Stalin's Nemesis
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163Verbally to author R. Kobryn, 10 April 1998. During the march which took place during the day, the column was attacked by aircraft which resulted in casualties.
164Letters to author M. Niniowsky (via E. Shypailo), 24 June 1997, 17 September 1997 and 16 February 1998. The presence of the Pioneer Battalion was confirmed in a letter to the author by Bohdan Kutny 14 January 1998, and in Schmitt, Pioniereinheiten …, op cit.; pp. 10-11.
165Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit.; p. 197.
166Ibid.
167Ibid.
168According to Heike, these included a compromise whereby the Division could retain 20 per cent or its weapons and 20 per cent of its supplies. In response to a reminder that with only 20 per cent of its supplies the butcher and bakery sections could not feed all its soldiers, the authorities decided that it was to hand over all its supplies. Heike, Sie Wollten…, op cit.; p. 199. According to Ferkuniak ‘the Division was notified in the second half of March that as it was not yet battle ready, 80 per cent of its armaments should be given to units that were, and that the Division itself should be moved to the region of Salzburg for further training’. Ferkuniak, Spomyny …, op cit.; p. 32.
169HW1/3666, NA, PRO, Kew.
170Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit.; pp. 197-198.
171The idea of mass mutiny by the Ukrainians soldiers was discussed within the Division at all levels. Two prominent men who had connections with the Ukrainian underground circles, Waffen-Obersturmführer Bohdan Pidhayny and Father Laba are known to have conferred on the subject. Verbally to author M. Scharko, 18 October 1997. Other local clandestine discussions also took place at which it was agreed to ‘resist the disarming and disarm—by force if necessary—the German personnel and then head towards the advancing Western Allies or join the local partisans’. Letters to the author W. Sirsky, 13./WGR 29, 2 July 1997, and R. Kolisnyk (3./I./WGR 31) 24 June 1997. However attractive this solution may have seemed to be, the reality was fraught with difficulties, mainly because the co-ordination of all sub-units for any such action was almost impossible; ‘Our horizontal connections and communication with other units was almost non-existent. We had good vertical connections, but for the most part this was in German hands’. Hawrylak, Memoir, op cit.; p. 26. In addition to which individual units were reluctant to desert for fear of reprisals against those who remained.
172Letter to author V. Veryha, 10 January 1998. It appears that most units were disarmed for a day as confirmed by Q1: Dmytryk, interview M. Klymchuk, London, 6 June 1997.
173Heike give his time and date of arrival as being ‘late at night on 26 March 1945’, Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit.; p. 200.
174There is no evidence to suggest that Dr Wächter consulted or even informed General Shandruk or the recently recognised ‘Ukrainian National Committee’ at this critical time, which in any case would have been powerless to intervene.
175Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit.; p. 201.
176Ibid.
177Letter to author R. Kolisnyk, 24 June 1997. The movement of WGR 31 was possibly a precursor to a third large scale operation planned by Rösener designed to advance of the centre of Tito’s forces. The Division which was to have been the backbone of the advance was to cover an area from the outskirts of Ljubljana south-west, all the way to Trieste. Heike mentions this operation in his memoirs Eng. ed., op cit.; pp. 103-104.
178Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit.; pp. 201-202.
179Ibid., p. 203.
180Ibid., p. 201.
181The short term objective of this manoeuvre was intended to get behind 6 and 2 Panzer Armies and link up with Soviet forces coming out of Yugoslavia. The Soviet breakthrough in this sector was largely attributable to the collapse of the Hungarian infantry units several of which according to the war diary of Army Group South had begun deserting in droves, see Ziemke, Stalingrad ..., op cit.; p. 455. For details of the German counterattack see Oberstleutnant Josef-Paul Puntigam: Vom Plattensee Bis Zur Mur …, pp. 146-149.
182In Sie Wollten …, op cit.; p. 200, Heike states that this was the Fusilier Battalion. If this is the case, it can only have been the HQ, 1 and 4 companies, as in letters to the author dated 11 December 1997, and 30 December 1997, two former members of the 2 and 3 companies respectively have confirmed that these units were accompanying the Divisional Artillery Regiment at this time. For the command structure of the Fusilier Battalion in Spring of 1945 see Visti Kombatanta Nr.3, 1992, p. 90, and (for corrections) Visti Kombatanta Nr.4, 1992, p. 96.
183Only part of the Fusilier battalion was available as the 2 and 3 companies were still deep in Slovenia.
184Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit.; p. 207.
185Ibid., p. 202.
186Letter to author Volodymyr Kudla, 11 September 2000.
187Keczun, Memoir, op cit.; p. 29.
