Stalin's Nemesis

by Michael James Melnyk

  Former Division members as POWs in England working in agriculture at a camp near Diss in Norfolk, 1948. Far right is Mychailo Sadiwsky.

  Not long after arriving in Great Britain several hundred volunteered for the dangerous task of mine clearance which around 90 men continued right up until 1986. Far left is Mychailo Kormylo.

  Ukrainians from the Division helping with the harvest Norfolk, 1948.

  As we began combing England digging up ‘treasures’ and defusing the explosives in the eyes of the English command we immediately became high class specialists. Years were passing and we had only touched the tip of the iceberg. The further we went the more ‘discoveries’ we made—mines hastily discarded, boxes of ammunition, dynamite, unexploded bombs. When somebody reported something ‘suspect’ we were there straightaway and immediately began doing the most feared thing—removing the fuses. You are unscrewing it and big drops of sweat are rolling down your cheeks. You are gripped in the vice of fear. Your death hangs on a thin hair. And we did it all for a ‘thank you’ because we received the pay of one shilling per day in camp coupons. But nobody complained, nobody rebelled. We were patiently awaiting our freedom.

  In 1948 we were freed but on condition that we would work for 3 years at a job given to us by the authorities.[…] our sapper unit continued as it has signed a contract with the Ministry of Defence. Very few were released into civilian life. We thought it was better for us to do a job where you are considered a professional. We were young, the wages were good and conditions were very good. First class accommodation, billiard rooms restaurants, bars, our own transportation. Years began to pass quicker but we didn’t realise it. We felt young and for us time stood still. The 1950s and 1960s passed then came the 1970s. We were still playing games with death.

  The East coast all the way down from the Scottish hills and round to Lands End in the south were sewn many times. We had accidents. One lost his arm, another two arms and a third lost an eye. Some said ‘good bye’ to this life, but compliments and praise was coming from everywhere, from the Department from the population, in the press praiseworthy articles appeared. The BBC made two documentaries which were shown on television several times.59

  Between August and October 1948,60 the Ukrainians were finally released from their POW status and became free settlers. Exiled from their homelands the majority stayed in England where they married and established themselves within the community that now numbers in excess of 30,000.

  About 4,000 (especially those with relatives resident in those countries), later emigrated in Canada and the United States while other popular destinations were Australia (the first Ukrainian immigrants to that country), Argentina, Brazil and Europe settling in countries such as Germany and France.61 Here, they strengthened the leadership of the Ukrainian Organisations, for example Petro Sawaryn PhD, was elected as the president of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians. The veterans who settled in the west went on to form the ‘Brotherhood of the 1 Division of the Ukrainian National Army’, published two magazines and numerous related books whilst those in Ukraine formed the ‘Brotherhood of Veterans of the Galicia Division’ (this had approximately 1,000 members in 1993).

  As a human resource the Ukrainians who settled in the west flourished with many going on to obtain higher education and becoming professionals, professors, businessmen, priests, artists and writers, and play prominent roles in all walks of life including academia, medicine, religion, business, politics, science, engineering, law and the arts. This ensured that their legacy was to make a lasting positive contribution to the communities in which they went on to live.

  The Great Escape

  With the cessation of hostilities, in the immediate post-war period the Western Allies were committed to fulfilling the repatriation clauses of the Yalta agreement,62 under which every former ‘Soviet citizen’ would be returned to Stalin.

  The most unsavoury aspect of this was the violent forced repatriation of over 32,000 Cossacks and their dependants who had surrendered to 5 Corps in Austria.63 In a blatantly inconsistent application of the terms of the Yalta agreement by the British military, they included many who did not qualify as ‘Soviet citizens’ for example the German nationals who were the commanders of the Cossack units. These, together with an estimated 2 to 3,000 recalcitrant white Russian émigrés and Tsarist fugitives who had never lived in Soviet Russia, were still subjected to compulsory repatriation in flagrant disregard for the orders which emphasised that ‘non-Soviet citizens’ were to be screened and retained in accordance with policy laid down by the British Government.64

