Stalin's Nemesis

by Michael James Melnyk

  86Apart from Biegelmeyer himself, most of these such as SS-Untersturmführer Schmidt, were polyglots speaking fluent German, Polish, Russian and Ukrainian.

  87Some of the Legion’s anti-partisan activities in which it is sometimes referred to as ‘der Melnikkampfgruppe’ are partly documented in the reports to Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD für den Distrikt Lublin, Grenzpolizeikommissariat Hrubeshiv, 7-30 March 1944, WAP. Lublin Ortk, I/524/23,–AGR MSW 185, APL.

  88During the fighting in Warsaw at least ten members of the Legion were killed; these have been named in a document signed by SS-Oberscharführer Rawlin as Feldwebel Filimon Buszanskij, and privates Iwan Dub, Iwan Halaszewskij, Jurij Hajworonskij, Evgen Kolacki, Andrej Melnyk, Andrej Sledz, Gregor Trofimowicz, Teodosij Wosniuk and Archip Wachara. S.M.d.S.-Batl.31- (Ukr. Selbstschutzlegion) Targowisko, den 12.10.1944, SA.

  89Born 18 August 1918, in the village of Zhydachyn in Kivechivskiy rayon. He studied in Lutsk and worked for the Ukrainian company Maslosoyuz (a dairy) from 1936 until 1938. In 1938 he joined the OUN operating under the code name ‘Cherkasy’. As a direct consequence of his objection to the deployment in Warsaw, he was arrested by the SD and sent to a concentration camp where he perished. Letter to author O. Horodysky, 18 February 2000.

  90The unit was stationed in the villages of Spielfeld, Oberschwarz and Unterschwarz.

  91Heike, Eng. ed., op cit.; p. 105.

  92Interview F. Tsymbaliuk, Toronto, 20 June 1999.

  93A full written detailed account of this episode by one of the participants see Fedir Tsymbaliuk, Visti Kombatanta, Nr.2, 1996, pp. 73-81.

  94Horodysky wrote; ‘In the legion was one young Jew under the assumed name of ‘Majdurch’. When on 9 March units from the Division surrounded us, he was the only one lightly wounded, but needed hospitalisation and his company commander was afraid that the German doctors would recognise him as a Jew’. They did not however and he survived the war. Letter to author O. Horodysky, 20 June 1997.

  95The presence of these individuals was confirmed by M. Scharko, verbally to author 7 December 1997.

  96Fedir Tsymbaliuk, Visti …, op cit.; pp. 73-81.

  97Horodysky added; ‘Mychailo Ostaphuk was hiding behind the trees and asked Ltn Kyveluk, for permission to send a few salvoes of machine gun [fire] on the Germans –’Voron’ [Kyveluk] refused. Letter to author O. Horodysky, 7 October 1997.

  98The priests were Scakalsky and Dubycky and the doctors were Miroshnychenko and Jurgens (the latter was a Latvian national). Interview F. Tsymbaliuk Toronto, 20 June 1999.

  99The largest group was sent to the 14. Feld Ersatz Batallion under SS-Sturmbannführer Kleinow.

  100J. Hnatkiw, The Fusilier Battalion …, p. 2.

  101Orest Horodysky ‘Dva dni v partyzantsi’, …, and letters to the author dated 12 February 1993, 25 March 1993, 12 November 1994, 20 June and 13 July 1997.

  102Hawrylak, Memoir, op cit.; p. 28.

  103Letter to author R. Kolisnyk, 24 October 2014.

  104Literally ‘Thunder weather’ i.e. a storm.

  105Information pertaining to operation ‘Donnerwetter’ was provided verbally to the author by V. Veryha 6 June 1997 and in Herasymowycz, The Formation …, op cit.; p. 2.

  106Mozirske Planine is collective name for 4 plateaus, that together form one geographical unit.

  107Marolt. Šercerjeva brigada ...,’ op cit.; pp. 323-338.

  108Stephan Medynskyj, Visti Kombatanta, Nr.5, 1959, pp. 34-37.

  109Heike, Eng. ed., op cit; p. 102.

  110Ibid.

  111Letter to the author W. Sirsky 2 July 1997.

  112See Mirko Fajdiga, Bračičeva brigada na Štajerskem, Koroškem in Gorenjskem, 2. knjiga, Maribor: Založba Obzorja 1994, pp. 537-554.

  113Ibid.

  114Marolt, Šercerjeva brigada …, op cit.; pp. 323-338.

  115Ibid.

  116Verbally to author R. Drazniowsky, 13 September 1997.

  117See Dr Miroslav Stiplovsek, Šlandrova brigada, Knjiznica NOV in POS 10, Ljubljana, Maribor, 1971, pp. 646-650.

