the importance of the oath to all Christians followed by General Shandruk who, dressed in a greatcoat with red lapels and bearing the trident insignia, spoke briefly about the importance of keeping Ukrainian traditions in the struggle for the independence of Ukraine. He also announced that all aspirants who had graduated from Lauenburg but not yet been given appropriate ranks were henceforth promoted to Unterscharführers, because they would be needed to train recruits for the Ukrainian National Army.57
Immediately afterwards a review took place before Shandruk as ‘Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian National Army’, who greeted several of the young Ukrainian officers, for whom along with the vast majority of their comrades, swearing an oath of allegiance to Ukraine which made no mention of Adolf Hitler represented the culmination of their aspirations to become soldiers of a ‘Ukrainian National Army’.58
As a rule, the Division’s German contingent were perhaps understandably somewhat less inclined to view the matter with the same degree of sentimentality although some Germans including the commanders of the I./WGR 30 Hauptsturmführer Siegfried Klocker and 13./WGR 30 Hans Vorkoeper replaced the SS Deaths Head insignia on their caps with the Ukrainian trident badges.59 However, with the exception of the commander of WGR 30 SS-Obersturmbannführer Forstreuter,60 the senior German commanders and general staff officers did not take any part in the proceedings.
Despite appearances, Dr Wächter and Dr Arlt were still anxious to stifle any official uncensored announcement of these events and when Kriegsberichter Oleh Lysiak who had witnessed the ceremony, approached the group to ask for a comment he was told sharply by Arlt that ‘The Kriegsberichter are not permitted to write in the interim’ (‘Sie Kriegsberichter darüber dürfen nicht Schreiben’).61
A photographic record of the highlights of Shandruk’s visit including the oath and visit to positions at the front did however appear as a one-page insert in the last issue of the Divisional paper Do Boyu which was printed in Maribor and dated 6 May 1945,62 six days after Hitler’s suicide in Berlin on 30 April 1945, and two days before Germany’s capitulation.
As the ‘1 Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army’, the Division remained subject to the authority of the Reichsführer-SS, remaining dependant on the Waffen-SS establishment for its supplies, equipment and replacements. Further, the SS-FHA continued to exercise complete control over all the German cadre personnel assigned to it and as late as 29 April 1945, the SS-Personalhauptamt was ordering the re-assignment of individuals for special duties.63 Tactically, the Division remained subordinate to 6 Army commanded by Panzer Army General Hermann Balck.
Despite his new found capacity, the limitations of Shandruk’s authority and influence as the ‘Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian National Army’ were becoming all too apparent. While the dismissal of the more odious Germans (of all ranks) was ultimately promised, there is no evidence to suggest that this actually took place. Their continued survival and the failure to implement the eagerly awaited and long over due major radical reform measures, was most likely due to the machinations and external pressure from Dr Wächter and Dr Arlt and the prevailing circumstances due to the impending defeat.
Insert from the last ever edition of the Divisional newspaper Do Boyu (To Battle) dated 6 May 1945, showing Shandruk’s visit to the Division’s soldiers in the frontline in Austria, April 1945 and the swearing of the oath to the Ukrainian national Army.
Shandruk did however indicate his intention to address this and other concerns in the next Divisional order (‘Divisional Order Number 71’), issued on 27 April 1945, entitled ‘The Ukrainianisation of the Division’.64 The contents of the order set out the envisaged military and political consequences for the Division according to the agenda of Dr Wächter and all the others who subscribed to the popular belief of the inevitability of a conflict between the Western Allies and the Soviets after a defeat by Germany.
Divisional Order No. 71
THE UKRAINIANISATION OF THE DIVISION
II. Consequences for the Division.
Military consequences:
Fact: The Div. is part of the Eastern Front and must continue to fight Bolshevism as part of the Eastern Front.
1.) The Division is, and remains a purely Ukrainian combat unit only a small percentage of which consists of German leaders, whose positions the Ukrainians are unable to fill because so many of the most intelligent have been liquidated.
2.) The success of the Div. in combat stands or falls on its unity.