  The British however, declined to repatriate the Ukrainians from the ‘1 Ukrainian Division’ on the pretext that they were classified as de jure Polish citizens (i.e. they had been domiciled in territory which prior to 1 September 1939, had belonged to Poland), therefore as ‘Polish citizens’ they were not deemed to be eligible under the terms of the agreement.65 As we have already seen, the Soviets however took issue with this interpretation and at the Potsdam conference in July 1945, uniquely the Ukrainian Division was singled out and its personnel identified by Stalin himself as being eligible for repatriation as ‘Soviet citizens’.66 Yet, unusually the British authorities did not accede to this demand.67 Their reasons for so doing were dictated by ulterior motives68 and as a consequence of the direct intervention of its creator.

  Dr Otto Wächter, Founder and Saviour?

  Since the earliest days of his appointment as Governor of Galicia, Wächter had enjoyed cordial relations with members of the Greek-Catholic Church especially Archbishop Ivan Buchko. Wächter played a pivotal part in cultivating the active protection of the Ukrainians by the ecclesiastical hierarchy under the protectorate of the Holy See in Rome through his contacts with Buchko who was Exarch for the Ukrainians in Western Europe (Ukrainian Catholic Bishop in Rome).69 Confirmation of their close relationship and contact with the Western Allies is provided in an undated letter from July 1949 to his doctor Ludovico Marchesani. Written whilst Wächter was in hiding under his pseudonym Alfredo Reinhardt, it read:

  […] After consultation with (Bishop) Dr Hudal (when it should become serious), the intervention of Bishop Jan[Ivan] Buchko of the Greek Uniate Catholic Church, Roma, Passegiata del Gianicolo 4, should be discussed (speaks German). Buchko knows a Governor Dr W. from his activities in (Buchko’s) homeland, has good relations with the Vatican and the Western Allies, but should only be used when it (has become) critical, for to not shift things—as long as unnecessary—into an international level.70

  Buchko subsequently lobbied Pope Pius XII directly on behalf of the Ukrainians to prevent their forced return to the Soviet Union. In his memoirs Shandruk records:

  […] Father Voyakovsky also found a way to transmit a letter from me to his Excellency Archbishop Ivan [Buchko] who was in Rome. Archbishop Ivan answered my letter very soon informing me that he has already visited the Division which was the subject of special interest of various Soviet agencies. In a special audience (at night) the Archbishop had pleaded with His Holiness Pope Pius XII to intercede for the soldiers of the Division, who are the flower of the Ukrainian nation.[…] I learned from the Archbishop and from General Krat that as a result of the intercession by his Holiness the soldiers of the Division were reclassified merely as confines and Bolshevik agents were prohibited to visit their camp.[…]71

  As the founder of the Galician Division, Dr Wächter also took pre-emptive steps to secure the future safety of its personnel, by facilitating contact with the British and Americans. In August 1944, Dr Wächter had been appointed head of the Military Administration in Italy and on 23 February 1945, Wächter, who had already embarked on an unspecified ‘special task’ on behalf of the Reichsführer SS lasting ‘several weeks’,72 referred the preservation of the Division to his immediate superior SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff. In his capacity as Supreme SS and Police Leader and acting military commander in northern Italy, Wolff recognising the futility of continuing the war, had become i
nvolved in secret surrender negotiations of the German forces in Italy, with the Western Allies.73 Through him, the Division was to be offered to them as an ‘armed anti-Bolshevik unit’ which when required, would fight on their side against the Soviet Union in the event of the much anticipated outbreak of hostilities.74 This is documented in ‘Divisional Order Number 71’, dated 27 April 1945, which stated:

  […] The deployment and maintenance of the Division in its current state as an anti-Bolshevik combat unit is being organised in co-operation with the Allied camp.[…] The negotiations are being done via the political leaders of the Div. with SS-Obergruppenführer Wolff and via Switzerland.[…]75

  There is therefore no doubt that the Western Allies were fully cognisant of the Division’s existence prior to the end of the war.76 Moreover, the British certainly had a use for it as an ‘anti-Bolshevik combat force’ in the increasing likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities with the ever more belligerent activities of Tito’s forces. Field Marshal Alexander was becoming more and more concerned that the use of force might be necessary to counter Tito’s claim to the area of Trieste and parts of southern Austria. Tito’s attempt to acquire this territory was a major cause for concern for the British and could easily have escalated into a full blown conflict especially if he had received support from the Soviet Union. Although the matter was ultimately resolved via diplomacy, as a trained and disciplined force of ardent anti-Communists which had recently fought Tito’s partisans, the utilisation of the Ukrainian Division encamped nearby would have presented a viable option in assisting to thwart his territorial ambitions.