  118Throughout March 1945, the partisan units within the ‘4 Partisan Operative Zone’ received air dropped supplies from the Allies. For example the Bračič Brigade received supplies on 14 March near the village of Zavodnje (see Fajdiga, ‘Bračičeva brigada ..., op cit.; pp. 537-554) as did the Šercer Brigade on 14 March near Razbor and again on the 23 March in the vicinity of the villages of Dolic and Paka, see Marolt, Šercerjeva brigada …, op cit.; pp. 323-338.

  119For this operation the 18. Geb. Jg. Rgt. Treeck was stationed along the Sava River, where it acted as a holding force.

  120Email to author R. Kolisnyk, 24 October 2014.

  121Keczun, Memoir, op cit.; pp. 25-26.

  122Franc Sever Franta (3 ed., 2009): Past na Menini planini: Kako smo prelisičili XIV. SS-divizijo Galizien na Menini planini. Celje: Fit Media. (3 ed., 2009).

  123Ibid.

  124Heike, Eng. ed., op cit; p. 102.

  125For example, platoon commander Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Kolisnyk wrote: ‘At one time my platoon met a Luftwaffe unit that was combing the forest uphill toward us. Because of their blue uniforms I took them for partisans’. Email to author R. Kolisnyk, 24 October 2014.

  126Keczun, Memoir, op cit.; p. 27.

  127The co-ordination of forces during these actions was sometimes poor. Support for this statement is evidenced by the account of a Waffen-Untersturmführer Zenon Kuk whose company 5./II./WGR unexpectedly encountered a unit led by Waffen-Sturmbannführer Evhen Pobihushtschyi from the Division’s Reserve Regiment, during one action. Catching sight of each other from a distance, neither had been notified of the possible presence of the other and as some members of Pobihushtschyi’s unit were wearing short fur jackets over their uniforms, they were almost mistaken for partisans. A potential disaster was only averted because somebody heard the Ukrainian language being spoken and was therefore able to identify the unit as being ‘friendly’. Kuk, The 5 ..., op cit.; p. 30.

  128Email to author R. Kolisnyk, 24 October 2014.

  129For an account of the operation by the German commander of the 2 company of the Pioneer Battalion SS-Obersturmführer Wilhelm Dzillum see Schmitt, Pioniereinheiten …, op cit.; pp. 10-11.

  130W. Sirsky, ‘13 I.G. Company of WGR 29’, Visti Kombatanta, 3, 1997.

  131Verbally to author M. Prymak, 3 November 1997.

  132For example a platoon of Volhynians from the 3./I./WGR 31, were responsible for the discovery of a military radio station which was subsequently dismantled and brought down from the mountains intact. Q 26: Kolisnyk.

  133Letters to author W. Sirsky, 2 July 1997 and B. Kutny, 7 November 1997.

  134In the chapter on Slovenia in his unpublished memoirs entitled Masheruyut Dobrovoltsi (The Volunteers Are Marching), M. Fylypovych an NCO serving with the 4 company of the Fusilier Battalion writes: ‘While combing the area, the advanced troop noticed smoke rising from the snow covered ground. They surrounded the area, found the entrance and entered what turned out to be an underground bunker used as a field hospital. One wounded solider was lying on a bed. He wore a cap with a red star and a rifle was lying next to him. In the bunker were about 30 beds and a supply of medicine. The partisan was interrogated—he turned out to be a fanatical Communist—and later was turned over to the battalion staff’.

  135Several veterans have described ambushes taking place, for example a former member of 14./WGR 30 recounted the following incident in a letter to the author dated 7 December 1997: ‘The partisans set up an ambush but were afraid to attack our marching column. However they grabbed the company cook, a Waffen-grenadier named Husak who had stayed behind for a couple of minutes to relieve himself. When it was reported to the platoon commander that a soldier was missing, he stopped the marching column and sent a group to look for the missing soldier. The group encountered heavy machine gun fire and all six were killed except the group leader who jumped into a nearby stream and retreated back to his unit under cove
r of the forest undergrowth. During the combing of that area we captured a wounded partisan who was turned over to the military police with the appropriate report. During an intensive interrogation he revealed the partisan hide-out.[Later] Five partisans were captured, three of which were sentenced to be shot in front of the prison wall, and two were sent to higher authorities for further interrogation’. See also Schmitt; Pioniereinheiten …, op cit.; p. 11.

  136In one action in the mountains near Celje, a medical doctor together with his orderly were brutally killed (hacked to death) while they were sleeping in a hamlet. The enraged Ukrainians subsequently burnt down the house in which the two men had been sleeping. Q 24: Kulchycky. Verbally to author M. Prymak, 16 October 1997. In his memoirs The Trials of the Ukrainian Division (Dyvisiynymy stezhkamy), p. 185, Stephan Medynsky describes how on the afternoon of Friday 23 March his unit (6./II./WGR 29), found the body of a Divisional soldier stripped to his underwear and murdered by partisans after having first been tortured.

