Stalin's Nemesis

by Michael James Melnyk

  The Soviets were surprised and enquired about our Easter celebrations. Then I heard somebody call my name. Curiously, under cover I moved forward and saw a silhouette of a soldier from the Soviet side moving towards the map. He spoke in Russian and said he was the commander of a company. He began a propaganda piece but I interrupted him saying ‘We have no time for such rubbish because we celebrate Easter. We would like to give you an Easter present’. He agreed and after certain security arrangements had been made, a soldier from the Volhynian Legion took a basket across the road and after the Orthodox custom of Easter greeting (shaking hands and kissing) passed it to the Red Army soldier who happened to be a Ukrainian from Bila Tserkva.76

  This period also provided a poignant reminder of the tragic circumstances that had come about. Waffen-Untersturmführer Walter Motyka serving with 1./I./I (formerly WGR 29) wrote:

  Sunday 6 May was Ukrainian Easter. Our company was in the front line. My good friend Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Prypchan, an officer for special assignments with 29 regiment, had sent me an Easter basket with a bottle of liquor, some wine and sausages which I shared with my soldiers and staff. Early at dawn on Easter Sunday the soldiers of our division in the front lines sang Christ is Risen (‘Khrystos Voskres’) and to our surprise the Soviet line joined our troops in singing because there were many Ukrainians soldiers in the Soviet army. It was an irony and tragic indeed that Ukrainian soldiers on opposite sides of the front line were shooting at each other and brother was killing his Ukrainian brother.77

  News of Hitler’s ‘heroic death’ and the subsequent appointment of Grand Admiral Dönitz as his successor, reached many units including elements of the 1 Ukrainian Division after its announcement on the radio.78 The main concern now facing its command and all those associated with it, was Germanys’ impending defeat and the consequences that entailed. The process of clearing out continued with renewed emphasis and all units were subjected to a purge of un-necessary matériel and encumbrances to increase mobility. This was especially important since it would have to negotiate a retreat path across steep mountain passes to the Western Allied demarcation line.

  On the morning of 6 May a briefing was held for all Divisional Chiefs of Staff at the command point of 4.SS Panzer Corps. Unconditional capitulation of the German Wehrmacht was now expected at any time and SS-Obergruppenführer Herbert Gille’s instructions were that from 7 May the entire German front was to disengage from the Red Army and move to territories occupied by the English and Americans. Other than essential items, all matériel and heavy weapons was to be rendered useless and left behind. The first units to withdraw on 7 May were to be the frontal elements of 4.SS Panzer Corps while the 1 Ukrainian Division was to follow twenty four hours later on 8 May when all the Corps’ units had been aligned.

  A second conference took place on the afternoon of the same day when all divisional commanders and commanding generals were called to General Balck’s headquarters for the last time. Where the main topic of discussion was the avoidance of capture by the Red Army. At the Division’s proposal, Völkermarkt was designated as its mustering point (as this was conducive to Wächter’s plan of moving it to Tolmezzo in northern Italy). Requests were also made by its command that it be given priority when the withdrawal orders were issued on the basis of its unique circumstances in that as a ‘Ukrainian Division’ the consequences of capture by the Soviets would in all probability be far worse than for regular German formations and unlike its mobile neighbours, as an infantry Division its retreat would necessarily be slower. General Balck listened to these representations but refused to commit himself and made no definitive decisions even though he had the latitude to do so knowing that the schedule for capitulation on the eastern front gave no instructions for a precisely timed cease-fire because of the potentially disastrous results.79

  General Shandruk, Dr Arlt, Dr Wächter and Oberst Bisanz returned to the 1 Ukrainian Division on the afternoon of the same day and Dr Wächter immediately left for the army headquarters, hoping that by exerting his influence he could obtain an early withdrawal.