188Among the units which did have their weapons taken away were parts of WGR 29, Klymchuk, verbally to author, 7 June 1997; WGR 30, letter to author Jacyna 10 December 1997 and the Fusilier Battalion, letter to author W. Kudla, 11 September 2000. Several units including the Artillery Regiment and WGR 31 do not appear to have received the order at this time, Q 24: Kulchysky, Q 26: Kolisnyk, Q 2: Havrych, Q 3: Humeniuk.
189One rumour circulating at this time was that once disarmed, the Ukrainian soldiers would be interned in concentration camps by the Germans, a prospect that for some individuals provided sufficient impetus for them to desert. Letter to author O. Sokolsky, 23 June 1992.
190Letter to author W. Kudla, 11 September 2000.
191Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit.; pp. 207-208.
192Gustav Harteneck: (commander 1 Cavalry Corps.) Das Deutsche Kavallerie-Korps February 1963 (unpublished manuscript) p. 14 (21), RH 24-202/23, BA-MA. For a complete list of all units assigned to 1 Cavalry Corps see Ibid., p. 26.
193Madej, The Russo …, op cit.; p. 67. The chart dated 24 March 1945, reveals that the 1 Cavalry Corps had the highest ratio of low combat effectiveness according to a system developed by the German high command which gave a numerical value for the estimate fighting capabilities of every fighting unit; 1 = a unit capable of offensive actions, 2 = limited attack capability, 3 = full defensive capabilities, 4 = limited defensive capability and lastly ‘unreliable’. The following breakdown is given for 1 Cavalry Corps: 10.Para–(Forming),
117 J[ager] Div. (none given)
3.Cav [4],
14.SS.PzG ‘Ukrainian’ [unreliable],
44 (Reichs-Gren.Div ‘Hoch-u.Deutschmeister) [4],
23.Pz [4],
9.SS.PzK (Kampfgruppe) [unreliable].
194Heike, Eng. ed., op cit.; p. 116.
195HW/16/43, GPD 4077 Addendum II, 31 March 1945, An Gauleiter in Graz, NA, PRO, Kew.
196Verbally to author P. Jacyna, 5 November 1997, verbally to author M. Prymak, 8 November 1997, verbally to author E. Shypailo, 20 December 1997.
197Verbally to author O. Sokolsky, 5 November 1997, and 6 December 1997.
198In a letter to author dated 12 August 1997, Waffen-Grenadier Ostap Sokolsky wrote: ‘[…] We [8./II./WGR 29] went into battle at around 0600 hrs, just at daybreak and occupied the village of Gleichenberg. The Red Army retreated in a hurry leaving some six heavy artillery pieces. When I entered a building there was food and Red Army caps lying on the table. We suffered some losses. At about 1000 hrs on the first day we captured two Red Army prisoners, both of whom were Ukrainian from western Ukraine—they were sent to the Division’s HQ’.
199Letter to author O. Sokolsky, 23 June 1992.
200‘The first patient I had to treat was a 16 year old mildly retarded girl, who was raped by Soviet soldiers a day or two before our arrival’. Letter to author Dr Krywulak, 23 August 1997. Numerous incidents of rape of local women have also been reported. Letter to author W. Sirsky, 16 September 1997.
201The presence of Ukrainian soldiers in the vicinity of the villages of Popendorf and Trautmannsdorf on 2 April 1945, is confirmed by civilians who came into contact with them, see Kriegsende in der Sudoststeier
mark …, p. 14.
202See ‘Fights of the Castle of Gleichenberg’, Visti, Nr.4 (6) April 1951. W. Kosak.
203Volodymyr Keczun had formerly been a member of 12./III./WGR 30, however when this unit was incorporated into Kampfgruppe Wildner it became 4./I./WGR 29. This is recorded in his Soldbuch (in the author’s archive). Hence although Keczun wrote ‘12./II./WGR 30’, he was in fact with 4./I./WGR 29.
204In an email to author 12 October 2010, Theo Andruszko confirmed the encounter with the women who had been raped by Red Army soldiers and added that one of them showed them the cigarette burns they had inflicted on her body.
205Keczun, Memoir, op cit.; pp. 30-31.
206Herasymowycz, The History …, op cit.; pp. 3-4 and letter to the author, 14 July 1997. Letter to author V. Veryha, 16 August 1997, Verbally to author M. Scharko, 7 December 1997.
207Herasymowycz, The History …, op cit.; pp. 3-4 and letter to the author 14 July 1997.
208The movement of the 13./WGR 30 was confirmed verbally to author Jacyna, 31 August 1997, letter to author E. Shypailo, 5 August 1997.
209Volodymyr Bohdan Mykula—platoon commander 2./I./WGR 31, (Memoir), pp. 181-188.
210Letter to author R. Kolisnyk, 24 October 2014.
211Letter to author R. Kolisnyk, 24 June 1997. The regiment arrived in Gonobitz on 1 April 1945. Verbally to author P. Jacyna, 31 August 1997.