  137Of this number at least twenty eight were known to have been convicted by a field court and sentenced to death by firing squad mostly for desertions and other infractions such as petty theft, drunkeness and disobeying orders. See Spysok Polyahlych …, op cit.

  138Local truces were recorded as having been made by a number of veterans; Interview Dmytryk, Rushden (Pioneer Battalion), 21 October 1990, interview M. Klymchuk, (III./WGR 29) London, 29 April 1997 and letter to the author dated 2 July 1997, W. Sirsky, (13./WGR 29). Waffen-Obersturmführer Bohdan Pidhayny, one of the prominent OUN-B operatives serving with WGR 30 also played a significant part in negotiating a cease-fire in the vicinity of Velenje where it was based. At Pidhayny’s instigation, a meeting was set up with representatives through a Ukrainian intermediary at which an agreement was reached that neither party would interfere with the other. Verbally to author M. Scharko, 18 October 1997.

  139Two such incidents of soldiers of the Division being released by partisans have been recorded. In one case a Ukrainian grenadier was visiting a family with a young girl during when five partisans emerged from hiding but did not harm him. For another documented case see V. Veryha ‘Zustrich z Titovskymy partyzanamy’, Visti Kombatanta 1977, Nr.3, pp. 45-50. A former member of 6./II./WGR 29 deserted from the Division and was subsequently captured by Tito’s partisans whom he joined, fighting with them until the end of the war and receiving a decoration in the process. He returned to western Ukraine at the end of the war and was not punished by the Soviets. Letters to author O. Sokolsky, 23 June 1992, 12 August 1997.

  140Keczun, Memoir, op cit.; pp. 27-29.

  141A rumoured incident involving the burning of a partisan field hospital along with all the patients who could not walk (including a British airman) following its discovery by soldiers of the Galician Division at this time was subsequently investigated by the RAF and discounted because the statement given by the principle witness Flight Sergeant Parker, contained no evidence to this effect. The entire investigation is chronicled in the file AIR 402315, NA, PRO, Kew. The report of the Provost Marshal PM/2072/1/4 dated 3 September 1945 concludes: ‘[…] 7. Whilst it cannot be precluded that Sgt Calder’s hospital was, in fact burnt down, it will be observed that the statement of F/Sgt. Parker does conflict with the original report upon which this enquiry has been based, since, though the hospital which he vacated was burnt, Sgt. Calder was certainly not therein at the time. 8. In view of this and the difficulties involved in obtaining permission for entry into Yugoslavia, it is not proposed to make further enquiries which can only take place in Yugoslavia’. On the basis of the above evidence the matter was not pursued. For the full wording and detailed reports on the inquiry see Melnyk, To Battle …, op cit.; 369.

  142Heike, Eng. ed., op cit; p. 104.

  143In a letter to the author dated 2 July 1997, W. Sirsky related an episode during which seven cart drivers from 13./WGR 29 wished to dance with local girls. The partisans seized them, disarmed them and undressed them to their underwear, put them on a truck and transported them a few kilometres and staged a mock execution. The Ukrainian soldiers jumped off the wagon and ran barefoot for their lives back to the castle at Gonobitz where they were quartered.

  144Verbally to author V. Tomkiw, 23 December 1996. Since the Division’s soldiers carried the deaths head insignia pinned to their cap, the local population often assumed that they were non-Christian ‘unbelievers’ and were both relieved and amazed when confronted with evidence to the contrary.

  145Letter to the author V. Veryha, 16 August 1997.

  146Heike, Eng. ed., op cit.; p. 106. One recorded instance of the desertion of a German was referred to in a letter to the author from Roman Kolisnyk dated 4 June 1997 and Q26: Kolisnyk.

  147Chomicky, Memoir, op cit.; p. 5.

  148Volodymyr Bohdan Mykula—platoon commander 2./I./WGR 31, (Memoir), p. 182.

  149Interview M. Bihus, Toronto, 30 June 1999.

  150Beginning on 6 March 1945, in the vicinity of lake Balaton, Operation Spring Awakening (Frühlingserwachen) was to be the last German offensive of WWII. Its strategic objective was to recapture the Hungarian capital of Budapest and the Hungarian oil fields. For details see Feldbacher Beitrage zur Heimatkunde der Südoststeiermark …, pp. 8-9.

  151Generaloberst Alexander Löhr commanded Army Group E, and as of 15 March 1945, the commander of all German forces in south east Europe (OB Südost).