  The Allies had by now entered Austria from the west and northwest and at Shandruk’s bidding, Dr Makarushka who was felt to be the Division’s most suitable emissary, was directed to leave for the Völkermarkt/Klagenfurt district80 and accompanied by Dr Arlt who was to act as an interpreter, he was given the assignment of making contact with the English. He was to inform them about the existence of the ‘Ukrainian National Army’ and obtain a written order to move the 1 Ukrainian Division to the rear of the British lines. Makarushka subsequently met an English unit whose commander agreed to his request that Völkermarkt would be designated as the Division’s assembly area but this plan subsequently had to be abandoned as the city had been occupied by a large garrison of Tito’s pro-Soviet partisans who claimed it belonged to them and not England and were hostile to the presence of Ukrainian soldiers.

  Under these circumstances, having lost contact with the Division’s command, Dr Makarushka took the precaution of sending guides to divert its columns bound for Völkermarkt to Radstädter Tauern which was under British control. Similarly, he redirected the Training and Reserve Regiment which had begun its retreat on 3 May81 north to avoid further harassment although in some cases this was accomplished only with the upmost difficulty, especially for those units which were posted south of the Drava.82 Tito’s partisans which had crossed into Austria proper, continued to surprise and ambush the retreating soldiers, frequently inflicting casualties and capturing prisoners (over eighty were taken from the 2 battalion alone).83 Forced to fight their way through, in the fierce battles that ensued the regiment splintered into small units which made their way towards the Allied lines independently.84

  The strong presence of partisans in the vicinity of Völkermarkt also meant that Dr Wächter’s plan for the Division to cross the Alps was no longer feasible.

  Unconditional Surrender

  In accordance with the urgent measures outlined in Divisional Order 7185 by 6 May the removal of unnecessary equipment had begun and the first of the staff files and documents and war diaries were burned and surplus matériel destroyed. Simultaneously the thinning out of all non combatant and support units took place. On 7 May or earlier, all divisional unit commanders relocated their supply, service and logistics units to the rear, mostly during the hours of darkness to avoid detection. The roads leading west soon became congested and any movement on them was subject to the control of the military police and occasionally officers.

  All day on 7 May Freitag and Heike petitioned the 4.SS Panzer Corps headquarters for an exact time of withdrawal but no orders were forthcoming and they were told to wait. In the early morning hours of 8 May, Dr Wächter who had been unable to reach 6 Army HQ because his car had broken down, telephoned and stated that to the best of his knowledge 6 Army had already given the appropriate orders. Despite this, it was not until 0600 hrs on 8 May that the Chief of Staff of 4.SS Panzer Corps finally telephoned with orders for retirement to commence without further delay. The 1 Ukrainian Division was now to move westwards as quickly as possible.

  On the same day the inevitable unconditional surrender which had long been anticipated was declared. For those Ukrainians who heard the news and faced an uncertain future that lay ahead, it was received with complete indifference or relief86 while for some of the Germans it came as a bitter blow. Waffen-Unterscharführer Wasyl Sirsky wrote:

  I remember quite clearly that Untersturmführer Wendt cried quite profusely after hearing the news about capitulation, for 6 years he had fought on different fronts.87

  The Allied/Soviet demarcation line some 200 kms to the rear, would now have to be crossed before 0900 hrs 9 May as according to the surrender terms, after that hour all military movement was to halt. All troops were to then remain where they were until taken in to captivity by the army against whom they had last fought. The objective now was simple; to put as much space between the soldiers of the Division and the ad
vancing Soviets as quickly as possible.

  Instructions followed to commanders of the 1 Ukrainian Division’s sub-units, who were anxiously awaiting them. To expedite the retreat most of the remaining heavy weapons and equipment together with infantry support weapons such as mortars were disabled and abandoned. Superfluous items of personal kit such as steel helmets, gas masks,88 machine gun mounts, entrenching tools and other non-essential items were discarded at the owner’s discretion as the soldiers disengaged from the front completely by constant and accelerated marching.