212It was rested for one day before being committed. Letter to author R. Kolisnyk, 4 June 1997, Q26.
213Bohdan Kutny and Taras Katzchmarchuk, The Pioneer …, op cit.; p. 7.
214The Fusilier Battalion of the Ukrainian Division, p. 1, Hnatkiw The Fusilier …, op cit.; p. 2, and interview P. Cisarsky, Norwich, England, 14 November 1998.
215Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit.; p. 203. Letter to author W. Sirsky, 16 September 1997.
216Letter to author O. Sokolsky, 26 December 1997, Q: 15.
217Interview M. Klymchuk, London, 7 June 1997. Those Ukrainians who had themselves at this time been temporarily disarmed took revolvers from the Hungarians for self defence. Letter to author O. Sokolsky, 23 June 1992.
218Letter to author O. Sokolsky, 26 December 1997.
219Adjutant des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres Nr. 1097/45 g.Kdos. H.Qu.OKH, den 30.3.45, NA/T78, roll 305, frame 6256217.
220Op Abt (1a) 31. Marz 1945, NA/T78, roll 305, frame 6256213.
221Geheime Kommandosach Op Abt (1a) Nr.4022/45 g.Kdos 1. April 1945 , NA/T78, roll 305, frame 6256334.
222Adjutant des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres Nr. 1136/45 g.Kdos. H.Qu.OKH, den 1.4.45, NA/T78, roll 305, frame 6257053.
223Organisationsabteilung III H.Qu., den 1.4.45, NA/T78 roll 305, frame 6257056.
224SS-Gruf. Von Kammerhofer, An SS-OGruf. Roesener Laibach.[Ljubljana] Geheim! HW 16/49 GPDR 50, 4065, NA, PRO, Kew.
225It is interesting to note that at least on paper the quantities of the weapons listed here exceed the numbers held by the Division at this time as given by SS-Sturmbannführer Göhler the adjutant to the Liaison Officer of the Waffen-SS at the Führer conference a few days earlier. An additional 500 sub-machine guns, and 10 Zielfernohrgewehre [rifles with telescopic sights] would have been required to meet the required quota.
226HW/16/43, GRD 4053, NA, PRO, Kew.
227Including WGR 30, as confirmed by Herasymowycz The Formation …, op cit.; p. 4, verbally to author M. Scharko, 7 December 1997, letter to author V. Veryha, 10 January 1998, and the elements of both the Pioneer and Fusilier Battalions based in or close to the city, Q 1: Dmytryk, Q 12: Sadiwsky, Q 13: unknown Q 14: unknown: Q 4: Jacyna, Q 5: Melnyk. Neither WGR 29, the forward elements of which had by this time already been involved in skirmishes with Red Army units, the Artillery Regiment nor WGR 31, which was still marching through Slovenia appear to have been effected.
228Letter to author V. Veryha, 10 January 1998.
229Two sources confirm that Oberst Karl-Heinz von Hofmann took over as commander of the Division from Generalleutnant Gustav Wilke in early April 1945. See Die deutsche Fallschirmtruppe 1942–1945 Einsätze auf Kriegsschauplätzen und Western’, Hans-Martin Stimpel (2001), and Die Fallschirmjäger-chronik 1935–1945: die Gesichte der deutschen Fallschirmjäger Erich Busch 1983.
230Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit.; p. 202.
231Geheime Kommandosache, Op abt/Ia, Nr.4178 g.Kdos., 4.4.45, notiz nach Führervortrag Nacht 3./4.4.45. A reference to this order can be found in the ‘Verordnungsblatt der Waffen-SS’, where it is recorded thus: ‘Führer has decided that the Division is to provide cadre for the 10.Fallschirmjaeger Div.’.[Tg.Buch-Nr Il 1907 gk v.9.4.45.]. AA. See also Document N 756/170 (Sammlung Vopersal), BA-MA.
232Heike, states that the Division received a telegram from the headquarters of Wehrkreise XVIII (Salzburg)—with which it had no connection, for it to immediately reform as the 10 Fallschirmjäger Division, Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit.; p. 202. This order was almost certainly the same order (or a variation of) that quoted above.
233Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit; p. 208.
234Letter to author V. Veryha, 10 January 1998, Herasymowycz. The Formation …, op cit.; p. 4.
235See GPD 4053 No. 1 Traffic : 3.4.45, HW 16/71, NA, PRO, Kew.
236Dmytro Ferkuniak writes ‘[…] at an officers conference on April 2 to which Ukrainians were not invited., a decision was taken to return the arms to the Division and send it to the front in southern Styria’. Ferkuniak, Spomyny …, p. 32. The return of the weapons to elements of WGR 30 was confirmed by V. Veryha in a letter to the author dated 10 January 1998 and Herasymowycz. The Formation …, op cit.; p. 3.