  More significantly, it was an obvious choice for deployment in case of the widely anticipated coming conflict with the Soviet Union. The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who was angered by the fact that the Red Army had been allowed to advance across Germany unchallenged, and rightly did not trust Stalin’s intentions, had ordered a feasibility study for a top secret plan entitled ‘Operation Unthinkable’. This was to be an Anglo-American military offensive projected to commence 1 July 1945, designed to combat the perceived Soviet threat and force back the Red Army from the Elbe. The plan required 103 Allied divisions 64 American, 35 British and 4 Polish which were to be supplemented by mobilising the beaten Germans on the side of the Western Allies, by the reformation and subsequent utilisation of ten unspecified ‘German Divisions’. After receiving a great deal of opposition from members of his war cabinet and senior military commanders Churchill himself reclassified the study as ‘a hypothetical contingency’. Shortly thereafter the British generals vetoed the idea due to insufficient resources and the plan was finally abandoned when President Harry Truman reiterated that there would be no prospect of American help.77 Although there is as yet no direct evidence that the Ukrainian Division was earmarked to take part in ‘Operation Unthinkable’, it would have been an ideal candidate to have done so since from the very outset it had been formed for the very purpose of fighting the Bolsheviks and was still relatively intact. It would also explain why initially in Austria and later in Italy, the bulk of the Division was held together and the otherwise inexplicable behaviour of the British military authorities towards it in the period immediately following the end of the war in Europe. For example. the testimonies and memoirs of Divisional veterans concur that many of its soldiers were not disarmed immediately upon initially passing into British captivity but instead they were allowed to retain their weapons for several days, and some even had previously surrendered weapons returned for protection against Tito’s partisans. SS-Obersturmführer Dzillum a company commander from the Pioneer battalion wrote:

  […] Having arrived in Spittal we bivouacked the unit in a big meadow, fully armed as POW’s guarded by Americans. Eight days later the NCOs and men had to surrender their arms. The Americans took us to Udine in Italy by truck. There we were handed over to the English. Now the officers had to give up their weapons and binoculars etc.78

  After their initial report of their surrender, the Ukrainian Division also seems to virtually vanish from 5 Corps records,79 in addition to which elements of the Division were permitted to make their own way to Italy, fully armed and unescorted. Lt-Col. Campbell-Preston has provided an account of how on 28 May his regiment, the 80 Scottish Horse Medium Rgt RA, was near Riccione, south of Rimini when on that day one group from the Ukrainian Division arrived under Colonel Krat who stated that the men with him comprised the ‘remnant of the Ukrainian Division, but still about 10,000 strong “reporting” (no word of surrender)’. It was explained that ‘they had crossed the Alps in small groups’ (hence the lack of movement order or need for British transport or supervision) and ‘would now join the victorious Allied armies and drive the wicked Russians out or Europe’.80

  In much the same way the screening of the Division’s personnel by the British whilst interned in the camp at Rimini was cursory at best. During this period only approximately 250 men (approximately 3 per cent) of the 8,272 inmates81 were interviewed about their involvement with the Division.82 Moreover in a then secret report dated 21 February 1947, prepared for the British Government by D. Haldane Porter, the official in charge of screening camp 374, Italy, it stated:

  […] virtually none of the men had any identifying documents of any use such as German Army pay books although one or two of them had pre-war Polish civilian identity cards.[…]83

  Yet a significant number of Ukrainians did retain identity documents such as Soldbuchs (paybooks) and German issued Kennkarte (civilian identity cards)84 even though in the case of the latter it was officially prohibited to retain such documentation after being enlisted for military service. When the reports on the screening which had taken place were produced the affiliation with the Waffen-SS was unclear and the British authorities appear to have deliberately obfuscated the link between the 1 Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army and the Waffen SS ‘Galicia’ treating then as two separate units, even though they were one and the same.