  Two primary routes were to be used as far as Graz: a few units in the north (amongst them parts of the 14.Feld Ersatz Bataillon) were to march along the main route to Feldbach—along the Raab Valley to Gleisdorf and then to Graz. Meanwhile the bulk of the Division moved further south from Gnas to the first collection point at St Stephan (where the classified regimental documents were burnt)89 —Enzelsdorf, to the Mur at Kalsdorf and then north to Graz. Here, both columns were to combine and retreat westwards along the Packerstrasse (the main route assigned to the majority of 6 Army’s units) in the direction of its mustering point at Völkermarkt. Rest stops were forbidden because of the constant threat of a final Soviet offensive. The route was marked by signs or placards bearing the divisional insignia or messages giving mustering points, affixed as prominently as possible.90

  Initially at least a relatively orderly withdrawal by the Division’s units began under cover of its artillery batteries intent on expending its last shells91 after which their crews then joined the masses of soldiers marching west, carrying only light hand-held weapons and essential provisions. Waffen-Grenadier Volodymyr Keczun remembered:

  […] During the night of 7/8 May we were informed, that Germany had capitulated. The war was over. The artillery observer informed us that with the first light in the morning, the artillery would start a barrage of the Red Army positions to use up the remaining ammunition and slow down their pursuit of us. While it was still dark we collected all our equipment and in haste vacated our positions. As we were force-marching to rejoin our transport, we heard a barrage of the Red Army positions by our artillery gather momentum.

  Life was very hard for the next twenty-four hours of our retreat because the night before we had not received our food ration so we were forced to live off the land. Sadly all the houses seemed deserted and striped bare. If we were lucky enough to find any vegetables they needed cooking and we had no time to do it. On the way we met other groups of retreating soldiers but they were in the same predicament. In the afternoon we passed the position of our artillery, guns silent and forlorn now. They were spiked so that the Red Army could not use them. With each step the road was getting more crowded.

  At last, on the morning of the following day we caught up with our transport. We learned that they had found out about capitulation hours before us and because of their slowness were ordered to start retreating immediately. Our aim was to cross the Mur River and reach the Allied/Soviet demarcation line. After that we were to march via Judenburg to Salzburg, to surrender to the British Army.

  News arrived that Red Army troops were following us and another of their units was advancing along a parallel road on our right, trying to outpace us. Sad thing was that our trigger happy troopers were firing flares during the night to illuminate the road and it showed them exactly where we were. As Wildner’s group found itself at the tail of the retreat, Kosak picked the best of his soldiers and sent them to guard our back.[…]92

  As soon as the first infantry units began leaving their trenches, enemy activity increased, but fortunately there were only small scale, isolated attacks along the front. To cover the retreat, Freitag ordered one reinforced company per regiment to remain in place until 1400 hrs.93 In practice the size of the unit that remained was left to the discretion of the individual battalion commanders and hence it varied considerably.94 In the case of the II./2 Rgt (formerly WGR 30), this duty was assigned to the 5 company reinforced with two adjacent platoons. In the absence of the company commander Waffen-Untersturmführer Wasyl Moskalyk and another Ukrainian officer Waffen-Untersturmführer Ivan Ivanyk who had both disappeared the command was given over to an NCO platoon commander Fedir Tsymbaliuk-Obychenko.

  On 8 May beginning at the break of dawn, the force which had a total strength of approximately 180 men, came under heavy attack which was only repelled with heavy casualties including 3 of the 4 squad commanders. Between 0730 hrs and 0800 hrs during a lull in the fighting, repeated attempts to contact the battalion by telephone were made in vain so eventually a messenger was sent who returned after midday and reported that there was nobody there. Unable to wait until darkness fell before pulling back because of the possibility of being outflanked, at 1430 hrs the survivors withdrew in broad daylight. Moving along a road towards Feldbach under cover of an escarpment, they continued in the direction of St Stephan by which time only twenty five men were left from the original contingent.95

  To delay the advancing Red Army, the third company of the Pioneer Battalion commanded by SS-Obersturmführer Alfred Dombrowsky, which was one of the last to retreat, had constructed anti-tank obstacles, laid mines and placed explosive charges on trees which were detonated so that the trees fell blocking the roads.96 There was not however enough time to carry out the standing orders to destroy all the bridges over the Mur in the 1 Ukrainian Division’s sector which would have caused the civilian population significant hardship.97