237Heike, Sie Wollten …, op cit; p. 208.
238Ibid.
239Op. Abt. IN/K 5.4.45, NA/T78 roll 305, frame 6256948. Even at this late stage it is evident that the disarmament and dissolution of the Galician Division was still expected to take place as is evidenced by the following intercepted enigma message dated 7.4.1945 concerning the disposal of its horses. SSD DQH No. 209 (BERLIN) to LYV (MAIBOR) 2015 7.4.45
To Waffen Gren. Div SS Ukraine No. 1. IV C, MARIBOR/DRAVE SECRET.
From SS Ops HQ
The 450 ambulance horses reported are to be released to General Veterinary Hospital of Waffen SS III at HERMARIGEN AN DER BRENZ, WITTENBERG. Div to arrange transport and escort detachments, Report departure to this HQ.
Report by phone to Dienststelle SS Gruppenfhr. FEGELEIN, for SS Sturmbannfhr. Dr EICHIN, BERLIN, Reich Chancellery, what personnel and equipment will be released on account of reorganisation and giving up of weapons, under headings:-
a) horses
b) veterinary officers
c) farriers
d) veterinary and shoeing equipment
f)Can Veterinary coy. or German cadre personnel be drafted away immediately? HW 16/71, NA, PRO, Kew.
240Kriegsende …, op cit.; p. 142.
241For a highly detailed account of the German counter-attack in the Raab Valley sector see Oberstleutnant Josef-Paul Puntigam: Vom Plattensee …, pp. 146-149 and a second account by the same author containing excellent maps, Ortskampf—am Beispiel der Stadt Feldbach im Jahr 1945, Truppendienst 1/1989, pp. 27-37.
242Letter to author Julian Wilshynsky, 2 September 1998. Kutny, The Pioneer …, op cit.; p. 7.
243Ostap Czuczkewycz (born Romaniv, 2.10.1907) served with the Polish Army from 15.7.1928 until 15.1.1930 and then with the Wehrmacht from 1.6.1939 until 1.12.1939. See Personal-Akte A3343-SSO-133 (ff. 25-26) NA.
244The description of these events is given as told to the author by Mychailo Klymchuk an NCO who prepared the battle maps. According to his testimony in this period 1./I./WGR 29 lost 50-60 of its strength of 110 in killed and wounded. His account continues ‘following the attack on Bad Gleichenberg, maps were submitted to the battalion HQ where Wildner discovered that one company had pulled back without orders. Wildner ordered an immediate counterattack to retake the positions which was scheduled to begin at 0400 hrs the next day, however this was superseded when at 0330 hrs the Soviets
attacked and suffered heavy casualties. As a result I. battalion withdrew approximately 1 to 2 km to the edge of Bad Gleichenberg’. Verbally to author M. Klymchuk, 30 August 1997.
245The movement of the bulk of WGR 30 was recorded by two of its former members, Herasymowycz, The History …, op cit.; p. 4, and V.Veryha, letter to the author 10 January 1998. The commander of 5./II confirmed that it remained behind in Slovenia guarding a brown coal mine which was important for the local industry. Kuk, The 5 …, op cit.; pp. 30-32.
246Herasymowycz, The History …, op cit.; p. 4.
247Ibid.
248Wittenmeyer was promoted to SS-Sturmbannführer with effect from 9 November 1944.
249Verbally to author M. Scharko, 15 June 2015.
250These tactical problems were confirmed to the author by the regimental commanders’ former Ordonnanz Offizier M. Scharko, verbally to author 5 and 10 February 2000.
251Herasymowycz. The History …, op cit.; p. 4.
252The combined strength of this disparate force was approximately two thousand eight hundred men supported by a handful of tanks and self propelled guns. The German forces involved in this action included ‘Kampfgruppen from ‘10 Fallschirmjager Div.’, ‘1 Panzer Division’, and ‘Fahr Ersatz und Ausbildung-Abteilung 18’, see Oberstleutnant Josef-Paul Puntigam, Ortskampf–am Beispiel der Stadt Feldbach im Jahr 1945, Truppendienst 1/198, p. 30.
253Just south of Oedt the battalion’s medical team established its advanced clearing station, serving and treating the seriously wounded and referring more than a dozen in a short while to the field hospital. Krywulak, The Medical Service ., op cit.; p. 3.
254Puntigam, Ortskampf …., op cit.; pp. 35-36.
255Oberstleutnant Josef-Paul Puntigam: Ortskampf-am Beispiel …, pp. 35-36. A ‘Kampfgruppe’ from 1 Panzer Division commanded by Major ‘Ritz’ and the Fahr-Ersatz-und Ausbildung-Abteilung 18 were also involved in this action.