  Operation Integral

  Although a direct conflict between the east and west was avoided, the prevailing climate of growing fear and tension with Stalin resulted in the so called ‘Cold War’ which in turn led to a manifestation of the legacy of ‘Operation Unthinkable’, namely the secret enlistment of Ukrainian veterans of the Division, by the Western secret intelligence services. In the late 1940s and 1950s, both the British and to a lesser extent the American services, utilised Ukrainians for espionage purposes against their former ally. The British MI6’s Northern Division controlled ‘Integral’ an operation run by Harry Carr85 to send agents into Ukraine. Recruitment was undertaken in conjunction with ‘K3’, a secret courier and intelligence gathering unit which was developed and encompassed people from different sections of OUN-B. It included former officers of the Division such as Bohdan Pidhayny and Bohdan Maciw whilst others such as Volodymyr Kosak and Evhen Pobihushtschyi co-operated with K3 along with other members of OUN-B but were not on its staff. Its principal staff members were Svyatoslav Wasylko, Volodymyr Kerod, Anatol Kaminsky and Modest Ripetskyj who was the security officer.86

  Recruits were supporters of the OUN-B faction, selected from the internment camps in Italy and later in England. MI6 also helped to train some of the operatives in England at a special school in Holland Park, London; Rome, (San-Vito); Austria, (Atersh) and locations in Germany including Munich. Around 80 men87 were given parachute training by the British and received tuition in radio code transmission and decryption, photography and unarmed combat. Overland routes were utilised and later nearly 50 agents were parachuted into Ukraine in teams of four to six men from low flying, unmarked RAF planes operating from bases in Cyprus and Malta, while on at least one occasion a hot air balloon was used launched from a submarine.88 Equipped with portable radio equipment, small arms and an ampoule of poison, the plan was for them to link up with UPA units and assist them in gathering intelligence and fomenting rebellion.

  The first drops were made successfully in July 1948 a
nd others followed in the coming months.89 Unbeknown to the Ukrainians the entire programme was fundamentally compromised from the outset. Not only had a Soviet agent infiltrated K3, but the master spy within MI6 Kim Philby, alerted Soviet security forces regarding the date, time and destination of the drops. Most of the participants were very quickly rounded up by Soviet security forces and shot.90 The captured agents included Ivan Zhilaviy, Michailo Yaremko, Wasyl Malzensky, Lev Bahlaj, Myron Matviyeiko (was turned and became a double agent),91 Volodymyr Nebesnij, Wasyl Malysevich, Jurij Stefiuk, and Julian Mahur. Vasyl Okhrymovych92 who was one of the last operatives to be parachuted into Ukraine from a US plane with three others, on 19 May 1951 not by K3 but by ZP UHVR (Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council) was captured by the NKVD on 6 October 1952, sentenced to death and shot in May 1954.93

  The developments described above, were all contributory factors which prevented the Ukrainians from being repatriated against their wishes. For the duration of their captivity, British policy towards them was always predicated first upon British self-interests, both international or domestic and it was their good fortune that ultimately these coincided with saving them from the grasp of their nemesis Stalin, and allowing them to live out the remainder of their lives in exile from their homeland as free men.

  Afterword

  The first wave of volunteers for the ‘Galician Division’ understood that without its own army, Ukraine would always be at the mercy of its traditional enemies—Poland and Soviet Russia. They believed that the Division for which they had volunteered and which was formed under German auspices, was to be the basis of a Ukrainian National Army and that in due course this could support an independent Ukrainian national state. That they wore German uniforms and served under German command for the majority of its existence was a matter of expediency, a sacrifice of short term form for long term substance. It was a means to an envisaged end, which at the time of German capitulation in May 1945, had partly been realised. It is an incontrovertible fact that in the final days of the war the Ukrainian soldiers had been ultimately recognised as members of the ‘1 Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army’ and had sworn a new oath to the Ukrainian nation.