Political consequences:
1.) The political advisers of the Div. General Shandruk
SS-Gruppenführer Dr Wächter
Oberst Bisanz
SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr Arlt
are either with the Div. or will arrive at the required time. They will most definitely be with the Division as political advisers at the required time. General Shandruk is furthermore the Commander in Chief of all Ukrainian units including the 1. Ukrainian Division. This is of particular importance and is to become common knowledge among the troops.
2.) It is vital that we keep the Div. away from the grasp of Bolshevism and to maintain it’s integrity as a single effective anti-Bolshevik combat unit.
3.) The deployment and maintenance of the Div. in its current state as an anti-Bolshevik combat unit is being organised in co-operation with the Allied camp. These matters are considered together with the negotiations and are being done via the political leaders of the Div. with SS-Obergruppenführer Wolff and via Switzerland. The negotiations regarding the Georgians and Caucasians were resolved favourably. These units will retain their weapons and German SS leaders, and remain armed anti-Bolshevik units.
4.) When the Americans near their own Eastern Front, it is intended that they should be approached as early and as far back as possible. Herein lies the particular purpose of the A.u.E.Rgt. The relocation of the A.u.E.Rgt is not envisaged, because of its intended role in engaging the Americans. Both Army and Corps have been briefed in these measures and have approved them completely and without reservation.
5.) The negotiations can however only be carried out on the following basis :
The Div. is to remain, as before, a purely Ukrainian Division, i.e. the 1. Ukrainian Division, which along with the Ukrainian National Army (which is to be set up with the authorisation of the Reich’s Government) is to have at its head General Shandruk as Commander in Chief. The German personnel assigned to the Div. were only essential in the beginning, because Ukrainians suitable for the posts held by German officers and NCOs were not available. The leaders and Ukrainian intelligentsia had been liquidated en masse by Bolshevism. The withdrawal of German personnel following the development of suitable Ukrainian leaders was envisaged from the beginning. In the Division there are … (11 per cent) Germans. The inclusion of Luftwaffe personnel, which would mean the raising of German personnel to 3,600† is for the aforementioned political reasons not viable. A decision regarding the future use of the Luftwaffe personnel has been requested. Until a decision has been made, we must tread water. The commanders do however have the right to immediately enlist any Luftwaffe personnel that are suited to join their troops, and who would not compromise the integrity or morale of the Div. All other Luftwaffe members are to be initially formed into closed training units. It is however stressed that exceptional men should be transferred to the troop
s of the Division immediately. It is important to remember that the Div. is west Ukrainian (i.e. a Galician) Division. Only a few individuals are east Ukrainian. There are NO RUSSIANS in the Div. There is therefore no conflict with the Polish government in London, but there is a distinct conflict with the Polish government in Lublin. This omission of west Ukrainians is necessary to distinguish the Division from the Polish Corps fighting for the Anglo-Americans in Italy. This Corps is also anti-Bolshevik. It is very important that the Div. is the first combat unit of the Ukrainian National Army, at whose head General Shandruk stands as Commander in Chief.
IV. Likely possibilities for the Division
The honour of being part of the coming anti-Bolshevik combat block [Kampfblock], while retaining all weapons and the integrity of the Division. Negotiations regarding this are in progress and appear to be progressing favourably. It is in the interests of the matter as a whole that the German personnel (Luftwaffe still to be decided) should stay with the Div. There is also the possibility that without German personnel the unit may join the Anglo-American side. This possibility seems unlikely in view of the circumstances.
1.) All German personnel remain complete within the Div.
When considering how to present this step to the German personnel, or when each German answers to his conscience, the following should be considered:
a) The maintaining of all units with any combat capacity whatsoever, will be decisive in the final battle against Bolshevism which lies ahead of us with 100 per cent certainty. It is therefore the duty of every member of the Div. whether German or Ukrainian to do his utmost to maintain the unit in its entirety as a fighting force against Bolshevism. The tighter and more complete the internal cohesion of the unit, the more successful will be the coming march against Bolshevism.
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