  Amid outbreaks of sporadic fighting, the remaining rearguard units also began to vacate their positions in the early afternoon as instructed, after booby-trapping command bunkers and other defensive installations. As they withdrew, they left behind 729 of their comrades who died during the fighting at the front in Slovenia and Austria.98

  The Mur

  The first natural barrier to be encountered was the Mur River which ran approximately 50 kms (one day’s march) behind the front line. Some difficulties were anticipated because of the small number of bridges spanning the river, the current of which was very strong. To ease the congestion, especially on the existing main permanent concrete bridge (which had been mined but was still intact), barges were utilised by some infantry units so that the crossing proceeded without any significant delays.99

  All roads leading west soon became packed with a long slow moving column of vehicles, horses, bicycles and carts and all kinds of military weapons and material. They were joined by civilian refuges and retreating Hungarian, Cossack and Croatian troops of all ranks, as well as those from the regular army and the Waffen-SS. These were a prime target for fighter planes which had began strafing them intermittently since the afternoon of 8 May causing temporary panic and further casualties.100 In spite of the fact that it was already after capitulation these attacks lasted until 12 May when the last units reached the safety of the Allied lines.101 Waffen-Grenadier Volodymyr Keczun wrote:

  Unit from WGR 29 retreating from the front, May 1945. In the centre wearing camouflaged Zeltbahn (shelter quarter) is Waffen-Untersturmführer Jaroslav Owad.

  Column from the Division passing through an Austrian village during the retreat.

  The mountainous terrain was tiring. Horses and carts were soon abandoned when the retreat path moved into the high mountains.

  A break to get bearings and study the rare luxury of a map of the locality, Austria May 1945.

  […] When we crossed the Mur River (because we were on the front until the last minute we were nearly the last to cross), we stopped for a while to rest, while sappers laid mines to blow up the bridge, because the Soviets were close behind us. Suddenly pandemonium everywhere. One Soviet aeroplane appeared above us and started shooting indiscriminately at our column. There was no hiding place anywhere. Crying injured soldiers, rearing, squealing horses. Luckily some stalwart lads grabbed their MGs and started shooting at the plane and it flew away.[…]102

  Initially, the Division’s staff remained in the vicinity of Gnas, to assist with the evacuation and to clear up tacti
cal difficulties caused by the earlier retirement of one of the Division’s neighbours which had temporally caused its left flank to be exposed. After a few hours it transferred its headquarters to the west bank of the Mur where it remained until the bulk of its personnel had crossed. Shandruk, together with Freitag waited for the last of the soldiers at the bridge at Leoben approximately 40 kms north of Graz before moving west to Judenburg.103 Waffen-Sturmmann Roman Chomicky who had recently received a bullet wound in the leg wrote:

  […] In Sankt-Stefan two doctors operated on my leg and bandaged it up to my knee. About midnight Dr Kowalsky and two medics came and ordered everybody out, but left me inside. In the morning they came again. Dr Kowalsky told me to return to my unit at the front. I showed him my leg which started to bleed and said that I was operated on yesterday. He scratched his head.

  The road was full of soldiers moving west. ‘The War is over!’ they said. A two-wheeled, single horse carriage came with three Wehrmacht soldiers on it. They picked me up. I got off after crossing the River Mur as they continued heading north.

  I kept on walking and noticed some officers standing in a garden. One of them had general’s stripes on his pants. He called me over. He told me to lie down and asked a young lieutenant to find me a spot on a carriage. That man was General Pavlo Shandruk, Commander of the Ukrainian National Army.104

  Some of the last rearguards and stragglers crossed the Mur south of Graz and stopped to rest, mistakenly believing themselves to be safe when Red Army ground units appeared hard on their heels firing mortars and creating panic among the troops, who quickly dispersed and fled to the west.105