  152Fernschreiben, Geheime Kommandosache, Generallt v. Grolman, 24.3.1945. RH 19 V/63, BA-MA.

  153Victor Madej, The Russo-German War …, p. 67.

  154Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit.; p. 199. Also see intercepted radio communication from Rösener to the SS-Gauleiter Dr Uiberreither, HW/16/43, GPD 4077 Addendum II, 31 March 1945, An Gauleiter in Graz, NA, PRO, Kew.

  155Ibid., pp. 194-195. Elements of the ‘14.Waffen-SS Grenadier Division ‘Galizien’’, are also reported to have arrived at Gorenjska (north west of Ljubljana) on 19 March 1945, to take part in the first phase of an offensive (code-named ‘Frühlingsanfang’ (Spring Awakening), aimed at defeating the 9 Corps NOVJ. Together with the 13.SS Polizei Regiment, 17.SS Polizei Regiment and the 28.SS Polizei Regiment they became part of an ‘assault group’ operating under Rösener’s command. The offensive is reported to have started on 19 March 1945, when elements of the 14.SS Division ‘Galizien’ moved from its positions in the valley of the Sava River in order to sweep the Jelovica plateau. On 22 March troops of 14. Waffen-SS Division ‘Galizien’ are stated to have advanced to the Selska Valley and then during the night of 22/23 March—arrived at the hamlet of Prtovc on the southeast slopes of Ratitovec mountain. The account states that the last units of 14.SS Division ‘Galizien’, departed from Jelovica plateau, two days after ‘Frühlingsanfang’ ended on 5 April 1945. For further details see Zdravko Klanjscek, Deveti korpus slovenske narodnoosvobodilne vojske 1943–1945 …, pp. 386-394.

  156Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit.; p. 195.

  157Ibid., If Heike is correct about the date being before 25 March then there remains a discrepancy in the timetable that follows as that date proceeds any order by the RF-SS issued after Hitler’s conference. One possible explanation is that the initial order was prompted by a report at the beginning of the month to higher authorities that the Division was still not yet ready to be committed at the front. Evidence in support come from Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Dmytro Ferkuniak, one of very few Ukrainian officers serving on the Division’s general staff. He wrote; ‘In early March 1945, the Divisional command was questioned as to whether and when the Division would be ready for combat. The Divisional commander with his advisors no longer had any will to go into combat and replied that the Division, for many reasons, was not fit for combat. In response to such an answer an order came in the middle of March. If the Division was not fit for combat then the Division should send 80 per cent of its arms to the other units which were going into combat and the Division should be relocated to the region of Salzburg for additional training’. Ferkuniak, Spomyny
…, op cit.; p. 32.

  158As has already been seen, by this time the Division had undertaken extensive anti-partisan operations in both Slovakia and Slovenia.

  159The fact that the Division had a T/O (table of organisation) strength of 11,000, but an actual strength of 14,000 (i.e.; a figure well above the establishment required by the Division) surprised Hitler. In all probability the figure of 14,000 included its Training and Reserve Regiment (SS-Ausb.u.Ers.Rgt.14) which uniquely, was deployed in the Division’s area of operations. As a rule under the German system a Division’s Training and Reserve Regiment remained garrisoned in Germany and did not accompany its parent formation into the field.

  160Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War …, p. 150.

  161Evidently no one present at Hitler’s HQ including the adjutant of the Liaison Officer of the Waffen-SS (Adjutant des Verbindungsführers der Waffen-SS) SS-Sturmbannführer Johannes Göhler was able to differentiate between the ‘14. Waffen Grenadier Division der SS’ and the ‘Ukrainian Division’. These as Hitler rightly suspected were in fact one in the same. Its current status given as ‘resting’ was also incorrect and no mention was made of its subsequent deployment against partisans in Slovakia or its ongoing security actions in Slovenia. Neither had the Division ever given ‘a large part of its equipment to the 18 SS’ Moreover, the weapons inventory given was not at all accurate, since its personnel had acquired and retained a large amount of ‘unregistered’ armaments of all calibres after the successful suppression of the Slovak uprising. Hitler’s remarks also suggest that he had no knowledge of and hence never officially sanctioned the formation of the ‘Ukrainian National Committee’.

  162Himmler’s standing with Hitler had already begun to slip a few days earlier as recorded in Goebbels’ diary entry for 15 March 1945, in which he refers to Himmler having received ‘an extraordinarily severe dressing down’ from Hitler, see The Goebbels Diaries: The Last Days, Secker and Warburg, London, 1978, p. 145. (ed. Hugh Trevor-Roper). Seven days later and only two days before the disarmament order was issued Hitler had relieved Himmler as the commander of Army Group Vistula because of his incompetence.